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Abstract 
Coalition unionism occurs when unions and community organisations form 
coalitions. This study develops three frameworks to improve analysis of 
• 
coalition unionism. The purpose is to sharpen scholarly approaches, and to focus 
attention on how coalitions relate to union practice. 
The approach builds from a new definition of community as organisations, 
common interest/identity and place. This definition underpins the three 
frameworks developed. The first framework identifies three elements of 
coalition unionism that determine coalition success - inter-organisational 
relationships, common concern and scale. These elements also categorise three 
models of coalition unionism: agenda-driven coalition unionism, relationship-
driven coalition unionism and mobilising coalition unionism. The second 
framework identifies three types of collaborative union power that make unions 
more powerful - relational collaborative power, class movement power, and 
place-based power. The third framework identifies opportunities and choices 
that suggest when a union is likely to engage in a coalition. Coalition success is 
defined by achieving outcomes, supporting a change in the political climate, 
sustaining relationships between organisations and increasing the capacity of 
participating organisations. 
These frameworks are explored through three case studies of long-term 
coalitions located in Sydney, Toronto and Chicago- three global cities, operating 
within liberal market economies. The Sydney-based Public Education Coalition 
is an example of agenda-driven coalition unionism, where strong common 
14 
concern and scale combine with weak inter-organisational relationships to 
produce a union-dominated coalition that achieved significant policy outcomes, 
political climate change and member engagement while struggling to sustain 
organisational relationships. Most successfully, it enhanced the class movement 
power of the New South Wales Teachers Federation by increasing the political 
awareness of its membership and its ability to set an agenda. The Toronto-based 
Ontario Health Coalition is an example of relationship-driven coalition 
unionism, where strong inter-organisational relationships and scale produced an 
independent coalition structure that sustained long-term relationships and drove 
two major canvassing campaigns with a strong volunteer base. When it shifted 
to an issue of mutual interest it also engaged the Canadian Union of Public 
Employees in a coalition relationship that enhanced its place-based power, 
increasing its campaigning and strategic capacity through learning from and 
with coalition partners, Chicago's Grassroots Collaborative is an example of 
mobilising coalition unionism, where strong inter-organisational relationships 
and common concern produced a trusting, accountable coalition managed by a 
coordinator. These relationships shifted the political climate in Chicago, 
facilitating an independent campaign by Service Employees International Union 
Local 880 that won collective bargaining rights and living wages for its homecare 
and childcare members, and the Grassroots Collaborative's campaign to require 
large retail stores to pay living wages in Chicago. The interdependence of these 
relationships provided the union with relational collaborative power, by 
increasing its available resources through strong relationships with community 
organisations. 
15 
The thesis builds a theory for understanding how coalition umomsm IS 
successful, and how and when coalitions contribute to union renewal by 
enhancing a union's collaborative power. 
• 
16 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
Unions have always built relationships with other organisations and groups. 
Central labour councils, labour-management partnerships and labour parti(l!l all 
evolved alongside unions. There are numerous stories of unions joining forces 
with community organisations to advance shared interests. The 1930s Back of 
the Yards Neighbourhood Council in Chicago spread the new organising of the 
Congress of Industrial Organisation that spurred the New Deal. In the 1970s, 
alliances between resident action groups and the Builders Labour Federation in 
New South Wales, Australia, produced 'Green Bans' and gave birth to the first 
labour-environmental alliance. The Action Canada Coalition in the 1980s 
organised some of the first responses to economic liberalisation in the 
industrialised world, where unions and community organisations mobilised 
against a free trade agreement with the United States. Collaboration is one of 
many union strategies used to represent union members and improve their lives 
at work. 
Union preferences for collaborative strategies shift, and the pressure for unions 
to collaborate with community organisations has intensified as the size and 
influence of unions has fallen. The decline in union density in English-speaking 
countries has been widely documented: the United States, Canada, New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom and Australia have all experienced significant reductions·in 
union membership (Peetz 1998; Fairbrother and Yates 2003; Frege and Kelly 
2004a; Frege 2006). The magnitude of the decline varies between countries. In 
the United States, unions have fallen from representing 35% of the workforce in 
17 
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1953 to representing 12% of employees in 2007; Australia has fallen from 61% in 
1951 to 20% in 2006; and Canada has fallen less sharply from a high point of 
37.2% in 1984 to 30% in 2006 (Peetz 1998; Visser 2003; Jackson 2006, pp. 381-2; 
ABS 2007; BLS 2007). 
• 
At the same time as union membership has been falling, capital has become 
increasingly mobile and more powerful. The trend of governments deregulating 
capital flows and privatising state infrastructure have been caused by, and have 
contributed to, a resurgence in the power of business (Streeck and Hassel 2003). 
Since the 1980s, Australian, Canadian and United States union negotiations have 
increasingly featured concession bargaining, where unions bargain for reduced 
wages and conditions in return for retaining employer recognition (Western 
1995). Industrial relations has decentralised, where business strategies such as 
privatisation, outsourcing and enterprise-based employment regulation have 
reduced unions' ability to reduce wage competition amongst workers (Kochan, 
Katz and McKersie 1986; Peetz 2006a). Additionally, labour parties have 
distanced themselves from unions, undermining the role of unions as 
representatives of working people, further constricting unions' political power 
(Wills 2002; Frege 2006, p. 233). 
These shifts in the economic and political context have contributed to the 
breakdown in traditional institutional support for unions. Baccaro, Hamann and 
Turner argue that the challenges that unions now face in gaining employer 
recognition in the economic sphere have provoked unions to revitalise their 
internal operation and their external relationships, shifting from strategies that 
focus on 'the enterprise' to those that focus on 'the community', including the 
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practice of coalitions, to rebuild forms of institutional support (Baccaro, Hamann 
and Turner 2003, p. 121). 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify a concrete framework for understanding 
what this study terms 'coalition unionism', the strategy of unions working- in 
coalition with community organisations. It investigates if, how and when coalition 
unionism may rebuild union capacity and help unions achieve policy outcomes 
and a supportive political climate. This thesis explores coalition unionism 
through an international comparison of three case studies of long-term coalitions 
in Australia, Canada and the United States. 
This study of coalitions makes theoretical and empirical contributions. For 
research on union renewal, the thesis develops a framework for analysing the 
success of coalitions, identifying common elements of coalitions. To do so, the 
thesis defines the,relationship between terms such as community unionism and 
coalition unionism. It also embarks on an a reframing of existing theories of 
union collaborative power, suggesting how industrial relations scholarship can 
better understand the conditions under which union collaboration with 
' community organisations may increase union power to win outcomes, shift the 
political climate, sustain relationships with other organisations and enhance 
member engage in union activity. Empirically, the thesis uses a qualitative, 
internationally comparative analysis of coalitions. 
This study of coalitions seeks to contribute to the analysis of coalitions in union 
renewal literature. Scholarship on union renewal has increased in response to 
the decline in union density and influence and it now documents different 
strategies undertaken by unions to revitalise their structure, leadership, 
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membership, relationships and institutional support (Cooper 2001; Fairbrother 
and Yates 2003; Behrens, Hamann and Hurd 2004; Frege and Kelly 2004a; Kumar 
and Schenk 2006). In the early 1990s, an 'organising model' was proposed as the 
' preferred strategy for renewing unionism (Conrow 1991), leading to programs of 
reorganisation in union movements across the United States, Australia, New 
• 
Zealand and the United Kingdom (Heery, Simms, Delbridge et a!. 2000; Cooper 
2001; Carter and Cooper 2002). The organising model advocated that unions 
should focus on growth, through strategies that included strategic industry 
planning, organising outside of the workplace, member leadership development 
and internal restructuring of unions to shift staff organising time from servicing 
and grievance handling to new member organising (Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich 1998; Cooper 2001). 
However, preferred strategies varied and there was some resistance to the 
organising model. _Debates developed, dividing scholarship and practice into two 
broad streams (Wills and Simms 2004, p. 59). On the one hand, unions were 
encouraged to renew the 'movement' features of unions. Thus, the term 'social 
movement unionism' included strategies such as rank and file mobilisation, 
coalition building, political action, new member organising and union education 
(Bronfenbrenner, Freidman, Hurd et a!. 1998; Kelly 1998; Nissen 2003; Behrens, 
Hamann and Hurd 2004; Milkman and Voss 2004). Conversely, there was a 
focus on rebuilding institutional support for unions - labelled 'social 
partnership' and including improving legal avenues for recognition, labour-
management partnerships and political relationships (Baccaro, Hamann and 
Turner 2003). Yet as Hurd, Milkman and Turner argue, these strategies are 
connected. For instance, social movement unionism strategies have often 
developed where institutional support was weak, with the aim of building a 
20 
movement to institutionalise gains for workers through legislation and employer 
recognition (Hurd, Milkman and Turner 2003). 
Amongst these strategies, coalition building was seen as a potential path for 
union renewal. Yet while the study of coalitions has increased since the ~arly 
1990s, there remains a conceptual ambiguity about what makes coalitions work. 
Indeed, the question of how coalitions rebuild the ability of unions to win 
outcomes or increase union power was underdeveloped. Union rhetoric may 
embrace the concept of coalitions with phrases such as 'solidarity forever', yet 
the process of building and sustaining long-term organisational relationships has 
proved much more of a challenge. 
Since the 1980s, coalitions between unions and community organisations have 
become a feature of union renewal debates in the United States (Nissen 2004b). 
Early scholarship ·focused on the local coalitions that emerged in response to the 
decline of manufacturing· and plant closures (Haines and Klein 1982; Craypo and 
Nissen 1993; Nissen 1995). In 1990, Brecher and Costello's Building Bridges 
documented both coalition practice and theory (Brecher and Costello 1990a), 
soon followed by several editions of Labor Research Review, which published some 
of the first practitioner reflections on coalition experience (Banks 1992; Dean 
1996; Sneiderman 1996; Nissen 2004b). 
United States coalition research and practice accelerated after the ascendancy of 
John Sweeny at the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial 
Organisation (AFL-CIO) in 1995, and the rise of the Union Cities program that 
advocated for the mainstreaming of coalition practice as a part of the role of 
_ central labour councils (Nissen 1999; Kriesky 2001; Ness and Eimer 2001; 
21 
Milkman and Voss 2004; Reynolds 2004b; Reynolds and Ness 2004). Similarly, 
the Service Employees International Union's Justice for Janitors campaign 
strengthened the potential usefulness of coalitions for unions by showing how 
community organisations could provide support for organising new members 
(Savage 1998). In the United States, the development of national movell;lents 
around living wages (Reynolds and Kern 2002; Fine 2004; Luce 2005), and 
unusual alliances such as those between environmentalists and labour have 
sustained interest in coalitions amongst academics and practitioners alike (Rose 
2000; Obach 2004; Turner 2006). 
While the largest contribution to coalition research comes from the United States, 
scholarship on coalitions developed in other industrialised countries from the 
mid-1990s. In Australia in the 1990s, concern for coalitions increased in parallel 
to debates on union renewal (ACTU 1999; Cutcher 2004; Heery and Frege 2006). 
Contributions, mainly from outside the US, have introduced labour geography 
coalitions research (cf Herod 1998; Jonas 1998; Savage 1998; Lopez 2004). For 
instance, Tufts documented how the fixed location of tourism allowed hotel 
workers to build coalitions in Canada (Tufts 1998). Ellem and Rainnie led 
analysis on successful community relationships in regional towns in Australia 
(Ellem 2003; Ellem and Shields 2004; Rainnie and Drummond forthcoming; 
Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming). Wills's work on The East London Community 
Organisation (TELCO) and London Citizens also connected coalition practice to 
the importance of place (Wills 2003; Wills 2004). 
Although coalitions have become a mainstream focus of union renewal 
I 
scholarship, their role is contested. At one end, the potential of coalitions is seen 
as broad. Turner argues that social movement unionism and union renewal can 
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be understood by the presence or absence of coalition practice (Turner 2001; 
Baccaro, Hamann and Turner 2003, p. 122; Hurd, Milkman and Turner 2003, p. 
106; Frege, Heery and Turner 2004). Conversely, there is a more modest analysis 
of coalitions. Bronfenbrenner and Juavich see coalitions as one tactic in a union 
renewal toolbox called comprehensive campaigning (Bronfenbrenner _and 
Juravich 1998, p. 21; Jarley 2005). 
While a consensus about the importance of coalitions has developed, the 
contribution that coalitions actually make to union renewal remains little 
understood. Moreover, coalition scholarship has lacked descriptive typologies 
that can interpret coalition practice and explain when it is likely to be successful. 
While Heery, Frege and Turner (2004) and Obach (2004) each produce different 
coalition frameworks, these theories are ideal types. They do not identify 
common variables that are similar to all coalition practices that describe how and 
when coalitions are likely to be successful or support unions. 
This thesis seeks to redress these gaps. This study aims to develop a theory of 
how and when coalitions between unions and community organisations are 
successful in a climate where coalition practice is increasingly common. The 
thesis seeks to clarify some of the concepts used in coalition scholarship and 
practice. Coalitions are described in many different ways. The term 
'community' is frequently invoked, where coalitions are seen as a method for 
building 'community support'. Coalitions are also described as an example of 
'community unionism' (Banks 1992; Tufts 1998). Yet the terms community and 
community unionism are not concretely defined in industrial relations or union 
renewal research. This thesis develops working definitions of these terms in 
- order to explain their relationship to coalition unionism and union practice. 
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This study also seeks to contribute to the discipline of industrial relations by 
reframing the discipline's approach to union collaborative power. Most scholars 
who examine the issue at all assume that coalitions are a useful strategy for 
unions, rather than demonstrate that they are useful. Chapter Three and the case 
studies rethink traditional industrial relations scholarship, which often isolates 
unions as 'special actors' rather than emphasising how union relationships with 
community organisations may build union power and potentially change unions 
themselves. The present approach uses the multi-disciplinary nature of 
industrial relations, by applying insights from labour geography and social 
movement theory (Hyman 1994). This rethinking of union collaborative power, 
as Kelly (1998) encourages, seeks to understand how union power operates in 
order to explore how it can be enhanced. 
Empirically, this thesis brings an international and comparative dimension to 
research on coalition unionism. Comparative studies on coalition unionism are 
all too rare in industrial relations scholarship. With the noteworthy exception of 
Turner and Cornfield's Labor in the New Urban Battlegrounds, internationally 
comparative study of coalition practice has been limited (Turner and Cornfield 
2007).1 When international comparison does occur, it tends to compare across 
the Atlantic rather than between the similar liberal market economies of 
Australia, Canada and the United States (Hall and Soskice 2001; Frege and Kelly 
2004b; Turner and Cornfield 2007). Yet it is in these three nations - amongst 
liberal market economies - that coalitions between unions and community 
.organisations are most widely apparent. Additionally, coalitions in these three 
1 Frege, Heery and Turner (2004) do build a framework of coalitions based on five countries, but their study 
does not document cross-national case studies. 
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countries are significantly diverse, providing a rich site for comparison. 
Coalitions in the United States were born of crisis, whereas the longer history of 
social justice coalition work in Canada has a strong contemporary tradition of 
coalitions beyond wages and conditions issues (Bleyer 1992; Maioni 1998). In 
Australia, coalition unionism has often flourished in regional areas, (Ellem 2003; 
• 
Markey and Nixon 2004), as well as shifting to issues beyond union and 
workplace concerns (Tattersall 2006a; Tattersall forthcoming a). 
To help control for difference born of location, the thesis selects three global cities 
within these countries. International comparison enables an exploration of 
whether and how national political and regulatory differences dialectically affect 
the agency of coalitions, while also identifying common features of coalition 
strategy that operate across national boundaries. It also allows the thesis to 
contribute to the global cities literature, by exploring if and how coalitions can 
help redress the inequality of global cities (Sassen 1994; Fainstein 2001). 
The research presented in this thesis explores coalition unionism as a particular 
strategy within the broad debates around union renewal, union collaboration 
and community unionism. It fills a theoretical and analytical gap between the 
prevalence of coalition unionism and an understanding of how that work can 
support union renewal and create successful coalitions. Fmthermore, in 
investigating coalitions, the methodology provides a new way to build 
frameworks that can help evaluate if, when and how coalition unionism is likely 
to enhance union power. 
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To analyse coalition unionism, this ~tudy addresses three interrelated questions: 
1. How and when is coalition unionism successful? 
2. How and why does coalition unionism increase a union's power? 
• 
3. When is an individual union likely to engage in coalition unionism? 
To answer these questions, this thesis develops three frameworks for 
understanding coalitions. These frameworks are conceptually grounded in a 
new approach to community outlined in Chapter Two, where community is 
defined as organisations, common interest or identity and place. The study 
builds an understanding of coalition unionism as a specific form of community 
unionism. However, my focus is not simply to define concepts such as 
community unionism, but to establish an analytical foundation for the narrower 
term- coalition unio!lism- around which the contribution of coalitions to unions 
can be explored. 
The first framework uses this definition of community to establish three elements 
of coalitions. Chapter Two argues that these three elements define how 
coalitions vary and produce coalition success. The elements of inter-
organisational relationships, common concern and scale are described as key 
analytical components of all coalitions. The three coalition elements are explored 
against four benchmarks of coalition success. This study's approach to coalition 
success allows for an investigation of the concepts of 'power' and 'capacity'. In 
this thesis, the terms power and capacity are understood through a four-part 
framework of coalition success. Coalition success is defined, firstly, as achieving 
outcomes, such as winning or resisting policy decisions by government or 
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bargaining outcomes against an employer. Secondly, success is understood as a 
shift in the political climate, where coalition activity produces attitudinal or 
political change that makes future coalition campaigning easier. Thirdly, 
coalition success is understood as sustaining relationships between unions and 
community organisations. Finally, coalition success is understood as increasing 
• 
the capacity of participating organisations, where coalitions not only support 
external outcomes but enhance the ability of unions and community 
organisations to win outcomes in the future. 
' 
Additionally, the study argues that combinations of these elements present three 
'coalition models' that describe different but common types of coalition practice. 
Following Hyman's analysis of union identity that builds three ideal types of 
union identity out of the concepts of market, class and society (Hyman 2001), this 
study presents three models of long-term coalition unionism. Firstly, agenda-
driven coalition unionism, which has strong common concern and scale, with 
weak inter-organisational relationships; secondly, relationship-driven coalition 
unionism, which has strong inter-organisational relationships and scale, with 
weak common concern; and thirdly, mobilising coalition unionism, which has 
strong common concern and inter-organisational relationship, with weak scale. 
The usefulness of these coalition elements and models is explored in the case 
studies. 
The second framework, outlined in Chapter Three, considers how and why 
coalition unionism may increase a union's power. It narrows the discussion of 
coalition success to focus on unions in particular and argues that coalitions 
between unions and community organisations potentially offer unions three 
sources of collaborative power. Firstly, coalitions can provide a relational 
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collaborative power, where unions increase their capacity to win outcomes by 
sharing power with community organisations through sustained relationships. 
Secondly, coalitions can provide unions with class movement collaborative 
power, which increases the class consciousness of union members and the 
capacity of unions to set an agenda. Thirdly, coalitions can provide unions with 
• 
place-based power, which increases the capacity of unions by teaching leaders 
new ways of organising, and enhancing the campaigning skills of union 
members. 
The third framework is also outlined in Chapter Three, and considers when 
-~ 
unions are likely to engage in long-term coalition unionism. It explores how 
unions develop strategies like coalitions in response to the dialectics of 
opportunity and choice. It examines the role of opportunities such as political 
and economic context, union identity and existing organisational characteristics, 
as well as the process of union choice such as the role of issue selection, who 
decides to collaborate and how that decision activates the internal scale of the 
union. 
This thesis tests a hypothesis that coalition unionism under certain circumstances 
produces successful coalitions and enhances union collaborative power. The 
three case studies are located in three global cities in liberal market economies to 
provide a similar contextual setting for comparison, in order to draw out 
common features about coalition practice. The case studies focus on three long-
term coalitions, and their relationships with one key Pl;lblic sector union. The 
choice of public sector unions was in part driven by practical necessity- the vast 
majority of long-term, reciprocal coalitions in industrialised nations operate in 
the public sector rather than the private sector. It is not surprising that longer-
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term coalitions have developed in the public sector, as there is a logical common 
interest between public service users and workers, and state services have been a 
key target of contemporary policies such as privatisation Gohnston 1994; 
Tattersall 2006a) In choosing similar public sector unions, the case studies 
control for union diversity, enhancing the focus on the dynamics of union and 
• 
coalition strategies, how they interrelate, affect and change each other. The 
conclusion of each case study does however draw on published case studies of 
private sector coalition unionism in order to demonstrate how coalition strategies 
may have a broader potential in the private sector, and how common interests 
can be found beyond the public sector. 
The aim of this study is to develop a theoretical framework for understanding 
how coalition unionism is a useful strategy for union renewal, by demonstrating 
how coalitions enhance the ability of unions to achieve victories and increase 
their internal capacity. The research seeks to refine academic understandings of 
this practice, to create a concrete framework for understanding coalitions and the 
usefulness of union collaborative strategies. 
This thesis is structured into nine chapters, 
Chapter One is the Introduction 
Chapter Two uses the term 'community' to define the terms community 
\ 
unionism and coalition unionism. It analyses and categorises the literature on 
coalitions into three coalition elements - inter-organisational relationships, 
common concern and scale - and corresponding measures that shape coalition 
success. It also identifies three different models of long-term coalitions. 
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Chapter Three reviews and reframes the literature on union collaboration with 
community organisations, exploring its relational, movement and geographic 
dimensions. It then assesses when unions are likely to engage in collaboration 
with community organisations, considering the opportunities and choices.that 
make coalition unionism likely. The conclusion brings together the frameworks 
set out in Chapters Two and Three. 
Chapter Four outlines the methodological approach, including the choice of 
liberal market economies and global cities. It explains why this approach chose 
to select three case studies and what they seek to compare. 
Chapter Five documents the first case study, the Public Education Coalition, 
based in Sydney, Australia. It is an example of agenda-driven coalition unionism 
involving the New South Wales Teachers Federation (NSWTF). The study 
examines the coalitions from. 2001 till 2004. 
Chapter Six explores the second case study focused on the Ontario Health 
Coalition (OHC), based in Toronto, Canada. It is an example of relationship-
driven coalition unionism and focuses on the involvement of the Canadian 
Union of Public Employees (CUPE) (the OHC featured seven unions in total). 
The study examines the activities of the coalition from 2001 to 2006. 
Chapter Seven investigates the third case study focused on the Grassroots 
Collaborative, based in Chicago, United States. It is an example of mobilising 
coalition unionism and focuses on and the Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU) 880. The study examines coalition practice from 2002 to 2006. 
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Chapter Eight uses the theoretical frameworks established in Chapter Three to 
interpret my findings, through a comparative review of the cases taken together. 
Chapter Nine is the conclusion, which explores how the findings in this ~tudy 
have implications for research approaches to union renewal, global cities, and 
union strategy and practice in a time of union crisis. 
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·, 
Chapter Two 
Community and Coalition Unionism 
The concept of coalition unionism is based on the idea that union relationships 
• 
with community organisations build successful campaigns and successful 
unions. This chapter builds a framework that seeks to understand how and why 
this may occur, with the aim of building a conceptual foundation for the term 
coalition unionism. It begins with a term more commonly associated with 
coalitions in the literature- community unionism. The chapter firstly defines the 
term 'community', and then uses it to define 'community unionism' and 
'coalition unionism'. Then, it analyse literature on union renewal, social 
movement theory and labour geography to build a framework to help explain 
how and when coalition unionism is successful. The chapter identifies the 
elements and measures that describe how coalition unionism can create 
successful coalitions that support union renewal. These processes are then 
explored through the case studies. 
This chapter begins with the term community because, though problematic, it is 
the more commonly used phrase to categorise coalitions. Since the 1990s, the 
term labour-community coalitions has been used to describe coalitions in the 
literature (Brecher and Costello 1990a; Nissen 1995; Nissen 2004a). Alternatively, 
the term community unionism is sometim,es used to refer to coalitions between 
unions and community organisations (Banks 1992, p. 324; Tufts 1998; Cutcher 
2004; Tattersall2006a). 
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1.0 What is Community? 
Community is a troublesome 'keyword' of sociology. It is almost always 
invoked positively, a panacea for social ills, conjuring up ideas of generalised 
public support (Williams 1976; Tattersall2005). 
• 
Union practice and scholarship fall victim to this definitional ambiguity. 
Community is often used as a populist silver bullet that can magically enhance 
the power of unions. The term has recently flourished amongst union renewal 
writers, invoked in concepts such as union-community coalitions, community 
unionism and social movement unionism. The term community is also used to 
describe a variety of strategies and practices beyond coalitions. For instance, 
community is used to identify an alternative space for union organising beyond 
the enterprise (Baccaro, Hamann and Turner 2003; Fine 2003). In a different vein, 
community is used to describe a space for union action beyond wages and 
conditions, where a union's purpose is broadened to include so-called 
community issues such as health care, education and social justice (Gindin 1995, 
pp. 197, 266; Robinson 2000a). Community is also used to describe a complex 
array of social networks, whether based on place, identity, culture or common 
feeling (Crow and Allen 1994; Massey 1994; Patmore 1994; Thornwaite 1997; 
Wills and Simms 2004). 
The multi-purposed use of the term community has not served union renewal 
literature well. As Moody observes, community is a vague concept (Moqdy 
1990). There are few attempts in industrial relations literature to define or 
reconcile these interpretations of the term community (cf Taksa 2000). 
Consequently, community has no fixed or settled meaning in the literature. This 
33 
has led to significant debate about the meaning of the term community unionism 
itself (ACREW 2006; Cranford, Das Gupta, Ladd et a!. 2006; McBride and 
Greenwood 2006; Unions NSW 2006; Tattersall 2006a; McBride and Greenwood 
forthcoming). 
• 
Although there are competing uses for the term community, it is possible to 
isolate three different meanings across the union renewal literature: community 
as organisation, common interest/identity or place (Tattersall2006a). 
Firstly and most commonly, the term community is used to substitute for the 
phrase (community) organisation. This slippage is built into the term labour-
community coalition to describe joint action between unions and community 
organisations (Craft 1990; Brecher and Costello 1990a; Patmore 1997; Estabrook, 
Siqueira and Paes Machado 2000). The concept of organisation is important. 
Community organisations vary in type, issue and membership, which affects the 
success of any relationship between a community organisation and a union. 
Unfortunately, the nostalgic, positive connotations of community often brush 
over how community organisations differ from one another and whether or not 
they are likely to be supportive of or hostile to unions (Macintyre 1980; Williams 
1976; Taksa 2000). 
Secondly, community is frequently used to describe people who have a set of 
common interests or identities, such as a religious community or a community, of 
women (Heckscher 1988; Taksa 2000, p. 11). Fine defines community unions as 
community-based organisations of low wage workers, where the term 
community underscores the importance of common identities such as race, 
ethnicity and gender as a principal means of recruitment and solidarity (Fine 
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2005a, p. 155). Similarly, Cranford and Ladd (2003) use the term community to 
describe organising strategies amongst precarious workers with marginalised 
identities (see also Needleman 1998b; Milkman 2000; Cranford, Das Gupta, Ladd 
et al. 2006). Conversely, Gindin (1995), Eisenscher (1999) and Cornfield and 
Hudson (1998) use the term community to describe the common class interests of 
• 
workers beyond the workplace, to include issues such as housing and health care 
(Fitzgerald 1991; Taksa 2000). Using community in this way emphasises the 
subjective, tactile, personal, and potentially transformative role of community as 
a set of bonds created over shared values. 
Thirdly, community is used to describe a place, such as a local neighbourhood or 
village (Williams 1976; Miles 1989; Wial 1993; Patmore 1994). Labour 
geographers use this definition to emphasise the role of geography in 
understanding social and economic relations (Massey 1984; Herod 1998; Savage 
1998; Ellem 2003), Some geographers link the term 'place' to locality and the 
local scale (Peck 1996; Jonas 1998; Wills 2002; Fine 2005a). For instance, Agnew 
argues that place refers to physical location, the physical area for everyday life 
and the locus of identity (Agnew 1987). Others consider how place constitutes 
and is constituted by the relationships within and around it, and consider place 
as interpenetrated by multiple scales (Massey 1993; Herod 1997, p. 155; Hudson 
2001; Sadler and Fagan 2004; Ellem 2005). 
These three alternative meanings of community allow us to understand 
community's multiple dynamics. Combining the concepts of organisation, 
common identity/interest and place as intertwined and connected opens the way 
for a richer analysis. While the concept of community is used in three different 
ways, in practice, community operates as the combination of each of these 
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different meanings. Thus, these three definitions of community are not mutually 
exclusive; they are reinforcing and connected. Understanding community in this 
way helps us to understand community unionism. 
Figure 2.1: Three interpretations of community 
• 
Organisations 
/\ 
Common Interest/Identity Place 
2.0 What is Community Unionism? 
Given that the term community is used by union renewal writers to describe 
organisation, common interest/identity and place, then one way of conceiving of 
community unionism is as a descriptive term that refers to the broad set of 
strategies that interconnect unions with organisations, common interest/identity 
and place (Tattersall 2006e). This approach tries to settle the term community 
unionism, which has a long and cross-purposed history. 
The term was coined by O'Connor in 1964 (O'Connor 1964a; O'Connor 1964b). It 
was soon appropriated by the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) as part of 
their commitment to build an 'interracial movement of the poor' (Frost 2001). 
' 
The SDS's Economic Research Action Project between 1964 and 1967 aimed to 
_ organise the urban poor through geographic communities as opposed to 
36 
workplaces (Frost 2001, pp. 1, 27, 37). They called several of their community 
organising projects 'community unions' (O'Connor 1964a; Frost 2001, p. 46). The 
United Auto Workers in the US also adopted the term community union. They 
defined community unions as a strategy for organising the urban poor, piloting 
organising projects such as the Watts Labor Community Action Council (Fine 
• 2003, p. 308). 
These organising programs were inspired by the social movements of the 1960s. 
Community-based worker organising surged with Chavez's farm worker strikes 
(Frost 2001; Fine 2005a), which also inspired a 'new kind of unionism' organised 
by the civil rights movement (Plug 1990, p. 328; Frost 2001, p. 46; Korstad 2003). 
The civil rights experiments organised workers by focusing on issues such as 
housing, a common African-American identity and 'community' support 
through consumer boycotts and protest (quoted in Plug 1990p. 329). 
/ 
These experiments in community unions were weakened by tense relationships 
with labour (Bok and Dunlop 1970, p. 342; Plug 1990). Furthermore, the 
'localness' of community unions may have opened them to individual 
participation, but it left a large membership base out of reach and confined their 
political influence to the local scale (Fine 2003). 
The terminology of community unionism re-emerged in 1992 in a different 
context and a radically new form, at a time when US labour fortunes were in 
decline. Banks, a former SDS activist, used the term community unionism to 
argue for alliances to help meet labour's challenge for renewal (Banks 1992). 
Similarly, Tufts defined coalitions that acted with mutuality and reciprocity as 
community unionism (Tufts 1998). This interpretation of community unionism 
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became common in Australia (Lipsig-Mumme 2003; Cutcher 2004; Tattersall 
2004; Tattersall2006a). 
Labour geographers also adapted the term community unionism, with the aim of 
'drawing together' the literature on alliances with an understanding of labour 
• geography (Ellem 2003, p. 424). For Wills, Ellem and Rainnie, community 
unionism is a form of unionism that combines union alliances with community 
organisations and union work with 'local communities' to achieve social change 
(Ellem 2003p. 426-7; Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming). Their focus on geography 
emphasises a place-based approach to community unionism. However, Ellem 
emphasises that it is multi-scaled activity - action.at the local as well as at a 
national and international scale - that shapes how community unionism can 
rebuild union power (Ellem and Shields 2004; Ellem 2005). 
In the late 1990s in the US, the term community unionism was again used to 
describe community-based organising strategies by community organisations or 
unions. Fine argued that unlike craft or industrial unions, community unions 
focused on common ethnic, gender and place identities of workers to recruit and 
build commitment (Fine 1998; Fine 2003; Fine 2004; Fine 2005a; Fine 2005b). 
Similar to Fine's work, a definition of community unionism developed in Canada 
and Japan (Black 2005), where community-based organisations that organised 
workers on the periphery of state regulation were labelled community unions 
(Cranford and Ladd 2003, p. 46; Urano and Stewart 2005). 
The term community unionism is now applied concurrently to alliances, 
organising strategies based on place and identity and union strategies to re-exert 
strategic control over place. These interpretations are often seen as distinct, and 
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there is some debate over which interpretation of community unionism is more 
'correct' (Black 2005). This discussion of community unionism parallels the 
definitions of community, where definitions are also contested. 
Yet this research has shown that there is an interconnection among the three 
• 
different strategies of alliances, organising and place in the practice of and 
analysis of community unionism. Bringing together the scholarship on 
community unionism and the above definition of community, community 
unionism can be defined as an all-encompassing descriptive term that includes 
three specific, different types of organising strategies: 
• Coalitions between unions and community organisations (relating to 
community as organisation) 
• Organising workers on the basis of identity (relating to community as 
common identity/interest) 
• Place-baseq.union strategies (relating to community as place). 
Firstly, then, community unionism describes when unions reach out to other 
organisations and form coalitions; what I call coalition unionism (Banks 1992; 
Tufts 1998; Lipsig-Mumme 2003). This is community unionism as the 
interconnection between unions and community organisations. 
Secondly, community unionism also refers to an organising strategy, when 
unions or community organisations seek to organise workers on the basis of their 
common identity or interests. This may include organising women or 
immigrants (Cranford and Ladd 2003; Fine 2003; Cranford, Das Gupta, Ladd et 
a!. 2006). Community unionism may also refer to Gin din's suggestion that 
unions should campaign on issues beyond the workplace (Gindin 1995). This 
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community-based form of workplace organising is community unionism as the 
interconnection between unions and common interest/identity. 
Thirdly, community unionism encompasses place-based strategies, such as the 
desire for unions to act globally or locally (Ellem 2003). Community unionism 
• 
thus describes the local organising practices of some mining unions (Ellem 2003). 
It also describes city-scaled strategies, such as the AFL-CIO' s Union Cities 
program that sought to improve the ability of union movements to collectively 
shape the local environment for unionisation (Colburn 2004; Ellem and Shields 
2004; Reynolds and Ness 2004; Wills and Simms 2004; Rhee and Sadler 2007). 
Community unionism may also describe the desire for unions to go global and 
increase their ability to act across the global community (Tattersall2007b ). 
Figure 2.2: Defining community unionism 
Coalition Unionism 
/\ 
Community-based 
Workplace 
Organising 
Place-based 
Organising 
Strategies 
This conceptualisation of community unionism is distinct from the different 
definitions of the term in current use. Yet, this approach does not seek to 
contradict the specific interpretations of community unionism in existing 
literature, but rather to organise them. A fixed and more certain definition of 
community unionism allows us to evaluate a more pressing question for this 
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thesis - what are the dynamics of one form of community unionism - coalition 
unionism? 
2.1 Coalition unionism 
Within the broad definition of community unionism sits the more sp~cific 
strategy of coalition unionism. This study uses the term coalition unionism to 
refer to a specific type of coalition - coalitions between unions and community 
organisations. While it is hoped that this thesis can contribute to analysis of 
community unionism broadly, the narrow focus of the empirical research is on 
coalition unionism as a specific example of community unionism. 
The term community can be used to identify key elements of coalitions, to 
categorise how coalitions vary and understand when they may be successful. 
Coalition unionism has three distinct elements: 
• Inter-organisational relationships 
• Common concern 
• Scale. 
The first element of coalition unionism derives from the 'organisation' definition 
of community and refers to a coalition's inter-organisational relationships. The 
second element of coalition unionism is that these relationships are based on the 
existence of a common concern, derived from the definition of community as 
either common interest or identity. The third element of coalition unionism is 
scale, and derives from the dialectical relationship that coalitions have with the 
external world. 
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Figure 2.3: Elements of coalition unionism 
(organisation) 
Inter-organisational Relationships 
/\ • 
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These elements describe the practice of all coalitions. Firstly, coalitions are about 
organisations coming together. Necessarily all coalitions will be defined by the 
ways in which they seek to structure how the organisations relate to each other, 
whether through formal meetings or one-off exchanges. 
Secondly, coalitions are about organisations coming together over something 
they agree on - a common concern. Coalitions come together around different 
concerns, from a short-term concern for a rally to a long-term project such as 
health care reform. 
Finally, coalitions operate at particular geographic scales. Scale refers to a 
particular geographic level, such as the local or the national (Brenner 2001 ). 
Because coalitions seek to shape the decisions of employers or politicians, they 
are organised and take action at different scales in order to contest, construct and 
shape decision-making processes (Agnew 1987; Jonas 1998). 
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These elements are not only descriptive. They are used to categorise the 
scholarship on coalition unionism, and to explore how current literature 
understands the operation, variation and success of coalition unionism. 
For the purpose of this thesis, an investigation of coalition unionism requires an 
• 
investigation of two distinct areas of scholarship. Firstly, it considers the 
literature that analyses coalitions as a joint strategy between unions and 
community organisations. The rest of this chapter investigates scholarship on 
how and why coalitions are likely to be successful, and on finding measures that 
might indicate success. Secondly, in order to investigate how coalitions can 
contribute to union renewal, this study analyses literature on union collaboration 
specifically. The analysis of unions is in Chapter Three. 
To explore when and how coalitions are likely to be successful requires a 
definition of what success actually means. This study uses four criteria to 
describe coalition success: two external variables and two internal variables. 
Success can be defined by external outcomes- if a policy victory is achieved. Yet 
simply relying on outcomes as a measure of success is ahistorical and abstracted 
from the goals of coalition participants. Organisations are historical entities, and 
their campaigns, struggles and activity not only achieve discrete outcomes but 
affect the broader political climate. A coalition's activities may not win a specific 
victory, but they may make winning future victories easier. Thus, my 
understanding of success includes two external criteria - whether outcomes are 
achieved and whether the political climate is changed by coalition action (Fine 
2003). 
43 
However, reducing coalitions to external events disguises an understanding of 
the mechanisms by which coalitions can build strong organisations, strong 
relationships and sustainable power over the long term (Levesque and Murray 
2002; Fine 2003). After all, if achieving a political victory reduces the internal 
capacity of an organisation (for instance, by reducing the number of union 
• 
members), it would be misleading to call that coalition successful based simply 
on external criteria, as the coalition has reduced the ability of its participating 
organisations to achieve victories in the future. Thus success is defined not only 
to mean achieving outcomes but also in terms of building sustainable and 
powerful relationships and organisations. Consequently, the literature review 
considers how and when coalition unionism is likely to produce successful 
campaigns in this broader sense; the elements are broken down by how they 
potentially contribute to these four separate criteria. 
The next three sections undertake a literature review of coalition unionism with 
the purpose of establishing measures for successful coalition unionism practice. 
There are two major weaknesses in the current scholarship that require a robust 
examination. There is a tendency in coalition scholarship to describe current 
coalition practice rather than evaluate that practice. For instance, scholars often 
identify the importance of 'long-term coalitions' or describe who participates in 
different labour-community coalitions without analysing how long-term 
coalitions are created or if the type of organisational involvement varies coalition 
success. There is also a tendency to choose case studies that exemplify best 
practice in an attempt to stimulate better existing coalition practice, rather than 
conceptualising the key variables of coalitions and how they affect success. The 
literature is empirically focused and lacks a comprehensive analytical 
framework. This means that there is a dearth of explanatory measures or 
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frameworks to help us understand when, why and how coalition practice is 
successful. 
The literature review responds to these gaps by developing categories of 
coalition unionism using the three elements of coalition unionism noted above, 
• 
and identifies measures that shape the dynamics of coalition unionism. It begins 
with a discussion of the inter-organisational relationships that support successful 
coalition unionism. Secondly, it analyses the content of coalitions -
conceptualised as the common concern of a coalition (Brecher and Costello 
1990a). Finally, it considers how coalition success relates to scale. 
3.0 Inter-organisational Relationships 
Coalitions are defined by their structure. How organisations choose to engage 
with each other is often a 'measure of their persistence' (Rose 2000, p. 31). This 
section reviews, the literature on how coalition success relates to four measures of 
inter-organisational relationships: firstly, the capacity and commitment of the 
participating organisations, secondly, the structure of the coalition, third the type 
of decision making, and finally, the organisational culture and role of bridge 
builders in coalition unionism. 
3.1 Organisational capacity and commitment 
Coalitions vary depending on the capacity and commitment of the participatipg 
unions and community organisations. Neither unions nor community 
organisations are homogenous. Yet the literature only deals in passing with 
differences between organisations. Coalitions are labelled differently, as in a 
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'labour-environmental alliance' or a 'labour-religious alliance', but it is 
uncommon for the resources or commitment of community organisations to be 
treated as a factor that influences coalition success (Craft 1990; Brecher and 
Costello 1990a; Scipes 1991; Robinson 2000a; Reynolds 2004b). 2 
• 
Organisational capacity is multi-dimensional. As noted in the definition of 
coalition success, organisational capacity refers to an organisation's resources. 
These may refer to the organisation's membership, such as the number of 
members, the willingness of members or delegates to take action, member and 
delegate skills. It may also refer to an organisation's financial resources or the 
quality of its external relationships. Organisational capacity varies depending on 
an organisation's goals, how it achieves those goals and its structure. An 
organisation's purpose and its range of interests, what Obach refers to as 
'organisational range', shape whether an organisation is likely to engage in a 
coalition (Obach 2004). Obach argues the broader an organisation's range or 
vision, the more likely that. an organisation will establish a common interest with 
other organisations and form coalitions (Obach 2004, p. 53). 
Secondly, organisational capacity is defined by how an organisation works to 
fulfil its goals. This may include whether an organisation recruits members, 
provides services, speaks in the media or lobbies. Fine and Cranford compare 
organisations based on whether they practise 'community organising' (Cranford 
and Ladd 2003; Fine 2003; Cranford, Das Gupta, Ladd et a!. 2006). Community 
organising is a complex measure of capacity that focuses on the quality of an 
organisation's membership. It considers the extent to which members take 
2 Chapter Three considers how questions of commitment and capacity relate to unions. 
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collective action, what issues they take action on and the education and training 
processes used to develop rank and file leaders (Cranford and Ladd 2003; Fine 
2003). The degree to which an organisation practises community organising 
affects its capacity to mobilise in support of coalition goals (Nissen 2000). 
• 
Thirdly, organisational capacity refers to an organisation's structure. There are 
four relevant organisational structural attributes that affect capacity, including 
leadership, history of coalition practice, external relationships and sources of 
funding. Firstly, leaders play a key role in selecting issues, choosing to commit 
to coalitions and engage members in particular campaigns (Lee 1990; Rose 2000, 
p. 136; Obach 2004). Leadership is especially critical for community 
organisations, because as Rose notes, many value-based organisations have a 
fluid membership structure which vests power and authority in the leadership 
(Rose 2000, pp. 58-9). Secondly, if an organisation has a history of coalition 
relationships, it is more likely to engage in them in the future, as coalitions are a 
familiar 'repertoire of contention' for the organisation (Tarrow 1994; McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2001).3 Thirdly, external relationships may also be a part of an 
organisation's capacity, as supportive relationships outside of a coalition, with 
the state or other organisations, may be able to be mobilised by a coalition 
partner Gonas 1998; Jarley 2005; Tattersall 2007b). Fourthly, the capacity of a 
community organisation also depends on its sources of funding. Community 
organisations can be funded by membership dues, the state or foundation grants, 
each of which shapes organisational capacity (Fine 2005b). Membership dues 
provide an independent funding source while potentially providing limited 
resources. State funding often makes campaigns against the state difficult. 
_ 3 A repertoire of contention are common forms of activity, for a union this may mean industrial action. 
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Foundation funding can narrow community organisation activity to external 
criteria rather than membership concerns (Gottlieb 1993; Fine 2005b). 
For the purposes of international comparison, community organisation capacity 
is important because the types of community organisations vary greatly between 
• 
countries. Even within the relatively similar liberal market economies of the 
USA, Australia and Canada, community organisations have different historical 
traditions in terms of community organising style, funding sources and 
membership bases. In the USA there is a history of 'community organising' 
following the practises of Saul Alinsky, with a variety of large, member-based 
organisations which assist community members to mobilise and take direct 
action in defence of community interests (Alinsky 1971; Delgado 1986; Osterman 
2002; Obach 2004). These organisations are often funded through membership 
dues, and supplemented by foundation funding. Consequently the US has a 
large number of volimtary membership-based organisations, with relatively high 
levels of participation (Tocqueville 1990; Putnam 2000). At the opposite extreme, 
community organisations in Australia receive most of their funding from the 
state (Hamilton and Maddison 2007). While many Australian community 
organisations were formed through political movements (such as the women's 
movement), they tend to have a small membership base. Their work is advocacy 
and client service-focused rather than built around direct action. Canada sits in 
between, with strong service and advocacy organisations for women, seniors, 
immigrant groups and national identity (Council of Canadians), who have also 
' 
engaged in social movements around fair trade and left nationalism (Bleyer 1992; 
Panitch and Swartz 2003). 
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Successful coalition practice requires an organisation's capacity to be made 
available to a coalition through organisational commitment. Organisational 
commitment occurs as a consequence of interest connection and structural 
ownership; it is a product of coalition success. However, there are two distinct 
features. 
• 
Firstly, union commitment is considered a critical element of successful coalition 
practice. Nissen and Obach argue that because unions are resource rich, gaining 
and maintaining their commitment to a coalition is vital for success (Nissen 2000; 
Obach 2004). Union commitment is important because of unions' independent 
financial base through membership dues, their relatively large membership size 
and their relatively large number of strong external relationships (Fine 2003; 
Nissen 2003; Obach 2004). 
Secondly, there is also a series of generic measures for organisational 
commitment. Organisational commitment is evidenced by the seniority of 
officers sent to coalition meetings, the level of resource commitment and the 
existence of dedicated 'contact points' - people in union or community 
organisations who are a point of contact for a coalition (Nissen 2000; Krinsky and 
Resse 2006 ). 
3.2 The structure of the coalition 
Coalitions vary according to the degree of formality in the structure of the 
relationships between their organisational participants. This structure is shaped 
by the organisations that form the coalition, whether a formal decision-making 
structure exists and the degree of organisational ownership across the coalition. 
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A coalition's structure is influenced by the initiating party, particularly in short-
term relationships (Tattersall 2005). Fine argues coalitions are either union-
initiated or community organisation-initiated, and that coalition formation 
shapes the structure of organisational relationships, participation and de~sion 
making (Fine 2003; Fine 2005a). While union domination is a commonly cited 
problem in coalition practice (Sciacchitano 1998; Eisenscher 1999a), the examples 
cited tend to be short-term, single issue coalitions rather than long-term, mutual 
interest coalitions. Rather than seeing all coalitions as having fixed identities 
determined by their birth, coalitions can instead be seen as moving from single 
organisational dominance to more plural spaces for organisational participation 
(Frege, Heery and Turner 2004; Obach 2004; Tattersall 2005). 
Unfortunately, there is limited examination of whether or how coalitions can 
overcome organisational dominance. Some of the early social movement 
unionism writers made vague suggestions that coalitions should be 'democratic 
and part1cipatory' (Waterman 1991; Moody 1997). They documented the 
problem of union dominance but did not explain strategies for overcoming that 
dominance. This approach idealises the practices of social movement decision 
making as 'more correct' because social movements are more 'open' and less 
'hierarchical' than the realities of formal decision making in unions (Lynd 1990; 
Hecksher and Palmer 1993; Lynd 1996; Waterman 1999). Moreover, 
romanticising best practice often disguises the realities of actual existing practice 
- where the ideals of equality and participatory democracy are modified by the 
realities of informal power and influence. 
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More concretely, it is suggested that coalition participation is shaped by the type 
of interest engagement in the coalition. Obach and Frege, Heery and Turner 
argue that common cause coalitions are more likely to share decision making 
than vanguard coalitions where the coalition issue is in the interests of a single 
party (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004; Obach 2004). Yet interest engagement is a 
• 
transitory mechanism for a coalition structure. As the political economy changes, 
so do the issues that organisations prioritise. If coalition structure is reduced to 
organisational concerns, then the sustainability of relationships is contingent 
upon the issues and interests held in common. 
Outside the coalition literature, Hyman makes a useful contribution to 
understanding coalition structure, suggesting that organisational solidarity is 
produced by two competing impulses. It is influenced, firstly, by organisational 
engagement in the coalition demands, what he calls a commitment to coalition 
'unity', but secondly and simultaneously, it is influenced by whether the 
relationship is able to respect 'organisational autonomy' and the discrete needs 
of individual organisations (Hyman 1975; Hyman 1989). 
Using Hyman, coalition relationships are more likely to be sustainable if they are 
structured to balance the dialectic of organisational autonomy and solidarity 
(Hyman 1975; Tattersall 2006a). For unions, this negotiated balance between 
coalition unity and organisational autonomy is crucial, because unions are 
accountable firstly to union members through internal decision-making 
structures as well as being accountable to joint coalition structures (Clawson 
2003). Coalitions function best when they simultaneously recognise the 
( 
constraints of organisational members in the context of decision making between 
organisations. Obach labels this tension the 'coalition contradiction', stressing 
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that organisational leaders sit within a tension between the causes they seek to 
campaign on and maintaining their organisation (Zald and Ash 1966; Zald and 
McCarthy 1980; Obach 2004, pp. 107, 129). 
If a successful coalition structure is based on interdependence, then it lllay 
benefit from a centralisation of resources that supports the balancing of unity and 
organisational autonomy. Thus, it is suggested that locating staff in separate 
coalition offices may help balance interdependence by collectively sharing the 
burden for meeting planning and information sharing (Lipsig-Mumme 1998; 
Bobo, Kendall and Max 2001; Reynolds and Kern 2002; Fine 2003; Reynolds 
2004a). By providing resources for coalition activities separate and above the 
participant organisations, these coalition offices signal a way for coalitions and 
participant organisations to flourish simultaneously. 
Managing the tension between coalition unity and organisational autonomy may 
be easier if coalitions have a more limited, narrow organisational membership. A 
large number of organisational participants loosens a coalition's structure. As 
Bleyer suggests, a large number of partners can tum coalition consensus into 
decision making that reaches to the lowest common denominator solutions 
(Bleyer 1992). Coalition unity may be easier to negotiate when there is a smaller 
degree of organisational autonomy to negotiate and where the commitment of 
participating organisations is high. Consequently, a coalition might be most 
effective when the organisations at the table have a certain level of capacity and 
commitment, rather than simply inviting anyone who will come. 
The pressures for a narrow number of organisational partners may also require a 
coalition to build supplementary external relationships with outside 
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organisations to maximise support. While a small number of committed 
organisations make a coalition structure manageable, it may be necessary to 
work with additional organisations to increase leverage and achieve outcomes. 
This may also be a useful way to build relationships with organisations that have 
a high degree of influence against a coalition's target, but which have conflicting 
• 
values or goals with the coalition (Bobo, Kendall and Max 2001; Lofy 2005). 
3.3 Types of decision making 
Coalition relations are more likely to be sustained if organisational ownership is 
shared in coalition decision making. Ownership is most likely to be shared when 
the coalition collectively undertakes long-term planning, cultivates informal as 
well as formal relationships between partners and creates a space for reciprocity 
and learning between organisations. (Brecher and Costello 1990c; Banks 1992; 
Tuffs 1998; Reynolds and Kern 2002). 
The sustainability of a coalition varies depending on whether decision making is 
shared or if it is dominated by one organisation. At one extreme, unions and 
community organisations can operate in ad hoc episodic relationships without 
establishing a formal decision-making structure. Here, the relationships are 
based on requests rather than joint meetings (Lipsig-Mumme 2003; Frege, Heery 
and Turner 2004, pp. 141-2). These 'ad hoc coalitions' are the most common form 
of union-community relationships. They can be tactically powerful, but are the 
least sustainable form of relationship (Tattersall 2007a). Ad hoc coalitions assist 
as a reactive form of leverage or support (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004), and 
they build relationships between organisations, creating familiarity that may lead 
to further solidarity (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; Tattersall 2005). Without a 
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space to share decision making, it is difficult for the parties to share control over 
the tactics and strategies pursued in coalition; these coalition forms remain 
dominated by the organisation - union or community - that initiated them (Fine 
2003). 
• 
Relationships last longer if a formal decision-making process develops. 
Coalitions tend to operate with some form of consensus decision making, where 
the organisational participants are treated as equals, providing organisations a 
stake in decision making (Tuffs 1998, p. 232; Johnston 2000). If organisational 
ownership is not shared, then coalitions are less likely to build commitment to 
taking action. The alternative to consensus - majority votes - tends to 
institutionalise opposition (Tattersall 2007a). 
Informal relationships and learning between organisations also enhance 
organisational ownership and coalition sustainability. The networks of 
individual relationships within a coalition are important for building trust 
between organisations (Chambers 2003). Individual relationships can create a 
learning environment that can help break down stereotypical assumptions and 
distrust between groups, and expose organisations to contrasting perspectives 
and structures (Richards 1990; Rose 1997, p. 184; Obach 2004). 
Shared decision making breeds reciprocity and trust between coalition partners 
(Craft 1990; Tuffs 1998). Reciprocity is absent when the relationship is merely 
one-sided solidarity (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004). Reciprocity can take the 
form of a transactional exchange - a quid pro quo arrangement - where 
organisations mutually pledge solidarity because they know they will get 
something in return (Craft 1990, p. 153; Brecher, Costello and Smith 2000, p. 47; 
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of values and identities, and have open membership structures (Touraine 1981). 
In contrast, unions are seen as hierarchical and bureaucratic organisations based 
on interests. Fine notes that ideological, structural and cultural differences 
explain much of the conflict between worker centres and unions (Fine 
forthcoming). Rose argues that there is a fundamental class difference bet~een 
unions and new social movements, suggesting that distinctive decision-making 
processes, membership structure and goals have their roots in the contrasting 
'identities' of middle class and working class organisations (Rose 2000). 
Resource mobilisation theorists argue that organisations may prefer different 
types of action, what they call 'repertoires of contention', which may produce 
conflict over tactics in coalitions (Tilly 1978; Dreiling 1998). 
Cultural differences between organisations need not be a permanent obstacle to 
coalition practice. Rose argues that organisational difference can be mitigated if 
there are informal ties between organisations through people who can help 
bridge cultural gaps (Rose 2000). People with experience in both unions and 
social movements can be cultural translators, or bridge builders, in coalitions 
(Rose 2000). Their cross-movement experience allows them to interpret 
organisational concerns across different cultural environments (Estabrook, 
Siqueira and Paes Machado 2000). 
Rose suggests that if a coalition is faced with conflicts over cultural differences 
and is able to overcome them, then it is a sign of coalition strength. Coalitiop.s 
provide organisations with the opportunity to learn about issues, values and 
strategies. Rose suggests that a combination of organisations with cultural 
differences can create hybrid organising strategies that can enhance the resources 
and success of a movement (Rose 2000, p. 196). He argues that coalitions that 
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bridge across diverse values are likely to develop a clearer vision of an 
alternative society (Rose 2000, p. 199). Obach calls these coalitions learning 
coalitions, arguing that they are examples of strong cultural interrelationships 
(Obach 2004). 
• 
3.5 Bringing the question of inter-organisational relationships together 
A coalition's inter-organisational relationships vary, depending on the capacity 
and commitment of the organisational partners, the structure of the relationships, 
its decision-making processes and its ability to manage cultural differences 
between organisations. These four measures contribute differently to coalition 
success in the ways in which they help a coalition win outcomes, support 
changes to the political climate, sustain relationships and build the capacity of 
participating organisations. 
The capacity and commitment of coalition participants affects coalition success, 
at they shape the resources a coalition can deploy to achieve political outcomes 
against an employer or a government. If the participant organisations have 
members or external relationships they can mobilise, then the coalition's 
campaign can be enhanced. The participation of high-capacity and high-
commitment organisations in a coalition increases .the likelihood that a coalition 
can be capable of changing the political climate as well as winning specific 
outcomes. 
The structure of a coalition helps a coalition to sustain its relationships by 
allowing organisations to balance their coalition commitments with individual 
organisational needs. By balancing the dual needs of organisational unity and 
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autonomy, coalition relationships may be more likely to shape the political 
climate as well as win outcomes, as they can undertake longer-term strategic 
campaigns. Interdependence is assisted when a coalition commits resources to 
undertake collective work, such as hiring staff and a coalition office. 
Interdependence may be easier to establish if there is a narrow number of 
• 
organisational parties. However, this narrowness may be complemented by the 
coalition also reaching out to a broader set of allies beyond the coalition. A 
broader range of coalition allies may increase the ability of a coalition to 
influence its targets. 
Organisational ownership can be shared through practices such as formal 
structures, consensus decision making, informal relationships and the practice of 
reciprocity. In turn, sharing organisational ownership may increase the capacity 
of a coalition to win outcomes, as organisations are more likely to commit to a 
coalition's campaigns if they have an ownership over them. It may also make 
coalition relationships more sustainable as the parties are treated equally and 
mutually benefit from reciprocity. 
Coalitions must also overcome any cultural barriers between the organisational 
partners, particularly between unions and community organisations. This is vital 
for coalition relationships to be sustained in the long term. Overcoming cultural 
barriers may also help coalitions maximise their power by helping a diverse set 
of organisations with different types of resources to work together. This is most 
( 
effectively done by either choosing similar partners or supporting bridge 
builders to translate across the different movement experiences. 
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These four measures of inter-organisational relationships are connected to the 
four different types of coalition success in Table 2.1 below. The correlations 
between success and the inter-organisational relationships are outlined so they 
can be examined in the case studies. 
• 
Table 2.1: Coalition success and inter-organisational relationships 
Organisational The structure of Fonns of Organisational 
capacity and the coalition decision culture and 
commitment making bridge builders 
• Does • Do external • Does joint • Can a strategy 
organisational relationships planning for overcoming 
capacity of beyond the increase cultural 
Winning coalition coalition help a coalition differences help participants coalition commitment? bring 
outcomes increase the influence organisations 
ability of the employers or with different 
coalition shift government? types of power 
government? together? 
• Can engaging • Connection is • Connection is • Do bridge 
strong not claimed in the not claimed in the builders help a 
Supportive organisations in literature literature coalition change 
political coalitions change the political 
climate the climate as climate? 
well as achieve 
outcomes? 
• Connection is •How do • How does • How do bridge 
not claimed in the coalition consensus builders 
literature resources such as decision making overcome conflict 
staff and offices work in practice and translate 
Sustaining help coati tions to sustain difference? 
relationships sustain relationships? •Do 
relationships? organisations 
with closer 
cultures sustain 
relationships 
more easily? 
Building the • Connection is • Connection is • Can coalitions • Can bridge 
capacity of not claimed in the not claimed in the generate builders help 
participating literature literature learning across organisations 
organisations organisations? learn new 
practices? 
59 
While inter-organisational relationships highlight how the internal organisation 
of a coalition is critical to success, so do the types of issues that a coalition 
campaigns on. These are a coalition's common concern. 
• 
4.0 Common Concern 
At the heart of coalition unionism is a bond of common concern between 
organisations (Craft 1990; Tuffs 1998; Tattersall2005). This section explores three 
key measures of common concern - inter-organisational commitment, member 
commitment and public commitment. While all coalitions have a common goal 
or common concern, the type of concern held in common varies. Yet coalition 
scholarship commonly uses catch-all phrases such as common interest or 
common issue to describe the solidarity that exists between organisations in 
coalitions (ChildsJ990; Brecher and Costello 1990a; Altemose and McCarty 2001; 
Fine 2003). These descriptions are limited because singular phrases such as 
'common interest' inadvertently skim over possible variations in common 
concern, from basic and fleeting joint concern for an event, to a deeply shared set 
of common values. 
However, common concern not only varies between coalitions, it varies within a 
coalition. It shapes a coalition's inter-organisational relationships, the degree of 
member commitment and participation and the social frame of a coalition. This 
section isolates these three measures of common concern in order to understand 
how the issue underpinning a coalition relationship affects coalition success. 
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4.1 Inter-organisational commitment 
Coalition engagement is premised on organisational engagement. Coalitions 
vary depending on the narrowness or mutuality of interest in the coalition's 
purpose that draws organisations into coalition work. Inter-organisational 
relationships develop when union or community organisation leaders, and/or 
• 
their internal democratic processes, make a decision to work in coalition. This 
section discusses the different types of common concern, and then discusses how 
organisational relationships differ depending on whether the issue at the heart of 
the relationship is in the interests of, or valued by, of one or both of the partners. 
While coalitions form when organisations share something in common, the type 
of common concern varies. Common concern is at its most episodic and fleeting 
in ad hoc coalitions where organisations come together to support an issue 
through a joint event or activity, such as information pickets or forums (Brecher 
and Costello 1990b; Russo 1996; Lipsig-Mumme 2003; Tattersall2005). 
Joint concern lasts longer when unions and community organisations come 
together to plan a campaign around an issue (Brecher and Costello 1990b). 
Coalitions may form around an issue that represents a shared threat or 
conversely around a more positive proactive issue-based agenda. A shared 
threat may be an easier base to form a short-term alliance, whereas a positive 
issue agenda once agreed upon may have the capacity to provide a longer-term 
relationship (Brecher and Costello 1990c; Rose 2000, p. 23). The breadth and 
interconnection of issues may be a measure of success. Reynolds for instance, 
suggests that if coalitions shift from single to multiple issues, this broader agenda 
may be more powerful (Reynolds 1999; Reynolds 2004a). 
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If an organisation has an interest in an issue, then it is likely to have a strong 
commitment to a coalition formed on that issue. Interest refers to the stake that 
an organisation has in an issue. If an organisation has an interest in a coalition's 
strategy or goals, then it is more likely to support that coalition, because 
• 
supporting that coalition also supports the organisation's own needs (Childs 
1990; Brecher and Costello 1990a). 
An organisation's commitment to a coalition is likely to be longer term, and 
strengthened, if the partners share values and a coalition is formed around an 
issue which they have an interest in. The Marxist tradition emphasises the 
importance of a common ideology for inter-organisational relationships, when 
that common ideology reflects shared class interests and values (Gapasin and 
Yates 1997; Mantsios 1998; Estabrook, Siqueira and Paes Machado 2000). Carroll 
argues this type of coalition symbolises Gramsci's counter-hegemonic historic 
bloc, where the working class in coalition with other class interests creates an 
alternative' program for how society should be run, while agitating on specific 
issues (Carroll 1992). For Marxists, values are an extension of interest. As 
Moody argues, these values reach out 'from the starting point of self-interest to 
embrace a broader, more inclusive class interest' (Moody 1999, p. 113). In 
contrast, new social movement theory distinguishes values from interests in 
making a distinction between 'old' interest-based, class-based union movements 
and value-based 'new' social movements like environmentalism (Melucci 1980; 
Touraine 1981; Boggs 1986; Larana, Johnston and Gusfield 1994; Boggs 1995; 
Touraine 1995). They claim that there is an inherent tension between value-
based new social movements and interest-based working class movements 
(Obach 2004, p. 121-2). 
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These different organisational expressions of solidarity come together in various 
combinations to create coalitions. There is some debate amongst the theorists as 
to the different combinations of common concern. 
• Some link the question of organisational self-interest to coalition formation. Fine 
identifies two types of coalitions: community-initiated, community dominated 
coalitions and union-initiated, union dominated coalitions, suggesting that 
coalitions are always dominated by one organisation's self-interest and issues 
(Fine 2003). Similarly, Obach proposes that a frequent coalition form is 
instrumental cooperation, where the pursuit of an organisation's core goals is 
directly enhanced and converges with the activity of a coalition, leading to 
domination (Rudy 2001; Obach 2004, p. 132). 
Others suggest that a coalition that is based on mutual self-interest provides a 
way to combat and overcome organisational dominance. Frege, Heery and 
Turner use the term 'common cause coalitions' to describe the possibility of 
unions and community organisations working in coalition on separate but 
associated interests (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004). 
Beyond mutual self-interest coalitions, Obach argues that compromise and 
learning can operate alongside mutual interest engagement. He uses the term 
compromise cooperation, where unions and community organisations agree to 
diverge from stated individual organisational agendas in order to accommodate 
the concerns of their potential partner (Obach 2004, p. 132-3). He speculates that 
deep, trusting relationships involve a process of enlightened engagement, where 
organisations open their self-interest to the perspectives of others, expanding 
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their issue range beyond their immediate self-interest (Rose 2000; Obach 2004). 
Similarly, Frege, Heery and Turner suggest there can be integrative coalitions, 
where unions take over non-union social objectives and accept them as their own 
(Frege, Heery and Turner 2004). 
• 
If organisations are likely to move away from their self-interest and embrace a 
broader communal indirect interest, it suggests that so-called 'integrative' or 
'compromise' coalitions can involve the interconnection of interests and values. 
Indeed, several of the scholars who argue the merits of mutual interest coalitions 
suggest that a mutual interest relationship is strengthened if, in addition to an 
interest alignment, there is also a value alignment, as a value-based connection 
may overcome the potential instability which may arise if distinct interests shift 
over time (cf Rose 2000, p. 31; cf Frege, Heery and Turner 2004, p. 143). 
As was noted, new and old social movements debate whether unions are driven 
by values in addition to interests. Several theorists have explored whether 
unions and community organisations are likely to work together on a 
combination of interests and values. Rose, while agreeing that there is a 
difference between the participants in new social movements and unions, argues 
that coalitions can work across interest and value-based movements (Rose 2000). 
More strongly, Burgmann argues that most so-called 'new social movements' 
consist of both working class and middle class activists (Burgmann and 
Burgmann 1998; Burgmann 2003). Moody and Carroll stress that 'class' is both 
an interest and value-based concept: while class position might create an 
objective 'class-in-itself' the idea of 'class-of-itself' encompasses material interest 
as well indirect, value-based social concerns (Thompson 1963; Carroll 1992; 
.. Thompson 1995; Moody 1997; Clawson 2003, p. 98). Similarly, Rose and Obach 
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suggest that successful coalitions embody a synthesis of interests and values 
which strengthen the common bonds between organisations (Obach 1999; Rose 
2000; Obach 2004). 
Thus coalitions vary depending on whether their common concern is based on 
• 
issues, or a combination of issues, and organisational interest and values. This 
suggests that for organisations to have longer relationships, they need to have a 
stronger common concern (through a strong overlap of issues, interests and 
values in common). Without shared interests and values, as Bleyer argues, a 
large number of organisations coming together can end up producing a common 
concern which is merely an aggregation of group concern - a lowest common 
denominator rather than a multi-issue agenda (Bleyer 1992). 
Different types of common concern, and the presence or absence of common 
values or interests ·also raises the issue of conflict within a coalition. Craft argues 
that conflict breaks down common interest (Craft 1990). Patmore emphasises 
that not all community organisations are potential allies for unions; irrevocable 
conflict over values may impede joint work on issues (Patmore 1994). Rose 
suggests strategies for dealing with conflict, for instance 'agreeing to disagree', 
where coalitions focus on the interests and issues that are common and overlook 
those that are in conflict (Rose 2000, pp. 135, 144). Estabrook et al optimistically 
suggest that conflict between organisations can be overcome through dialogue, 
mutual respect and understanding, thus suggesting that conflict does not 
' 
necessarily break down a coalition, but the capacity to deal with conflict is a 
measure of the strength of a coalition's relationships (Estabrook, Siqueira and 
Paes Machado 2000). Obach and Rose also argue that organisations learn from 
their differences, and thus if a coalition can manage conflict through strong 
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internal practice, it may strengthen the learning between the organisations and so 
strengthen the coalition (Rose 2000p. 31; Obach 2004). The mutual presence of 
common values and interests may provide an incentive to sustain relationships, 
whereas an absence of common values beyond common interests or a common 
issue may make relationships more likely to end if conflict arises. 
• 
Reconciling interest and value alignment is a challenge. Instrumental concern 
may create the greatest level of organisational buy-in from a single organisation, 
but unless other organisations can also perceive a direct interest in the coalition, 
then it may not produce a powerful coalition as a whole. Similarly a 
'compromise' coalition may strengthen the agenda of two organisations by 
broadening common concern and creating a strong agenda for change, or it may 
produce a lowest common denominator issue that reduces each organisation's 
commitment (Bleyer 1992; Obach 2004). An 'enlightened' coalition, if framed 
abstractly and formed rapidly, may fail to generate mass member participation, 
but if it is a culmination of a campaign that began at the level of interest and 
extended to values it may generate significant engagement (Moody 1997; 
Burgmann and Burgmann 1998; Obach 2004). 
In stark contrast to Obach's concern for organisational autonomy, Clawson 
argues that the most effective form of common concern is when the concerns of 
both new social movements and union movements are fused into a joint agenda 
(Clawson 2003). He argues that joint action must develop to the point where the 
distinctions between these movements are abolished (Clawson 2003, p. 194). 
Fusion calls for more than just alliances, it seeks to join organisational agendas to 
the point that it is 'no longer clear what is a labour issue and what is a women's 
issue' (Clawson 2003, p. 194). In contrast to Obach, Clawson is focused on a 
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radical reformulation and widening of coalition issues where organisations 
internalise each other's concerns, incorporating them into their culture and 
practice (Clawson 2003, p. 195). 
There is a tension in this scholarship between the idea of coalition unity and 
• 
organisational autonomy. Clawson, for instance, analyses the coalition as a 
whole and emphasises the importance of common cause and values, whereas 
Obach stresses organisational participation and emphasises organisational 
interest. Yet these two interpretations are not necessarily in opposition. Again 
we can refer to Hyman's argument about union solidarity, that suggests 
sectionalism and solidarity are dialectic relations (Hyman 1975; Hyman 1989). 
The simultaneous presence of shared concern and sectional concern indicates the 
importance of organisational interdependence for understanding the mutuality in 
common concern. Interdependence suggests the importance of an organisation's 
self-interest, while noting that the coalition's operation is greater than the sum of 
its parts, potentially consisting of values as well as interest alignment. Levels of 
commitment are evident first through issue-based commitment, then value-
based commitment, and finally and more strongly through the mutuality of 
value and interest-based commitment. 
Thus, this thesis considers how the interrelationships of issue, interest and values 
vary the commitment of organisations and the bonds between coalition partners. 
It will consider how inter-organisational commitment influences the 
sustainability of coalition relationships, the capacity of participating 
organisations, and the ability for those relationships to achieve outcomes and 
changes in political climate. 
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4.2 Member commitment 
A coalition's common concern also affects the degree to which union and 
community organisation members commit to coalition activity. A common 
criticism of coalitions is that they often substitute cross-organisational 
relationships for deep, internal organisational engagement (Robinson 2000a; 
• 
Clawson 2003). Both Robinson and Clawson argue that powerful social 
movement unionism is distinguished from social unionism or coalition practice 
by whether there is member engagement or not. These concerns echo a radical 
critique of coalitions that surfaced particularly in the US in the 1990s that stressed 
that rank and file members are the engine of coalition (and working class) power 
(Lynd 1990; Gapasin and Yates 1997; Moody 1997; Eisenscher 1999b). They 
argued that coalition success occurs when coalitions dialectically provide a space 
for developing member class consciousness (Waterman 1991; Moody 1997; 
Bernard 1998). This criticism echoed the union democracy debates in British 
industrial relations, where scholars debated the importance of member 
engagement in union decision making as a mark of union democracy (Flanders 
1970). Yet a weakness of this analysis is that it categorises coalition practice 
simplistically, contrasting the 'evils' of leaders, bureaucracy and hierarchy and 
the panacea of democratic engagement (Tillman and Cummings 1999). It 
overstates the role of the 'movement' at the expense of 'organisation', rather than 
seeing movement and organisation as equally important aspects of coalition 
success (von Holdt 2002). 
A useful approach to the role of member commitment comes from social 
movement theory, which explores how individuals engage with social 
movements. The term 'collective action frame' is used to explain how issues can 
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be articulated to generate member commitment (Snow, Rocheford, Worden eta!. 
1986; Tarrow 1994; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Zald 1996). Collective action 
frames suggest that member engagement occurs through a dialectical process of 
engagement and transformation. For Gamson, the likelihood of an individual 
participating in a social movement relates to the proximity of an issue: that is, the 
• 
degree to which it has a direct and immediate consequence for one's personal life 
(Gamson 1992, p. 163). A collective action frame begins with this personal 
identity, then through a process of struggle opens an individual's awareness by 
intersecting that personal identity with a collective identity that broadens 
consciousness, strengthens solidarity and stimulates political participation 
(Fantasia 1988; Kelly 1998; Clawson 2003, p. 98). Collective action frames enable 
a coalition to agitate members by conveying a rhetoric of change (Gamson and 
·Meyer 1996, pp. 285-6). These messages are more successful when they express 
urgency and/or agency, as it assists to counterweigh a rhetoric of reaction, of 
jeopardy, apathy or futility (Hirschman 1991). The concept of collective action 
frame shows how values or ideology create a framework for movement building 
by providing a collective explanation for individual experience, providing a 
vehicle for collective action (Carroll1992). 
Rose suggests that the development of collective identity operates differently in 
new social movements and the union movement. Like new social movement 
theorists, he argues that political engagement in new social movements begins 
with values (such as opposition to racism), and later shifts to a concern for 
interest (what interests are denied by racism) (Melucci 1980; Touraine 1981; Rose 
2000). Conversely, for unions, he argues political consciousness is based in 
private interest, such as the need for improvements in working conditions, which 
broadens to the question of values, such as class and social concern (Rose 2000). 
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As with the debate over values and interest, many disagree with this dichotomy, 
preferring a synthesis by which solidarity is seen as a mutually reinforcing 
process of interconnecting values and interests across unions or soda! 
movements (Fantasia 1988; Carroll 1992). Fantasia, Kelley, Clawson and 
• 
Fitzgerald, amongst others, emphasise that union member commitment may 
derive from opposition to racism or sexism as much as it may come from anger 
around workplace conditions (Lynd 1983; Fantasia 1988; Fitzgerald 1991; Kelley 
1997, 98-72; Kelly 1998; Clawson 2003). 
Common concern can successfully enhance member commitment to the degree 
that it engages both the interests and values of members. Member TI;terests and 
values are engaged when a coalition's common concern touches their day-to-day 
experiences and deeply held beliefs (Gamson 1992, p. 8). As Kelley argues, the 
politicisation and engagement of people comes when local concerns are 
contextualised in a broader system of causes (Kelley 1997). Carroll similarly 
argues that member engagement and mobilisation must be actively sought and 
won through ideological struggle (Carroll 1992, p. 12). This ideological struggle 
must be sensitive to the generalised values and specific interests of all its 
constituents (Bleyer 1992). Moreover, the process of member commitment not 
only can politicise, but it is also a process of self-development and empowerment 
for movement participants (Freire 1972; Melucci 1980). 
Thus a coalition's common concern is increasingly effective at generating 
member commitment and movement building to the extent that it touches not 
simply the interests or values of members in a single organisation, but also 
engages the interests or values of many different organisation members. This 
70 
thesis takes the insights of social movement theorists and union renewal scholars 
on member commitment to explore how the common concerns of a coalition can 
vary member participation, and particularly whether member participation in a 
coalition shapes coalition outcomes and the capacity of the participating 
organisations. 
• 
4.3 Public commitment 
Separate to organisational engagement and movement building, a coalition's 
common concern also communicates a public social frame to the wider 
population and the coalition's targets. The term social frame is normally not 
used in reference to coalitions, but is important for understanding how coalitions 
generate public support, media interest and social pressure against employers 
and particularly politicians (Gitlin 1980; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson 
1992; Snow and Benford 1992; Lakoff 2005). 
A frame is a way of thinking about the world - how people make sense of the 
world (Coffman 1974); it simplifies the world by selectively encoding 
experiences, events and facts with one's present or past environment, and 
established values (Coffman 1974; Snow and Benford 1992, p. 137). Therefore 
frames shape what people consider to be common sense (Lakoff 2006). 
A public social frame is the messages and values that communicate a coalition's 
purpose. As Snow and Benford argue, a social frame is an attempt to produce 
meaning - it is a coalition's story about what it is campaigning for and why 
(Snow and Benford 1992, p. 136). Public social frames seek to legitimise the 
claims of a coalition, shift social opinion and influence coalition targets (i.e. 
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employers or government). However, social movements sometimes do not 
distinguish between social frame and collective action frame (Snow, Rocheford, 
Worden et a!. 1986; Gamson and Meyer 1996). This study uses the term public 
social frame to distinguish the 'public' messages of a coalition; a coalition's 
common concern in the form of a public social frame shapes how a coalition 
expresses its broad social goals to the public at large. • 
Public social frames are contested. A coalition's public messages enter a public 
struggle for meaning in the process of trying to influence public policy, 
contesting opponents' attempts to define the problem at hand (McCarthy, Smith 
and Zald 1996). 
Public social frames are said to be more effective if they are 'elaborated' rather 
than 'restricted' (Bernstein 1970; Bernstein 1971; Snow and Benford 1992). A 
restricted closed frame tends to organise a narrow set of ideas in a tightly 
interconnected fashion for a defined audience. For example, the term 'nuclear 
freeze' which created a defined, narrow solution to the broad problem of nuclear 
proliferation - 'freezing' nuclear production (Snow and Benford 1992, p. 140). 
An elaborated frame instead organises a wide range of ideas; it is inclusive and 
'allows numerous aggrieved groups to tap it and elaborate their grievances in 
terms of its basic problem-solving schema' (Snow and Benford 1992, p. 140). 
Examples include the term civil rights or living wage, which can be used to 
express grievances for a wide variety of politically or economically 
disenfranchised constituencies. 
Public social frames are powerful if they conjure the values of injustice. Gamson 
argues powerful social frames describe moral indignation - hot cognition -
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where the message is laden with emotion (Gamson 1992). Snow calls this process 
frame alignment, where social values are connected to coalition goals (Snow, 
Rocheford, Worden et a!. 1986). Similarly, Lakoff argues that public social 
frames based on values, rather than issues, convey moral weight (Lakoff 2005; 
Lakoff 2006). Moreover, public social frames can be supported if they are 
• imbued with cultural meaning; if they have cultural resonance (Zald 1996). 
Metaphors that resonate with cultural narrations - stories, myths or folk tales -
help a message connect to a broader political culture and help build support 
(Snow and Benford 1988). 
Public social frames also must be remedial; they must respond to the instance of 
injustice with a call for action and for change. Without an adversary, the political 
target remains an abstraction - such as hunger, rather than the cause of that 
hunger (Gamson 1992, p. 7). Similarly, a social frame is effective if it identifies a 
collective actor with the legitimate power to remedy the problem. In this way 
public social frames legitimate collective action as a solution to injustice (Gitlin 
1980, p. 291; McCarthy, Smith and Zald 1996). 
The messenger is as important as the message for establishing the credibility of a 
public social frame (Lakoff 2006, p. 36). The person or organisations that carry 
the message in public can reinforce or detract from the articulated frame, creating 
or mitigating legitimacy (Snow and Benford 1988; Snow and Benford 1992). 
Similarly, as McAdam argues, actions do speak louder than words and coalition 
tactics are a method of framing and producing a social crisis (McAdam 1996). 
Lakoff, a cognitive linguist, also analyses the role of positive and negative social 
frames. He argues that positive messages are more successful than negative 
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messages for shifting the political climate (Lakoff 2005). He argues that negative 
or reactive public messages such as 'no' or 'against', often reinforce the messages 
of opponents. Amongst the array of positive messages, the most powerful are 
those that are 'strategic'; that is, they articulate a transformation of the 
organisation and allocation of social resources (Lakoff 2005). Lakoff suggests an 
• 
example of a conservative strategic frame is 'tax relief', which seeks to reorganise 
social opinion against taxation. Alongside strategic frames are 'domino' frames, 
which if passed make similar more radical demands easier. For example, 
demands against 'partial birth abortion' make a broader anti-abortion claim 
easier (Lakoff 2006). 
Furthermore, within a broad social frame message are 'surface' or specific 
demands (Lakoff 2006). The interconnection of a specific demand with a 
strategic or transforrnative agenda builds support for a powerful social frame by 
connecting a broi).d agenda to incremental steps (Pastor 2001 ). 
Social movement theories about social or master frames are reinforced by claims 
by union renewal writers. Fine argues that part of the power of workers' centres 
is that the organisations frame issues broadly as a general or social interest as 
opposed to a narrow special interest (Fine 1998, p. 159). This echoes Flanders, 
who argues that a union's 'sword of justice' is a vital ingredient for exercising 
public pressure and social power (Flanders 1970). Carroll uses Gramsci's concept 
of counter-hegemony to emphasise that a powerful common inte~est 
symbolically establishes an alternative agenda to how society is organised, 
creating an alternative set of progressive values that speak to 'the working class' 
as a whole (Gramsci 1971; Carroll1992). 
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These claims by sociologists and union renewal writers have not been applied to 
the specific practice of coalitions. This thesis considers how the public messages 
and the public social frame of a coalition impacts on its ability to win outcomes 
and affect the political climate. 
• 
4.4 Bringing the question of common concern together 
This discussion identified three measures that shape the success of a coalition's 
common concern: inter-organisational commitment, member commitment and 
public commitment. These three measures were investigated to see how they 
may affect the success of a coalition. 
Inter-organisational commitment varies from a fleeting common concern for an 
event to joint concern over a program for change. Organisational interest in a 
coalition increases-commitment. If more organisational interest is shared across 
the coalition; the greater are the resources the coalition has to rely on for 
achieving outcomes. Sharing interests often relies on compromise and 
organisational learning. Shared values can strengthen longer and more 
sustainable relationships. 
Member commitment is dependent upon whether a coalition's common concern 
engages member support and participation. Concepts such as collective action 
frame, direct interest and class consciousness attempt to capture the processes of 
member political development. Participation is enhanced when there is a 
connection to the day-to-day experiences, interests and values of organisation 
members. Strong member commitment enables a coalition to mobilise a mass 
movement to pressure for coalition outcomes and political climate change. 
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Member engagement may also allow a coalition to politicise rank and file 
members. 
The degree to which a coalition gains support from the public relates to the 
degree to which a coalition's public messages engage with and strike a mutual 
• 
interest with the 'general public at large' by presenting positive messages and 
values to convey a coalition's common cause. The public social frame shapes 
coalition participation in public debate, and thus affects its ability to shape the 
political climate and win outcomes. 
The relationship between the three common concern measures and coalition 
success is explored in the case studies. The claims in this literature review are 
summarised in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: Coalition success and common concern 
Inter-organisational Member Public 
commitment commitment commitment 
• Does an overlap of interest • Does member • Do positively framed 
Winning and value concern support hard commitment help a demands sup~rt 
to win battles? coalition take outcomes? 
outcomes 
collective action to 
win outcomes? 
• Do the combination of value • Connection is not • Do positively framed 
and interest connections claimed in the literature demands help build a 
support climate change by supportive social 
Supportive allowing for long-term climate more 
political relationships to build an effectively than 
climate alternative political agenda negative demands? 
armmd an issue? • Do 'domino' and 
'strategic' demands 
help build a supportive 
social climate? 
• Do overlapping interest and • Connection is not • Connection is not 
value concern help sustain claimed in the literature claimed in the literature 
relationships? 
• vyhai about the claims of 
organisational learning and 
fusion? 
• Does organisational 
Sustaining dominance weaken 
relationships relationships, does mutual 
interest overcome 
organisational dominance? 
• Do the number of 
organisational participants or 
the openness of coalition 
participation affect the 
sustainability of relationships? 
Building the • Connection is not claimed in the • Does member • Connection is not 
capacity of literature commitment provide claimed in the literature 
participating an opportunity for 
organisations politicisation? 
Common concern defines a coalition's purpose. Coalition success depends not 
only upon internal and relational factors but also on how a coalition is able to 
77 
interact and shape the world around it. This final element of coalition success is 
understood here in terms of scale. 
5.0 Scale 
• While coalitions are strategic actors and can make their own history, that history 
is not always of their choosing. The scale or scales that coalition unionism 
operates at affects its ability to achieve outcomes against employers or 
government, and shapes the degree to which a coalition can increase the capacity 
of its participating organisations. 
Firstly, scale is measured by the available opportunity structure. Secondly, a 
coalition's ability to shape employer or political decisions is affected by the scales 
of power at which these decision makers operate and the scales at which the 
coalition operates,. whether locally, nationally, internationally or at multiple 
scales. Finally, the most important scale for member engagement and 
development is the local scale, which can be engaged most effectively if a 
coalition establishes and builds relationships with local broker organisations. 
5.1 Opportunity structure 
The availability of external structural opportunities affects the success and 
sustainability of coalitions. US social movement theorists developed the term 
opportunity structure, also called political opportunity. Its core idea is that 
political space opens and closes in different contexts, times and places (Gamson 
and Meyer 1996, p. 277) It suggests that the structures of the external world, 
such as election cycles, iuling class cleavages and the relative openness of the 
78 
state, affect social movement formation and victory (Tarrow 1994; Jenkins 1995; 
Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). 
Political opportunities begin with national political context and intervening 
institutional variables (Gamson and Meyer 1996, p. 273). Factors such as the 
• 
openness of the state, the prevailing cultural climate, types of political parties, or 
activity in civil society, vary between countries and may contribute to 
international variations in coalition unionism (Tilly 1978; Brand 1990). 
Additionally, some political opportunities are common across liberal market 
economies and remained fixed and beyond the control of coalitions, such as the 
timelines of public elections (Rucht 1990, 196; Tarrow 1994, p. 277; Gamson and 
Meyer 1996). 
Many other political opportunities are matters of contention. Opportunities may 
be shaped by government or employer adversaries such as a legislative 
timetables or the scheduJed closure of a plant. Yet, opportunity structure is also 
dynamic; able to be shaped by coalition action, for instance where coalitions 
cultivate allies in the state, change the political discourse, change public policy or 
shift elite alignment Genkins 1985; Tarrow 1993; Gamson and Meyer 1996). 
These dynamic opportunities provide strategic choices for coalitions, where 
decisions about institutional and extra-institutional action can be jointly or 
selectively made (Gamson and Meyer 1996, p. 284). It is the dialectical 
combination of available external opportunities, combined with social movement 
readiness and strategic choice, that enables a coalition to increase its chance of 
victory in the face of opportunities (McAdam 1982; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996, 
p. 1633; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2006). 
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Yet the process by which a coalition is most likely to create opportunities is 
under-theorised. In some of the best-practice literature in the United States, the 
work of successful central labour councils is said to create an agenda for 
progressive policy (Rudy 2001; Reynolds and Ness 2004). These conclusions do 
not draw out general 
opportunity structure. 
lessons about how coalitions can build a supportive 
• 
It can be speculated that a sustained coalition may be 
necessary for a long-term campaign to create an agenda. This is not confirmed 
by coalition theory, but is certainly worthy of further analysis in this thesis. 
Political opportunities make coalition campaigns winnable, and as Pastor 
suggests, short-term victories are critical for sustaining a coalition's momentum, 
reinforcing the utility of collective action and enhancing long-term organisational 
commitment (see also Neidhart and Rucht 1991; Pastor 2001). 
The opportunity structure can also shape media and public support for 
coalitions. As Von Holdt emphasises, the 'contentious challenge' of an issue or 
event can be critical for mobilising and energising not simply an organisation but 
a mass movement (von Holdt 2002). A supportive political opportunity can 
create a large, deep mobilisation even without a coalition structure to support it 
(Tattersall 2004). Social contention raises media attention, and by creating wide 
and broad public awareness of an issue can open opportunities for coalition 
success (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). If harnessed well, opportunities can 
magnify the organised power of a coalition. Weaker, ad hoc coalitions can still 
achieve objective political outcomes if a timely reaction generates widespread 
contention as a symbol of community anger (Tattersall 2005; Tattersall 
forthcoming a). 
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5.2 Multi-scalar decision makers and multi-scalar coalitions 
Social movement scholarship has recently turned to human geography, arguing 
that structural opportunities cannot be understood in a geographic vacuum. This 
is because the full interaction between social movements and the external world 
has both social and spatial dimensions (Martin and Miller 2003). Any 
• opportunity structure is affected by the space and scale in which it operates; it is 
socially and spatially contested (Massey 1993). As Martin and Miller argue: 
Space constitutes and structures relationships and networks; situates a 
social and cultural life, influencing repertoires of contention, is integral to 
the attribution of threats and opportunities, is implicit in many types of 
category formation and is central to jumping scale strategies (Martin and 
Miller 2003, p. 144). 
If scale is socially constructed, then different scales such as the local or the 
national vary significantly. For instance the local scale, as Taksa and Wills stress, 
is where people live, where social relations take shape and where participation 
and memory are rich (Wills 1998; Taksa 2000; Wills 2001). Across the local scale, 
local spaces are distinct, with distinct identities and place consciousness (Castree, 
Coe, Ward eta!. 2004; Ellem 2005). Yet the local is not isolated from other scales; 
social relations interpenetrate scales (Agnew 1987; Ellem 2005). As scale shifts 
up, organisations become increasingly important as media for coordinating 
action and influencing decision makers. 
At one level, coalitions are defined by their scale. They can operate at different 
scales - at the local, city, state, national or global (Tattersall 2005). Theorists 
dispute whether the scale of a coalition varies its power or likely success. Some 
emphasise the importance of the local as a scale for coalition action. Jonas argues 
that local coalitions usefully connect political influence to member involvement 
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(Jonas 1998). Patmore argues that the local scale, particularly in smaller regional 
cities, is powerful because of the close proximity between where people live and 
work (Patmore 1997; Patmore 2004). Indeed, Taksa affirms this, arguing that the 
perception of mutual interests based on shared experience of everyday activity is 
a 'much more likely and solid foundation for collective action than the mere 
• 
existence of common interests or common identity' (Taksa 2000). 
Others suggest that the city is a powerful space for coalition activity. Walsh 
notes that city-wide activity, in the US in particular, enables coalitions to shape 
city regulation - for example through living wage ordinances (Walsh 2000). 
Pastor, and Turner and Cornfield agree that coalition activity can affect policy 
change when acting at the scale of a regional economy (Pastor 2001; Turner and 
Cornfield 2007). Much of the US work on central labour councils affirms that 
strong coalitions at the city-scale can achieve strong sustainable policy reform 
(Luce and Nelson2004; Reynolds and Ness 2004; Rhee and Sadler 2007). 
Coalition success is best seen as contingent on the scales at which the coalition's 
adversaries operate. Coalition unionism requires different organisational 
resources depending on the scale at which decision makers operate. But power 
is rarely contested at a single scale (Smith 1999; Martin and Miller 2003, p. 101). 
Political power, for instance, is multi-scalar, operating at and among the local, 
city, state, national and international. Governments consist of locally elected 
officials representing a small, defined local area, who then act as representatives 
at a city, state or national scale (Martin and Miller 2003). Creating influence over 
political representatives can occur at either the local electorate or the scale of 
government, or at both simultaneously. Similarly, the functions of government, 
education, health care, housing, also operate at more than one scale as they are 
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locally delivered and centrally funded (Taylor and Flint 2000, p. 316). Capital is 
similarly multi-scaled. Depending on the scale of the industry, capital may rely 
on local production (as in mining), consumption (for example, 'care' services, like 
education, childcare or health) or investment (such as government subsidies) 
(Savage 1998; Ellem 2005). Consequently, the success of coalition unionism may 
• 
be enhanced to the extent that a coalition can mobilise, resource and sustain 
multi-scaled action and organisation. 
To understand multi-scaled coalitions, we can return to social movement 
theorists. They introduce the concept of 'brokers' to understand how a 
movement can operate at a variety of scales (Martin and Miller 2003, p. 152). 
'Brokerage' is a: 
Specific set of linking mechanisms defined as the linking of two or more 
currently unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relation 
with each ()ther and/or with yet another social site (McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly 2001, p. 142). 
For these theorists, brokers refer to single persons (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 
2001). However, the term can be expanded to cover organisations. The role of 
the brokers is to mediate scale, paralleling the concept of bridge builders who 
mediate cultural differences. Adapting this concept to coalitions, coalitions may 
form broker organisations that operate at different scales to enable a coalition to 
act at multiple scales. 
This study uses the term broker to describe coalition activity and new 
organisational forms established by coalitions. that enable a coalition to exercise 
power at additional scales. These may be episodic, as in a strategy to act locally 
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or nationally. A coalition may form relationships between state-scaled 
organisations that facilitate a national coalition capacity, or mobilise state-scaled 
volunteers to take action in local areas. Conversely, it may be a more permanent 
organisational form, what I call a broker organisation, where a coalition 
establishes a permanent structure at a particular scale to manage coalition 
• 
activity at that scale (Tattersall 2006a; Tattersall 2006b; Tattersall 2006c). Thus 
multi-scaled coalition activity may be based on multi-scaled 'mobilisation' or on 
multi-scaled 'organisation' (Flanders 1970; Eisenscher 1999b). 
The idea of multi-scaled coalition activity and broker organisations is not 
sufficiently addressed in existing literature. This thesis will investigate how 
multi-scaled capacity affects a coalition's ability to achieve outcomes against 
employers or government. 
5.3 Local broker organisations 
Aside from the need to influence outcomes, the local scale is critically important 
for coalitions as it is the space at which individuals can participate and be 
decision makers. As Jonas and Patmore note, local coalitions are important 
because they connect the political influence of a coalition to member 
involvement. This is reinforced by recent research based in Australia, that 
suggests that it is in regional areas where union relationships with community 
organisations have been most advanced and most successful (Markey and Nixon 
2004; Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming). 
More centrally scaled coalitions at a city or national level can harness the 
advantages of local activity through local coalition broker organisations. 
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Coalitions are often criticised for substituting member engagement and 
participation for horizontal relationships between organisations (Clawson 2003). 
A local broker organisation provides a specific mechanism that allows a coalition 
to go deep as well as broad. 
• 
The establishment of local broker organisations may provide a coalition with a 
local resource base. Yet this concept of broker organisations is new. It is 
uncertain under what circumstances local broker organisations are likely to be 
effective. The concept of local broker organisations raises important questions 
for this thesis. For instance, do local resources, the space for local planning, 
involvement in central decision making, and the ability to shape a campaign 
responsive to place-based idiosyncrasies affect the success of a local broker 
organisation? If so, how do successful broker organisations shape coalition 
success? Ideally, it appears that local broker organisations could be a space for 
rank and file union and community organisation members to participate in 
coalition decision making. The effectiveness of this space for organisational 
change will be investigated in the case studies. This is possible because broker 
organisations developed in two of the case studies, allowing for a comparison of 
their activities over time. 
5.4 Bringing together scale 
This discussion of opportunity structure and scale identifies some measures for 
understanding successful coalitions. 
Firstly, coalitions can enhance their success if they link their activity with 
available political opportunities. Whether or not a coalition can take advantage 
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of employer or government decisions may help a coalition achieve victories. It 
also may support member engagement in coalition activities by raising 
awareness of the importance of political action. 
Secondly, a coalition's ability to shape employer or political decisions, ~r the 
broader political climate, is affected by the scales of power at which these 
decision makers operate. Coalitions therefore may enhance their ability to 
achieve external victories if they can mobilise or establish organisation at 
multiple scales. 
Finally, the most important scale for enhancing member participation, 
engagement and development is the local scale. Whether a coalition establishes 
local structures and the degree to which those local structures are connected to 
coalition planning and are adequately resourced, will also shape coalition 
success. Local broker organisations enhance a coalition's ability to influence 
locally scaled decision makers and provide a space for members to be decision 
makers in a coalition campaign. 
Overall, a coalition will increase its chance of success if it can harness 
opportunities and take action at multiple scales. The connection between scale 
and coalition success is outlined in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3: Coalition success and scale 
Opportunity Multi-scaled Local broker 
slructure coalitions organisations 
• Use opportunities • Activity at • Local broker 
to maximise influence multiple scales can . . . Winning orgarusations can 
and participation increase coalition sustain local 
outcomes influence influence 
• Connection is not • Acting at multiple • Local broker 
Supportive claimed in the literature scales can intensify organisations can 
political or broaden support provide a base for 
climate for a broad set of future progressive 
values or agenda campaigning and 
agenda-setting 
• Connection is not • Relationships are • Connection is not 
claimed in the literature easiest to build claimed in the 
Sustaining across the same scale literature 
- more scales = more 
relationships 
opportunity for 
sustaining 
relationships 
• Opportunities • Connection is not • Local broker 
Building the create winnable claimed in the organisations can 
capacity of campaigns, and can literature provide 
participating help engage opportunities for 
organisations organisation building member 
members organising capacity 
and politicisation 
6.0 Conclusion: Research Questions on Coalition Unionism 
This chapter builds an analytical framework of elements and measures that 
attempt to understand when coalitions might be successful. It defines success as 
not merely achieving political outcomes, but also creating sustainable 
relationships and organisational capacity; it examines three cornerstones of 
coalition unionism, borrowing from the definition of community established at 
the beginning of the chapter. 
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This literature review identifies a series of measures that may explain the 
different elements of coalitions. This thesis tests the viability of these measures 
by exploring them through three long-term case studies of coalitions by assessing 
how and whether these elements shape coalition unionism success. 
• 
The case studies will examine whether the different elements not only categorise 
coalition variation but also can be used to identify different types of coalition 
practice. They consider if certain combinations of the elements are likely over 
time. For instance, Hyman (2001) not only identified three competing union 
identities - market, class and society - but argued that the combination of these 
identities defined different types of union practice in England, Germany and 
Italy (Hyman 2001). The case studies will therefore explore if, and how, the 
elements operate in combination, to produce different types of coalition 
unionism. 
Like Hyman, this study explores whether combinations of these elements 
effectively describe different ideal types, or models, of coalition unionism. 
Hyman builds his ideal types from three axes of union identity (Hyman 2001). 
Following this, it explores the utility of breaking down the coalition elements 
into models of coalition unionism. 
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Figure 2.4: Three models of coalition unionism 
Inter-organisational Relationships 
Common 
Concern 
\
elationship-
driven 
Scale 
agenda-driven 
• 
First, is the combination of strong common concern and multi-scalar contextual 
capacity, without strong inter-organisational relationships. This study calls this 
'agenda-driven' coalition unionism, where there is a strong institutional base for 
membership participation in the coalition, with an incomplete structural form 
supporting inter-organisational relationships. Ultimately this form of coalition 
unionism has strength in its purpose and strategy but weakness in its inter-
organisational relationships. 
Second, is the combination of strong multi-scalar contextual capacity and inter-
organisational relationships, but weak common concern. This study calls this 
'relationship-driven' coalition unionism, where there is a strong set of inter-
organisational relationships and a strong participatory process capable of acting 
with multiple scales, but a weak common concern that limits interest buy-in from 
organisations. Ultimately this form of coalition unionism has structural and 
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strategic strength, but weakness in how it frames and engages organisations in 
its purpose. 
Third, is the combination of strong inter-organisational relationships and 
common concern but weak contextual capacity to act at multiple scales. This 
• 
study defines this as 'mobilising' coalition unionism, where there are strong 
inter-organisational relationships and a strong framework for negotiating 
common concern, but a weak capacity for multi-scaled activity due to a lack of 
broker organisations and/or means for developing local decision making 
amongst the rank and file. Ultimately this coalition form has strength in 
structure and purpose, but a weakness in its strategic multi-scalar engagement 
with the external world. 
These three models of coalition unionism are an attempt to categorise different 
coalition practice. according to the strengths and weaknesses of the coalition 
elements they sustain over the long term. Thes research undertaken in this thesis 
explores if these categories are useful to describe coalitions, and I consider why 
these elements might exist in partial contradiction. After all, underpinning these 
three ideal types is the suggestion that there is a tension between the elements 
that inhibits the realisation of all three elements acting with strength. The case 
studies explore how these different coalition forms operate and how these 
differences contribute to variations in practice and success. 
Accordingly, this chapter has reframed a definition of community to create a 
framework for structuring the literature on coalition unionism in order to 
identify elements and measures of when and how coalitions are likely to be 
successful. This review has focused on coalitions between unions and 
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community organisations. But, as argued earlier, a critical element of coalition 
unionism is the question of unions themselves. The next chapter specifically 
investigates unions. Using literature within industrial relations, as well as 
several multi-disciplinary areas that have recently branched into labour studies, 
Chapter Three considers how union collaboration is considered to be effective 
• 
and also considers when it is likely for unions to engage in long-term coalitions. 
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Chapter Three 
Unions and Coalition Unionism 
This chapter narrows the analysis of coalition unionism to the central role of 
unions. Too often the scholarship on coalitions assumes that coalitions are 
powerful and useful for unions, without exploring the dynamics of suc~essful 
coalition unionism from a union perspective. Moreover, when coalitions are 
viewed from the position of unions, coalitions are frequently seen as an 
instrumental, vanguard source of power 'for unions' (Frege, Heery and Turner 
2004; Nissen 2004a, p. 437), instead of exploring the potential power that can 
arise from a longer term, reciprocal alignment between community organisations 
and unions. Whereas the previous chapter considered successful coalition 
practice, this chapter explores (i) how and when coalitions support union 
collaborative power, and (ii) when unions are likely to engage in coalitions. 
In focusing on the specific role of unions, this chapter moves into the industrial 
relations discipline. It considers theoretical analysis of union collaboration as a 
specific example of union power, and within that, analyses coalitions with 
community organisations as one specific form of collaboration. In this study, 
union power is understood by building off the definition of coalition success 
established earlier. Unions are thus considered to be increasingly powerful to 
the degree to which they can achieve outcomes, shift the political climate, sustain 
relationships with allied community organisations and increase their internal 
capacity, in particular the ability of their members to participate in the union. 
However, as this chapter uncovers, the question of union collaboration with 
community organisations receives little attention in industrial relations 
scholarship. This is despite a convergence of radical and traditional industrial 
92 
relations scholars calling for research work on union collaboration with 
community organisations (Hyman 2001, p. 174; Kochan 2005, p. xi). To take up 
this challenge, this study draws on a broad range of multi-disciplinary 
scholarship on union collaboration to develop a framework of how, why and 
when collaboration between unions and community organisations is likely and 
• 
powerful for unions. 
1.0 How and When do Coalitions Increase the Power of Unions? 
Different perspectives on the role and importance of union collaboration arise 
from the various theoretical and ideological understandings of union purpose 
across industrial relations literature. Yet the contradictory ideological values that 
underpin liberal 'pluralist' and Marxian 'radical' perspectives have resulted in a 
parallel, bifurcated analysis of collaboration. Debate is deadlocked, with 
theorists tending to send shots across the bow, accusing each other of supporting 
'partnership', lacking 'power' or believing in 'class warfare' (Taylor and Mathers 
2002; Turner 2004). There is not a synthesised approach that attempts to derive 
lessons from across these different perspectives. Consequently, analysis of how 
and why collaboration is powerful for unions is limited. 
This section attempts to build a framework for understanding one form of 
successful union collaboration - collaboration with community organisations. It 
does this by reviewing a broad spectrum of traditional, radical and more recent 
cross-disciplinary approaches. It presents a synthesised view of union 
collaborative strategies (Turner 2004; Frege and Kelly 2004b). This approach 
follows the recent revival in industrial relations scholarship evidenced by 
Ackers' s neo-pluralism, interest in 'new actors' in industrial relations (Jones 2002; 
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Heery and Frege 2006; Osterman 2006),< and Hyman and Kelly's radicalism 
(Kelly 1998; Hyman 2001; Ackers 2002). This section considers three areas of 
industrial relations research: pluralism, radical theory and labour geography. It 
identifies different forms of power that collaboration with community 
organisations may provide unions. These forms of power build off the definition 
• 
of success developed in the previous chapter. The section considers not only 
how coalitions can help unions achieve outcomes and a supportive political 
climate, but build sustainable relationships and internal union capacity that 
advance a union's purpose. 
1.1 Pluralist industrial relations theory 
In traditional approaches, UK pluralists and American systems theorists argue 
that unions may collaborate with employers and the state to advance wages and 
conditions (Bean 1994, p. 2). Until recently, these theories have tended to ignore 
community organisations (Heery and Frege 2006). However, their relational 
focus, while weakened by a narrow economic frame and a cursory analysis of 
power, builds an understanding of relational power that operates as a 
cornerstone of union collaborative power.5 
Pluralists consider collaboration a key form of union power, but narrow their 
focus to economic and employment-based collaborative relationships with 
industrial actors, such as employers and the state (Dunlop 1958). Unions 
collaborate with employers and the state to achieve their perceived purpose, 
4 Current interest is highlighted by two symposiums on 'new actors', one by the British Journal of Industrial 
Relations in 2005 and in Sydney by the University of Sydney in November 2006. There was also a special 
edition on new actors in the British Journal of Industrial Relations, (2006) 44, 4. 
5 While Ackers acknowledges the important role of 'community' and social partnership, he analyses the 
partnerships between business and the community rather than unions and community groups (Ackers 2002, 
p 18). 
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which is the economic advancement of union members through bargaining and 
the social regulation of work through the state (Chamberlain 1951; Dunlop 1958, 
p. 7; Flanders 1970, pp. 41-3). 
Pluralists' focus on interdependent economic relationships has an ol:wious 
weakness for understanding coalition unionism in that it excludes 'outsiders' like 
community organisations from the unit of analysis (Patmore 1997). This narrow 
frame of reference precludes an explicit analysis of the effect that potentially 
supportive organisations may have on union interactions with the external world 
(Patmore 1997, p. 243). 
This theoretical blindness has been criticised by Dabscheck in Australia and Piore 
in the US (Dabscheck 1994; Dabscheck 1995; Piore 1995), and has led to a 
formative theory of community industrial relations that seeks to incorporate the 
role of community (inter)actors (Bellemare 2000; Jones 2002). Dabscheck 
suggests that industrial relations theory should include 'interactors' - any 
'individual, group or organisation involved in real-world industrial relations', 
including 'women's feminist, Aboriginal, immigrant, ethnic, youth, church, 
religious and other groups' (Dabscheck 1994, p. 11). Beyond descriptively 
suggesting the importance of community organisations (Michelson and Westcott 
2001; Dabscheck 2002), Bellemare and Jones argue that actors, such as service 
users or the wives of unionists, can measurably affect industrial relations 
outcomes, and thus must be incorporated into industrial relations theory 
(Bellemare 2000; Jones 2002). Paralleling the idea of mutual self-interest, Jones 
suggests that employee relationships with community organisations or identity-
based groups, like women's organisations, can enhance union activity by 
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requiring compromises and reciprocity (Dabscheck 2002, p. 139; Jones 2002, pp. 
162-3). 
While usefully introducing the role of community organisations, these new actor 
theories still beg the question of how this new variable of 'community actor' 
• 
affects industrial relations, and in particular what types of relationships vary the 
impact of these actors. Additionally, they tend to measure the utility of these 
relationships according to industrial outcomes (Bellemare 2000, pp. 398~9; 
Dabscheck 2002, p.141), rather than more subjective understandings of success 
such as union capacity or the sustainability of those relationships. 
However, we can adapt the insights of pluralists themselves to help fill this gap. 
As Walton and McKersie envisaged in 1965, the behavioural theory of labour 
negotiation could be used to help explain 'all forms of social negotiations' 
(Kochan 1974; Walton and McKersie 1991, p. 281). Despite this potential, these 
theories have not been applied to social movement forms, and in particular have 
not been applied to relationships between coalition actors. 
Despite pluralists' tendency to segregate collaborative relationships from the 
social context of power imbalances between workers and employers (Hyman 
1978, p. 35), they develop useful and comprehensive theories of collaboration 
that explore patterns of negotiation and relational collaborative power (Dunlop 
1958). The behavioural theory of labour negotiation is the most detailed analysis 
of the mechanisms of negotiation and decision-making processes (Kochan 1992), 
which may have useful implications for understanding union collaboration with 
community organisations 
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However, behavioural theories of bargaining have had limited application. 
While dominant in the USA, these theories have not had widespread use in the 
UK, Canada or Australia.• While influencing industrial relations from a labour-
management perspective, they have rarely been used by writers examining 
industrial relations from a union perspective (Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986; 
• 
Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld and McKersie 1994; Fells 1998a; Fells and 
Skeffington 1998b; Fells 1998b; Heery and Frege 2006). 
Behavioural theory can be used to make important contributions to 
understanding the variables within coalition relationships, specifically to their 
decision-making processes. Usefully, unions and community organisations, even 
where they contain members from different social classes, have the capacity to 
overcome difference and collaborate on issues of common concern (Rose 2000). 
There are common features of the 'collaborative process' between the issues 
which Walton and McKersie examine in labour-management relationships and 
the questions this study examines in coalition practice. Behavioural theories can 
be used to broaden our understanding of how relational collaborative power 
varies between unions and community organisations. 
Behavioural theory recognises that relationships between collaborative partners 
operate along a continuum of two extremes of distributive and integrative 
bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1991). This continuum reflects the diversity of 
decision-making processes across coalition relationships from conflict to 
consensus. Distributive bargaining is based on conflict, and more usefully for 
6 The major exception is Fells, whose application of the behavioral theory of bargaining to Australia has been 
published in UK, Canadian and Australian journals (Fells 1998a, Fells 1998b, Fells 1998b). See also Smith 
(1981) for an application to New Zealand. These are amongst the few international applications. 
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our purpose, integrative bargaining is based on forging a consensus (Walton and 
McKersie 1991; Fells 1998b). Integrative bargaining, like the analysis of coalitions 
in Chapter Two, is underpinned by the assumption that parties act on their self-
interest but are capable of acting beyond it to serve effective negotiations (Walton 
and McKersie 1965). Integrative bargaining requires parties to recognise their 
• 
interdependence and their capacity to work together to create mutual gains. Like 
effective coalition practice, integrative bargaining is supported by a shared 
understanding of information and interests, frequent interaction and a strong 
sense of trust and respect between the parties (Walton and McKersie 1965; 
Peterson and Tracy 1977, p. 43; Smith and Turkington 1981). 
The objective of integrative bargaining is the establishment of positive-sum 'win-
win' negotiation outcomes, where each party achieves organisational victories 
simultaneously in its own interests and the other party's interests (Walton and 
McKersie 1965). 1t is speculated that integrative bargaining is perhaps easier on 
'soft questions' like workplace conditions rather than wages, whose costs are less 
quantifiable, where benefits may be indirectly felt by multiple parties and where 
negotiation may be easier (Walton and McKersie 1965; Tracy 1974; Peterson and 
Tracy 1977). 
Behavioural theory also recognises that personal relationships and the 
organisational leadership of the parties, described as attitudinal structuring, 
affect negotiation processes (Peterson and Tracy 1977, p. 35; Walton and 
McKersie 1991, p. 5, 185). These theorists emphasise the importance of context, 
as well as the individuals doing the negotiation, including their personality, level 
of planning and social belief, as elements that shape relationship longevity and 
capacity for consensus (Walton and McKersie 1965; Tracy and Peterson 1986; 
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Fells 1998a, pp. 190-9). They connect attitudinal alignment to the need for 
organisational leaders to have a self-oriented understanding of their needs and 
behaviour, warning of the importance of cooperation rather than collusion. 
Cooperation brings parties together through a recognition of their own interests, 
whereas collusion brings parties together to the exclusion of their own interests 
• 
(Walton and McKersie 1965, pp. 188, 263). While their work focuses on the role 
of leaders, some scholars acknowledge the role of internal organisational 
pressures. Internal pressures include factional disputes and the imperative to 
'manage' disputes down into the rank and file, with their use of the concept of 
inter-organisational bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1991; Fells 1998a). 
Behavioural theorists also identify strategies to support attitudinal alignment, 
which extends the discussion of organisational relations introduced in Chapter 
Two. These include an understanding of other organisations' interests, 
identifying points in common, de-emphasising differences, using a similar 
language, sharing views of outsiders and evaluating practice based on mutual 
success (Walton and McKersie 1965; Smith and Turkington 1981, pp. 225-9). 
Pluralists' concentration on the relational nature of collaboration offers a 
valuable insight into how union collaboration with community organisations can 
be successful. Their major weakness, framing union collaboration as a narrow 
activity concentrated within a finite set of industrial relations abstracted from the 
social distribution of power, can be turned into a positive for understanding 
coalitions. As in bargaining relationships, coalitions bring together differently 
interested organisations to maximise organisational strength for common 
purposes. 
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Pluralists identify a range of behaviours that are common to union collaboration 
with community organisations, and help explain when they might be sustainable 
and mutual. These factors include the importance of common interest, the role of 
leaders in coalition decision making, the importance of forming relationships 
outside of specific campaigns to identify mutual 'problems' and forge trust, and 
• 
their categorisation of the range of bargaining relationships, from distributive to 
integrative forms of bargaining. Importantly, pluralists suggest that integrative 
'win-win' bargaining with community organisations is more likely to result in 
sustainable relationships than distributive bargaining. The implication is that 
deeper, trusting relationships may offer greater potential for lasting union power 
than a short-term instrumental relationship with a community organisation. 
That is, a long-term, positive-sum relationship may be more likely to enable a 
union to not only achieve outcomes and build sustainable organisational 
relationships, but also achieve political climate change and enhance internal 
organisational capacity. 
Despite the weakness of 'power analysis' in pluralist approaches, their approach 
to relational negotiation is useful for understanding when and how union 
collaboration with community organisations may provide a relational form of 
collaborative power. 
1.2 Radical industrial relations 
Radical theorists deal sparingly with how union power- that is, a union's ability 
to achieve outcomes, climate change, sustain relationships or build internal 
capacity - is enhanced by collaboration with community organisations. 
However, lessons can be drawn from their insights about the difficulties imposed 
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by the external pressures of capitalism, the importance of coalitions for class 
consciousness, the challenges of coalition sustainability for unions, and how 
\ , ... ...,. 
coalitions can assist unions to broaden their agenda. There are two 
contemporary waves of radical industrial relations theory; a 1970s Marxist 
perspective and more recent work connecting Marxism and social movement 
• 
theory. 
Firstly, radical theorists diverge from pluralists by focusing on the effect of class 
relations, arguing that the potential for collaboration is informed by whether 
relations are inter or intra-class-based. Radicals insist that all social relations are 
class relations, shaping institutions such as the state towards the interests of 
those who are dominant in society. For them, the state is shaped by capitalism, 
the influence of the ruling class and the historical patterns of class struggle (Marx 
and Engels 1967; Gramsci 1971, pp. 237-9). Radicals suggest that relationships 
solely with employers or the state are inherently limited because of the conflict of 
interest created by class. Unions may be able to have negotiated outcomes with 
employers or the state but class conflict cannot be permanently resolved; 
relationships with the state or employers are more transient, shaped by a union's 
internal collective strength, including the participation of its members and their 
willingness to take action. 
Radicals argue that coalitions potentially contribute to union capacity in four 
ways: by broadening union identity and enhancing internal solidarity and class 
movement consciousness; by creating trusting and powerful external relational 
solidarity that assists unions to challenge and make gains against contradictory 
class forces - particularly employers and the state; by potentially acting as a 
change agent for unions; and finally by providing a capacity to create an agenda-
I 01 
setting power for unions that can integrate economic and political concerns 
(Levesque and Murray 2002). 
Radicals argue that coalitions can expand a union's internal class movement 
capacity by expanding the social and class identity of unions and the 
• 
consciousness of union members. While most radicals argue that unions 
generally do not act as agents of class power, some suggest that under certain 
circumstances unions can be class-based organisations (Hyman 1971; Hyman 
1975; Hyman 2001). 
At a leadership level, coalitions may expand a union's organisational identity. 
Hyman argues that union identity is derived from three social forces: the market, 
society and class (Hyman 2001). Yet today union identities are 'adrift', suffering 
'ideological disorientation' (Hyman 2001, p. 173). In this vacuum, coalitions can 
be seen as \1 ·medium for recapturing a social vision and class capacity; in 
Hyman's terms coalitions may support new union 'utopias' (Hyman 2001, pp. 
173, 176). This is because coalitions provide a vehicle for opening the 
organisational range of unions, allowing them to form common interests with 
other organisations and broaden their basis for solidarity (Hyman 1997; Rose 
2000; Levesque and Murray 2002; Obach 2004, pp. 184-5). 
Yet radicals also insist that union identity and solidarity cannot be 
'manufactured from above', suggesting that union member engagement is 
critical to strategies for horizontal coalition solidarity (Hyman 1975, p. 65; 
Hyman 1994; Taylor and Mathers 2002; Clawson 2003). Connecting union 
members to coalition campaigns is essential for expanding coalition capacity 
(Kelly 1998, p. 174; Hyman 2001; Levesque and Murray 2002; Clawson 2003). 
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Coalitions potentially have the capacity to act as agents for deepening and 
broadening union identity by increasing the political consciousness and 
engagement of union members. This may not always be the case; some 
coalitions, like many unions, focus on sectional union concerns like wage claims 
• 
(Nissen 2004a). However, when a coalition engages with the mutual interests of 
other organisations or operates with a broadening social frame, the engagement 
of the union in the coalition may open up the class consciousness of union 
members to a broader set of social concerns. A qualitative understanding of 
union power is important here, as radicals emphasise that it is not simply the 
numerical presence of union members that creates union power, but the extent to 
which they are willing to take different forms of action and the extent to which 
they are willing to take action on a multiplicity of (class) issues (Hyman 2001). 
Radicals use the concept of class consciousness to argue that internal union 
solidarity helps union members perceive that their individual interests are 
connected to the broader interests of the working class. This is not an automatic 
process; while union members exist as a sectional 'class-of-itself', part of the 
working class commonly oppressed by capital, class consciousness is the process 
that sees the working class unite into a 'class-for-itself' willing to take action 'in 
defence of class interests' (Marx 1963, p. 15; Fantasia 1988, pp. 8-10). 
While radicals argue that class consciousness is important, how a union's class 
' 
consciousness is broadened and whether coalitional unionism may affect this 
process is uncertain (Fantasia 1988). Hyman argues that politicisation is not an 
'abstraction', but rather begins with 'localised sympathies' growing out of the 
'imaginative extension of what is directly experienced' (Hyman 1975, p. 178). 
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Similarly, Fantasia's work on working class solidarity suggests that workplace 
mobilisation can be a space for broadening class consciousness, through the 
'lived process' of struggle, organisation and contention (Fantasia 1988). Yet, 
whether these processes of 'imaginative extension' of direct experience or 
struggle are enhanced by coalition unionism is not explored. 
• 
Separately from the Marxist tradition, social movement theorists suggest that an 
integration of pre-existing community identities with the union may also support 
the expansion of class consciousness. Like Hyman's emphasis on 'lived 
experience', Clawson and Kelley suggest that pre-existing collective identities 
such as race, ethnicity, location or gender may enhance class consciousness if 
they are connected to workplace experiences (Kelley 1997, p. 91; Hyman 2001; 
Clawson 2003). This analysis has its roots in new social movement theory. 
Touraine argues that 'post-industrial identities' beyond the workplace can assist 
the developmer~t of class consciousness (Touraine 1981, pp. 33-4; Touraine 1995; 
Hyman 2001). The importance of interlinking identities is evident in the 
secondary literature. For example, the SEIU's Justice for Janitors campaign aims 
to connect the identity of workers as migrants to the union's capacity to act as an 
agent for migrant workers while campaigning for collective bargaining rights 
(Savage 1998; Clawson 2003). As Fraser argues, this integration of the politics of 
recognition and redistribution increases worker commitment to the union by 
integrating non-union and union identities and expanding the concerns of the 
union from simple economic concerns for wages to the social recognition of 
immigrants (Fraser 1997). 
Coalitions may play a similar role in increasing the class movement power of 
union members. However, when coalitions are able to do this most effectively 
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remains uncertain. While union renewal theorists examined in Chapter Two 
speculate about the importance of mutual self-interest coalitions or the operation 
of a broad social frame for creating effective coalitions, there is not a detailed 
exploration by radical theorists that connects the process of union engagement in 
coalitions with how coalition practice may or may not enhance engagement or 
class consciousness of union members. This thesis will explore th!s gap, 
considering when and how coalitions may provide a mechanism for broadening 
class consciousness and thus the class movement power of unions. 
Radical theorists also provide an insight into when coalitions are likely to 
enhance a union's relational power and be sustainable for unions. Productive 
horizontal solidarity is not automatic, and cliches such as 'solidarity forever' 
disguise the possibilities and difficulties for collaborative relationships between 
unions and community organisations (Ackers 2002; Ellem and Shields 2004, p. 5). 
For instance, while the term 'united front' asserts the importance of collaboration 
between the organisations of the working class, middle class and working class 
parties, more recent industrial relations theorists have not explored under what 
conditions united front relationships are likely to be effective, or contribute to 
renewal. 
Indirectly, radical scholarship provides some lessons about the circumstances 
under which coalitions may support sustainable relationships for unions, in their 
work on union-to-union collaboration. Hyman emphasises the permanent 
dialectic of unity and sectionalism, recognising that a negotiated tension between 
organisational unity and organisational sectionalism is the conceptual 
foundation for robust, successful collaboration (Hyman 1975; Hyman 1989). 
Unions are autonomous, forced to respond to sectional concerns created by 
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industrial location, leadership and member concerns and democratic processes. 
Yet between unions there are common concerns that create the need for unity. 
As Hyman argues, 'solidarity implies the perception of commonalities of interest 
and purpose which extend, but do not abolish, consciousness of distinct and 
particularistic circumstances' (Hyman 2001, p. 170). These simultaneous tensions 
• 
cannot be overcome, but rather are permanently balanced; and thus Hyman 
argues that collaboration must: 
respect differentiations of circumstances and interests ... the alignment 
and integration of diverse interests is a complex difficult task which 
requires continuous processes of negotiation: real solidarity cannot be 
imposed (Hyman 2001, p. 174). 
This thesis aims to extend this insight about union-to-union collaboration to 
union collaboration with community organisations. It considers what practices 
can help balance the permanent tension of unity and sectionalism in coalitions to 
support relational collaborative power for unions. 
Thirdly, radicals suggest that in certain circumstances external organisations, and 
by extension coalitions, can act as change agents for unions themselves. Deriving 
from Lenin's claim about the social transformative role of the Communist Party 
(Lenin 1970), Marxists envisage the possibility of outside organisations widening 
the vision and mobilisation capacity of unions (Hyman 1971; Hyman 2001). 
Similarly, new social movement theorists and union renewal writers in the social 
movement tradition argue that new social movements have the capacity to 
radicalise 'old' social movements such as unions (Touraine 1981). This claim is 
supported abstractly in the union renewal literature, which suggests that 
community organisations can cause unions to change (Waterman 1991; Moody 
1997; Rose 2000; Clawson 2003). Yet neither radicals, new social movement nor 
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union renewal writers document the factors that explain how these movements 
can change unions. This thesis will seek to describe under what conditions a 
coalition structure may facilitate change in unions. 
Finally, radical theorists argue that collaboration also has the capacity to deliver 
• 
agenda-setting power. Agenda-setting power is widely used in political science 
and communications theory to refer to the ability for political parties, the media, 
institutions or civil society organisations to shape the political agenda (Dahl1957; 
Cobb and Elder 1971; Lukes 1974). Associated with pluralism, 'agenda-setting' 
power is viewed from the perspective of political outcomes, and is commonly 
used to focus on how a political agenda is exercised and reproduced within 
representative democracy (through political parties and the media) (Layer and 
Budge 1992; Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2005). In 
contrast, radicals, including social movement and Marxist theorists, consider 
how civil society organisations can shape the public agenda through crisis and 
counter-hegemonic alternatives (Gamson 1968; Gramsci 1971). Hyman argues 
that a key resource for unions is the ability to create an agenda that influences the 
'attitudes and perceptions of employers, governments, the general public and 
their own members so as to create a favourable ideological climate' (Hyman 
1994, p. 127). Hyman argues that the unions that have greatest success in 
achieving this social 'mobilisation of bias' are those: 
which have helped generate broad definitions of membership interests, 
formulated and propagated an extensive agenda, and cultivated alliances 
with social movements whose concerns overlap with theirs (Hyman 1994, 
p. 131). 
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Coalitions may be capable of supporting a 'bottom up' agenda-setting power 
with a counter-hegemonic quality that challenges the power of the ruling class by 
presenting an alternative, legitimate plan in the interests of society at large 
(Gramsci 1971). 
• 
Coalition agenda setting creates a counter-hegemonic form of union power by 
intervening into the disorganising tendencies of capitalism. Capitalism is 
assumed to be based on the formal separation of the economic and the political. 
According to radicals, this separation is real but illusory (Holloway and Picciotto 
1977, p. 80; Holloway and Picciotto 1978, pp. 17-8, 78; Meiksins Wood 1995). The 
capitalist state may appear distinct from the capitalist class, yet the social power 
of large firms allows capital to shape the practices of the capitalist state (Miliband 
1973; Poulantzas 1973; Holloway and Picciotto 1978; Jessop 1982). To limit the 
power of the ruling class, radicals argue that union demands must traverse the 
economic and -political because the joining of political and economic struggles 
confronts the tendency of capitalists and the capitalist state to separate them 
(Hyman 1971, p. 8; Hyman 2001, p. 20). Coalitions provide a vehicle for 
connecting economic struggles to political struggles by potentially connecting the 
economic power of the workplace to political action against the state. 
Radical theory usefully demonstrates that coalition power is shaped by class 
relations. It suggests that coalitions may be able to broaden the economistic 
tendencies of unions, creating organisations that act with broader class interests. 
Radicals argue that the common interests of the working class can become a 
vehicle for building class movement union power, a second form of union 
collaborative power. Yet the means by which coalitions broaden union identity, 
politicise union members, create sustainable relations and create agenda-setting 
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power is less clearly outlined. A key aim of this thesis is to understand the 
mechanisms behind these abstracted, sometimes overly theoretical claims of 
radical theorists, by identifying the change processes through empirical studies 
of coalitions. 
• 
1.3 Labour geography 
A union's external struggle indicates whether it will use collaborative.strategies, 
and if so, what type. However, industrial relations theorists have often been 
blind to one critical aspect of this context - the spatial dimensions of industrial 
relations. This section, like Chapter Two, uses labour geography to explore how 
space, scale and place shape the possibilities for union collaboration. Here the 
focus is explicitly on how the geography of industrial relations shapes 
collaboration with community organisations to support the place-based power of 
unions. 
Geographers argue that the changing context of work challenges the possibilities 
and context of union practice, and thus the potential for powerful coalition 
unionism. In industrialised countries, the workplace and work regulation have 
decentralised as employers seek to replace the union-dominated industrial 
conditions that evolved under Keynesianism's nationally scaled regulation with 
non-union enterprise-based, individualised workplaces (Savage 1998; Walsh 
2000; Hudson 2001). Yet power is rarely unipolar and geographers note another 
contradiction in work regulation: while capital has the potential to flow globally, 
in re-regulating work environments 'place matters' (Massey 1984; Visser 2003). 
The fact that workers are relatively tied to place because of social reproduction, 
and are organised through multi-scaled union structures, creates a base upon 
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which powerful union action, and union collaboration, can emerge (Amin 1999, 
p. 42; Castree, Coe, Ward et al. 2004, p. 96; Ellem 2005). 
Labour geography makes several important contributions to understanding how 
coalitions are powerful for unions. Firstly it emphasises the scalar attributes of 
• 
coalition unionism. Secondly it emphasises the potential of the local scale for 
coalitions, and, in given industrial and political contexts, a union's internal 
organisational scales and the importance of union member engagement. Thirdly 
it points to the importance of 'place consciousness'. 
The multi-scaled form of industrial and political relations requires coalitions to 
operate with new kinds of articulation at multiple levels. Geographers 
emphasise that collaboration is a process of multi-scalar exchange, where 
mobilisation and capacity at one scale or level affect outcomes at other scales 
(Massey 1984, p. 337; Levesque and Murray 2002; Castree, Coe, Ward et al. 2004; 
Ellem 2005). Geographers emphasise the relational nature of power between 
scales and thus the importance of harnessing union action and collaborative 
action at multiple scales (Sadler 2004; Ellem 2005). Yet it is unresolved whether 
coalition unionism is more powerful at particular scales or if coalition unionism 
is most powerful when the coalitions themselves are multi-scaled. While Herod 
argues that no scale is primary (Herod 2001), it may be the case that in certain 
contexts, coalition unionism at particular scales may be more powerful or more 
likely Gonas 1998; Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming). This raises two important 
issues for when collaboration might be powerful for unions: how does the 
industrial and political context of a union vary the power of collaboration for 
unions? Secondly, how does the organisational structure and scale of a union 
vary the potential power of coalition unionism? 
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A union's industrial context may provide opportunities for coalitions to directly 
enhance a union's place-based power, particularly at the local scale. 
Geographers argue that the apparent mobility of capital is somewhat illusory 
(Harvey 1982; Herod 1997; Hudson 2001). The needs for capital investment from 
• 
the state and local government, the need for proximity of service provision to 
consumers, and the fixed form of primary industries, for instance, create spatial 
constraints to the mobility of capital in certain industries - tying it to place 
(Walsh 2000; Hudson 2001; Ellem 2005). In industries with a spatial tie, locally 
focused action has significant power over capital (Harvey 1982). Ellem, in 
analysing resource extraction in mining towns, and Savage in analysing low-paid 
service work such as cleaning, argue that unions may increase their control of 
space through union collaboration with community organisations (Savage 1998; 
Ellem 2003; Ellem 2005). Consequently, union collaboration may be particularly 
powerful for unions in industries where capital has ties to place. 
Similarly, coalitions can enhance union political power, as coalitions could be 
used to leverage political power to defend and regulate union and community 
concerns (Walsh 2000). Government is a multi-scaled decision-making body, 
operating at the scale of a city council, state or nation, but also at a local scale- at 
the scale of local electoral districts (Taylor and Flint 2000). Political power has 
historically been an important form of relational power for unions, yet arguably 
this form of power has declined as unions have become less capable of securing 
work regulation that supports the interests of unions or working people (Hudson 
2001; Tattersall 2006a). Coalitions could provide a mechanism for unions to 
rebuild political influence by advocating for political regulation to act as a 
'spatial fix' that defends the collective interests of labour against the 
Ill 
decentralising and competitive interests of capital (Herod 1995; Walsh 2000). 
This might not simply be at the national scale, but perhaps could be more 
successful at local metropolitan and municipal government (Walsh 2000; Pike, 
O'Brien and Tomaney 2004). Furthermore, because much public sector work is 
provided to a local consumer market and is considered socially valuable, there 
• 
might be consumer or community organisation allies available for coalition work 
Gohnston 1994; Walsh 2000; Tattersall2006a). 
Public sector unions in particular reveal these intersections among human 
service work, fixed sources of public investment and the importance of political 
power for union power. This thesis focuses specifically on public sector union 
coalitions because they allow for a detailed examination of how scale, both 
locally and at multiple scales of government, affects the usefulness of coalitions 
for union strategy. However, while public sector unionism is a key research 
interest in this thesis, it is not the exclusive research focus. The findings in this 
thesis may extend beyond public sector union coalitions. This is because the 
fortunes of public sector union coalitions are produced in part by the public 
sector's multi-scalar nature rather than simply because of its public sector 
location. 
Yet the ability for multi-scaled coalition action to deliver for unions also relates to 
the internal organisational scale(s) and capacity of unions themselves. It is 
argued that there is often a spatial gap between unions and community 
organisations. Community organisations tend to be based at the local scale 
whereas unions tend to be organised (and have vested authority and resources) 
with a leadership based at a state or national level (Wial 1993; Wills 2002; Pike, 
O'Brien and Tomaney 2004; Fine forthcoming). This question of the space of 
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union organisation has received limited attention from labour geographers, who 
tend to focus on the possibilities of scaling up union action to the global scale, 
often assuming that unions are powerful at the local scale (Harvey 1993, pp. 430-
1; Peck 1996, p. 257; Castree, Coe, Ward eta!. 2004, p. 209).7 This spatial gap may 
create difficulties for building strong coalitions at the local level. A union's 
• 
capacity, or 'internal solidarity', varies depending on the types of delegate and 
communication structures, and whether unions have decentralised branches 
which allow union rank and file members a space to participate in decision 
making (Levesque and Murray 2002; Pike, O'Brien and Tomaney 2004). Yet the 
relationship between multi-scalar union structures and coalitions is a gap in the 
coalition literature. In investigating the effect of union scale, this study also 
assesses the degree to which decentralised union structures affect the place-based 
power of union collaboration. 
Labour geographers also suggest that the local in general may be a powerful site 
for union engagement in coalition unionism, because of the power of local social 
networks and 'place consciousness'. It is at the local where workers live, 
reproduce their labour power, retain a memory of social action and where 
participation in coalitions is accessible (Harvey 1989; Martin, Sunley and Wills 
1993; Hudson 2001; Wills 2004). The local scale is not an isolated space; 
geographers insist that it is shaped by and shapes social relations at other scales. 
However, the local retains an importance for coalitions because it is the space for 
participation and engagement in coalitions by union members and with 
7 Those who focus on 'up-scaling' to combat global capital often go so far as to deride the 'militant 
particularism of labour struggle'. They firstly assume militant labour struggle exists (when arguably it is in 
crisis) and further assumes that local action is not sufficiently powerful to challenge employer or 
government decision making .. 
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community organisations, and because the location of coalition action may be 
supported by place consciousness (Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming). 
Place consciousness may also enhance union power and the possibilities of 
coalition unionism. Ellem uses the term place consciousness to argue th'l): places 
can hold memories of struggle and experience, conditioning and affecting future 
actions (Ellem 2005).8 The local scale is a space of both workplace and non-
workplace identities, and economic production and social reproduction (Savage 
1998). It is where the membership base of community organisations such as 
religious organisations or immigrant organisations overlap with union 
membership (Wial 1993; Clawson 2003; Wills 2004). Similarly a history of 
struggle, particularly union struggle, may support future union and coalition 
organising. Conversely, but less studied empirically, a place may have a hostile 
place consciousness, where individuals from a particular location have a history 
of exclusion from unions or are anti-union (Patmore 1997). Within a multi-scaled 
or a locally-scaled coalition strategy, the power of coalition unionism may be 
impacted if staged at a local scale because of supportive or hostile place 
consciousness. 
Labour geographers' insights about the importance of scale in industrial relations 
extend to coalition unionism. They open up questions about how the scalar 
nature of coalitions, the geography of industry and politics, the multi-scaled 
nature of unions and the role of the local scale and place consciousness shape the 
potential power coalitions can provide unions. 
s Similarly Castree .. Coe, Ward et al. use the term 'place identities' (Castree, Coe, Ward et al. 2004: p. 71). 
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1.4 Rethinking powerful union collaboration 
This review of collaborative literature highlights the need for industrial relations 
to broaden its analysis to include community organisations. Furthermore it 
identifies three discrete types of union collaborative power with community 
organisations that are suggestive of a new framework of collaboration. Drawn 
• 
from three different literatures, this study argues that collaborative power 
operates as three distinct types: as relational power from the pluralists, class 
movement power from the radical theorists and place-based power from the 
geographers. These types of collaborative power may provide vehicles for a 
renewal of union power. 
These three types have similarities with the definitions of community and 
coalition set out in Chapter Two. Relational power connects to the 
'organisational' definition of community and the 'inter-organisational 
relationships' element of coalitions; class movement power connects to the 
'common interest/identity' definition of community and the 'common concern' 
element of coalitions; and place-based power connects to the 'place' definition of 
community and the 'scale' element of coalitions. 
Bringing these three concepts together and connecting them with the theoretical 
project of the thesis overall, this section points to a new conceptual framework of 
union collaboration with community organisations, that builds on my definition 
of community. This is laid out in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Three types of union collaborative power 
Relational Power 
(C<>ohtionf •lnter-<>rgani ... tlonal Reloolloi'IOhlpo) 
{CommiDlity • Organ..allon) 
Class Movement Power 
(Co•IIIIOIII • Common Concern) 
(Community • Common lnlerot~Vldentlty) 
Place-based Power 
(Coallllono•Scale) 
(Commumty • Pia«>) 
• 
Firstly, is the potential for relational power arising from union collaboration with 
community organisations. Pluralists emphasise the possibilities of 'win-win' 
relationships in collaboration, which are most likely when there is a mutuality of 
interest and trusting close behavioural relations between the parties. Radicals 
emphasise the perpetual contradiction between the competing needs of 
organisational autonomy and unity. Together, relational collaborative power can 
be measured to the extent to which a coalition manages the contradiction of unity 
and autonomy, builds organisational trust and works off identified interests in 
the pursuit of positive-sum collaborative relationships. Thus, coalitions can 
contribute to union renewal by changing the horizontal relational power 
available to unions. 
Secondly, is the possibility of class movement power from union collaboration 
with community organisations. Pluralists suggest this form of power is a 
'legitimising form of power', where coalitions enable unions to publicly act with 
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a 'sword of justice' rather than just vested interest (Flanders 1970; Frege, Heery 
and Turner 2004). Radicals take this further, suggesting that sustained coalitions 
can enhance the likelihood of union members to take political action, to expand 
their class consciousness and open a union's organisational range. Indeed, 
coalitions can create an agenda-setting form of power if they integrate economic 
• 
and political struggle, and link workplace struggle to the community; coalitions 
can contribute to union renewal by changing a union's internal capacity. 
Finally, coalitions offer unions the possibility of place-based collaborative power. 
Radicals note that multiple scales of union engagement are critical for powerful 
coalitions. For geographers, place-based power has two dimensions. First, 
place-based power is enhanced when unions can maximise the number of scales 
at which they operate - particularly at the local scale. Secondly, place-based 
power has a contextual element, where a union's collaborative power varies 
depending on--factors such as industrial location, whether the work of union 
members has direct impact on a definable (organised) public, and whether union 
' 
coalition work is occurring in a site that has broader place consciousness that 
supports coalition or union action. Coalitions can contribute to union renewal by 
strategically enhancing how unions engage with their multi-scalar context. 
This reworking of industrial relations theory creates a three-part framework, 
with types and measures of union collaborative power, that is explored through 
the thesis. The goal of this framework is to explore how collaboration can 
enhance the power of unions, and in particular help support union renewal. This 
moves beyond more instrumentalist conceptions of industrial relations theory, 
which seek to explore how collaboration can support union victories (Dabscheck 
2002; Jones 2002). While victories are critically important, a renewal of union 
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organisational resources including sustainable horizontal relationships, building 
union agendas, enhanced member engagement and strategic responses to union 
context are also vital goals as they represent the bedrock of union power 
resources (Levesque and Murray 2002; Frege, Heery and Turner 2004). 
• 
The framework can be organised into three types of collaborative power 
relational, class movement and place-based power. These can be broken up into 
measures identified by the three theories, and are outlined in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Types and measures of union collaborative power 
Pluralism Radical Labour geography 
Relational power • Win-win • Balancing unity • Relationships are 
relationships and autonomy strongest across the 
I • Identifying self- same scale 
interest 
• Behavioural trust 
Class movement • Legi timising power • Opening up the • Organising across 
power organisational range work and non-work 
of the union identities 
• Coalitions 
'changing' unions 
• Broadening class 
consciousness of 
members' 
engagement 
• Creating agenda-
setting power J 
Place-based power • Pluralism does not • Coalition strength • Union location: I 
explicitly deal with is enhanced by capital fix 
the geography of member • Enhancing union 
unionism participation in political power 
coalition decision • Multi-scalar 
making and articulation 
mobilisation • Place 
consciousness 
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Underpinning this framework is the question of how a 'positive-sum' form of 
union collaboration with community organisations is possible. Too often union 
(and community organisation) perceptions of external relations are that there are 
'no permanent friends and no permanent enemies' (Osterman 2002), leaving 
coalitions to be a 'tactic' as part of a comprehensive campaign (Bronfenbrenner 
• 
and Juravich 1998). This thesis, by building an adaptive theory of collaboration, 
seeks to explore in the case studies the measures that make positive-sum 
collaborative relationships possible. It explores when and how these types of 
collaborative relationships can support union renewal, by simultaneously 
supporting powerful outcomes and enhancing the organisational capacity for 
unions. 
2.0 When are Unions Likely to Engage in Coalition Unionism? 
Union strategies, including coalition unionism, rarely develop evenly across 
national or international union movements. Rather, there are many internal and 
environmental factors· that influence when these strategies are used. Yet there is 
little theoretical work or empirical study that seeks to track this variation and 
help explain why, for instance, coalition unionism appears more prevalent in the 
United States compared to the UK, or in the service industry rather than 
traditional blue-collar industries (Frege and Kelly 2004a; Tattersall forthcoming 
b). This section explores literature on union renewal, labour geography and 
social movement theory to develop a framework for understanding when unions 
are likely to engage in sustained collaboration with community organisations. 
The idea that unions can change is a relatively recent focus, that contrasts to the 
common sense view of Michels that unions are rigid structures; victims of the 
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'iron law of oligarchy' (Michels 1958; Voss and Sherman 2000). Union renewal 
writers argue that certain structural or strategic factors can support union leaders 
or members to change their internal strategies. This review of research borrows 
from a recent approach used by Turner. Adapting resource mobilisation theory 
to union renewal, he categorises the pressures that generate union c4ange as 
arising from both external pre-existing opportunities and choices internal to 
unions (Turner 2007). This formulation is embedded in sociology; Gidden's 
'competent actor' is an agent confronted by conventions, constraints and social 
rules (Giddens 1984). It derives from Marx, who argued that the contradictions 
of agency and structure are a contradiction of history and present choices 
(Darlington 2002): 
Men [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please. They do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves 
but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the 
past (Marx 1972, p. 437). 
The approach taken here diverges from Turner's, as the focus in this thesis is on 
three different unions rather than an urban union movement. Additionally, I 
categorise different opportunities and choices using the definition of the term 
community from the Chapter Two. The aim of the review is to identify the 
multiple forces that affect union change, and to develop a framework capable of 
categorising those forces so they can be examined in the case studies. 
2.1 Opportunities 
A union's environmental and historical context shapes the kind of strategies that 
it is likely to develop. As noted in Chapter Two, the term opportunity structure, 
adapted from social movement theory, stresses the importance of structural and 
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environmental factors in social movement emergence (Tarrow 1994; McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Opportunity structure is a set of signals and processes 
that make social movement participation possible and plausible to a wide 
audience (Tarrow 1994, pp. 85-9; Greer, Byrd and Fleron 2007). This section 
explores three key opportunities, each deriving from the definition of 
• 
community. It firstly considers the political and economic context (place), then 
union relationships and structural features (organisation), and finally pre-
existing union identities (common interest/identity). 
2.1.1 Political and economic context 
At an instrumental level, the sharp decline in union political and economic 
influence has heightened the need for collaboration with community 
organisations. As Hyman notes 'only when unions have been forced to come to 
terms with the decline in their autonomous influence have they contemplated 
broader alliances of this kind' (Hyman 2001, p. 62). 
Research in union renewal frequently emphasises the current hostile political and 
economic context as the factor that both drives down union density and creates 
an opportunity structure that may inspire strategic innovation and renewal in 
unions (Gamer 1989; Bronfenbrenner, Freidman, Hurd et a!. 1998; Peetz 1998; 
Cooper 2001; cf Darlington 2002; Crosby 2005; cf Turner and Cornfield 2007). 
While the sharp decline in union power is a key force in propelling collaboration, 
this study argues overall that it is not the only opportunity relevant for a shift to 
collaboration with community organisations. 
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The political influence of unions through poli~cal parties and quasi-judicial 
regulatory structures has declined, creating opportunities for new forms of 
political power through collaboration. 'Third way', 'new labour' parties that 
have spread in Australia, the United States, Canada and Britain in the 1990s, 
argue that state intervention into the economy should be conditioned by the 
• 
needs of international economic competitiveness (Buchanan and Watson 2001). 
Third way advocates also argue that unions no longer represent core community 
interests because of declining membership. Upchurch, amongst others, suggests 
this creates a 'crisis of social democratic unionism', where traditional political 
support leads to strategic renewal, that may lead to the use of coalitions by 
unions as an alternative vehicle to galvanise support for union demands (Hyman 
2001; Carter and Cooper 2002; Wills 2002; Wills 2003; Upchurch, Taylor and 
Mathers 2006). Similarly, it is suggested that the more widespread practice of 
coalitions in the United States than in other industrialised countries may directly 
relate to the .relative weakness of the relationship between unions and the US 
Democratic Party (Moody 1997; Fine 2003). 
Yet the extent to which political party relationships 'cause' coalition unionism is 
ambiguous. While Upchurch argues that there is a direct relationship between 
the 'collapse' of social democratic unionism and the growth of coalition practice, 
Frege and Kelly argue that the demise of labour party relations have not spurred 
widespread coalition unionism in the UK (Frege and Kelly 2004a; Upchurch, 
Taylor and Mathers 2006). While there is a consensus that shifting labour party-
' 
union relations represent a threat to union power, that shift appears to be one of 
many factors rather than a singular cause of coalition unionism. 
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Additionally, it is uncertain what impact coalitions have on union-party 
relationships and whether they renew union political power or create further 
crisis. Empirical examples from Australia suggest that where isolated unions 
embark on coalition strategies alone, they may face increased hostility from 
social democratic parties (Markey and Nixon 2004; Tattersall 2006a). In contrast, 
• 
in the US, where there has been support for coalitions across the labour 
movement, in Los Angeles, coalition unionism has renewed and strengthened 
union-party relationships (Frank and Wong 2004; Markey and Nixon 2004; 
Hauptrneier and Turner 2007). However, coalition strategies have sometimes 
been a victim of their own success, as in South Africa where the success of the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions' (COSA TU) anti-apartheid coalitions 
reduced the practice of coalitions once the ANC intensified its political 
relationship with COSATU (von Holdt 2002). It raises the question of whether 
coalitions are limited, as one side of a dialectic of political power, or if coalitions 
can be a more comprehensive and longer-term strategy for union renewaL 
Institutionally, employer-supported restrictions of quasi-judicial regulatory 
structures are reducing their importance for unions, potentially provoking 
coalition relationships. Institutions such as the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission or the National Labour Relations Board in the US were a key vehicle 
for union recognition and dispute resolution under Keynesianism (Howard 1977; 
Wial 1993). Yet these institutions have been redrawn as employment law has 
come to reflect the interests of employers (Peetz 1998). These changes have 
c 
prompted some unions to seek alternative strategies for bargaining, including 
comprehensive campaigning (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998; Savage 1998; 
Benz 2005). However, this factor, while important, is unlikely to be a singular 
'cause' of coalition practice. As Turner notes it is not evident that hostile legal 
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environments produce coalition. For instance, there is no evidence to suggest 
that unions in US "right to work" states produce a greater likelihood of coalition 
practice (Turner 2007). 
A union's economic context, including falling union density and hostile 
• 
economic climate, is regularly cited as a factor in likely coalition practice. Case 
study documentation of coalitions has coincided with the economic environment 
of international competition and plant closures (Haines and Klein 1982; Banks 
1990; Brecher and Costello 1990a; Craypo and Nissen 1993; Robinson 2000a). In 
the public sector, fiscally conservative budgeting, combined with contracting out 
and privatisation, has been a factor in some public service unions embracing 
coalitions with service consumers Oohnston 1994; Carpenter 2000; Terry 2000; 
Cutcher 2004; Tattersall 2006a). Furthermore, the decentralisation of work and 
work regulation through small workplaces, out-sourcing and casualisation has 
required unions to search for alternatives to 'hot-shop organising'. These have 
included opportunities for community-based unionism, including coalitions 
(Heckscher 1988; Miles 1989; Cobble 1991; Wial 1993; Savage 1998; Walsh 2000; 
Wills 2002; Osterman 2006). 
As labour geographers argue, economic context may provide rich opportunities 
for coalitions for certain unions. As discussed in the previous .section, spatial 
fixes that tie capital to place, whether through government, industry, investment 
or consumers, create opportunities for coalition formation in the unions that 
work in those industries (Herod 1998; Walsh 2000; Ellem 2003). These coalitions 
may act to re-regulate labour and community standards in the interests of 
unions. Thus local coalitions may be more likely in primary industries such as 
the public sector, or mining or service industries where the labour and product 
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market have common geographies (Johnston 1994; Savage 1998; Ellem 2003; 
Ellem 2003; Ellem 2005). Coalitions are still viable in other industries, such as 
those that formed around US plant closures in the 1980s (Haines and Klein 1982; 
Lynd 1983; Craypo and Nissen 1993; Nissen 1995; Swinney 1999). However, 
these campaigns were often unsuccessful because of the spatial competitiveness 
• 
in manufacturing - work was able to be moved to a cheaper location (Nissen 
1995; Walsh 2000). 
Economic and political context is clearly an important factor in likely coalition 
development. However, other organisational and identity-based opportunities 
are also influential to the opportunity structure and are discussed below. 
2.1.2 Organisational relationships and features 
A union's pre-existing organisational relationships and organisational structure 
can also support unions to engage in coalitions. This might include 
organisational structure and form, and the existence of union and community 
organisation relationships. 
Internal organisational features of unions, such as decentralised member-based 
participatory structures and member homogeneity, may make long-term 
coalitions more likely. A union is more likely to foster internal commitment to 
coalition campaigns if it has participatory structures that can involve members in 
those campaigns (Levesque and Murray 2002; Peetz and Pocock 2006b). A 
coalition may struggle to engage union members unless there are structures 
which allow for member participation, initiation and mobilisation (Hyman 2001). 
Additionally, given that many community organisations often operate at a local 
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neighbourhood scale (Wial 1993, p. 698; Wills 2002), without local structures a 
union may limit its ability to harness and organise relationships with potential 
community partners. Thus unions with multiple scales of member engagement, 
at a workplace, community or regional level, as well as at a union's head office, 
may be more capable of engaging members and supporting me~bership 
engagement at the local scale and in multi-scaled coalitions (Wial 1993; Pike, 
O'Brien and Tomaney 2004). 
The ability to cultivate common experience across the membership may also vary 
depending on the perceived and actual homogeneity or heterogeneity between 
union members (Delaney, Jarley and Fioritio 1996). Kelly argues that collective 
action frames are more successful where union member experiences are 
common, such as deriving from common workplace or occupational experiences 
(Kelly 1998). Where a union has a degree of industrial or occupational 
homogeneity, it may be more likely to cultivate a higher degree of support for an 
issue across the union, thus collaboration may have wider support (Tattersall 
2006a). 
Union relationships with peak councils or other unions may support coalition 
practice by cultivating community relationships that provide opportunities for 
coalition unionism in individual unions (Ellem and Shields 2004; Tattersall 
2007a). Central labour councils in the US can be agents for change. For instance 
the AFL-CIO Union Cities program supported coalition practice (Hecksl"!er and 
Palmer 1993; Ness and Eimer 2001; Byrd and Rhee 2004; Luce and Nelson 2004; 
Reynolds 2004a). Ellem and Shields argue it is central labour councils' capaCity 
to act as agents of mobilisation that can generate coalition unionism. Terry 
affirms that a labour council's overarching position above the imperative of 
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sectional industrial concerns helps it to negotiate common concerns with 
community organisations (Terry 2000; Ellem and Shields 2004). Yet labour 
councils are not a pre-requisite to coalition formation, as Greer demonstrates 
(Greer and Fleron 2005). The relative affect of peak councils on individual union 
strategy in part relates to their influence over affiliates as a whole (Briggs.2004). 
Similarly, other unions can generate opportunities for coalitions by influencing a 
union to change its strategy. This change process can be influenced by unions at 
the same scale (Heery, Simms, Delbridge et a!. 2000; Cooper 2002; Obach 2004), 
or national unions which, for instance, make resources and support available for 
coalition strategies (Voss and Sherman 2000). Yet it is uncertain how a shift to 
coalition unionism is affected by union collaboration or competition. 
Coalition unionism also requires community partners; opportunities vary 
depending whether unions have ready community allies (Tarrow 1994). Public 
sector unions may be more likely to engage in coalitions because of the 
availability of interested allies amongst organised users of social services 
(Carpenter 2000; Terry 2000). This can also extend to the private sector. For 
instance, morality claims against low wages or bad employers successfully 
mobilised faith-based community organisations as partners in the Justice for 
Janitors campaign (Turner 2007). Tight-knit identity-based networks, 
particularly amongst immigrant workers, may also help build community 
relationships. This is because union members who are simultaneously members 
of unions, community organisations and religious organisations may support 
coalition formation through bridge building (Rose 2000; Clawson 2003; Turner 
2007). 
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2.1.3 Union Identities 
Finally, pre-existing union identities, practices or capacity may also create 
opportunities for coalition unionism. Unions who are committed to 
campaigning across a broad range of social concerns, beyond wages and 
conditions, may find it easier to cultivate a common interest with community 
• 
organisations (Obach 2004; Krinsky and Resse 2006). For instance, unions with a 
history of militancy, ideological radicalism or broad interest representation 
beyond wages because of the professional or industrial concerns of members, 
may be more likely to engage in coalitions (Hyman 1994; Waterman 1998; 
Robinson 2000a; Hyman 2001; von Holdt 2002; Frege, Heery and Turner 2004; 
Obach 2004). This may also include unions with a more socially conservative 
frame, such as European Catholic unions which forged strong coalitions with the 
churches (Hyman 2001; Streeck and Hassel 2003). 
Furthermore, if coalitions are a familiar, historical tactic for a particular union, 
then it is more likely that they will be used again as a future strategy. Social 
movement theorists use the term 'repertoire of contention' to demonstrate how 
social movement organisations tend to engage in similar types of action over 
time (Tarrow 1994). Familiar tactics are also likely to be repeated by unions 
(Frege and Kelly 2004a). The use of ad hoc alliances with community 
organisations can thus provide a basis for repeated, and possibly deeper, future 
coalitions (Tattersall2005). 
Yet, as Hyman argues, union identity and thus the potential for coalition 
unionism is not fixed, but intimately connected to a union's economic and 
political context (Hyman 2001). He argues that the harsh context for unions is 
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creating a crisis in narrow sectional union identities, which may in tum create 
greater opportunities for coalition unionism in traditionally non-militant unions. 
Union identity can also derive from the membership base of the union and 
dominant non-workplace identities, such as ethnicity, faith or gender. Qiversity 
may support strategic innovation as member support creates pressure for unions 
to represent interests beyond the workplace (Delaney, Jarley and .Fioritio 1996; 
Nissen 2001). For instance, Needleman argues that female-dominated 
workplaces may be more likely to support campaigns that integrate work and 
family issues, because work and family are more connected in many women's 
lives (Needleman 1998b). Similarly, ethnically or racially diverse workplaces 
have a direct concern for issues of racial equality and civil rights (Flug 1990; 
Kelley 1997; Clawson 2003; Korstad 2003). 
Union identity may also be enhanced by union education programs. Union 
education may increase political awareness and breadth of concern, cultivate 
political concerns beyond wages and conditions, and create a basis of solidarity 
where personal interests are connected more broadly to industry, region or class 
(Freire 1972; Spencer 1994; Bernard 2002). 
Finally, coalitions may be more likely to develop in large, resource-rich unions 
which have the capacity to dedicate surplus staff and money to coalition 
participation (Tattersall 2006a). Coalition unionism can be a resource-intensive 
union strategy; coalition participation often requires dedicated staff and 
campaign budgets (Delaney, Jarley and Fioritio 1996). In addition, pre-existing 
internal capacity such as internal communication structures or experience in 
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turning out members to events such as rallies, may provide opportunities for 
member engagement in coalition unionism. 
2.1.4 Opportunities for long-term coalitions 
This review builds a framework to explain when coalitions are likely to 'Cievelop. 
It incorporates multiple opportunity factors, in contrast to scholarship that 
focuses on single causes of coalition development. The review points to an 
interconnection between these factors: while union identity may be a key factor 
in likely coalition practice, identities change in light of political context, which 
may cause coalition unionism to develop depending on the availability of 
community organisations. 
Importantly, this framework connects back to the definition of community. It 
suggests that 'community' characteristics in a union's opportunity structure 
support a shift to coalition unionism. These community orientations within 
unions can be categorised according to place, organisation and common interest 
and identity. These three sets of opportunities for collaboration are outlined in 
Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Opportunities for collaboration 
Place Organisation Common 
interest/identity 
Political and Union relationships Union identitJ,es 
economic context 
• legal regulatory • Deep union • Wide-union identity 
structure structure • Identity crisis 
Opportunities for • union-social • Union • Non-work identities 
union democratic party homogeneity in membership 
collaboration with relationships • Peak councils • Union education 
community • union density • Other unions • History of coalitions 
organisations • spatial fixes • Available • Union size 
community 
organisations 
2.2 Choice 
Opportunities aside, the development of union practice is not simply a force of 
nature. A union must choose to commit to coalition unionism, given the 
surrounding opportunities (Pocock 1998, pp. 41-2). Unions are 'strategic actors' 
(Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986), and as Turner argues, coalition unionism is a 
conscious strategic choice by unions amidst the opportunities in which they find 
themselves (Turner 2007). 
Again, the definition of community is used to structure the research: firstly, 
considering unions as organisations and exploring how different union actors 
influence unions to 'choose' coalition unionism; secondly, considering common 
( 
interest and how the selected issue agenda of a coalition affects union 
engagement in coalitions; thirdly, considering organisational scale, and how the 
choice to activate a union's internal solidarity structures may make sustained 
collaboration more likely. 
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The purpose of this review is to demonstrate how existing research on choices 
suffers from similar limitations as the research on opportunities. The limitations 
are highlighted by the tendency to single out isolated actors as 'causes' of 
coalitions. The goal is to develop a dialectical approach to explai~ when 
coalitions are likely to develop. 
2.2.1 Organisational actors 
Specific union actors are often held out as key for choosing, or causing, coalition 
unionism (Hyman 1975; Delaney, Jarley and Fioritio 1996). Most commonly, 
leadership support is said to be critical for organisational change, including 
sustained coalition engagement (Nissen 2000; Voss and Sherman 2000; Cooper 
2001; Frege, Heery and Turner 2004). Union leaders are the key actors 
responsible for responding to organisational crisis, and it is through leaders that 
organisational relationships tend to be first cultivated (Gamer 1989; Delaney, 
Jarley and Fioritio 1996; Cooper 2001). Conversely, 'bottom up' democratising 
pressure is also suggested as a key agent for collaboration. Moody, for example, 
presents an idealised picture of rank and file democratic pressure as key for 
initiating and promoting sustained 'democratic' coalitions (Moody 1997; Moody 
1999). 
In addition, staff and delegate characteristics are also identified as important for 
actor-compelled change. Voss and Sherman suggest the importance of a social 
movement background for union leaders and staff (Voss and Sherman 2000). 
Rose argues that 'bridge building' officials or union activists with experience in 
social movements may use that experience to generate support for coalition 
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practice and help overcome initial cultural differences when working with 
community organisations (Rose 2000). In her study of organising, Cooper argues 
that union officials who support strategic change play a key role in adapting 
strategies and countering resistance, especially amongst staff (Cooper 2002) . 
• 
In contrast to a tendency to select single primary agents of strategic change 
(Weinbaum and Lafer 2002), Hyman emphasises that it is the interconnection of 
union forces that propels change. He argues that unions contain a complex set of 
relations, decision-making bodies and political factions that all influence the 
development of strategy (Clegg 1970, p. 80; Hyman 1975, pp. 92-3; Tattersall 
forthcoming b). For Hyman, union change occurs through a dialectical tension 
between the need for 'power for' union members and leadership 'power over' 
union members (Hyman 1975; Hyman 1989). The effect of a union leader's 
decision varies significantly because of this dialectic. For instance, rank and file 
pressure may mean that a leader's decision 'over' members dialectically creates a 
strategy that is also '.for' members (Hyman 1989, p. 90). In contrast, where 
members are not involved in decision making, even the most benevolent leader 
may be making decisions that reflect a leader's 'power over' rather than 'power 
for' members. Thus, Hyman emphasises that greater union engagement in 
decision-making processes at all levels of the union creates a rich dialectic of 
engagement, and produces a union that has higher levels of unity over 
fragmentation (Hyman 1989). 
Adapting Hyman's analysis of union change to the debates on union strategy 
provides a framework for exploring the process of coalition development in my 
case studies of long-term coalitions. Thus it is the existence and degree of 
support for coalitions amongst stewards or delegates, part-time officials, bridge 
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builders, leaders and factions that highly influences the likelihood of coalition 
unionism. Furthermore, these different paths for 'choosing' to engage in 
coalitions potentially varies the depth of union support and engagement 
(Tattersall2006c; Tattersall 2006d; Tattersall forthcoming b). 
• 
While the issue of organisational support allows us to examine individual agents 
of change, the ability to cultivate member or leadership support is affected by the 
choice of issues and the capacity for multi-scaled collaboration, which are 
considered below. 
2.2.2 Common identities and interests within the union 
Engagement in collaboration is also affected by whether the issue selected for 
collaboration connects to union members. The connection between issue and the 
direct interest and experiences of the membership is relevant. As EP Thompson 
argues, class relations take shape through lived experience (Thompson 1963; 
Martin, Sunley and Wills 1993; Wills 1998), and by extension, the connection of 
coalition issues to the actual lived experience of union members is more likely to 
gain member support than abstract or distant concerns (Fantasia 1988). For 
instance, a teacher is likely to connect to a campaign on public education because 
there is a direct connection between education funding and working conditions 
Gohnston 1994; Tattersall 2006a). Similarly, union members are generally more 
likely to connect to coalitions that directly support bargaining or workplace 
conditions (Bramble 2001; Nissen 2004a). Membership support is more likely if 
the common interest at the heart of the coalition relates to the common 
experiences of union members. 
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Yet membership engagement need not always be an instrumental construction of 
self-interest. Pre-existing opportunities may open up a union to create a broader 
basis of solidarity for common concern. Union education may enhance political 
awareness and breadth of concern, cultivating a political consciousness beyond 
wages and conditions and creating a basis of solidarity where personal .interests 
are connected more broadly to industry, region or class (Freire 1972; Spencer 
1994; Bernard 2002; Nissen 2002). Furthermore, if an issue dialectically relates to 
a widespread non-work identity, then that issue may also receive widespread 
support. Yet this is not automatic, as Needleman and Nissen argue, it is 
necessary for the identity to be recognised and valued by the union, either 
through struggle, such as the work of the women's movement in the 1970s, or 
being recognised by the union leadership (Needleman 1998b; Nissen 2001; 
Nissen 2002). This recognition process dialectically opens a union's identity, 
making membership engagement in coalitions more likely. 
2.2.3 Organisational scale 
The ability to undertake sustainable coalition unionism and the extent to which 
that coalition unionism will be shallow or deep is affected by the organisational 
scale and capacity of the union, and the extent to which that capacity is engaged 
in the coalition campaign. If common interest tries to measure and predict the 
breadth of union support for coalition unionism, then organisational scale seeks 
to understand the degree to which the rank and file are engaged in the coalition 
campaign. 
Union collaboration can originate and operate at a variety of organisational 
scales which dialectically interrelate with the external environment. Often 
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coalitions are focused at the scale of union leaders and union offices, where 
membership participation is minimal (Clawson 2003; Tattersall 2005). Yet for a 
coalition to act with any depth, the desire to engage in a coalition must extend 
beyond the leadership and either be driven by the membership, such as a 
factional grouping, or be supported by it. 
• 
Localised membership support may come from the external environment in 
which the union operates. Location, place consciousness and socio-economic 
conditions may directly contribute to member engagement in coalitions. Ellem 
argues that it was the geographic isolation and the union place consciousness of 
the Pilbara region that inspired several unions in a mining town to embrace 
broad coalitional strategies (Ellem 2003). Speaking broadly, scholars have 
privileged the local scale and regional locations as a space for participation, 
politicisation, place consciousness and thus coalition sustainability Oonas 1998; 
Walsh 2000; Darlington 2005; Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming). Indeed, at the 
local scale, there is a more ready capacity to connect internal union capacity to 
broader coalition forms such as broker organisations, facilitating union member 
engagement and participation in coalition decision making and planning 
(Tattersall2006c). 
The capacity for a union to act locally relies in part on the pre-existing 
opportunity of decentralised membership structures that facilitate local member 
engagement and participation in the decision making, planning and tactics of 
' 
coalition unionism. Yet deep coalition unionism will not happen simply because 
these structures exist, but only if these structures are activated. Action may arise 
from decision-making processes, where factions, stewards or union members are 
the advocates for coalition strategies (Fantasia 1988; Darlington 2002; Darlington 
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2005). Conversely, coalition unionism may spread as the leadership engages 
members in micro-mobilisations that become opportunities for organising 
around the issues of the coalition, generating member support. As Kelly 
emphasises, it is through micro-mobilisations, at the scale of delegates and rank 
and file leaders, that commitment to collective action takes place (Kelly 1998). 
Micro-mobilisations may happen through a union creating internal tactical 
opportunities for engagement, such as rallies, or through external forces such as 
outreach by a coalition broker organisation or a harsh local socio-economic 
context (Tattersall 2006c). Here the relational and multi-scalar operation of 
coalition unionism is important. Multi-scalar capacity allows local action to feed 
back into multi-scalar engagement, avoiding local isolation (Terry 2000; Ellem 
2005). 
The effectiveness of locally scaled member engagement will also depend on the 
skill and capacity of local union activists. For instance, Darlington argues that 
ideological, radical rank and file stewards play a critical role in stimulating 
member activism (Darlington 2002; Darlington 2005). Union members with 
organisational experience outside the union, such as bridge builders, may have a 
strong commitment to undertake micro-mobilisations that facilitate the 
decentralisation of the campaign to workplaces or regional associations of 
delegates. Yet, as Peetz and Pocock argue, bridge builders are more powerful 
supporters of coalition practice inside unions if they have been trained in union 
organising (Peetz and Pocock 2006b ). 
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2.2.4 Choices to collaborate 
Thus, for coalition unionism to develop, a union must act as a 'strategic agent' 
and choose to embrace the practice of coalitions, given the available opportunity 
structure (Turner 2007). The types of organisational actors promoting coalition 
unionism, the member common interest in the coalition issues and the scale of 
• 
organisational engagement all shape whether a union is likely to engage in a 
coalition. These variations in 'choices' for coalition unionism are outlined in 
' 
Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Choices for coalition unionism 
Place Organisation Common i 
' interest/identity I 
Organisational Organisational Common 
decision makers interest/identity 
within union 
• Place • Power over and • Touching 
consciousness power for union member 
• Activating members experience 
·organisational • Leaders • Practices that 
Choices for union stnucture:nnicro • Rank and file open union 
collaboration with mobilisation or pressure identity-
community agents • Bridge builders education, non-
organisations • Staff work identity, 
past coalition 
practice 
• Homogeneity 
of interest 
Moreover, this discussion reveals that the types of actors that support coalitions 
not only affect whether collaboration is likely, but condition the depth of 
engagement in coalition unionism. For instance, leadership support for a 
coalition may provoke coalition unionism. But as Hyman suggests, the coalition 
unionism will operate at a different quality and depth when the shift in strategy, 
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includes or is provoked by, a group of rank and file unionists. The link between 
how a coalition embraces coalition unionism and the depth of coalition unionism 
is an under-theorised area of research and is examined in the case studies . 
2.3 When is coalition unionism likely to develop? • 
Analysis of when coalition unionism is likely to develop is weakened by a 
tendency to isolate single factors as responsible for the shifts in strategy. In 
contrast, this framework of opportunities and choices identifies a multiplicity of 
factors that may be responsible for coalition practice. The relative importance of, 
and relationships between, these factors and coalition practice is examined in the 
case studies. 
The framework suggests that coalition unionism is likely to develop given the 
intensity of 'community-based' opportunities that derive from a union's 
surroundings and history, as well as choices that come from internal union 
structure, engagement and interest. Importantly, these opportunities and choices 
do not act as singularly important causes, but operate as intertwined processes. 
For instance, an opportunity such as a major crisis that affects union members 
creates dialectical pressure from union members to agitate for strategic change, 
which may pressure a leader to embrace coalition unionism. Moreover, the 
different ways in which coalition unionism develops shape the kinds of coalition 
unionism that unions practice. 
3.0 Conclusions from the Literature Review 
The past two chapters explored frameworks of coalition success and when 
coalitions might be a powerful and likely union strategy. This chapter focused 
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specifically on the role of unions in coalition and relied on industrial relations 
and multi-disciplinary contributions to consider when coalition unionism can 
support union campaign outcomes and strengthen a union's horizontal and 
internal power resources. This question highlights a'stark gap in union renewal 
literature. Collaboration is under-investigated by industrial relations, and thus 
• 
my contribution is not only to identify this gap but to suggest a possible three-
part collaborative framework that may help to fill it. 
This chapter identified three elements of powerful union collaboration with 
community organisations, each of which contribute to union renewal. Firstly, 
relational power, which creates power for unions by developing powerful, 
intertwined trusting relationships that also respect the need for a mutual balance 
of unity and organisational autonomy; secondly, class movement power, which 
creates power for unions by broadening the vision or organisational range of 
unions, building class consciousness amongst union members and assisting a 
union to develop a counter-hegemonic agenda for union action and thirdly, 
place-based power, which enhances union power by helping unions access 
power from the context in which they operate. This may be power from a 
union's local environment through multi-scalar union structures or tendencies to 
industrial capital fixes. In parallel to the findings in Chapter Two on successful 
coalitions, this study found that coalition unionism is powerful for unions when 
unions engage with coalitions to produce mutual relationships, to forge mutual 
interest-based agendas and to act at multiple scales. 
This chapter also investigated when unions are likely to engage in coalition 
unionism, finding that coalition unionism is supported by a strong dialectical 
connection between historical or contextual opportunities and an internal will 
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that supports coalitions as a particular union strategy. Coalition unionism is 
supported by political and economic opportunities and the choices taken at an 
internal organisational scale; opportunities can also come from pre-existing 
union identities and the choices made about the types of campaign undertaken 
and finally, opportunities may also derive from the organisational struc~ral and 
relational context of a union as well as the kinds of organisational actors that 
'choose' coalition unionism. 
These specific theories on how coalitions can be powerful for unions directly 
relate back to the analysis in Chapter Two. After all, for a coalition to be 
powerful for unions it must also be a successful coalition form in itself. 
Therefore, Chapter Two explored why and how coalition unionism is likely to be 
successful. Using the definition of community, it identified three elements of 
coalitions. Coalitions vary according to their type of common concern, inter-
organisational relations, and how those relationships respond to an external 
context, which is defined by political opportunities and multiple scales of 
decision making and organisational capacity. 
Underpinning this analysis was an understanding that coalitions can successfully 
achieve external outcomes, a supportive political climate, sustain relationships 
and build the capacity of participating organisations. This success can be 
measured using the three elements of coalitions. A coalition's inter-
organisational relations support coalition success depending on whether they 
supported organisational autonomy as well as organisational unity, had formal 
and informal connections between the organisations and engage the commitment 
of powerful organisations. A coalition's common concern supports coalition 
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success depending on the degree to which it engages the mutual interests and 
values of organisational leaders, tapped into the direct interests of members and 
supported a positive, public social frame. A coalition's scale supported coalition 
success depending on its ability to harness and create political opportunities, act 
at multiple scales and operate with locally scaled broker organisations . 
• 
Moreover, Chapter Two identified three possible ideal types of coalition 
unionism, working off the three axes of coalitions: agenda-driven coalition 
unionism, relationships-driven coalition unionism and mobilising coalition 
unionism. Agenda-driven coalition unionism has a strong common concern and 
strong contextual and multi-scalar capacity with weaker inter-organisational 
relationships. Relationship-driven coalition unionism has a strong set of inter-
organisational relationships and a strong multi-scaled capacity with weaker 
common concern. Mobilisation coalition unionism has a strong set of inter-
organisational relationships and a strong set of common concern, but a weaker 
contextual-multi-scaled capacity. These ideal types can be distinguished by the 
fact that their organisational capacity is focused on two of the three elements. 
This parallels Hyman's assessment of union identities, which classifies different 
types of European unionism from three discrete union identities - market, class 
and society (Hyman 2001). 
Underpinning all this theoretical work is the original conceptualisation of 
community that was introduced in Chapter Two. The idea that community has 
,' 
three discrete meanings - organisation, common concern and place - becomes a 
constant theme and guide for the theory of the thesis as a whole. Furthermore, 
the three frameworks identified in this review help to explain how and when 
coalitions are powerful for unions and when coalitions are likely to develop. The 
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synthesis of these literatures provides a testable set of questions that can be 
explored through the thesis's empirical studies. 
• 
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Chapter Four 
Methodological Approach to Coalition Unionism 
This thesis explores the viability of coalition unionism as a strategy for union 
renewal. It develops three frameworks for understanding how ooalitions 
contribute to union renewal. The first framework assists understanding by 
identifying the elements of coalition unionism that are likely to ensure coalition 
success. The second framework considers whether coalitions help support union 
renewal by increasing union collaborative power. The third framework explores 
when unions are likely to engage in coalitions. These frameworks, assembled 
from the literature review in Chapters Two and Three, go to the heart of the 
research questions that are the focus of this thesis. 
This study also developed benchmarks for coalition success. Success is defined 
by four criteria: political outcomes, political climate change, sustaining 
relationships between coalition organisations and increasing the capacity of the 
participating organisations. These four outcomes refer to external achievements, 
for instance influencing policy decisions or achieving political climate change. 
Success is also defined by subjective measures, for example achieving sustainable 
relationships between community organisations and unions (horizontal 
solidarity) and increasing the internal capacity of unions (vertical solidarity) 
(Levesque and Murray 2002). 
To address these research questions and assess coalition success, this thesis 
undertakes three internationally comparative case studies of coalitions in global 
cities located in countries with similar industrialised liberal market economies 
(Sassen 1991; Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor 1999; Sassen 2001; Hall and Soskice 
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2001). The purpose is to explore the patterns of coalition practice and union 
participation over time in order to analyse the elements of coalition success and 
how coalition unionism can be powerful for unions. 
This chapter firstly outlines the international comparative method. It c~nsiders 
the selection of case studies in global cities, and in liberal market economies and 
explains the significant similarities and differences in the case selections. The 
chapter explores the importance of the case study method used in the thesis, and 
identifies the variables analysed in the case study chapters. 
1.0 Coalitions in Global Cities 
The three case studies compare unions and coalitions across three countries, 
Australia, Canada and the USA, in three global cities, Sydney, Toronto and 
Chicago. As Strauss argues, by undertaking research in different national 
contexts, it is hoped that uniformities in coalition practice, as well as universal 
rules can be identified to explain the differences between the studies (Strauss 
1998). By undertaking an international comparison, this thesis simultaneously 
considers how structure and agency shape coalition practice. 
These countries and cities have been selected because of their contextual and 
economic similarities, while acknowledging small political and organisational 
differences between them (Walker 1967; Bean 1994, pp. 12-3; Wailes 1999). By 
combining similarity and difference, the case studies test the relative importance 
of political context and organisational differences as variables, while also 
identifying common traits of coalition unionism that operate across national 
boundaries. 
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An international comparative method was the only way this study could analyse 
the extent to which my coalition frameworks are generalisable. An international 
comparison, rather than national comparison, allows an assessment of the impact 
of national political context (Banks 1974; Bean 1994; Strauss 1998). The aim of the 
• 
approach is to foster new insights into coalition practice by showing what is 
either unique about particular national arrangements or common across them 
(Rose 1983; Bean 1994). 
While international comparative research can reveal important insights about 
coalition practice (Bean 1994, p. 8), this is very rare. Internationally comparative 
research is dominated by 'parallel descriptors', where renewal strategies in 
different countries are explored often in a single text, with studies by different 
authors (Strauss 1998, p. 178; Fairbrother and Yates 2003; Turner and Cornfield 
2007). International comparison tends to occur through research teams, rather 
than as single author comparisons (Frege and Kelly 2004b; Turner 2007). While 
multiple author comparison is a useful approach, there are distinct advantages to 
a single author approach. As Whipp argues, a single author approach can 
uncover complex processes and hidden features of coalition practices across 
national contexts may become more apparent (Whipp 1998). There is far less 
research where a single author investigates a specific renewal strategy in 
different national contexts to explore an explicitly defined framework. By having 
a single author undertake internationally comparative qualitative research, this 
thesis seeks to fill this methodological gap. 
When international coalition practice is analysed, comparison tends to be trans-
Atlantic, comparing different types of national economic and political contexts 
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(Frege and Kelly 2004b; Turner and Cornfield 2007). Trans-Atlantic research, 
particularly in the recent Varieties of Unionism study, focuses on how different 
economic and political contexts shape coalition practice (Hall and Soskice 2001 ). 
However, by focusing on differences, attention tends to be drawn to how 
national context shapes renewal strategies (Hay 2004; Hay 2005). This is. because 
the political and economic differences between the coordinated market 
economies of Europe and the liberal market economies of North America are vast 
(Hyman 2001; Frege and Kelly 2004b). 
However this study is different. It selected cases that maximise similarities. In 
contrast to the trans-Atlantic studies of coalitions, this work considers Australia, 
Canada and the US, which are compared less frequently. In doing so, this study 
acknowledges 'small' political difference while attempting to control for 
economic context (Wailes 1999). The thesis firstly, analyses if political context is 
an important variable in coalition practice across countries; and secondly, if the 
common themes of coalition practice are prevalent internationally. It has also 
tried to avoid the pitfalls of similar matched pairs comparison, by identifying 
important small differences between the liberal market economies that have been 
selected (Sorge 1976; Wailes 1999). The similarities and differences between the 
locations of the case studies are outlined below. 
1.1 Controlling for similarities: global cities in liberal market economies 
The methodology in this thesis controls for similarities in context in two ways: by 
firstly selecting three countries in similar liberal market economies, and 
secondly, selecting three similar global cities within these three liberal market 
economies. 
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Australia, Canada and the United States are said to have similar economies. In 
political economy, world systems theory categorises each of them as similar 
'core' industrial countries (Wallerstein 1979; Geynne, Klak and Shaw 2003). The 
varieties of capitalism literature also argues that Australia, Canada.and the 
United States are all examples of liberal market economies, one of two 'varieties 
of capitalism' in industrialised national economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). The 
varieties of capitalism approach is an ascendant paradigm in the comparative 
political economy of advanced capitalist countries (Coates 2005; Hay 2005, p. 106; 
Frege 2006). It is a nation-state, and firm-centric approach that suggests that 
capitalist economies generally develop one of two responses to problems relating 
to industrial relations, skills, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and 
employee relations (Hall and Soskice 2001, pp. 4, 6-7). Two groups of national 
economies are identified: liberal market economies (LME) and coordinated 
market economies (CME). In LME countries production is the economic activity 
of firms coordinated 'primarily via hierarchies and competitive market 
arrangements', whereas within CME countries, firms depend more heavily on 
non-market relationships to coordinate their core competencies (Hall and Soskice 
2001, p. 8). The varieties of capitalism literature argues that there are 
fundamental similarities among Australia, Canada and the United States, that 
produce similar institutional state arrangements supporting the market's 
management of private enterprise decisions. 
While the varieties of capitalism literature is widely supported (Visser 2003; 
Frege and Kelly 2004b; Frege 2006), it has several limitations that this study seeks 
to accommodate. This thesis uses varieties of capitalism as a means of 
controlling for similar practices of economies in present time. It recognises that 
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LME's divergent histories may be significant for cda!ition practice (Hay 2004; 
Hay 2005), by identifying key political differences among Australia, Canada and 
the United States. 
To enhance the economic similarities in the three-country comparison, this study 
• 
also selected three 'global cities' in each of these countries to locate the research. 
Global cities are command centres in the global economy, each having a strong 
presence of finance capital and banking, many corporate headquarters and 
producer service firms that support corporate headquarters (Sassen 1991; Daly 
and Prichard 2000; Connell 2000b; Sassen 2004). There is a vast literature that 
ranges from identifying world cities or global cities by the presence of corporate 
headquarters, producer services (such as financing, legal firms), city 
infrastructure or cultural events. There is a preoccupation in global cities 
research to rank the cities by reference to single or combinations of, empirical 
attributes (Taylor 1997; Hall 2001). The purpose here is not to privilege a 
particular perspective, but rather to note that whether cities are categorised 
according to the presence of corporate headquarters (Friedmann 1986; Short, 
Kim, Kuss et al. 1986), advanced producer services (Sassen 1991; Friedmann 1995; 
Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor 1999; Sassen 1999; Sassen 2001), or even a 
combination of these and other factors (Connell 2000a; Taylor 2001), Sydney, 
Chicago and Toronto are all repeatedly identified as similar, powerful second-
tier global or world cities (Todd 1998; Connell 2000b; Madigan 2004; Brenner and 
Keil2006; GAWC 2006).9 
9 There are some differences amongst the frameworks, Beaverstock et al. (1999) argue that Chicago is an 
'alpha' world city, while Sydney and Toronto are 'beta'. Conversely, Sassen has used the term global city to 
describe Sydney, Toronto and Chicago (Sassen 2001). 
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Analysing global cities allows this thesis to investigate the viability of coalitions 
in shaping the direction of regional economies, and responding to the problem of 
rising inequality and declining local accountability in global cities. Sassen argues 
that global cities 'hollow out the middle', creating class polarisation and 
increasing inequality (Sassen 1991, p. 245; Sassen 1995). She also suggEi?ts that 
there is likely to be an accountability crisis in global cities, as business interests 
over-determine local decision-making processes, rather than the individuals who 
live there (Sassen 1991, p. 334). 
Heightened inequality and a potential lack of democracy in global cities is widely 
accepted (even if the causes are debated) (Friedmann 1986; Hamnett 1996; Baum 
1997; Fainstein 2001; May, Wills, Datta et a!. 2006). Yet the global cities literature 
has given limited attention to how inequality and a democratic deficit can be 
overcome (May, Wtlls, Datta et a!. 2006). This thesis, by investigating how 
coalitions can achieve outcomes and shape the political climate in global cities, 
may contribute to this· gap by exploring whether coalitions are a viable strategy 
for rebuilding local control and re-regulating global cities in the interests of those 
who live and work there. 
Selecting global cities as a site for this research also allows for an interrogation of 
the 'city-centric' interpretations of global cities within the global economy. 
Sassen, for instance, particularly privileges their role, suggesting that the global 
city has become a primary agent of the global economy above the state (Sassen 
2004, p. 32; May, Wills, Datta eta!. 2006). The idea that the city is a premier scale 
of activity, or the only unit of effective analysis, is interrogated in this thesis 
(Fagan 2000). The coalitions in these case studies campaign at multiple scales, in 
the city and across the province or state in which those cities operate. The 
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coalitions regularly seek state or national regulation in addition to city-based 
solutions, and the relative openness of those political systems is examined as 
having a possible effect on coalitions. The case studies unsettle the concept of the 
city as a homogenous unit, and they explore the impact of scale inside and 
outside the global city, analysing how socio-economic status and location may 
affect coalition success. 
More broadly, this thesis connects global city theory to social movement 
research. There is an acknowledged gap between these two bodies of theory 
(Scott 2001, p. 6). The limited scholarship on social movements and global cities 
tends to focus on new social movements rather than unions (Myer 2000; cf May, 
Wills, Datta et a!. 2006), or on comparing similar social movement strategies 
across cities, rather than on common forms of social action, or indeed union 
strategy across global cities. This thesis contributes to filling this gap by 
connecting the union renewal literature to global cities theory. 
Additionally, there are many empirical similarities among the cities of Sydney, 
Toronto and Chicago. Each has similar populations of approximately 4-5 million 
people (US Census 2005a; US Census 2005b; ABS 2006; StatCan 2007).10 They are 
capital cities of their state or province, and they are all the centre of key regional 
economies - Sydney and Toronto are the economic capitals of their country, and 
Chicago is centre of the Mid-West economy of the United States {Todd 1998; Daly 
and Prichard 2000; Sassen 2004). Despite the political differences between 
nations, each of these cities has a strong tradition of progressive politics -
10 In june 2006, Sydney had a population of 4.29 million; in 2006 Toronto had a population of 4.75 million; in 
2005 Chicago was estimated to have a population of 2.84 million in the city council area and in Cook 
County, which defines the area around the city (including the suburbs that surround Chicago) the 
population was 5.3 million. 
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Chicago, Toronto and Sydney have had a history of progressive government 
(Longworth 2004). The cities have a more similar union density than the national 
differences suggest, with Chicago's union density at 18.3% significantly above 
the United States national average of 12%, and much closer to Sydney's density 
of approximately 20% and Toronto's at 30% (LRA 2000; ABS 2007). 
• 
1.2 Testing differences through international comparison 
The privileging of similarities cannot disguise the presence of 'small' political 
differences between Sydney, Chicago and Toronto (Wailes 1999). The cultural 
and institutional legacies of history influence the political opportunities available 
to today' s coalitions (Hay 2004; Hay 2005). Important differences relate to the 
cities' and countries' political context and the capacity of their unions and 
community organisations. These are outlined in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Differences in national context 
Political context Organisational capacity 
Openness of Political parties Community Union density 
state organisations • 
• Strong welfare • Strong party· • Government 20% overall * 
state union ties funded 
• Compulsory • Often service-
Australia voting based 
• Binding party • Advocacy· 
caucuses based 
• Strong welfare • Union-party • Government 30% overall ** 
state ties through funded, often 
• Binding party minor party service-based 
Canada caucuses (New 
• Non- Democratic 
compulsory Party) 
voting 
• Weak welfare • Strong union- • Tradition of 12.5% overall 
state party ties, but community (but 18.3% in 
• Non- industrial not organising Chicago)*** 
compulsory political focus • Foundation 
United States voting for legislative funding 
• Individualised relationship 
party with 
representation Democratic 
and executive Party 
vetos 
Sources: • (ABS 2007), •• (Jackson 2006), ••• (LRA 2000; BLS 2007) 
1.2.1 Political context: state and political parties 
A coalition's ability to achieve outcomes and shape the political climate is 
affected by the opportunities available from the types of state and political 
parties. Jenkins and Tarrow, as social movement theorists, argue that states sit 
on a continuum between being open and closed to social movement expression 
(Tarrow 1994; Jenkins 1995). 
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The nation states in Australia, Canada and the United States have historically 
had different levels of openness to social change evident in their contrasting 
histories of welfare state capitalism and their different political cultures (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Skocpol 1992). These historical differences may shapt:, future 
political opportunities (Hyman 1982, p. 108; Poole 1986, p. 9; Bean 1994, p. 11). 
Australia and Canada ea·ch had relatively open, strong welfare states. These 
governments provided significant intervention into industrial relations, 
particularly in Australia through compulsory conciliation and arbitration, which 
established a system of industry-wide standards for wages and conditions 
(Howard 1977; Macintyre 2001). The Canadian system of industrial regulation 
was based more on enterprise level regulation, but in 1944 it institutionalised 
collective bargaining and in 1946 developed a system of card-check union 
recognition that assisted unionisation (Heron 1989, p. 12; Irving and Seager 1996; 
Panitch and Swartz 2003). Both countries also institutionalised universal access 
to social provisions such as health care, welfare and education (Hicks and Swank 
1984; Irving and Seager 1996; Maioni 1998; Myles and Quadagno 2001). In the 
US, while the New Deal provided enterprise-scaled collective bargaining rights 
and social security, it did not universalise social resources such as health care 
(Lichtenstein 1995; Piore 2005). US collective bargaining rights were weakened 
by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act which brought in processes of unfair labour 
practices that could litigiously slow down the process of union recognition and 
allowed states to introduce 'right to work' legislation that made union 
recognition more difficult (Abraham 1996). 
The political processes of the Australian, Canadan and United States 
governments reinforce the levels of openness in the state. The Australian system 
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is the most open to political participation, with compulsory, preferential voting 
in contrast to the non-compulsory, first past the post elections in Canada and the 
United States. Australia and Canada, following the Westminster system, have 
centralised party cultures with binding caucuses in government, in contrast to 
the US system where a weak party system means that political represootatives 
have to be individually lobbied for their support, and the executive branch 
(Governor, President or Mayor) has a right of veto over legislative decisions 
(Skocpol1992, p. 39; Maioni 1998; Myles and Quadagno 2001). 
Australia, Canada and the United States also have had historically different types 
of relationships between political parties and unions, providing different levels 
of access to state decision making that may affect coalition outcomes and the 
ability to shape the political climate (Esping-Andersen 1985). Union-party 
relationships are strongest in Australia, where a labour party, formed by the 
union movement in the 1890s, operates as a majority governing party, and where 
unions have strong formal and informal relationships with the Australian Labor 
Party (ALP) (Irving and Seager 1996). In Canada, the union movement 
participated in the formation of the socialist-worker-farmer party, called the 
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in 1932 (McCormak 1977; 
Laycock 1990). When the party turned into the New Democratic Party (NDP) in 
1961, the union movement became formal voting members, yet this party 
remained for the most part a minority party in the Canadian Government 
(Chandler 1977; Panitch and Swartz 2003). In the United States, unions are not 
members of the Democratic Party. While unions have maintained close relations 
with the Democrats, the relationship tended to be limited to industrial issues 
rather than broader 'class' issues (Perlman 1979; Upset and Marks 2000). While 
these historical differences continue to shape union-party relationships, 
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international social democratic trends such as 'third way' and 'new labour' show 
common trends in a weakening of union-party relationships (Giddens 1998; 
Buchanan and Watson 2001; Wills 2002; Howell 2004; Tattersall 2006a) . 
1.2.2 Organisational differences • 
Across Australia, Canada and the United States, unions and community 
•. 
organisations differ in size and how they operate, which may affect the 
organisational make-up and capacity of coalitions in the different countries. 
Union density varies significantly among the countries. In 2005, union density 
was highest in Canada, at 30% (Jackson 2006). In Australia in 2006 20% of 
employees were members of unions, and in the US in 2006 union density was 
12% (ABS 2007; BLS 2007). Additionally, the laws governing union jurisdiction 
and demarcation are different between the countries. In Australia, jurisdiction is 
/ 
defined and enforced by the court system, through a process of formal union 
registration. In Canada and the United States, jurisdictional rules and disputes 
are contested and debated by the unions with the central labour councils, making 
jurisdictional competition more common than in Australia. 
The types of community organisations also vary significantly among the United 
States, Australia and Canada, where community organisations have very 
different historical traditions in terms of community organising style, funding 
sources and membership bases (Salamon and Anheier 1998). As noted in 
Chapter Two, in the United States, there is a history of membership-based, 
Alinksy-style 'community organising', with a variety of large, member-based 
organisations which assist community members to mobilise and take direct 
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action in defence of community interests (Alinsky 1971; Osterman 2002; Tait 
2005; Osterman 2006). Consequently, the US has a large number of voluntary 
membership-based organisations, with relatively high levels of participation. At 
the opposite extreme, formal community organisations in Australia receive most 
of their funding from the state (Hamilton and Maddison 2007). • Many 
contemporary Australian community organisations have a small membership 
base, and focus on the provision of services. Canada sits in the middle, with 
strong service and advocacy organisations for women, seniors, immigrant 
groups and national identity (such as the Council of Canadians), who have also 
regularly engaged in social movements around fair trade (Bieyer 1992; Ricciutelli, 
Larkin and O'Neil1998). 
Organisational capacity affects the type of coalition partners and the different 
roles of unions and_ community organisations in coalitions. In countries with 
large unions, union dominance in coalitions may be more likely. Where 
community organisation capacity is weak, based on service delivery rather than 
member organising, the task of member mobilisation may become a 
responsibility of the unions or require innovation in how to build a membership 
base for the coalition. Furthermore, union density may shape union perceptions 
and experiences of crisis (Pocock 1998; Cooper 2001), which may influence the 
spread of coalition practice across a union movement (Frege and Kelly 2004a; 
Kelly 2006). 
1.2.3 Case study contextual differences 
Cross-national difference does not prevent cross-national comparison, or the 
ability to build a framework of coalitions that describes coalition practice across 
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borders. Rather, this study intentionally acknowledges that opportunity 
structures and organisational capacities are independent variables that may 
shape how coalitions work, and coalition success. Thus the frameworks outlined 
in Chapters Two and Three explicitly acknowledge how these external contextual 
variables feed into the coalition strategies that develop in different c~ntries. 
The coalition frameworks acknowledge the role of political opportunities and 
organisational capacity. 
1.3 Similarity and difference case studies 
In summary, my international comparison of coalition unionism selects similar 
types of global cities, with similar population sizes in similar liberal market 
economies, in cities with different national political contexts and organisational 
capacity. While it is impossible to control for all differences when undertaking 
international comparison (Wailes 1999), having similar size and economies at 
least allows for a comparison across cities of a similar scale. Furthermore, by 
selecting the case studies on the basis of the independent variable of global cities, 
ahead of selecting the specific coalition to study, the case selection minimises a 
perceived 'selection bias' weakness in qualitative research where case selection 
often occurs only based on the dependent variable (King, Keohane and Verba 
1994; cf Collier, Mahoney and Seawright 2004). 
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2.0 Case Study Methodology 
This study investigates the three frameworks of coalition unionism using three 
case studies. The coalitions selected were chosen because they varied according 
to the structure of their inter-organisational relationships, the types and O.epth of 
common concern and their scale, in order to compare and contrast the key 
elements of my coalition framework. Similarly, in each of these case studies the 
thesis focuses on one union in order to explore how and why coalition unionism 
helps increase the collaborative power of unions. This analysis of unions also 
allows for an exploration of when coalition unionism is likely to develop in 
unions, and the different patterns of union member engagement that occur 
across coalitions. 
2.1 The usefulness of the case study 
Case study research is the most common methodology in industrial relations 
research (Kitay and Callus 1998). As Yin explains, the case study method is: 
An empirical inquiry tha't investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not entirely evident and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used (Yin 1994). 
Case studies usefully allow for an in-depth analysis of a complex social practice 
over time, making them particularly well suited for analysis of long-term 
coalitions (Ragin 2004). 
Underpinning this method, this research approach derives from a social 
constructionist epistemology that attempts to identify analytical, generalisable 
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conceptual features of coalition unionism that are contingent on human action, 
subjective perception and experience (Crotty 1998). As Chapters Two and Three 
highlighted, the successful practice of coalition unionism consists of multiple 
variables, making it difficult to assess by quantitative measures. Analysing the 
process of union and community organisation interactions over time requires a 
• 
methodology that is capable of interpreting not only how outcomes are achieved, 
but how organisational relationships are sustained or weakened, how 
organisational capacity is enhanced, how interests between organisations are 
negotiated and how the operation of a coalition interacts with the external world. 
A case study methodology, which seeks to identify how relationships change 
over time, is the most useful methodology for testing the appropriateness of the 
key elements and measures in my theoretical framework, and how those 
elements and measures change (Kitay and Callus 1998). 
The thesis compares three cases, combining comparison with intensive analysis, 
to develop valid, generalisable findings (Shalev 1980). Additionally, this allows 
me to compare and contrast across the three repeated 'community-based' 
variables that structure the frameworks tested in this thesis. Moreover, the 
methodology is important because there is little comparative research on 
coalition practice. The tendency in coalitions research is for case studies to be 
examined in isolation, which has the potential to encourage 'best-practice' 
theorising. This is where theories of successful coalition unionism are drawn off 
one case study, making it difficult to determine features of coalition and .union 
practice that may be common across a variety of contexts. Given that the 
purpose of this thesis is to identify a widely applicable framework of coalition 
practice, the choice of three case studies allows me to isolate common features of 
coalition unionism, while still identifying how specific variations, either 
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produced by context or strategic choice, contribute to coalition success and union 
power. 
The case study approach uses a mixture of inductive and deductive analysis, 
attempting both to critique and create theory (Strauss and Whitfield 1998, p. 9; 
• 
McKeown 2004). The study does not use a grounded methodology, but a 
dialectical process of adapting and reframing existing literature to identify 
elements of powerful coalition practice. Indeed, the dialectical approach used in 
my frameworks is well suited to a methodology that seeks to acknowledge and 
identify the common and contrasting roles of opportunity and choice in different 
contexts. The study of three long-term coalitions explores the interrelationships 
between these elements and the dynamics of successful coalition unionism. The 
literature review in Chapters Two and Three not only identified theoretical gaps 
in existing coalition research, but actively reformulated this literature into new 
testable frameworks about coalitions and unions. Similarly, at the conclusion of 
each case study, the chapter returns briefly to secondary sources to see if my 
findings on a particular study apply more broadly to other examples of coalition 
practice in the secondary literature. 
2.2 Case selection 
My case studies have similarities and differences in terms of the coalitions and 
the unions involved. The case studies are: the Public Education Coalition in 
Sydney and the New South Wales Teachers Federation, that campaigned on 
public education issues between 2001 and 2004; the Ontario Health Coalition in 
Toronto and the Canadian Union of Public Employees that campaigned on 
health care issues between 2002 and 2006 and the Grassroots Collaborative in 
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Chicago and the Service Employees International Union Local 880 that 
campaigned on living wages between 2002 and 2006. 
2.2.1 Coalition form: similarities and differences 
The case studies selected are similar. I explore three long-term rooalition 
campaigns across a similar time period. Each of these case studies involves a 
coalition that included at least one union and several community organisation 
partners. The case studies campaigned around common issues, however not all 
of the coalitions were defined by the issues they campaigned on. In each of the 
case studies, regardless of how many unions were involved, the focus is on the 
involvement of one particular union, interviewing union officials and member 
leaders and monitoring the union's shifting participation in the coalition. 
In each case, this union was a public sector union that had its head office located 
in the global city but also operated cross the state or province. The activity of the 
coalitions was also similar, seeking to achieve political outcomes and affect 
decisions at multiple scales - at a local level, city-metropolitan level, state level 
and a national level. Each of the coalitions had a combination of electoral and 
non-electoral strategies and aimed to achieve policy and legislative changes. 
The coalitions were also similar. In each case study there were pre-existing 
relationships between the coalition partners, while the formality, depth and 
reasons for formation were different among the case studies. As my definition of 
coalition unionism would suggest, all the coalitions studied were defined by 
inter-organisational relationships, common concern and scale, while having 
variations in the kinds of measures present. This allowed for a comparison of the 
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presence and absence of these measures, and how they varied within and across 
the different case studies. 
Thus the case studies exhibited tendencies towards the different coalition models 
proposed in Chapter Two. The Sydney-based Public Education Coalitjon was 
union-initiated, with a relatively weak set of inter-organisational relationships 
but with a strong common concern and a multi-scaled coalition capacity. The 
Toronto-based Ontario Health Coalition had a strong set of inter-organisational 
relationships and a multi-scaled coalition capacity with relatively weak common 
concern. The Chicago-based Grassroots Collaborative was a community-
initiated coalition with a very strong set of inter-organisational relationships, 
strong common concern but a relatively weak multi-scaled capacity operating 
without local broker organisations. The variations in the coalition elements are 
outlined in Table 4.2 below. 
4.2: Coalition variations across the case studies 
Inter-organisational Common concern Scale 
relationships I 
Sydney Weak Strong Strong I 
I 
Toronto Strong Weak Strong 
I 
Chicago Strong Strong Weak J 
---
2.2.2 Unions: similarities and differences 
The unions in each of the case studies had important similarities and differences. 
Using the pre-existing opportunity factors identified in chapter three, the unions 
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can be compared and contrasted in terms of their political and economic context, 
their union identities and their organisational features. 
The unions' political and economic context varied sharply. While all three are 
similar public sector unions (Bean 1994, p. 14), the NSWTF organised a stable 
• 
population of professional workers (teachers), CUPE organised a stable 
population of lower paid non-clinical workers, and the SEIU Local 880 organised 
a growing, precarious and decentralised workforce of low-wage homecare and 
home childcare workers. 
The three public sector unions have similar union identities, but with some 
differences in origins that are explored in more detail in the three case study 
chapters. The NSWTF's ideological framework comes from the involvement of 
socialist activists and because its members are professionals. CUPE' s ideology 
comes from its involvement with the NDP and its social movement experience. 
SEIU Local 880's ideology comes from its formation by a community 
organisation, Association of Community Organisations for Reform Now 
(ACORN). 
The organisational features of the unions vary, with different organisational 
scales, capacity and relationships. CUPE and the NSWTF each operate on 
multiple scales beyond the workplace, including regional offices such as teacher 
associations or union locals, as well as state or province-wide rank and file 
decision-making bodies. SEIU Local 880 is different: it has a centralised scale of 
union participation - through city-based central meetings - either in Chicago or 
in regional Illinois cities. It does not have local structures with elected local rank 
and file representatives. The unions have different sizes and levels of 
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homogeneity. The NSWTF is a large union primarily consisting of school 
teachers. CUPE is a large heterogeneous public sector union, but it has a 
separate structure for health care campaigning. SEIU Local 880 has grown from 
a very small union to recently a very large union. It has a heterogeneous 
membership of homecare and home childcare workers, but orga~ises its 
members and has union meetings across industries. 
The union relationships with other unions and the central labour councils also 
vary. The NSWTF is a relatively isolated union, tending to act alone rather than 
having a close relationship with the state peak body, Unions NSW (interview 35: 
anon. union official, 2005). CUPE has a stronger web of union relationships than 
the NSWTF, but also has some ideological differences with the Ontario 
Federation of Labour, the central labour council in Ontario. SEIU 880 has the 
strongest set of union relationships, firstly through the SEIU State Council, 
secondly through the Change to Win unions and thirdly through the Chicago 
Federation of Labor. Similarly, the SEIU International has centralised resources 
and works with individual locals including SEIU Local 880. 
The coalitions also had different types of union participation. The Public 
Education Coalition involved only one union in this coalition, the OHC had 
seven unions and the Grassroots Collaborative had two unions formally 
participating with the Living Wage Coalition involving four unions. The 
coalitions also ranged from the union-initiated Public Education Alliance to the 
community-initiated Grassroots Collaborative and the semi-independent OHC. 
The similarities and differences across the unions across the case studies are 
outlined in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Union variations across the coalitions 
Sydney Toronto Chicago 
Political and Professional full-time Non-clinical hospital Home-based workers 
economic context workers workers 
Union identity Progressive ideology Progressive, Progressive, 
and professional ideology, party and community 
• 
public sector organisation 
'community focused' 
Organisational scale Decentralised Decentralised Centralised 
Large, homogenous Large heterogeneous Large (new), sectors 
organised together 
Other unions Weak union Some union Strong union 
relationships relationships relationships 
Who initiated the Union Union, but semi- Community 
coalition independent organisations 
3.0 Case Selection: the Specific Method 
To undertake a case study, a combination or triangulation of data collection 
methods is necessary (Yin 1994). Triangulation enables the researcher to test the 
reliability of the data obtained from interviews. The case studies data was 
collected through extensive semi-structured interviews with participants, the use 
of newspaper articles, internal union and coalition documents including minutes, 
a short questionnaire of union members, campaign materials, organisational 
journals and websites. 
However, the research approach relied most heavily on interviews. The study of 
coalition relationships must intensively focus on interpersonal relationships and 
how they shift. Long, semi-structured interviews were the most effective method 
for uncovering how and why relationships formed and strengthened, and how 
and why conflict arose. Moreover, undertaking interviews was a personal 
strength, as my background allowed me to develop a close and strong rapport 
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with the subjects (Whipp 1998). I have been a union organiser for four years, and 
a community organiser for the four years before that. This allowed me to 
develop trust with subjects, given my similar experience, and my knowledge of 
the language and practice of organising and working in coalition. 
• 
Research for the Public Education Coalition (PEC) case study used a combination 
of interviews, document analysis, participant observation, newspaper articles 
and a short survey of the 300 member NSW Teachers Federation State Council. 
This was the first case selected, and it was identified as a result of my experience 
as a full-time union official at Unions NSW. It was widely considered by union 
leaders and staff as a noticeably successful coalition. The study involved forty-
two interviews, twenty-six with union officials, including three executive union 
officials, six organisers, three rank and file representatives and three retired 
union members. Non-participant observation was undertaken at two State 
Council meetings, one union training session, and two teacher association 
meetings (one in western Sydney and one in rural NSW). Access was granted to 
the NSWTF library, and I reviewed internal union correspondence, the union 
journal Education and newspaper articles from the period. Copies of five NSWTF 
Sky Channel meetings between 2001 and 2004 were reviewed; these included the 
Vinson Inquiry, the State Election campaign and the salaries campaign. Outside 
of the NSWTF interviews were undertaken with one representative from the 
Australian Education Union, the President of the Australian Council of Trade 
' 
Unions (who was a former AEU President and NSWTF Organiser), two officials 
from the Public Sector Association and one additional anonymous senior union 
official. Interviews were undertaken with the coalition partners, including two 
interviews with the Secondary Principal Association, two with the Primary 
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Principals Council, two with the Public Schools Principals Forum, four with the 
Parents & Citizens Federation and two with the Federation of School Community 
Organisations. Two individuals who worked in the Department of Education 
and one former Minister of Education were also interviewed. 
• 
Research for the Ontario Health Coalition case study used a combination of 
interviews, document analysis, participant observation and newspaper articles. 
Thirty-four interviews were undertaken. The case study was identified on a visit 
to Canada in November 2004, where investigative interviews and meetings with 
different union and coalition representatives were undertaken. Across these 
interviews, the OHC was considered one of the more successful coalition 
examples in Toronto. Within the target union CUPE, fewer interviews were 
staged than in the NSWTF because overall there were seven participant unions 
rather than one. Two CUPE leaders, two full-time CUPE officials and one rank 
and file participant were interviewed. Interviews occurred with one 
representative from each of the participant unions, including Ontario Public 
Service Employees Union (OPSEU), SEIU, Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), 
Ontario Federation of Labour, Ontario Nurses Association and the United 
Steelworkers. Interviews were also undertaken with representatives from 
provincially-scaled community organisations, such as the Council of Canadians 
(CC), and three senior organisations. Ten interviews were undertaken with 
representatives from local health coalitions, two of which were also union activist 
bridge builders. Interviews occurred with the coordinator of the OHC and 
several former staff members. In addition, the research included non-participant 
observation of several coalition planning meetings, the OHC Assembly 2005 and 
the operation of the OHC office. The OHC provided access to the OHC's 
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archieves that included the minutes from all its meetings and its campaign 
materials. Newspaper articles were also reviewed from 2000 to 2006. 
Research for the Grassroots Collaborative Living Wage case study included 
interviews, document analysis, participant observation, review of intel'Ilfll data 
and a review of newspaper articles. There were forty-five interviews. The 
campaign was identified campaign through discussion with several US 
academics, to try to identify union and community organisation contact points in 
Chicago. The approach started with the organisations involved in the 1995-98 
Living Wage campaign, visiting Chicago in July 2005 and undertaking 
unstructured interviews to find a coalition campaign with significant similarities 
with the previous studies. Having located the Grassroots Collaborative, fifteen 
SEIU Local 880 representatives were interviewed, including senior staff leaders, 
organisers, two homecare rank and file leaders and two childcare rank and file 
leaders. Outside the union staff from United Food and Commerical Workers 
(UFCW), SEIU 73, SEIU1 and the Chicago Federation of Labor were interviewed. 
Interviews were undertaken with the coordinator of the Grassroots Collaborative 
and representatives from four key Collaborative organisations. Interviews 
included key staff leaders, organisers and rank and file leaders from ACORN, 
which was the most active community organisation in the living wage campaign. 
Access was provided to all internal campaign and meeting notes from SEIU 
Local 880, data collected about tum out statistics and reviewed newspaper 
articles from the campaign period. There was also non-participant observation 
of a Grassroots Collaborative breakfast meeting, a Big Box Living Wage 
campaign meeting, a SEIU Local 880 monthly member meeting, a mass rally on 
July 30 2005 and a rally against the veto of the living wage on 13 September 2006. 
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In each of the case studies, the interviews were semi-structured. They used a 
pro-forma method with three sections, firstly reviewing the background of the 
interviewees, secondly their experience of the campaign events, and thirdly a 
series of evaluative questions. They used some common evaluative questions, 
including: what makes a campaign successful? what makes an alliance 
• 
successful? and what did you learn from the campaign? Interview subjects were 
identified by beginning with the key coalition organisations, and used a Sf!OWball 
technique to identify key actors. The Public Education Coalition began with the 
NSWTF; the OHC began with a joint interview of the OHC convenor and a 
CUPE representative; and the Grassroots Collaborative began with ACORN. The 
interviews repeatedly asked for participant advice about other possible 
interviewees. 
The aim of the interviews was to develop extensive data on perceptions of 
coalition success and union engagement, from a wide array of union and 
community organisation participants. The intention was to interview union 
representatives from across the organisation in order to understand differences 
among the perceptions of union leaders, organisers and rank and file 
representatives. In each case study, multiple unions and central labour council 
representatives were interviewed to investigate variations between unions and to 
get additional perspectives on the union under study. Interviews and secondary 
research were undertaken on the national affiliates of each union. Where access 
was granted, such as in Chicago and Sydney, government department or 
political adversaries were also interviewed to understand how the state 
representatives perceived the operation and strengths of the coalitions. 
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To attempt to overcome ethnocentric biases as an outsider, I sought extensive 
informal advice from unions, academics and community organisations in Canada 
and the United States about development of my research (Strauss 1998, p. 191}. I 
also lived 'in country' for two years of this three-year study, basing myself at the 
Industrial and Labor Relations School at Cornell University in order to make 
• 
regular and repeated field visits. I lived for two months in Chicago between July 
and September 2005, and one month in Toronto in June 2005. I returned twice to 
Toronto in November 2005 and May 2006, and once to Chicago in September 
2006 to complete follow-up interviews. 
4.0 Conclusion 
The case study methodology controls for some contextual similarities, while 
focusing attention on the key variables of coalition practice, including political 
context and organisational capacity. The case studies have useful similarities and 
differences.that open up an exploration of the key coalition elements identified in 
Chapter Two. The aim of the three case studies in Chapters Five, Six and Seven 
is to document the dynamics of long-term coalition unionism. The thesis 
assesses if these variables are capable of analysing how coalition unionism 
changes over time, and the extent to which differences between the case studies 
are a product of political context or strategic choice, and the possible relationship 
between the two. 
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Chapter Five 
Agenda-Driven Coalition Unionism: 
The NSWTF and the Public Education Coalition 2001-2004 
• On Public Education Day, May 2002, in the NSW Teachers Federation (NSWTF) 
Library, representatives from the Public Education Alliance (PEA) sat down for a 
press conference. In the room were the senior officers from the peak parent, 
principal and teacher organisations in NSW, flanked by Tony Vinson, the 
independent head of the recent Inquiry into Public Education. 
On the side of the room was a visitor, President Chase, the leader of the National 
Education Association in the United States, the biggest union in the world. 'He 
couldn't believe his eyes', Gavrielatos, the NSWTF Vice President recalled. It 
was 'extraordinary . . . the legitimacy, validation, authentication . . . all of our 
campaign objectives articulated through this independent inquiry' (interview, 
Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005). 
This day was the highest point in an education campaign that delivered the most 
wide-reaching reform to the NSW public education system in a generation. It 
secured reductions in class sizes, a major increase in funding for teacher 
professional development and provided a launching pad for the union's salaries 
campaign. It was the peak achievement of NSW Public Education Coalition 
(PEC) from 2001-2004. 
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1.0 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the first of three case studies of coalition unionism. 
Each is a study of a long-term coalition campaigning on a common set of issues, 
drawing out the dynamics of successful coalitions, how coalitions are powerful 
for unions and when unions are likely to engage in coalition unionism . 
• 
This is a case study of a union-initiated coalition that created a broad policy 
agenda. It argues that it is an example of agenda-driven coalition unionism, 
with strong bonds of common concern and a strong multi-scaled, opportunity-
based coalition, but a weak coalition structure. The agenda-driven coalition 
unionism provided real resources to the union, particularly enabling new forms 
of member engagement through multi-scaled participatory structures. It also 
provided a strong issue-based agenda to achieve policy changes that were in the 
interest of the union. However, the coalition's weak inter-organisational 
relationships 'led to unevenness in the coalition's structure, resulting in union 
dominance of the coalition. 
This chapter explores the NSW PEC from 2001 to 2004. This time period marked 
a distinct campaign period for the NSWTF. In 2001 the NSWTF began using a 
new union fund that transformed its capacity to engage in positive campaigns 
around public education. The study ends in 2004, for in the words of the 
NSWTF's President, the federal elections of 2001 and 2004 provide 'natural 
bookends' for the education campaign (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). 
The case study begins with an overview of the participant organisations and then 
explores the PEC through five distinct phases: the 2001 Federal Election 
campaign, the Vinson Inquiry into Public Education, the 2003 State Election 
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campaign, the NSWTF Salaries campaign and the 2004 Federal Election 
campaign. 
2.0 Context for the Case Study 
• In 2004, the education system in Australia was regulated by both the NSW and 
Federal Governments, with primary responsibility for finance and curriculum 
resting with the NSW State Government. Since 1996, the Federal Government 
has been a Liberal-National Party Coalition with an economically liberal, socially 
conservative political ideology (Brett 2003). During the same period, the NSW 
Government was run by the ALP, which has a strong commitment to public 
education, but also a commitment to maintaining budget surpluses (O'Donnell 
2000; interview 34: former Minister for Education, 2005). In Australia, there were 
no decentralised school boards like in those United States or Canada; rather, the 
NSW Department of Education and Training (DET) set standards, pay-scales and 
school performance indicators for the entire state (interview 40: DET, 2005). For 
teachers, this had the advantage of minimising wage competition, allowing the 
NSWTF to collectively bargain at the state scale for the wages and conditions that 
operate at local schools. 
Before the 2001 PEC, the NSWTF and NSW-based parent and principal 
organisations had a history of ad hoc relationships. Principal representatives 
were simultaneously members of the NSWTF, and the NSWTF and parent 
'· 
organisations regularly met as the 'Three Federations'. This section briefly 
explores the background of the PEC partner organisations. 
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2.1 NSW Teachers Federation (NSWTF) 
During the period of this case study, the NSWTF was the largest public sector 
union and second largest union in NSW (Unions NSW 2005). It was formed in 
1918, and is registered in the NSW Industrial Relations System (O'Brien 1987, p. 
1). It primarily represented teachers, as well as TAFE and other public et!iucation 
workers (NSWTF 2005a).11 In 2004, approximately 82% of all full-time equivalent 
teachers were union members (DET 2004; White 2004; NSWTF 2005a). Three key 
features shaped the NSWTF's coalition practice. They were: its internal 
democratic structure, its status as a professional and public sector union and its 
ideologically progressive identity (Tarrow 1994). 
The NSWTF had a distinctly democratic internal structure, with a culture of 
decentralised decision making that involved the membership (interview, 
O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2004; Bloch: former NSWTF, 2005). In 2004, it had an 
Annual Conference of over 600 delegates, a State Council of over 300 delegates 
that met eight times a year, and a State Executive of rank and file teachers 
(NSWTF 2005a). The union's secretariat had forty-five officers, all required to be 
former rank and file teachers, elected by the Council for three-year terms, and 
three Presidential Officers elected by the entire union membership every two 
years (NSWTF 2005a). The NSWTF's key local decision-making bodies were 
teacher associations. Teacher associations had their own executive, and 
represented all teachers in a local geographic area. In 2004, there were 170 
teacher associations in NSW. Additionally, every one of the 2238 schools in NSW 
had a NSWTF representative and a women's contact person (NSWTF 2005a). 
The union's structure often meant the NSWTF worked separately from other 
n In 2005, there were 41 000 full-time teachers, out of a total of 65 000 members, making up 63% of the 
NSWTF membership (NSWTF 2005a). 
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unions, with union leaders forced to focus on internal union business rather than 
horizontal union relationships (interview 24: union official, 2005). 
As a professional union, the NSWTF had consistently worked on salaries and 
standards that support the professional status of teachers (O'Brien 198]). The 
union had long considered the industrial conditions of teachers intimately 
connected to the status of public education (Sky Channel 2001). !3efore WWII, 
this led the union to form an ad hoc group called the 'Three Federations' between 
the Federation of Parents & Citizens (P&C) and the Federation of School 
Community Organisations (FOSCO). This group did not campaign, but held bi-
monthly meetings to discuss priorities and lobbying agendas (interview 9: 
FOSCO, 2005). It meant that making coalitions with parents was a familiar tactic 
for the NSWTF. 
The NSWTF's.interest in public education funding, and its use of industrial and 
coalition strategies, was also shaped by the union's location in the public sector. 
The State Government was both the employer and primary funding body for 
public education, and consequently the union repeatedly engaged in the political 
process and elections (interview 5: NSWTF, 2005). Teachers constantly interacted 
with the direct beneficiaries of education - children and parents. Similarly, the 
physical location of the school in local neighbourhoods connected teachers to a 
physical community of people. As Sue Simpson, former NSWTF President, put it 
'schools are in every town and hamlet' (Sky Channel2001). The combination of a 
union dedicated to public service, in close contact with local geographic and 
parental communities, supported a history rich of coalition action (O'Brien 1987). 
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Finally, the NSWTF had an ideologically progressive union identity. During the 
1950s to 1970s a significant number of NSWTF officials were members of the 
Communist Party, creating political influence over union strategies (interview, 
Bloch: former NSWTF, 2005).12 This gave birth to its 'united front' strategy, 
where the union regularly organised alliances with education groups ~O'Brien 
1987). Indeed, this radical ideological vision generated leadership commitment 
to political issues beyond economic concerns, evidenced by the union's support 
of key social justice movements during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, including 
support of peace and Aboriginal rights (interview, Bloch: former NSWTF 
Official, 2005). Notably, this progressive identity was influenced by the union's 
female membership. Over 70% of union members are women, and female 
members have led campaigns for representation, recognition and workplace 
rights since the 1970s (interview, Bloch: former NSWTF, 2005; White 2004). As a 
NSWTF member argued in a NSWTF report, the fact that women often have to 
combine work and family helps them to cross traditional divides between the 
workplace and local external community organisations, supporting a broad 
union identity (Hallock 1997; White 2004). The union's broad organisational 
range is enduring; the NSWTF President described the union as a 'social justice 
union' because of its commitment to social issues (interview, O'Halloran: 
NSWTF, 2005; Zadkovich 1999; Sky Channel 2001). This left ideological vision 
had drawn the NSWTF away from the ALP, and there was a high degree of 
distrust of the ALP amongst NSWTF officials (interviews 2, 7, 15, 16, 18: NSWTF, 
2005). 
12 Even before this time, groups such as the Militant Minority Movement, a communist-influenced 
movement within the NSVVTF, focused on issues of education funding (interview 31: retired NSWTF official, 
2005) 
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These three factors help to construct familiar modes of NSWTF activity, or what 
social movement theorists call repertoires of contention (Tarrow 1994). When in 
industrial mode, campaigning for salaries and work conditions, the most 
favoured form of action has been the strike, supplemented by mass stop work 
meetings. Additionally, the NSWTF has a history of campaigning Qn social 
issues, influenced by the convergence of the union's professional concern for 
education and its radical history. These pre-existing opportunities supported its 
shift to sustained coalition unionism in 2001. 
2.2 Parent organisations 
Between 2001 and 2004, the PEC involved two organisations representing 
parents of children at public schools -the P&C and FOSCO. The P&C was the 
larger of the two parent bodies. 
In 2004, the Federation of Parents and Citizens Associations (P&C) was the NSW 
peak body for public school parents and citizens organisations. Parents & 
citizens organisations are school-based clubs of parents of school children that 
evolved at the tum of the century as fundraisers for local schools. The P&C 
united these autonomous organisations into a state-based network in 1922 (P&C 
2005a). The P&C's purpose was to assist communication between school-based 
parent groups and centrally act as a political organisation to lobby government to 
improve public education in the interests of parents and their children 
(interview, Baker: P&C 2005). The P&C operated at state, regional, district and 
local levels. At a state level there was a secretariat of seven paid staff plus 
elected voluntary officers which included a President, Publicity Officer, Vice 
Presidents and Treasurer (P&C 2005b). In 2004, the P&C had both smaller 
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district and larger regional structures, although participation was focused at the 
regional scale as that mirrored the structure of the DET (interview 41: DET, 2005). 
The P&C had a formal relationship with government and received most of its 
operating budget through NSW Government grants. 
• 
The character of the P&C has been greatly influenced by the personality of its 
leadership (interview 45: P&C, 2005; interview 22: P&C, 2005). The President's 
influence was reinforced by informal factions that developed in the 1990s. A 
contrast is evident in the outlook of the two past Presidents - Bev Baker and 
Sharyn Brownlee. Bev Baker believed that the most important relationship for 
the P&C was 'not between parents and government but between parents and 
teachers ... if we don't walk in their shoes and understand their pressures ... 
we're lost' (interview, Baker: P&C, 2005). In contrast, Brownlee believed that the 
P&Cs should privilege a close relationship with government, announcing on her 
election to the leadership that 'it's time for a change so that we're relevant to the 
Education Minister and the Premier' (Wood 2002). The centralised structure of 
the P&C meant that the President's ideology and organisational priorities shaped 
the P&Cs agenda, influencing its relationships with the government, the DET 
and the NSWTF. 
The Federation of School Community Organisations (FOSCO) began as a 
federation of mothers' clubs focused on the early years of education, from 
Kindergarten to Year 2 (interview, Allen: FOSCO, 2005). FOSCO was established 
in 1926 with the aim of increasing 'communication between clubs and making 
lobbying for better conditions easier' (interview, Allen: FOSCO, 2005). FOSCO 
was a powerful organisation when there were a large number of separate infants 
schools (K-2), but from the 1970s the unification of infants and primary schools 
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caused FOSCO's membership to fall. By 1997 the FOSCO Council was abolished 
because of declining attendance, replaced by a general meeting four times a year 
(interview, Allen: FOSCO, 2005). Between September 2001 and June 2003, 
FOSCO moved to dissolution. FOSCO participated in the PEC, but its 
engagement was limited by this internal organisational crisis. 
• 
While the two parent groups worked productively together through Three 
Federations meetings, both organisations acknowledged tension between them. 
FOSCO recognised that they sometimes competed with the P&C for legitimacy 
and recognition (interview 39: FOSCO, 2005). Officials in the P&C recall the lack 
of a truly honest and trusting relationship between the organisations, which 
often disagreed in public forums such as the Australian Council of State School 
Organisations (interview 38: P&C, 2005). However, each emphasised that when 
they were campaigning there was little tension between the two organisations 
(interview 8: P&C, 2005). 
2.3 School principal organisations 
The representation of school principals has been controversial in Australia. In 
other states, principals have formed separate industrial organisations that rival 
the teachers' union. Importantly, in NSW principals are simultaneously 
members of the NSWTF as well as having formal separate professional 
representative bodies. The latter evolved with the support of the DET in the 
1980s. In addition, there is the Primary Schools Principals Forum which' is an 
independent principal organisation. 
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In 2004, the Secondary Principals Council (SPC) represented the 460 principals in 
secondary schools across NSW, with the goal of supporting principal welfare and 
professional development (interview, King: SPC, 2005). Structurally, the SPC 
had an executive of fifteen, which was expanded in 2002 to include a more 
hands-on role for the President, Chris Bonner, and three Deputies (interview, 
• 
King: SPC, 2005). The SPC communicated using email, phone and fax bulletins 
to keep principals up to date (interview, King: SPC, 2005). The SPC had a formal 
relationship with the DET which funded half its operating costs; the remainder 
was funded by members. This relationship created a 'semi-independent' status 
for the SPC: it existed both 'inside and outside the tent' of the education 
bureaucracy (interview, Bonner: SPC, 2005). According to the SPC leadership, it 
is this 'messy' dual status that gave the SPC much of its power (interview, 
Bonner: SPC, 2005). Its stakeholder status provided influence and pressure as 
well as the space for criticism and distance. In the last decade, the SPC focused 
on the issue of public education, commissioning research called the Futures 
Project and appointing Judy King as a Deputy-President with responsibility for 
public education advocacy (interview, King: SPC, 2005). 
The Primary Principals Association (PP A) was the professional association for 
over 1800 primary school principals, aiming to improve conditions in primary 
schools through lobbying government and the DET, and providing professional 
development for their members (interview, Scott: PP A, 2005). The PP A consisted 
of forty-three geographically defined councils, each with a local executive 
(interview, McMillian: PP A, 2005). The PP A had a central Council and annual 
State Conference, and was Jed by a President who is a media spokesperson and 
internal communications officers. The PP A received funding from the 
Department (interview, Scott: PP A, 2005). 
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The Public School Principals Forum (PSPF) was a very different principal 
organisation, calling itself an independent organisation for principals, as it was a 
non-funded advocacy organisation. It formed in 1995 in response to a school 
dispute over basic testing, where principals, mainly in south-west Sydney, called 
• 
for the formation of an 'independent voice for principals' that was 'separate from 
government funding' (interview, McBride: PSPF; Chudleigh: PSPF, 2005). They 
evolved into a formally incorporated association, with the aim of 'advocating for 
public education' and to 'safeguard the status of principals' (interview, 
Chudleigh: PSPF, 2005). It had a management committee and senior officers 
including a Chair and Deputy Chair who had authority to make public media 
comments, creating a public profile (interview, Chudleigh: PSPF, 2005). 
There was tension between the principal organisations. The PP A and SPC, for 
instance, argued about how primary principals were paid less than secondary 
school principals. However they agreed on their distrust of the PSPF. McBride 
described the relationship with PPA as 'not happy'. She believed that the PPA 
saw the formation of the PSPF as a 'huge slap in the face' (interview, McBride: 
PSPF, 2005). Similarly, John McMillian described the PSPF as a 'splinter group' 
with which the PPA has 'no association ... we don't recognise them as an official 
body and would disagree with a lot of their attitudes and actions' (interview, 
McMillian: PP A, 2005). 
2.4 The emergence of the PEC 
The Public Education Coalition grew out of a period of increasing crisis in the 
education sector and radical organisational changes inside the NSWTF. The 
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major external crisis was one of funding. The 1990s saw significant budget 
reductions to public education from both State and Federal Governments. At a 
federal level, there was a shift in funding from public to private schools (Watson 
2003; Liberal Party 2004). At a state level, the policy of fiscal tightening firstly 
initiated a program of school restructures, including the development of 
• 
collegiate schools, selective schools, specialist schools, junior high schools and 
school closures (Vinson 2002, pp.l17-154). The school restructure program 
culminated in the 2001 Building the Future white paper which called for 
widespread school closures (DET 2001). Secondly, the fiscal tightening was also 
directed at reducing recurrent expenditure - the greatest being teacher wages 
(interview 34: former Minister for Education, 2005). Consequently, as a NSWTF 
official recalled, teacher salaries campaigns became 'increasingly bitter' during 
the 1990s (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). The 1999 Salaries campaign 
was the most hostile, both through the media and in union negotiations with 
government. The Daily Telegraph, the largest circulation paper in Sydney, ran 
articles attacking the credibility of the NSWTF and their wage claim. This 
culminated in a front-page article on the day of a strike that featured a cartoon of 
the NSWTF President who was drawn wearing a dunce's cap with the headline 
'if the cap fits' (Daily Telegraph 9 Feb 1999). 
This funding crisis created a process of organisational change in the parent and 
principal organisations. The combination of restructures and increased student 
testing led principals in western Sydney to form the PSPF (interview, McBride: 
PSPF, 2005). It also led to a radicalisation of the P&Cs, resulting in what a former 
Minister for Education described as the 'strong, articulate leadership of Bev 
Baker' (interview, former Minister for Education, 2005). 
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Most profoundly, the funding crisis directly challenged the NSWTF. The Salaries 
campaign generated significant disquiet amongst teachers: there was a sense that 
teachers 'were being denigrated by talk-back radio' (interview 17: NSWTF, 2005). 
This despair was sometimes expressed as anger at the union, particularly that the 
NSWTF did not have a sufficient media presence, with motions moved at 
• 
NSWTF State Council meetings calling for it to investigate more effective media 
strategies (NSWTF 1999a). 
In the late 1990s, a group of organisers and delegates all located in south-western 
and western Sydney and all broadly aligned to a loose faction that supported a 
united front-styled campaigning, began strategising about how to shift the 
union's capacity. In these areas of Sydney there was strong socio-economic 
disadvantage and awareness that public education was a key 'antidote to 
inequality' (interview, McBride: PSPF, 2005) At the same time, an organiser, 
Gary Zadkovich, was inspired by a study trip overseas and wrote a paper calling 
for a series of internal reforms that would support 'social movement unionism' 
(Zadkovich 1999). This group became an agent of change within the union. The 
group proposed three key structural changes to the union's organisational 
capacity and relationships: firstly, a fund for public education campaigns, 
secondly a new strategic relationship with principal groups and thirdly the 
formation of local public education lobby groups. 
Initially, the group proposed a public education fund and public education social 
frame, aimed at establishing a dedicated pool of money that could be used solely 
for proactive campaigns around promoting public education. Working off 
widespread member anger around media messaging and the inability of the 
union to get its 'message out' (interview 19: NSWTF, 2005), delegates from south-
184 
west Sydney moved a motion at the 1999 Annual NSWTF Conference calling for 
the formation of a public education fund - a compulsory membership fee that 
would create a dedicated union resource for public education campaigns 
(NSWTF 1999b). This motion captured member interest for an improved media 
strategy, but allocated resources not simply to union advertising but to the 
• 
'formation of a broad-based public education campaign agenda' (interview 19: 
NSWTF, 2005). The result of the motion was that from 2001 the union reframed 
all its campaigns as campaigns for public education, supported by a pool of 
funding to resource them (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). 
Next, the western Sydney group argued that the NSWTF needed to recast its 
outlook on principals as allies in public education campaigning. Previously, 
while principles were NSWTF members, the NSWTF did not have regular formal 
meetings with the principal organisations. It was in western Sydney, where the 
PSPF had independently initiated public advocacy on public education that 
NSWTF organisers and delegates 'reformulated their understanding of 
principals', believing that principals 'needed to be seen as school leaders rather 
than employers' (interview 7 and 27: NSWTF, 2005). This shifting role was 
accepted by the leadership through several internal debates during 1999 and 
2000. 
The successful repositioning of the role of principals led to a third change in the 
NSWTF: the formation of public education lobbies in the local federal electorates 
around the state. Public education lobbies were local organisations led by a 
locally-based parent, principal and teacher. This idea received tacit support from 
the leadership, but gained significant momentum after a series of local forums on 
public education, first in Campbelltown and Liverpool in 1999 which attracted 
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600 people, then in Mt Prichard in 2000 that attracted 750 people (interview 19: 
NSWTF, 2005). The idea was to establish local participation and advocacy for 
public education to supplement the centralised power of the union, so locally-
based teachers, parents and principals could lobby local members of parliament. 
• 
Thus, as a consequence of a crisis in union capacity created by major funding 
cuts and attacks on teachers, the NSWTF realigned its relationship with 
principals, created a multi-scalar capacity for action on public education and 
built a resource base and broad social frame on which to initiate changes to the 
public education system from 2001. These changes deepened the union's 
capacity to engage in coalition, yet were also consistent with the union's history 
of pre-existing professional and ideological union identities and its familiarity 
with coalitions and social justice campaigns. 
3.0 The PEC: 2001-2004 
The PEC between 2001 and 2004 can be conceptualised as a single period of 
public education campaigning that had five campaign phases underpinned by a 
variety of coalition structures. 
3.1 Federal Election campaign, Febrnary to October 2001 
The PEC began with the aim of influencing the outcome of the 2001 federal 
election, and to do so the NSWTF initiated an informal coalition with parents and 
principals. The idea of campaigning around elections was 'core business' for the 
NSWTF, because as a public sector union it believed it needed to engage in 
politics to influence the funding base for public education (interview 5: NSWTF, 
2005). In Australia, where voting is compulsory, the focus of the NSWTF's 
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Election campaign was to generate public attention for public education, while 
also generating electoral opposition to the Liberal-National Coalition who had 
supported private education while in office (Watson 2003). Yet, Federal Election 
campaigns had always been a challenge for the NSWTF, because as a state-scaled 
organisation it struggled to build policy influence at a national scale. 
• 
The Federal Election campaign consisted of a series of ad hoc events at two 
scales: nationally and locally. It began with a national advertising campaign and 
an inaugural public education day festival that focused on the merits of public 
education, and each were funded by the NSWTF through its public education 
fund (Hennessy 2001; O'Halloran 2001a). The campaign extended locally as the 
new public education lobbies lobbied local election candidates (Richard 2001). 
The aim of the lobbies was to 'sustain a continuous dialogue' between politicians 
and locally-based teachers, parents and principals who told stories about 
education from the local area, not 'union bureaucrats' based in the state-scaled 
office (interview 7: NSWTF, 2005). As one P&C representative argued, the local 
place base of the lobbies generated their power: 'the local politician couldn't 
duck and weave and pretend it was someone else's business, they had to argue 
the impact of the policy at that local level' (interview, Baker: P&C, 2005). 
The major activity of the campaign was a Public Education Convention on 8 
September. This was a nationally scaled event, built to obtain national media 
coverage (Long 2001). Planning was coordinated by the NSWTF, with the 
principal organisations (PP A, SPC and PSPF) and the parent organisations (P&C 
and FOSCO) consulted in drafting a joint statement which featured all the 
organisations' logos, and all the organisations were encouraged to bring people 
to the event (interview, King: SPC, 2005; interview 39: FOSCO, 2005). The 
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planning process was a 'loose formation', with most of the organisation 
occurring through email rather than face to face meetings (interview 39: FOSCO, 
2005; O'Halloran, President, 2005). The Convention was attended by over 10 000 
people, in a space that fits 30 000, with the audience addressed by politicians 
from all the major parties. 
• 
Evaluation of the event was mixed. One NSWTF organiser described it as 
'groundbreaking' and the union's journal, Education, was also positive (Long 
2001). This positive evaluation was connected to the fact that the NSWTF's 
internal election strategy was directly linked to tum out at the convention 
(interview 19: NSWTF, 2005) Yet many of the principal and parent 
representatives who were less involved in the planning had quite modest 
reflections (interview 21: principal representative, 2005). The convention gained 
significant media attention for the issue of education (Sunday Telegraph 9 Sept 
2001; Sun Herald 9 Sept 2001), however, in the end the issue of education was 
overshadowed. September 11, refugees and border control dominated the 
election and saw the conservative Liberal-National Coalition re-elected (Marr 
and Wilkinson 2003). With a Coalition landslide, the PEC's attention shifted to 
the NSW State Government with the next election campaign in March 2003. 
3.2 Vinson Inquiry, April 2001 to May 2002 
The PEC's most successful activity was the Vinson Inquiry, an independent 
public inquiry into public education. It was a multi-scaled, agenda-setting 
political opportunity created by the NSWTF and the P&C in response to repeated 
restructuring proposals from the NSW State Government. 
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The NSW ALP Government's Building the Future proposal, released in March 
2001, recommended the closure of thirteen schools and was immediately 
opposed by inner-city communities and teachers through wildcat strikes and 
public meetings of up to 1000 people (DET 2001; O'Halloran 2001b). Initially, the 
union called for the government to review its proposal through a Government 
• 
Inquiry. Then during its April state executive meeting, one rank and file 
representative exclaimed, 'why don't we just do a review ourselves' (interview, 
Simpson: NSWTF, 2005). 
Undertaking an independent inquiry was only possible because of the union's 
pre-existing resources and size. The inquiry ended up costing $500 000, and the 
NSWTF could only 'contemplate this review because of the public education 
fund' (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005; O'Halloran 2001a). 
The Vinson Inquiry was coordinated by a tight formal partnership between just 
two organisations, the NSWTF and the P&C. This partnership across the 
'education community' gave the Inquiry legitimacy to comment on the future of 
public education (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005). As one official 
described, the coalition: 
Was as much for political reasons as it was based on our belief that they 
were partners and stakeholders in the provision of education ... if you 
have the NSWTF and the P&C both commissioning this, it would make it 
that little bit harder for our political opponents to dismiss it (interview, 
Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005). 
A joint decision-making structure was formed, with dedicated representatives 
from the NSWTF and the P&C directly responsible for the Inquiry's day-to-day 
operation. The representatives were senior leaders of each organisation: Maree 
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O'Halloran, the then Deputy Vice President of the NSWTF, and Rodney 
Molesworth, the then Senior Vice President of the P&C. The NSWTF found an 
Inquiry head, Tony Vinson, an Emeritus Education Professor at the University of 
Sydney who also had previous experience in reviewing government services. He 
established a separate structure for the Inquiry, acting as an autonomous head of 
• 
a distinct organisation. He set up an office in separate premises, hired a research 
team and was given control over discretionary funds provided mainly by the 
NSWTF but also by the P&C (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005; Baker: P&C. 
2005). 
The Inquiry's independent status gave it authority within government and 
amongst the partner groups. Vinson was widely seen as a credible, independent 
expert, who would deliver a report based on its merits rather than just act as a 
creature of the NSWTF or the P&C (interview 34: former Minister for Education, 
2005). To protect his credibility, Vinson independently sought out a constructive 
relationship with the ALP Government, the Liberal-National Leader of the 
Opposition and the Department of Education: 
I said to them I was only going to undertake this if they were open-
minded enough to realise that someone like myself would be capable of 
rendering an objective report. I think I took the wind out of their sails ... 
heads were nodded (interview, Vinson: Inquiry Head, 2005). 
Although it was created by the P&C and NSWTF, the Inquiry sat above them, 
allowing the Inquiry to focus on their common concerns for public education and 
not conflicts of interest. As Vinson described it: 'the moment I started to look as 
though I was aligned to this group or that group it would have undermined the 
whole thing' (interview, Vinson: Inquiry Head, 2005). 
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The Inquiry resembled a formal government inquiry while acting as a tool for 
agenda setting and generating mass union participation. The Vinson Inquiry 
received submissions, held public hearing and public meetings (Vinson 2002). 
But it was also consciously structured to increase awareness about public 
education for the 2003 state election and to maximise teacher and parent 
• 
participation. The union constantly used mass-based communications 
technology to reach a broad public audience for every stage of the Inquiry, using 
a social frame of the 'community' to demonstrate that it was working across the 
state of NSW and beyond the concerns of the NSWTF (Sky Channel 2001). 
Submissions were advertised in the major daily newspapers, the Inquiry was 
launched through a satellite 'Sky Channel' which was labelled a 'community sky 
channel',13 772 submissions were received and the Inquiry held twenty-eight 
public meetings and school visits across the state (Vinson 2002). 
4 
The Inquiry operated simultaneously at the local scale and the scale of the state 
while engaging union I!lembers and parents through submissions and hearings. 
At the local scale, the submission process required teachers to reflect on their 
concerns and vision for public education (interview, Rosicky: NSWTF, 2005). It 
directly improved people's understanding of the education system and the role 
of the union, while also requiring local collective organisation. As Simpson from 
the NSWTF described it, 'it is a more engaging collective process to write a 
submission compared to a strike which can be organised in an individualised 
way . . . this was deeply collective and participatory (interview, Simpson: 
NSWTF, 2005). 
13 A Sky Channel is a live satellite television broadcast that plays live in over forty locations aronnd the state, 
followed by local meetings of teachers and parents in those locations). 
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The hearings lasted over six months and provided local organising opportunities 
for member engagement and media attention for public education. They were 
school-based events, inviting teachers and parents to air their grievances and 
make recommendations, generating a deep level of rank and file participation. 
As O'Halloran commented: 'it touched the middle teacher that doesn't get 
• 
involved in their union' (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). These events 
were organised by regionally located NSWTF organisers working with teacher 
associations around the state. Vinson's visits became a space for intense 
member, union delegate and organiser activation, as one organiser describes: 
I contacted the schools, I contacted the media ... I picked him up, Tony 
we're going over to this school, now we're going to visit the Area News ... 
At 11 o'clock, you have a television interview with WIN ... And then 
we're visiting another school and by the way, we have got a meeting at 
the RSL Club this afternoon at 6 o'clock, and we've invited the P&C and 
local parents and community groups (interview, Irving: NSWTF, 2005). 
The large number of public events created a sustained media campaign at the 
scale of the state. The decentralisation of the education industry, with schools 
located at a neighbourhood level in cities and towns which required the Inquiry 
to move across the state. Consequently, through a combination of local, state and 
national media outlets, according to the union 'there was hardly a day where 
there was not a story about public education' (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 
2005). 
However, while the Vinson Inquiry was an organising opportunity, it was 
temporary, and the union struggled to sustain participation after the event. 
According to union organisers, while the Vinson visits resulted in union 
members participating to articulate their disaffection, it was not evident that this 
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participation was maintained: 'when it came to translating that anger into 
political effect, they dropped away' (interviews 3, 16, 18: NSWTF, 2005). This 
was affirmed by the result of a short questionnaire I administered at the NSW 
State Council in April 2005, where the 300-person State Council was asked if 
participation in their Teacher Association increased or stayed the same after the 
• 
Vinson Inquiry.14 Out of a response rate of 196 surveys, eighty-one stated it 
increased while another seventy-seven stated it stayed the same. There was not a 
direct, consistent increase in participation evenly across the union because of the 
Vinson Inquiry. 
However, the issue of public education was broad enough to mutually and 
directly engage the organisational interests of the NSWTF and the P&C during 
the process of the Inquiry. The P&C at the time had priority concerns in two 
areas, school maintenance and smaller class sizes (interview, Baker: P&C; 
Molesworth: PcS<C, 2005). The form of the Inquiry provided a space for their 
issues to be raised and incorporated into the Inquiry's findings as it asked 
parents as well as teachers to communicate their concerns about the education 
system. Furthermore, by asking individuals to raise specific grievances, the 
Inquiry engaged organisation members on their specific issues of concern. This 
intermixing of broad and direct interest enabled the Inquiry's concern for public 
education to act as a mobilising, participatory force that deeply engaged the rank 
and file. 
The externally oriented Inquiry simultaneously shaped a conscious commitment 
by the NSWTF to broaden its public social frame, while providing the NSWTF 
14 The survey was conducted at the March NSW Teachers Federation Council meeting. It was a two page 
survey of the 300 Councillors, with 196 surveys returned. The response rate was 65%. 
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and P&C with a research agenda. O'Halloran, the NSWTF President recalled, 'I 
made an effort . . . of saying "parents, principals and teachers say" not just 
speaking as the union but as the education community' (interview, O'Halloran: 
NSWTF, 2005). The Inquiry produced a research agenda for the future of public 
education, synthesising the concerns of teachers, parents and principals into a 
• 
vision captured as ninety-six recommendations for reform (interview, Brownlee: 
P&C 2005; Vinson 2002). 
The Inquiry's research findings were then released as three reports in May, July 
and August, 2002. These were media events involving union and parent 
organisations targeting major media outlets to influence the Government in the 
lead-up to the March 2003 State Election. The first major release on Public 
Education Day in May began with a lunchtime press conference at the NSWTF 
offices, followed by a dinner of teachers and parents in the Parliament House 
Dining Room. The idea was for teachers and parents to 'symbolically' reclaim 
Parliament House 'because the government wasn't doing their job on education' 
(interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). The NSWTF's evaluation of these events 
focused on the 'legitimacy' that carne from having union objectives 'articulated 
through this independent inquiry' (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005). For 
the P&C, the release of the reports reflected a growing 'genuine partnership' 
(interview 22: P&C 2005). It was clear to the P&C that despite the unequal 
provision of resources from the NSWTF, that the 'NSWTF needed us' and 
together, with Vinson, the organisations had influenced public debate (interview 
22: P&C 2005). 
Moreover, for the NSWTF there was a sense that Vinson gave the union a 
positive-issue agenda. As O'Halloran argued, the Vinson Inquiry presented a 
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'thesis' and forced the government to be the antithesis (interview, O'Halloran: 
NSWTF, 2005). Through the Inquiry, the parent-teacher alliance had seized 'the 
agenda' and the government was forced to react (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 
2005). 
Indeed, the government did react. In November 2002, as the Vinson ftlquiry 
received increasing media attention, John Watkins was appointed as the new 
Education Minister. He was a former teacher and operated with a more 
accommodating approach, opening the ALP Government to greater advocacy. 
As the NSWTF noted, 'Watkins in his Ministry actually tried to do things, to the 
extent that they could they tried to solve things' (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 
2005). Watkins, with his preference for an open style of policy making, 
unsuccessfully attempted to accommodate the reform agenda of the Inquiry. In 
May 2003, he announced the formation of a Public Education Council, a new 
'stakeholder' body that tried unsuccessfully to connect the government with the 
Vinson Inquiry and the public campaign around education. Yet that council did 
result in the NSWTF forming the Public Education Alliance soon after. 
3.3 State Election campaign, May 2002 to March 2003 
The NSWTF joined with the parent and principal groups to form the Public 
Education Alliance in July 2002 as a coordinated state-scaled coalition to win 
targeted reforms using the opportunity of the 2003 state election. The Public 
Education Alliance evolved out of the coalitions initiated during the Vinson 
Inquiry and the 2001 federal election, and responded to the opportunity of the 
state election (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). It was also a product of 
union leadership change that supported extended coalition practice. In January 
195 
2002 O'Halloran, Gavrielatos and Leete took over as the new union leadership 
team. O'Halloran had led the Vinson Inquiry within the union, and together 
they had staged their union election campaign on the need to create 'agenda-
setting politics ... how do we get on the front foot ... be bold enough to articulate 
a vision, articulate the aspirations and needs of teachers, students and public 
education' (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005). • 
The Alliance sought to create a 'united front ... of parents, teachers and 
principals speaking with a united voice' (interview, Scott: PP A, 2005). The 
Alliance operated between July 2002 and March 2003 through irregular but 
constant meetings held at the NSWTF. These meetings were attended by the 
senior executive officers of all the participating organisations (interview, 
McBride: PSPF, 2005). The participants put aside their differences within 
Alliance meetings, as one representative acknowledged: 
I wouldn:t say we are close now as individuals, but when it comes to a 
public face in terms of pursuing those ideas for public education, well 
then we are buddies (interview 13: principal representative, 2005). 
While the Alliance was relatively informal, it provided a space for negotiation, 
evident in how it formulated its six United Demands for the 2003 State Election 
campaign during July and September 2002. The NSWTF prepared the initial 
draft of the Demands, then 'shopped them around' for discussion (interview, 
O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). The Demands included reducing class sizes, 
improving school maintenance, supporting quality teachers and professional 
development (Carr 2002). The Demands sought to balance the specific interests 
of individual organisations within a broad interest frame of public education -
binding organisations to the campaign through their own self-interest. Even 
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though the NSWTF wrote the Demands, there was a broad sense of ownership 
over content. As a parent representative argued, 'we always had the power to 
veto ... we wouldn't put our name to anything that we did not approve of as an 
organisation' (interview 9: FOSCO, 2005). Similarly, as one principal 
representative noted, 'we were all encompassed by those recommendations' 
(interview, King: SPC, 2005). • 
The major controversy in formulating these debates was how the ,Alliance 
framed its concern for salaries. The NSWTF knew it 'couldn't get away without 
having salaries there' in the United Demands (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 
2005). After the election, the union would move into salary negotiations. 
Mentioning salaries would help offset disquiet in the union's membership that 
the NSWTF was forgetting its core responsibilities (interview 3: NSWTF, 2005). 
However, the parent groups, particularly FOSCO, were equally adamant that 
salaries would not~ be mentioned, arguing it was 'inappropriate', and 'fearing 
that this issue would overshadow the Alliance, given the dominant role the 
union was already playing' (interview 9: FOSCO, 2005). Eventually the NSWTF 
compromised, with the United Demands calling for the 'development of 
strategies to attract and retain teachers in an era of teacher shortage', which was a 
way of expressing a need for salary justice to union members without 
mentioning the word salaries (Carr 2002). 
This controversy reveals a limitation in how coalition unionism establishes 
common concern. While an alliance flourishes on issues of mutual common 
interest, organisations also have autonomous internal needs, such as a union's 
concern for salaries, which must also be satisfied. The art of coalition practice 
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balances these competing needs, reflecting a contradiction between 
organisational autonomy and coalition unity (Hyman 1989). 
Amongst the list of Demands, the most important was reducing class sizes for K-
2 students (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). A campaign to reduce class 
• 
sizes had been a priority of the NSWTF since 2001. They had brought out 
Charles Achilles, a US expert, to address the 2002 NSWTF Annual Conference 
and to build public support for the pedagogical benefits of reducing class sizes 
for early childhood development (NSWTF 2002c). The NSWTF had distributed 
videos about small class sizes to every school, conducted parliamentary briefings 
and leafleted parents (NSWTF 2002a). Similarly, both FOSCO and the P&C had 
their own self-interest in the class sizes campaign, as it would improve the 
quality of education for children in the classroom (interview 9: FOSCO, 2005; 
Brownlee: P&C, 2005). 
Once the United Demands were determined, the Alliance planned a series of 
joint events that led up to the state election. The events were focused at the scale 
of the NSW State Government and directed towards the key decision makers 
who set Education policy, including the State Premier (Government Leader), the 
Treasurer and the Education Minister. The public education lobbies did 
undertake local activities, displaying school signs that said 'Public Education is 
the Issue' and continued with local lobbying by parents, principals and teachers. 
But the momentum for the Alliance was drawn to the state-based events, 
including the central lobbying of key politicians and a state public education 
forum. 
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The Alliance's lobbying activities harnessed the different capacities of the 
Alliance partners, each committing significant but different resources to the 
campaign because its outcomes supported their organisational interests. The 
PPA and SPC had close relationships with the Minister for Education, and 
separately lobbied the Minister in support of the United Demands (interview 11: 
• 
principal representative, 2005). The P&C had a strong voice in the media, and 
were regularly quoted in the press in support of the Demands (interview, 
Brownlee: P&C, 2005; SBS News 2002; Totaro 2003a; interview, Brownlee: P&C, 
2005; Doherty and Malking 2003b). The NSWTF had significant financial 
resources, paying for a background advertising campaign with slogans such as 
'The Future is Public Education' and 'Public Education ... it's Time to Give it 
More', and funded the distribution of a leaflet that was inserted into the Sun-
Herald newspaper on Australia Day - 26 January 2003 (interview, O'Halloran: 
NSWTF, 2004). 
While the narrow organisational mutual self-interest created significant buy-in 
within the Alliance, the Alliance partners did not seek broader external 
organisational support from unions or community organisations beyond the 
Alliance (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). The NSWTF believed that other 
unions would not be interested because the class sizes campaign was not an 
'industrial matter', but a 'professional and educational' concern (interview, 
O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). However, in not seeking broader union support, the 
NSWTF succumbed to a narrow industrial definition of unions; which was a 
limitation given that unions are the largest member-based organisations in 
Australia. 
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The Alliance's agenda-setting power created political opportunities that divided 
the political parties. On 4 November 2002, the Liberal-National Party's 
Opposition Leader, John Brogden, endorsed the Alliance's demands over class 
sizes five months before the election (Totaro 2002). This escalated pressure on 
the NSW ALP Government. The Alliance was then offered a meeting with the 
• 
Premier on 22 January, a remarkable achievement given that the NSWTF had not 
met with the Premier in over five years (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). 
However, the opportunity of the meeting with the Premier further exacerbated 
tensions between parents and teachers over the connection between salaries and 
the Public Education Alliance. When the Premier asked the meeting what their 
priorities were, O'Halloran answered 'class sizes and the Vinson 5%' as, 
independently of the NSWTF, Vinson had made a statement calling for an 
immediate five per cent raise in teacher wages (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 
2005; Vinson 2002; p. 372). This was consistent with the NSWTF's public 
comments at the time which sought to connect class sizes and salaries as 
demands: 'it was always there, you would say class sizes were a major issue for 
the election and you would also mention salaries' (interview, O'Halloran: 
NSWTF, 2005). However, the NSWTF's continued advocacy on salaries 
'angered' one of the parent groups, which saw it as acting against the decision of 
the coalition: 'when we had made it clear that we did not want it (salaries) to be 
part of the public education campaign' (interview 10: parent representative, 
2005). 
Nevertheless, the relationships across the Public Education Alliance were 
sustained until the state election. On March 3, three weeks before the election, 
the NSW Government announced a professional development program for 
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teachers, and on 9 March at the ALP's Election Launch, Premier Carr announced 
a class sizes policy consistent with the Alliance (Doherty 2003a; Totaro 2003b). 
Two weeks later, the ALP was re-elected. For the NSWTF, it was the broad range 
of voices including Vinson and 'parents, teachers and principals' that generated 
the policy victory. As O'Halloran acknowledged: 'it was the Alliance and Vision 
that allowed the Premier to announce his statement on class sizes without Iraving 
to look like he was conceding to the NSWTF (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 
2005). 
3.4 Teacher Salaries campaign, May 2003 to June 2004 
At the beginning of the Salaries campaign, the NSWTF stood in a strong position 
because of its coalition work. As one senior official argued; the election 
campaign 'had created a platform from which we were able to launch into 
salaries' (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005). Yet when the PEC shifted into 
the NSWTF's Salaries campaign there was a rapid deterioration of the close 
relationships built over the last two years. 
Over 2002 the NSWTF had prepared its salaries strategy, contemplating the 
possibility of a formal arbitration to determine its new 'award' (a collective 
bargaining contract) before the NSW Industrial Relations Commission (IRC). At 
the time the IRC had the power to compulsorily arbitrate wage disputes through 
open hearings, and independently determine a settlement. In 2002, the NSWTF 
surveyed members, and resolved at its 2002 Annual Conference that if the 
government guaranteed existing working conditions then they would have their 
wage claim arbitrated in the Commission (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005; 
O'Halloran 2002; NSWTF 2002b). For the NSWTF, while a Commission hearing 
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'wasn't a preferred option', the NSWTF leaders believed that an arbitration solely 
on the issue of wages could reverse the practice of salaries disputes in the 1990s, 
where the 'initial offer' was based on a loss of conditions or trade-offs, 'and the 
campaign was spent clawing conditions back' (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 
2005). The only other option, direct negotiations and industrial action, would 
potentially have more problems. As O'Halloran noted, there was 'four years to 
another election', it could be an 'intractable fight' which many 'members did not 
want' given the 'brutality' of the 1999 Teacher Salaries campaign (interview, 
O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). 
The 'solid context' of the State Election campaign delivered the NSWTF an early 
meeting with the Premier and the newly appointed Education Minister, Andrew 
Refshauge, on 9 May 2003. At that meeting the NSWTF told the Minister that 
'we can fight for four years over salaries or perhaps you can agree that our 
working conditions don't get touched and we go to the IRC (interview, 
O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). On 12 May, the NSWTF were 'surprised' to receive 
an early pay offer of a 6% wage increase over two years, and were told they 
could go to the Commission for more (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). 
This offer was significantly below the union's goal of a 20% increase, but it was a 
dramatically better starting point than the concession bargaining of the 1990s. 
The union's previous coalition work had delivered an improved starting point 
for salaries in recent memory. 
Yet, unknown to the NSWTF, the government had discussed the salaries 
negotiations and had decided that an arbitrated decision in the Commission was 
its preferred option (interview 40: DET, 2005). It wanted to' avoid a war' like that 
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in the 1990s, and wanted to use the industrial space of the Commission to control 
the dispute (interview 40: DET, 2005). 
In preparing for the campaign, the NSWTF faced three obstacles. Firstly, the 
union had not secured a commitment from the government to fully fund any pay 
recommendation from the Commission that came in above 6%. A fear wa~ that if 
the IRC awarded a pay increase above 6%, then the government would pay for 
that increase out of the existing public education budget- in effect cutting money 
from schools to pay for teacher salaries (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). 
Secondly, the NSWTF's relationship with the P&C had changed. In July 2002, the 
P&C experienced an acrimonious change in leadership. The new leader 
announced that she would prioritise building a stronger relationship with the 
Education Minister and the Premier, in effect distancing the P&C from the 
NSWTF (Parker 2002; interview 12: P&C, 2005; Wood 2002). This separation was 
compounded in April 2003 when the new Education Minister, Refshauge, 
initiated regular meetings with the P&C while the salaries negotiations 
commenced (interview 21: P&C representative, 2005). The NSWTF-P&C 
relationship 'deteriorated' to such a point during the salaries campaign that 
senior officials in the NSWTF and the P&C President 'wouldn't exchange words' 
(interview 22: P&C, 2005). In addition, the fact that the NSWTF's Commission 
hearings were only about the quantum of wages and not about conditions, 
helped separate the union from parents. Unlike the Class Sizes campaign, where 
the union and the Alliance were advocates on an issue that was perceived 'to be 
in the direct interests of parents and teachers, the parents saw the wage claim as 
the teachers' issue only (interview, Brownlee: P&C, 2005). 
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Thirdly, the NSWTF campaigned on salaries alone, without the support of 
regular meetings with the PEC. Despite the NSWTF initially placing its concern 
for salaries within a broad public social frame, 'pitching our campaign in a 
context that was relevant to the community', using slogans such as 'work value' 
and 'valuing teachers' (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005), support from the 
coalition partners was lacking. Since the 1960s, the NSWTF had not «rorked 
with the P&C or principal organisations on salaries, believing that as the sole 
industrial organisation it is the only legitimate body to determine wage outcomes 
(interview, Baker: P&C. 2005; Simpson: NSWTF, 2005). While this ensured that 
its industrial power remained unified within the NSWTF, it inadvertently 
separated the NSWTF's salaries campaign strategy from the other education 
partners. The lack of a coalition caused friction with the P&C when the NSWTF 
tried to speak on behalf of the community but was acting just as the union. For 
example, tension increased when the NSWTF produced a pamphlet about their 
pay claim that they circulated in Sunday newspapers, which talked about 
'parents' without consulting the P&C first (interview 3: NSWTF, 2005; NSWTF 
2003b). 
However, one community-based message around teacher shortages was more 
successful, at least in regional and remote areas where there was a high degree of 
concern. One of the NSWTF's social frames for the Salaries campaign was that it 
would help avoid teacher shortage (NSWTF 2003b; NSWTF 2004c). 15 Although 
this message was not reported widely in the Sydney-based media, it was 
extensively reported in rural areas where school viability and regional education 
were threatened by declining teacher numbers (interview, Irving: NSWTF, 2005; 
15 The advertisements said that 'unless we want a teacher shortage, the government has got to pay teachers 
more'. 
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interview 14: NSWTF, 2005; Canowindra News 10 Dec 2003; South Coast Register 24 
Sept 2003). 
The organisational isolation of the NSWTF in the Salaries campaign was 
compounded by the industrial context and processes of the Commission 
hearings. The IRC took the NSWTF into a courtroom, separated from the public 
agenda it had just created. While the NSWTF brought its members to coalition 
hearings and included witness testimony from two principal representatives and 
Tony Vinson, the tactics the NSWTF used were industrially not community-
based. The first rally about the salaries claim on 8 July only featured NSWTF 
speakers, and the second rally in September added an industrial partner, Unions 
NSW, but not an education partner (Sydney Morning Herald 18 Sept 2003). 
Similarly, as the Commission began its deliberations in 2004, NSWTF media 
comments increasingly focused on the percentage of wage increase that was 
being offered. NSWTF advertisements also narrowly focused on the issue of 
teacher pay, rather than the link between pay and quality education (NSWTF 
2003a)16, while the P&C leadership simultaneously distanced itself from the 
• 
NSWTF industrial action (McDougall 2003). 
During the hearing process, the employer-employee relationship between the 
NSWTF, the government and the DET weakened. The NSWTF were very angry 
at the 'aggressive' manner in which their teacher witnesses were interviewed 
(interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). The Department was 'shocked' at the 
'vitriolic' comments that the NSWTF circulated internally about Department 
witnesses (interview 40: DET, 2005). This compounded the isolation of the 
16 The NSWTF advertisement stated, 'for many years teacher's pay has been going backwards, increasing 
less than average weekly earnings'. 
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union; as one external union observer noted, 'the NSWTF builds so many 
enemies outside that it is often just left on its own' (interview 34: union official, 
~ 
2005). 
Further pressure on the NSWTF came in May 2004 from the government, which 
used unprecedented means to influence the Commission while n was 
determining its award (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). The Premier made 
a public statement on 11 May 2004 'warning' the Commission 'not to hand out 
unaffordable wage increases', and then on 13 May the Minister for Industrial 
Relations sought to reopen the salaries case after hearings had ceased, to lodge 
evidence about incapacity to pay wage increases (Dixon 2004; O'Halloran 2004; 
Burke 2004a). 
However unintentionally, the government's perceived aggression changed the 
political opportunities of the Salaries campaign, shifting the issue from 
percentage increases in pay to the issue of fully funding the pay rise. The 
NSWTF leadership now believed that the greatest obstacle to a pay rise would be 
whether the government would fund an award made by the IRC (interview, 
O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). With this broader frame, the NSWTF reached out to 
its education partners and its members. It leafleted parents at schools on 25 May 
arguing that full funding was in the 'interests of the public education 
community' as it 'protected the public education budget' (Zadkovich 2004a), then 
it staged a one-day strike on 27 May. The strike's public social frame was 
focused on the issue of full funding, even though many members were mobilised 
on the basis of needing a wage increase (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). 
According to the NSWTF, these campaign messages of salaries and full funding 
'were a complex balancing act', but the use of salaries to generate member 
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commitment, combined with a powerful social frame focused on full funding 
created a successful teacher mobilisation, as the rally was the 'largest protest by 
teachers in the Carr Government's history' (NSWTF 2004b). 
However, the public actions did not create the desired outcome in the II3,C, and 
on 9 June it handed down a decision awarding a 12.5% pay increase over two 
years, which 'deeply disappointed' the NSWTF (Dixon 2004). However, the IRC 
result did clarify the need to secure a government commitment to fully fund the 
difference between the 12.5% award and the initial 6% pay offer. 
The campaign's shift to full funding narrowed the campaign and changed the 
media commentary in support of the NSWTF. The Daily Telegraph, the same 
paper which five years before had run articles mocking the NSWTF, ran an 
opinion column written by an in-house journalist on 16 June that said 'this is not 
the usual_fight by teachers over money, this has become a fight for the survival of 
a valued and quality public education system' (Parker 2004). 
Secondly, the shift to full funding created the space for a critical vote inside the 
P&C in support of the NSWTF. The NSWTF had announced a strike on 25 June 
to escalate the demand for full funding. The weekend before the strike, the P&C 
had a Council meeting where a motion was moved that called on the P&C to 
'effectively support the teachers' Salary campaign on the basis that it was no 
longer a salary issue, it was an education issue' (interview 22: P&C, 2005). The 
motion was 'resoundingly supported by the P&C Council' even though it was 
not supported by the President (interview 22: P&C, 2005). According to one P&C 
official, the widespread support derived from 'considerable concern across the 
Council' about how the teachers' dispute was affecting the education system and 
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the motion represented an 'opportunity' to help resolve it (interview 22: P&C, 
2005). News of the motion immediately 'hit the press', with articles the next day 
talking about parents and teachers uniting against the government (Burke 
2004b). 
• 
The combination of P&C support and a threat of industrial action shifted the 
government. It was the day after the P&C motion and the day before the 
threatened strike that the government committed to fully funding the salary 
increase. For the NSWTF, the P&C was critical. O'Halloran argued, 'that 
actually kicked the balance in terms of full funding ... it was historic' (interview, 
O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). The public social frame of the full funding debate 
was broad enough to legitimately allow a dissenting faction of P&C leaders to 
generate support for the NSWTF salaries debate. Within the union and the P&C, 
a group of officials acted as bridge builders to help the organisations maintain 
relationships, despite the tension at a leadership level, and those relationships 
generated the support that cemented the NSWTF's full funding victory. 
3.5 Federal Election campaign, February to October 2004 
The 2004 Federal Election campaign was the final stage of the PEC, which was 
coordinated by the teacher, parent and principal organisations in a partial 
reunification of the Public Education Alliance. The NSWTF's and Public 
Education Alliance's Federal Election campaign had two distinct streams. Firstly 
there was a professional media campaign focused at the national scale, and 
secondly there was a more grassroots local campaign focused on local 
electorates. The campaign also had two distinct targets: to raise the issue of 
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education in the election, and to highlight the differences between the political 
parties' support of public education versus private education. 
This election campaign was first and foremost a media campaign operating at a 
national scale, targeting major metropolitan media with the aim of raising the 
• issue of education in the press. Nationally, the Australian Education Union 
(AEU) had contracted a professional media company to develop an advertising 
and free media publicity campaign (interview 25: AEU, 2005). In NSW, the major 
events were media-focused. The Public Education Alliance launched three 
rounds of television advertising, first in February, then in March and finally in 
May around the Federal Budget (Johnson 2004). The events were also media-
driven, with limited rank and file participation. The first, in February, was a 
screening of the advertisements to parents, teachers and principals at Bourke 
Street Public School (NSWTF 2004a). Similarly, a new electoral alliance was 
launched in May called Services First, that included the NSWTF and P&C, but 
only had one significant public event which was a media conference in May 
(Ride 2004). 
The campaign's second stream involved local public education lobby work 
pressuring local candidates in their electorates; however it struggled to build 
member engagement. It began in south-western Sydney in late March, where 
NSWTF delegates worked with the PSPF to stage a school gate protest when the 
Federal Education Minister, Nelson, visited Mount Annan High School in 
Campbelltown (Zadkovich 2004c). This event was well attended given the 
history of strong NSWTF and PSPF school-based activism in that area. 
Afterwards, the NSWTF attempted to replicate the idea of local actions, 
encouraging NSWTF school representatives to take on local lobbying of 
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candidates and protests (Irving 2003). The NSWTF, parents and principals also 
travelled to Canberra, the national capital, on 21 June to lobby politicians 
(Gavrielatos 2004). Yet here too, according to one NSWTF organiser, attendance 
was 'minimal', and NSWTF organisers reported that they 'struggled' to build 
NSW participation (interview 19: NSWTF, 2005). Moreover, the NSW delegation 
• 
was by far the largest, 'overshadowing' participation from the other states 
(interview 17: NSWTF, 2005) 
The NSWTF organisers interviewed noted that it was difficult sustaining local 
activity during the Federal Election campaign. The lobbying events coincided 
with the salaries 'strike action' which was a 'greater priority' than the Election 
campaign (interview 17: NSWTF, 2005). Others cited deeper problems. One 
believed that the activist base 'was exhausted', the years of 'constant 
campaigning' making it difficult to mobilise now (interview 17: NSWTF, 2005). 
Yet, others cited problems with the federal election target and agenda in 
particular .. As one official commented, the federal election 'seems so abstract': it 
was not like salaries or class sizes, 'it is hard to see how it relates' (interview 17: 
NSWTF, 2005). 
The national scale of the campaign made it difficult to coordinate members at a 
state scale. Similarly, the lack of a specific agenda or goal contributed to the 
difficulties that organisers faced in mobilising members for local action, as it was 
difficult to see the relevance or effect that local mobilisations would have on a 
national election. 
However, an exception to this was in western Sydney where a local NSWTF 
school representative prepared local materials that translated the Federal 
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Election campaign to the local area. A leaflet was produced that described the 
Federal Government's funding of private schools versus public schools by 
documenting the differences in funding levels for the local public and private 
schools in their area (interview 28: NSWTF, 2005). This leaflet created a 'buzz', 
because according to a local organiser, 'it brought horne the message' of how the 
• 
nationally-scaled policy affected the local school (interview 17: NSWTF, 2005). 
In summary then, the Election campaign was mixed. The ALP Opposition took 
up the issue of private and public school funding and thus the NSWTF and the 
PEC had successfully promoted the issue of education (Yaxley 2004). However, 
the campaign insufficiently engaged the Alliance partners or the union 
membership. In the end, the conservative Liberal-National Coalition won the 
election, with an increased majority and control of the Senate. While the 2004 
election was a success for raising the issue of education, it was not a success for 
public education ·funding as the conservatives' policy of supporting private 
education continued in 2005. 
4.0 Reflections and Conclusion 
The PEC between 2001 and 2004 varied significantly across these five campaign 
phases. These changes were produced by shifting dynamics of the coalition 
elements: inter-organisational relationships, common concern and scale. These 
produced different types of coalition success, in terms of outcomes: creating a 
supportive political climate, sustaining relationships and building the capacity of 
the participating organisations. At the same time, the coalition revealed 
consistent features of what this study has labelled agenda-driven coalition 
unionism. 
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The coalition unionism was a product of internal crisis in the union, generating 
pressure to reach out and form relationships with parents and principals. The 
internal movement in support of the coalition strategy generated widespread 
union delegate and organiser commitment that was repeatedly engaged during 
the public education campaigns. • 
In the first phase, the 2001 Federal Election campaign, the inter-organisational 
relationships were limited to organising tactics rather than joint planning or 
strategising. Limited coalition planning led to union domination of the event, 
and the event did not influence the outcome of the federal election. However, a 
joint convention did create familiarity and trust between the organisations that 
led to stronger relationships in the future. This phase also launched a multi-
scaled campaign which not only engaged rank and file teachers through their 
teacher association meetings but exposed them to local coalition meetings with 
/ 
parents and principals. 
The second phase of the campaign, the Vinson Inquiry, had a dramatically closer 
set of inter-organisational relationships. It had a narrow partner base of just two 
organisations- the NSWTF and P&C- and each were required to allocate senior 
staff and money to coordinate the Inquiry. The Inquiry also established a 
separate 'coalition office' structure above the two parties. This 'separate but 
connected' status gave the Inquiry power in its external relationships. Inviting 
the participation of parents and teachers opened the common concern of the 
coalition. 
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The Inquiry was a successful coalition, building a supportive political climate for 
public education and engaging a new level of union members and parents. 
Localised events around the state produced a rolling media campaign that 
established the crisis in education and legitimised teachers and parents as 
helping to solve it. The union opened itself more readily to inter-organisational 
• 
relationships, seeing itself as one of three advocates for public education. Vinson 
as a coordinator above the parents helped the organisations to sustain their 
relationships and to build a more influential role with government and the 
media. The local scale of activity combined with the open-ended frame for 
participation provided a space for collective action that drew in teachers who 
had previously not participated in union industrial campaigns. 
The third phase of the campaign, during the 2003 state election, involved a 
slightly broader coalition, deeply connected through mutual self-interest and 
supported by a new union leadership (Voss and Sherman 2000). It was an 
interest-based coalition, organised through the six United Demands that 
simultaneously created a unified education agenda out of the discrete 
organisational interests of parents, principals and teachers. The campaign 
successfully divided the political parties at the state scale and used the 
opportunity of an election to achieve a policy outcome. However the campaign 
had less multi-scalar participation than the Vinson Inquiry, focusing instead on 
the scale of the state decision makers. 
The State Election campaign translated the agenda-setting inquiry into political 
outcomes. Inter-organisational relationships were centrally coordinated, 
mitigating the impact that the campaign had on members. However, central 
coordination was critical for maximising pressure and winning outcomes against 
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the NSW Government. The negotiation of mutual interest demands sustained 
organisational engagement through organisational self-interest, and encouraged 
organisations to use different forms of organisational power to lobby for the 
United Demands. 
• 
At one level, the Salaries campaign was a tremendous victory, significantly 
advancing the NSWTF's recent history of wage negotiations. This victory, that 
shifted the government away from concession bargaining to arbitration only over 
wages, was a product of the previous coalition work. Yet the Salaries campaign 
also unwound the mutually interested coalition relationships, as the issue of 
salaries was framed as an industrial campaign undertaken by the union alone. 
The confines of the IRC narrowed the forms of activity that members could 
participate in. However, when the campaign shifted to full funding, the wide 
social frame and previous relationships with the P&C played a critical role in 
shifting the media debates and provoking the government to commit to funding 
the salary increase. 
Finally, the 2004 federal election re-established a set of formal inter-
, 
organisational relationships that built a campaign focused on media work and 
limited local lobbying. The campaign did not have a clear winnable common 
concern like class sizes. Rather, it focused broadly on issues such as private 
school fundin~. The campaign struggled to build participation as the national 
scale. In terms of success, it maintained awareness of the public education issue, 
but the coalition had limited effect on the member organisations, given the 
limited number of joint campaign activities. 
214 
While there was significant diversity across the campaign, overall the PEC 
exhibited similar features to what this study has called agenda-driven coalition 
unionism. This is where strong common concern and scale built an agenda, but 
it was limited by a set of weak inter-organisational relationships. The coalition 
unionism benefited the union by providing new forms of member engagement, 
• particularly in the Vinson Inquiry and through multi-scaled public education 
lobbies, with member participation based on issues of union interest. However, 
the coalition's weak inter-organisational relationships allowed the union to 
dominate the coalition. The NSWTF defined the activities of the coalition, which 
caused dramatic shifts in the strength of the inter-organisational relationships 
over time, reducing their stability. 
Moreover, the case study highlights that the centralised resources of the NSWTF 
acted as a limitation on the possibilities of this type of coalition unionism. While 
the local activity in this campaign created opportunities to engage previously 
non-participating union members, and the union had pre-existing multi-scalar 
internal structures, local activity was hard to sustain. This was partly affected by 
the changing issues at the heart of the campaign, such as between class sizes and 
the Federal Election campaign. However, the centralisation of union resources 
and the lack of local coalition capacity limited the coalition's ability to sustain the 
education campaign outside the centrally driven coalition and union strategies. 
More broadly, this form of agenda-driven coalition unionism is similar to other 
coalitions in the secondary literature. The Justice for Janitors campaign in the 
United States is a union-dominated organising campaign, which seeks to 
organise and win collective bargaining rights for janitors at a city scale through 
intensive mobilisations and coalitions with immigrant organisations, faith groups 
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and community organisations such as ACORN (Savage 1998; Rudy 2001; 
Clawson 2003). It, like the PEC, is defined by a strong common concern that 
touches union members and provides a strong public social frame, while also 
providing a moral basis for coalition relationships. Additionally, the immigrant 
membership of SEIU supported the union's relationships with community 
organisations and immigrant organisations, as janitors are often members of 
these organisations (Savage 1998). Workers are often organised off-site, through 
local meetings connected with these community organisations, providing a 
multi-scaled capacity (Savage 1998). The strengths and limitations of the Justice 
for Janitors campaign can be understood using elements of the agenda-driven 
coalition model. Its campaign strength is its capacity to build a supportive 
agenda and movement for collective bargaining for low-wage workers, however 
it has sometimes struggled to build sustainable relationships with its community 
partners beyond organising drives, because the activities of the campaign are 
union-dominated (Tait 2005). 
The PEC was a powerful agenda-driven form of coalition unionism that 
privileged a common concern for public education as a simultaneous driver of 
organisational interest, movement building amongst union members and as a 
public social frame. Its use of the Vinson Inquiry, multi-scaled internal union 
structures and the establishment of public education lobbies facilitated a multi-
scaled capacity that could build media, engage local autonomous member-driven 
activity and create political influence. However, the coalition's sustainability 
was weakened by union-dominated inter-organisational relationships, and the 
union's centralised resources sometimes limited multi-scaled campaign capacity. 
The union domination that was evident in this form of coalition unionism, while 
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still supporting a strong agenda for social change, mitigated the sustainability of 
class movement power or relational power during the collaboration. 
The next chapter investigates a coalition from Canada with contrasting strengths 
and weaknesses to the PEC. Unlike the PEC, the Canadian study had strong 
inter-organisational relationships and strong multi-scaled capacity •while 
struggling to build common concern. 
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Chapter Six 
Relationship-Driven Coalition Unionism: 
CUPE and the Ontario Health Coalition, 2001-2006 
• One evening in June 2005 in a community hall near Niagara-on-the-Lake, 
provincial government politicians counted the votes in a region-wide community 
plebiscite. It was an odd scene: the Liberal Government Members of the 
Provincial Parliament (MPPs) supported public-private-partnerships- yet they 
were counting votes that demonstrated that 13 000 voters in their electoral 
district opposed them. 
The first of the Ontario Health Coalition's (OHC) local community plebiscites 
had just ended. Though hastily organised, the local Niagara Health Coalition 
(NHC), led by several local unionists, had massively outstripped expectations. 
They had campaigned to 'build their hospital right' and they brought their fellow 
citizens along with them. 
This local community had built a 'social movement' (interview, Allan: CUPE, 
2005) As one union President commented, 'we could never have done this 
alone, no matter how big your union is, no matter how much power you have' 
(interview, Ryan: CUPE, 2006). Through years of sustained campaigning, the 
OHC had drawn unions and community organisations into a centralised 
province-wide coalition, and into dozens of locally organised health care 
coalitions, and had transformed the capacity of its participant organisations 
through the relative autonomy of its relationship-driven coalition unionism. 
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1.0 Introduction 
This is a case study of a coalition that acted as a provocateur and changed union 
strategy while campaigning to defend public health care. The coalition differs 
significantly from the public education campaign, where the primary strategic 
agent was the union, and the agenda was proactive. 
This chapter explores the work of the OHC from late 2001 to early .2006. The 
OHC was first established in 1980 and relaunched in 1995 (OHC 1980a). Over 
time it came to represent seven unions with a wide variety of participant 
community organisations including seniors' organisations, the left-nationalist 
Council of Canadians and approximately thirty-five active local health coalitions 
based around the province. While established by the Ontario Federation of 
Labour (OFL), the OHC has operated at arm's length from its participant 
organisations. _Structurally, it is unlike the Public Education Coalitions which 
/ 
consistently remained under the control of the NSWTF. The OHC had a separate 
coalition office, staff, and a large number of diverse participant organisations 
including locally-based health coalitions created by the OHC. It is the relative 
independence of the OHC's structure, and the possibilities and limitations that 
this offers for coalitions and unions, that is a focus of this chapter. 
This case study is a strong example of a different, but successful, relationship-
driven coalition unionism. The coalition elements of a formal inter-
organisational structure and strong multi-scaled broker organisations, identified 
in Chapter Two, are central to this study. The OHC's province-wide 
Administrative Committee, combined with its independent coalition staff and 
office, enabled the OHC to act like an independent 'organisation'. Its autonomy 
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was enhanced by a deep multi-scalar capacity through approximately thirty-five 
broker organisations that built volunteer participation. This structure enabled 
the Coalition to build campaigns through its relationships with unions and 
community organisations. 
This relationship-driven coalition unionism was important in two ways. ~irstly, 
it contributed to the OHC' s success; in particular it helped create sustainable 
long-term relationships that built the organisational capacity of the participating 
organisations and achieved policy outcomes. Secondly, it allowed the OHC to be 
a change agent, a dialectic actor amongst the coalition partners - most 
particularly with CUPE, the most involved union. 
This chapter firstly explores the contextual background of the OHC, then three 
phases of OHC campaigns. It begins with the 2002 Save Medicare campaign, the 
OHC's first major campaign involving both local and central coalitions, and ends 
with the Plebiscite campaigns, which represented an intensification of the locally-
scaled campaign work first begun in 2002. While there are seven unions in the 
OHC, the study focuses on CUPE. The story of this union helps explain and 
serves as an example of the strategic challenges and opportunities of 
relationship-driven coalition unionism for successful coalition practice and union 
power. 
2.0 Context for the Case Study 
National Health Care is intimately tied to Canadian national identity. Medicare 
was the creation of Tommy Douglas, a CCF Premier in Saskatchewan who 
created a universal health care system in his province in 1962. Through the 
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newly formed NDP, Douglas built a progressive alliance including unions that 
campaigned for its national adoption by the Liberal Party, through the national 
Medical Insurance Act on 12 July 1966 (Chandler 1977; Maioni 1998; Barlow 2002, 
p. 23). Universal health insurance was combined with federal funding for 
hospitals, with the Canada Health Act 1984 creating the foundation for the public 
• health care system (Barlow 2002, p. 31). 
Particularly since the 1980s, with pressures for free trade from the US, a left 
nationalism surged in Canada that embraced social institutions such as health 
care (Barlow 2002). In the 1990s the iconic status of universal health care was 
threatened by strong political lobbies pushing for privatisation. These forces 
included the Conservative Party, employer think-tanks and pharmaceutical and 
private insurance companies (Mehra 2005). The privatisation campaign began by 
stealth through reductions in public expenditure (Armstrong, Armstrong and 
Fuller 2000; Leduc Browne 2000; Department of Finance 2004).17 These cuts 
caused a well documented decline in care: in Ontario 900 acute and chronic beds 
were closed because of the cuts in hospital funding (Government of Ontario 
1998). As Mehra from the OHC argued, the system was in crisis: 'there were 
huge waiting lists for surgeries, cancer treatment centres were cancelled; there 
was no planning for the future of the health system' (interview, Mehra: OHC, 
2005). 
11 For instance, the Conservative Harris Government in Ontario cut $800 million from the hospital budget 
and delivered a 30% tax cut which reduced revenue for available care. Similarly federal budget cuts in the 
mid-1990s effectively halved the per capita provincial payments in the Canadian Assistance Plan, and cut 
the Canadian Health and Social Transfer spending by two-thirds (Leduc Browne 2000, p. 16; Department of 
Finance 1997). 
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It was from this context of crisis that the OFL resolved to re-establish the OHC 
(interview, Harris: OFL, 2006). The practice of the OHC between 2001 and 2006 
was influenced by the types of unions and community organisations that joined 
the OHC and the OHC's earlier history. 
• 
2.1 Unions 
The major unions involved in the Ontario Health Coalition and represented on 
its Administrative Committee included CUPE, the Ontario Public Sector 
Employees Union (OPSEU), the Ontario Nurses Association (ONA), the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU), the Canadian Auto Workers Union 
(CAW), the United Steelworkers of America (Steelworkers), and a central labour 
council, which was first represented by the provincial OFL and later by the 
national Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). The differences among these unions 
can be categorised using the opportunities and choices framework developed in 
Chapter Thr,ee. 
Firstly, the unions' external context varied, in terms of their industry location and 
whether they operated in the public or private sector. CUPE, OPSEU, ONA and 
SEIU were primarily public sector unions; in contrast the CAW and Steelworkers 
were predominantly private sector. The public sector unions had a strong 
opportunity structure that supported involvement in coalition unionism, 
particularly 'political' campaigns, including policy and electoral work. 
Secondly, the unions' organisational capacity and pre-existing relationships 
influenced coalition capacity. In terms of union homogeneity or heterogeneity, 
ONA was exclusively a health care union, whereas the others had a mixed health 
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care and non-health care membership. However, internally CUPE had the 
Ontario Council of Hospital Unions (OCHU) that provided a dedicated health 
care campaign structure (interview, Hurley: CUPE-OCHU, 2006). In contrast, 
both the CAW and Steelworkers were more 'general' unions, operating in a 
variety of industries, from auto-parts to health care and call centres. The unions 
• 
varied in terms of organisational scale. CUPE, ONA, OPSEU and the CAW were 
national unions, whereas the SEIU and Steelworkers were international unions 
with head offices based in the United States. Internally, CUPE, CAW and the 
Steelworkers had a nationally federated structure, where financial resources 
were split between the national office (or international office) and union locals, 
who retained between 45% of union fees. Conversely, SEIU, ONA and OPSEU 
were provincially-scaled with resources centralised in Ontario. 
In terms of organisational relationships, all these Canadian unions had 
relationships with political parties, mostly with the NDP. The closeness of this 
relationship has varied among these unions and over time. The exceptions were 
ONA, which is officially non-partisan (ONA 2007) and the CAW, which over the 
previous five years had shifted its political relationship away from the NDP, 
towards the Liberal Party, particularly after the 2003 Ontario provincial election 
(CAW 2006). 
These political relationships were also entwined and connected to ideological 
values, which broadly divided the unions into two groups. The first group, led 
by the Steelworkers and later labelled the 'pink paper unions', favoured a policy 
of supporting the NDP while in government and agitating inside the party as its 
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primary political strategy (Munro 1997).18 In contrast, CUPE and the CAW had 
agitated for a broader political strategy that placed greater importance on 
working with social movements (Robinson 2000b; Robinson 2002). While each 
group had supported social movement relationships, during the 1990s both 
CUPE and the CAW placed greater weight on social movement events, such as 
• 
the Days of Action in Ontario against the Harris Government (Munro 1997). At 
the same time, unions such as OPSEU were also engaged in the Days of Action. 
Finally, the unions' political relationships connected their union identity to 
campaigns beyond wages and conditions. This was particularly evident in the 
CAW, which defined itself as a 'social movement union' (Gindin 1985; Yates 
1993). Similarly, in interviews CUPE and OPSEU officials described their unions 
as social unions, because they were prepared to campaign beyond 'wages and 
conditions' (interviews, Ryan: CUPE, 2006; interview 3: OPSEU, 2005). In 
contrast, SEIU in Canada had a stronger 'wages and conditions' focus, and had 
been less involved in health care campaigning (interview 33: SEIU, 2006). This 
changed in 2003, and accelerated in 2005, when the SEIU underwent an internal 
organisational shift that included a commitment to building community 
organisation relationships and health policy advocacy (interview 33: SEIU, 2006). 
ONA, while still a union, operates more as a professional association than as a 
'wages and conditions' union. The difference is that it prioritised less 
confrontational strategies, such as negotiations without strikes (as nurses do not 
have the right to strike), and spends significant resources on grievance handling 
and services (interview 19: ON A, 2005). 
18 The group was called the pink paper unions because they signed a document supporting the Ontario 
NDP's social contract during the OFL debates which was printed on pink paper. 
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These different ideological values were underpinned by variations in levels of 
internal "union education, and gender diversity. While all the unions undertake 
broad union education programs and political education, notably the CAW had a 
major, internationally recognised union delegate education program that 
promoted social and political awareness and engagement (Yates 1993; Spencer 
2002). While many unions, such as CUPE and OPSEU also had delegate 
education, and SEIU had organiser training, these trainings tended to focus on 
skill development rather than political education (interview 33: SEIU, 2006). 
CUPE, amongst its hospital workers, is over 65% female, and OPSEU, SEIU and 
ONA all have majority female membership (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). In 
contrast, the mainly private sector CAW and Steelworker unions have majority 
male membership, with the CAW having approximately 33% female 
membership and the Steelworkers 20% (CAW 2005). 
These variations affected union participation in the founding of the OHC. In 
1995, CUPE, OPSEU, the CAW and Steelworkers were founding partners." The 
health care unions were primarily motivated by their industrial location, whereas 
the CAW and Steelworkers were involved primarily because of their leadership 
in either side of the NDP/social movement political debate (interview 38: union, 
2005). 
2.2 Community partners 
There were three key community groups in the OHC- seniors' organisations, the 
Council of Canadians and local health coalitions. 
19 In 1995, the CAW and Steelworkers did not have members in health care; the cross-jurisdictional 
organising developed later, after 2000, initially because of internal division in SEJU that led to the CAW 
encouraging SEIU nursing home members to join it (interview, CAW 1, 2006). 
225 
Seniors had always played a 'prominent' role in the OHC, and were the only 
patient/consumer group represented on the OHC's Administrative Committee 
(interview 32: seniors' organisation, 2006). There was a web of seniors' groups 
represented on the Administrative Committee including Care Watch, which was 
• 
focused on homecare, Canadian Pensioners Concerned, as well as the Ontario 
Coalition of Senior Citizens (OCSC) representing 130 seniors' organisations 
(interview 30: seniors' organisation, 2006). The largest seniors' group, OCSC, had 
formal monthly meetings, and internal communications tools such as a 
newsletter. It was funded by its membership, as well as receiving government 
support (interview 30: seniors' organisation, 2006). Seniors' groups had an 
interest in the OHC because, as one representative put it, 'for seniors, health care 
is everything, seniors are vulnerable to disease and impairment' (interview 30: 
seniors' organisation, 2006). However, seniors who participated in the coalitions 
tended to be people who were not 'consumers' because those 'who are heavily 
dependent on services are not able because of frailty to take a public stand on 
things and voice opinions' (interview 30: seniors' organisation, 2006). 
The Council of Canadians (CC) joined the OHC in 2001. The Council formed in 
1985, to galvanise opposition to a free trade agreement with the United States 
and protect Canadian independence, building Canada's largest public advocacy 
organisation rooted in progressive values (CC 2007). It was opposed to the 
economic agenda of corporate-led globalisation and policies such as privatisation 
(interview, Sousa: CC, 2005). The Council consisted of urban and rural chapters 
of volunteers, with seventy chapters across the country and eighteen in Ontario 
(interview, Sousa: CC, 2005). In Ontario there was a central office and field staff 
who supported local chapters and issue-based campaigns, such as around health 
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care. The Council was funded predominantly by membership dues, 
supplemented by foundation funding (interview, Sousa: CC, 2005). 
Local health coalitions became an increasingly important constituency in the 
coalition, first joining the Administrative Committee in 1996 (OHC 1996). In 1995 
• 
the OHC envisaged the idea of local coalitions in its founding statement (OHC 
1995b). The first local health coalitions began in Windsor, initiated by the 
Windsor Coalition for Social Justice, spreading through a network of local CAW 
activists to other union towns such as Niagara, Hamilton, Thunder Bay and 
Kingston (OHC 1996; OHC 1997; OHC 1998).20 While they were called coalitions, 
these local groups were run by individual volunteers and local union officials. 
However, they mirrored the structure of the OHC with two co-chairs, one union 
and one community. 
2.3 Context for the OHC 
The OHC was first formed in 1980, arising out of ad hoc discussions about rising 
health care fees amongst the Community Service Health Care Sector and the OFL 
Health Care Committee (interview, Harding: former Coordinator, 2005; OHC 
1980b; OHC 1996). After some initial success, the OHC was temporarily 
disbanded, then re-formed by the OFL in December 1995 in response to the 
conservative Ontario Government's proposed hospital closures. 
The OHC was established as the central policy and action body for the defence of 
public health care in Ontario (OHC 1995a). It had one community and one union 
20 However, local health coalitions had previously existed in the 1980s, with a local health coalition affiliated 
to the OHC in Thunder Bay by 1987. 
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chair, representing an equal union-community partnership (interview, Harris, 
OFL, 2006). It had a paid coordinator and office. Its primary decision-making 
body was an open collective space where any individuals or organisations could 
participate. There was also a small Administrative Committee with limited 
power. The Coalition's funding primarily carne from unions. 
• 
During the late 1990s, the OHC implemented three important decisions that set 
the course for later coalition practice. Firstly, in 1996 the OHC established a 
policy mandate, called a 'statement of vision', that defined the scope of its 
concerns (interview, coalition participant 4}. The mandate was not a 'lowest 
common denominator' agenda but included a relatively radical policy calling for 
the 'elimination of privatisation of health care' (Bleyer 1992; OHC 1995a). The 
policy mandate became an ideological standard for future campaigning, even 
when one union raised concerns about the privatisation policy because it had 
union members in the private sector. The mandate allowed the Coalition to 
maintain a 'principled' and predictable 'policy framework' (interview 41: 
coalition participant, 2005). 
Secondly, in May 1998 the Coalition created a representative Administrative 
Committee to enable 'more predictable' decision making (interview 41: coalition 
participant, 2005; OCSJ 1998). Up until then the open collective had created 
problems; as one participant from the time recalled, 'it was a disaster' because 
'individuals counted as much as CUPE with a million or so members' (interview 
12: coalition participant, 2005). The OHC narrowed and formalised its structure, 
opening up the Administrative Committee to a larger number of organisations 
with equal numbers of union and community organisations, and closing down 
the collective space (interview 41: coalition participant, 2005). The 
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Administrative Committee operated on a consensus-based form of decision 
making with equal numbers of union and community representatives. 
Thirdly, to ensure that the Coalition still remained open to individual 
participation, the OHC supported the formation of local health coalitions around 
• 
the province. A model for local action began in Windsor in 1996 (OHC 1996). 
The expansion of local coalitions was assisted greatly by an OHC research grant 
in 1997-8. The grant allowed the OHC to hire an organiser to move around the 
state and 'create opportunities for people to come together' through hearings. 
The organiser would 'set up local committees in each community in the hope 
that the momentum would be sustained' (interview, Luppa: OHC, 2005).21 These 
local coalitions were strengthened by the 1999 provincial election which helped 
'push' the local groups to become permanent local campaign bodies proficient in 
the 'local nuances' of their town (interview, Luppa: OHC, 2005). Initially, the 
local coalitions 'were not working in a coherent strategy together' (interview, 
Mehra: OHC, 2005). In 1998, to enhance coordination amongst local coalitions, 
the OHC allowed local coalitions to join the Administrative Committee (OHC 
1998). Furthermore, when Mehra was appointed as the cross-province 
coordinator in September 2000, she was able to use her local coalition experience 
to coordinate events such as speaking tours to 'set up an infrastructure of local 
organisations ... so we had a chance of winning in every area ... we would cover 
the whole geography' (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005). 
21 The OHC secured a Trillium Foundation Community Development Project to research the impact of 
health privatisation across the province (interview, Luppa: OHC, 2005). Part of the research involved the 
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives in addition to hiring a researcher (Leduc Browne 2000). 
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Therefore, by 2001 the OHC had an Administrative Committee of over fifteen 
organisations, with a central coordinator and office, and twelve local health 
coalitions. The OHC had a predictable structure and a regularised mandate. 
3.0 The OHC: 2001-2006 • 
With a mission to defend public health care and a multi-scaled structure, the 
OHC coordinated several flagship campaigns between 2001 and 2006. This case 
study examines three distinct campaign phases: firstly the Save Medicare 
campaign, secondly the Public-Private-Partnership (P3) campaign and finally the 
Plebiscite campaign. 
3.1 Romanow and the Saving Medicare campaign, April 2001 to November 
2002 
The Save Medicare campaign was driven by the OHC staff and coordinator, and 
the strong relationships between organisational representatives and local 
coalitions across the OHC. It featured a province-wide canvassing in support of 
national health insurance. The canvas capitalised on the OHC's multi-scaled 
structure and strong inter-organisational relationships, while achieving limited 
union member engagement and having difficulties formulating common 
concern. 
The OHC launched the Save Medicare campaign in 'reaction' to a national health 
care inquiry 'to save universal Medicare' (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005; Allan: 
CUPE, 2005). On 4 April2001, the Canadian Government created the 'Romanow' 
Royal Commission into the future sustainability of the public Medicare system, 
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led by the former NDP Premier Roy Romanow (Chretien 2001).22 The Inquiry 
was a response to an intensive privatisation campaign (Mehra 2005). Senator 
Kirby, a Conservative MP and board member of the private Nursing Horne 
Extendicare, established a Senate Inquiry in January 2001 to query the 
sustainability of health care (Fraser 2001; The Record 2001; Kirby and Le Breton 
• 
2002).23 Similarly, Ontario's Premier Harris began publicly canvassing 
privatisation as an alternative to an inadequate public system (Mackie 2000; 
McCarten 2001; Boyle 2001a). 
The OHC believed there was not widespread support for privatisation, and saw 
the Royal Commission as an 'opportunity' for a Medicare campaign (interview, 
Mehra: OHC, 2005; Allan: CUPE, 2005; OHC 2002b). Polling supported public 
health care (Brennan and Boyle 2001; Boyle 2001a), and talk of weakening 
Medicare conjured up images of the unpopular US private health care system 
(Leduc Browne 2000; Rosser 2001, p. 4). In February 2001, Mehra called a special 
Administrative Committee meeting and proposed that the OHC needed to do 
'something extraordinary' to save Medicare (interview, Mehra, 2005). 
CUPE led the OHC to take on a radical canvassing campaign around the 
Romanow Commission. The plan was the idea of Ross Sutherland, a member of 
the Kingston Health Coalition (KHC) and a CUPE union steward. He suggested 
that the OHC should go 'door to door' in defence of Medicare, using the 
'electoral strategies' of lawn signs and door-knocking in a non-electoral period to 
22 The Royal Commission was created by a Committee of the Privy Council on advice from the Prime 
Minister. 
23 Similarly there were a series of provincial level health inquiries in operation, including the Advisory 
Cmmcil on Health Reform in Alberta, the Clair Commission in Quebec and the Fyke Commission in 
Saskatchewan. 
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get petitions signed and to 'talk to people' (interview, Sutherland: KHC, 2005). 
Sutherland was a bridge builder between the Kingston coalition and CUPE, and 
used his position in CUPE to meet with the CUPE President, Sid Ryan (interview, 
Sutherland: KHC, 2005; Ryan: CUPE, 2006; CUPE 2001). For Ryan, Sutherland's 
idea was consistent with his belief that unions need to 'build community 
• 
influence' using 'direct strategies like door-knocking' (interview, Ryan: CUPE, 
2006). It was 'not a difficult leap', according to another CUPE official, given the 
'obvious connection between jobs and community services' (interview, Allan: 
CUPE, 2005). As the President of CUPE's hospital bargaining unit (CUPE-
OCHU) explained, because CUPE is the largest health care union, it has a 
'primary interest' in health care, 'more so than other unions', because the union's 
future is tied to health care (interview, Hurley: CUPE-OCHU, 2006). The wages 
and conditions of union members are directly connected to government 
financing of the public health care system. 
CUPE's Health Care Council ratified the campaign proposal, then it supported 
the province-wide canvas at the OHC's Administrative Committee. Other 
organisational representatives were broadly receptive; door to door canvassing 
was a familiar 'repertoire' for organisations used to electoral campaigning 
{Tarrow 1994). However, adapting an electoral tool to a non-electoral situation 
'had never been done, it was a totally new way to organise and broaden support' 
(Mehra 2005). 
The framing of the campaign was a challenge. While 'Save Medicare' had some 
success as a positive message, it had limitations in building member commitment 
and did not take on the issue of privatisation of health care delivery. Previously, 
the OHC's public social frames had been negative, such as 'opposition to 
232 
privatisation', and this time the Administrative Committee explicitly wanted a 
'positive campaign around Medicare' (OHC 2002g). The positive social frame 
'Yes National Public Medicare' used the word Medicare because it was seen as 
'so tangible ... Medicare touches people'; it also related to national identity and 
people thought it would work 'on the doors' (interview, Sutherland: KHC, 2005; 
• Barlow 2002). Yet, while the message was positive, it was also defensive and not 
agenda setting. As a former coalition employee put it, Save Medicare 'projects a 
position of weakness and pleading instead of making a specific demand' 
(interview 40: coalition participant, 2005). Save Medicare did not link the 
campaign to the threat of hospital privatisation. The leaflets and door-knocking 
script did not talk about how privatisation of health care infrastructure 
undermines the health care system (OHC 2002h; Mehra 2005). The campaign's 
common concern only indirectly tapped the workplace experiences of unionised 
health care employees, leaving open the possibilities of a privatisation agenda. 
Raising money for the campaign was a 'challenging task' because the OHC 
lacked an independent financial base (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). The OHC 
relied entirely on donations from its member organisations. Using the 
Administrative Committee representatives as contact points, these relationships 
drove a fundraising campaign where the OHC 'begged and borrowed' from the 
unions (interview 11: coalition participant, 2005). This money was used to pay 
for short-term campaign staff, lawn signs, ribbons, leaflets and petitions- costing 
over $100 000 (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005). In addition, many union locals 
and labour councils subsidised the purchase of lawn signs for their local area 
(interview, Vermay: CAW, 2006). Unions also paid for several union delegates to 
work full-time on the campaign around the province (interview, Mehra: OHC, 
2005). 
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The campaign plan was simultaneously locally and provincially-scaled; with the 
coordinated work of fifty local groups creating a province-wide campaign. The 
campaign plan was driven by the OHC coordinator and several employed staff. 
Between January and May 2002 the climax was a coordinated local canvas, 
launched after escalating local events including meetings, assemblie";; and 
community outreach (Mehra 2005). To 'build consensus' for this plan, a CUPE 
staff person proposed an 'Assembly' for December 2001 which could 'engage the 
local coalitions' (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2004). However, the Assembly had to 
address an issue around decision making, because the 2002 OHC Action Plan 
had been already debated and agreed to by the Administrative Committee before 
the Assembly (participant observation, Assembly, 2005). Consequently, the 
contribution from the Assembly was limited. As one participant said, 'it was so 
clear that everything happened outside ... I said I am wasting my time ... it 
might be useful to rally people, get them motivated ... but it was all really 
decided before' (interview 39: coalition participant, 2005). This reflected a 
tension between the need for the Coalition to be simultaneously accountable to 
the organisations funding it and to be open to the engagement of new 
participants. It encapsulates the dilemma of decision making across multiple 
scales. 
The canvas campaign increased the number of local coalitions, and was driven 
mainly by the work of local volunteers with more limited union involvement 
(OHC 2002a; OHC 2002c). The local canvasses were run by volunteers, with 
union participation corning from union staff rather than workplace activists. The 
local scale of these coalitions allowed local groups to build media and publicity 
(Daily Mercury May 13 2002; Daily Mercury May 16 2002; Muhtadie 2002). The 
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local scale also created local ownership of the campaign; as a Kingston activist 
described it: 'Kingston is very independent . . . people regularly changed 
campaign materials if they came from Toronto ... they really wanted to have 
control of the campaign' (interview 14: local coalition participant, 2005). The 
tactic of a canvas required building a volunteer base through ad hoc events and 
an open decision-making structure. Drop-in offices and sub-groups were 
established for organising publicity, outreach and logistics (interview, 
Sutherland: KHC, Mehra: OHC, 2005; interview 15: local coalition participant, 
2005; OHC 2002b). 
Union participation in the local canvas was somewhat limited, relying on union 
staff or activists to work as bridge builders. Union engagement was amplified 
where there were relationships to drive it, such as through bridge building from 
an active union co-chair or regular union participation in OHC meetings. For 
instance, in Durham and Kingston, rank and file bridge builders from OPSEU 
and CUPE connected the Coalition to workplace activists (interview, Sutherland: 
CUPE, Route: OPSEU, 2005). Where the coalition did not have strong union 
participants, as in Brampton, union engagement was extremely limited 
(interview 9: Brampton Health Coalition (BHC), 2005). Generally, local union 
support was resource-based; 'they gave us money, they put some staff on full-
time release to support the canvas and union staff gave time to the local 
committee' (interview 37: coalition participant, 2005). However, support 'didn't 
go deep to union activists or members' (interview 14, interview 39, interview 37: 
coalition participants, 2005). Sometimes engagement was self-selecting, where 
'busy union activists were unable to participate' (interview 38: union, 2005), and 
at other times it was blocked, for example when one Coalition volunteer was not 
given permission to call through a union list to find volunteers for the canvas 
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(interview 31: coalition participant, 2005). Union education was also important. 
In Kingston it was noted that amongst all the unions 'the CAW were very good 
at getting their members out ... partly because of their (union) education and 
partly because of their centralisation in Kingston' (interview 15: coalition 
participant, 2005). 
• 
Unions were more actively committed to the campaign at a national and 
provincial scale through two tracks, with greater commitment organised from 
union leaders rather than union members. Firstly, union leaders were 
encouraged to 'contact major private sector employers and industry leaders to 
publicly support Medicare' (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006). The 
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers and the CAW were key 
participants, with the CAW successfully lobbying the 'Big Three' auto parts 
manufacturers, General Motors, Ford and Daimler Chrysler, to publicly support 
Medicare (CAW 2002; Payne 2002). This campaign targeted the employers' 
direct interest in national health care: a publicly funded health care system meant 
that health care was not an employer cost, as it was in the United States 
(interview, Harris: OFL, 2006; CAW 2002). In this way, union leaders used their 
economic power and workplace relationships to leverage a temporary ad hoc 
alliance with businesses to support the health campaign. 
Secondly, the OHC unions undertook workplace education campaigns ·~ with 
limited success (interview 38: union, interview 5: union, 2005). These campaigns 
involved organisers and stewards distributing materials at hospitals during April 
and May (Linds 2002). Internal distribution depended on whether the union had 
interested workplace leaders (interview 3: OPSEU, interview 5: union, 2005). This 
was difficult because unions are structured with stewards who are responsible 
236 
! 
IIi 
1
1
1 I. 
IIIII 
for both union business, such as grievance handling, as well as coalition 
campaigning. For union staff, it meant that it was 'the same people you are 
calling on to do union work as well as coalition work', and 'these professionals 
are overworked because of the shortage of health. care workers' making it 
difficult for them to find time to be active (interview 3: OPSEU, 2005). 
• 
The Medicare campaign also operated nationally, and held several province-
wide events in Toronto. The Medicare campaign needed a national scope in 
order to influence the national Romanow Commission. The Canadian Health 
Coalition (CHC) provided in-principle support for a national canvas in October 
2002 (CHC 2001). However, a national canvas only developed after Ontario's 
campaign 'was well underway', built through peer to peer relationships 
(interview 11: coalition participant, 2005). As one organiser notes, 'we are all on 
email together so people were requesting materials and designs ... it ended up 
being a national campaign pushed from the provinces' (interview 11: coalition 
participant, 2005). The OHC used strong informal networks and a national 
political opportunity to upscale the campaign to the national scale. There were 
also province-wide events, such as rallies at the three royal commission hearings 
in Ontario and a National Medicare Day rally in Toronto in May. These events 
were 'energising' for participants but were quite small, and the second received 
little media attention (interview 6: coalition participant, 2005). This proved to be 
a trend, with the OHC often struggling to organise participation and media 
attention at Toronto-based events. 
Despite these setbacks, the Save Medicare canvas was evaluated by 
Administrative Committee representatives as an unprecedented success. The 
OHC collected 170 000 signatures on the petition, door-knocked over 250 000 
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houses and fifty-seven Municipal councils passed supportive motions (OHC 
2002d; Mehra 2005). 
Romanow released his report on 28 November. To the credit of the OHC and the 
health care activists across Canada, the report 'created a consensus to save public 
health insurance' (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). However, it did not exClude a 
role for private providers in the public system. Consequently, CUPE and CAW, 
two prominent 'social unions', expressed public misgivings because by not 
excluding private providers the Romanow Report in effect left the door open for 
public-private-partnerships (Hargrove 2002; CUPE 2002). 
The Romanow Report was a double-edged sword for the OHC and particularly 
for the health care unions. It embraced the OHC's call to 'Save Medicare', yet it 
did not stop the movement towards the privatisation of the health care system. 
The Save Medicare.campaign used multi-scaled relationships to build consensus 
around Medicare, but its limited public social frame left the OHC struggling to 
build a positive agenda. As one Administrative Committee representative noted: 
'we were never able to solve that forward looking question of how do we gain 
ground back' (interview 34: coalition participant, 2005). Consequently, by 2003 
the OHC had moved off the issue of Medicare to exclusively to fight public-
private-partnerships (OHC 2003d; OHC 2003£). 
3.2 The P3 campaign: August 2002 to May 2004 
The Public-Private-Partnership 'P3' campaign was a campaign against health 
care privatisation that created a close organisational relationship between CUPE 
and the OHC, based on a strong degree of mutual self-interest. The campaign 
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was managed through the central coordination of province-wide tours, in 
partnership with local coalitions, using union resources and the political 
opportunity of a provincial election. 
Public-private-partnerships were first proposed in December 2001 when 
• 
Ontario's Conservative Health Minister Tony Clement announced two P3 
hospitals in Brampton and Ottawa (OHC 2003a). P3 hospitals are operated by 
for-profit providers who build the hospital and run the non-clinical services, then 
lease the hospital back to the public to provide clinical services (CCPPP 2007). 
CUPE had learnt about P3s from the UK, where since the late 1990s they had 
caused a steep decline in employment standards and health care. CUPE's 
leadership were concerned that P3s would become the 'prototypes' for the 'new 
model of hospital operation 00. so we always had this strong consensus that this 
is really where, our energy gets put' (interview, Hurley: CUPE-OCHU, 2005). 
CUPE was familiar with working on politics, as government policy had been 
used before to reduce CUPE worker conditions (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). 
In the 1980s in British Columbia, a piece of legislation 'destroyed collective 
bargaining rights, overnight 00. 8000 jobs were privatised and wages and 
conditions were brutally slashed' (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). Similarly after 
1995, the Harris Government in Ontario tried to use legislation to remove job 
security provisions. For CUPE, it 'showed the importance of political 
campaigning 00. we all know that collective bargaining can only take you so far 
... legislation can take away things in the blink of an eye unless you are also 
fighting around legislation' (interview, Ryan CUPE, 2005). It was this 
combination of the familiarity of political campaigns plus the threat of P3s that 
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led CUPE to become engaged in the P3 campaign. As one CUPE official 
commented: 
At this point the union and OCHU became more focused on public policy 
and less focused, less exclusively focused on the bargaining conundrum ... 
this [P3s] became the issue and began more of a campaigning system 
(interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005) • 
CUPE's interest in the P3 campaign overlapped with the OHC's interest in 
' 
privatisation, directly connecting CUPE's interest in P3s to the OHC. The OHC 
had a mission to oppose hospital privatisation (OHC 1995a). CUPE and the 
OHC shared a mutual self-interest in eliminating P3s. 'Leadership time was 
invested' to jointly plan and coordinate events (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). 
This was in stark contrast to the Medicare campaign where logistics and strategy 
were independently planned by the OHC. 
The campaign, simultaneously operating at two scales, took advantage of the 
political opportunity of the 2003 Provincial Election (interview, Mehra: OHC, 
2005). Locally, it focused on the regional cities of Brampton and Ottawa, which 
were the sites of the first P3 hospitals. The campaign was province-wide through 
OHC-sponsored tours and events. This multi-scaled campaign was necessary for 
political influence. According to Hurley from CUPE-OCHU: 
We have this theory about fighting privatisation - as much as we 
restricted ourselves to fighting in Brampton and Ottawa where there were 
P3s, we would be making a political mistake; that we should hold the 
government accountable across the province. So, we were continually 
trying to find ways to talk about the issue outside of our population 
centres. The health coalition is really decentralised. It is its strength, it has 
got chapters everywhere. So, for example, we thought that we would 
begin to draw public attention by doing tours (interview, Hurley: CUPE-
OCHU, 2005). 
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The city-scaled campaigns in Brampton and Ottawa were led by local health 
coalitions that directly engaged the participation of CUPE's provincial 
leadership. CUPE leaders attended many of the early events. CUPE's President 
Sid Ryan attended a protest in May 2002, and then Michael Hurley from CUPE-
• 
OCHU attended a forum in August. For Doug Allan, the CUPE representative 
on the OHC, it was their personal involvement that generated the union leaders' 
ongoing commitment: 
I remember with our first meeting, Michael Hurley, the President, went 
out to Brampton ... it was a community-sponsored event by the BHC with 
the assistance of the OHC and I think at that point, it really clicked to 
Michael that hey this is a powerful force here . . . from there OCHU' s 
involvement gelled, where they ~ould invest resources, it just blossomed 
from there (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). 
City-scaled events escalated through 2002, with Brampton' s larger local coalition 
organising"higher-profile events compared to Ottawa. This was most evident at 
simultaneous rallies held in Brampton and Ottawa on 16 October. The Brampton 
rally was large, with union participation 'as its backbone' (interview 10: BHC, 
2005). The BHC had a 'stable, small group' of local activists, including a CUPE 
organiser. Together they planned the event in consultation with the OHC, 
working out of an office space provided by the local labour council (interview 29: 
BHC; interview 28: CUPE, 2006). In Ottawa, the OHC and CUPE struggled to 
find local organisers to run the logistics for the campaign, and because it was 
'five hours away', face to face support from the OHC was difficult (interview, 
Mehra: OHC, 2006). 
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However, the Brarnpton campaign had its challenges, struggling against hostility 
from local Conservative politicians and the media. Brarnpton was a 
'conservative town', with little memory of political struggle (interview 9: BHC, 
2005). There was also widespread community awareness that they needed a 
hospital. This place consciousness was exploited by the local politicians and 
• 
media. For instance, local Conservative MPPs attempted to frame the BHC as 
outsiders, 'saying that we were a small group of people that were trying to block 
the hospital ... that we were trying to stop this badly needed hospital from 
corning' (interview 9: BHC, 2005; Jeffrey 2004). Furthermore, in a place where 
union struggle was unfamiliar, the MPPs labelled the BHC 'a bunch of union 
people'. As one BHP member argued, 'from this bunch that's a pretty dismissive 
term ... it's derogatory' (interview 31: BHC, 2005). 
At this local scale, a key weakness for the BHC was its relationship with local 
unions. The conservative place consciousness complicated the relationship. 
Many local health coalition activists believed that a public union relationship 
would hurt the BHC's ability to generate public support (interview 31: BHC, 
2005). Yet, unions provided the numbers and resources that helped underpin the 
BHC's activity. To the dismay of BHC activists, the BHC was often publicly 
represented as a union-front (BramptonGuardian 24 Sept 2003). 
The union's relationship with the BHC was through local officials, not workplace 
stewards. As one representative described, the BHC had formal support 'from a 
core group of union officials ... but when you tried to get the large bulk of the 
membership involved it was very, very difficult' (interview 37: BHC, 2005). 
Employers sought to exacerbate divisions between clinical and non-clinical 
workers; for instance, telling nurses they wouldn't be affected by the P3. 
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Without a person to act as a bridge builder between the BHC and the unions, it 
was difficult to challenge these divisive tactics, and the BHC was unable to build 
sufficient trust with the local unions to organise union members directly. 
The provincially-scaled campaigns were proposed and funded by CUPE, and 
• involved a tour and a Toronto rally. The P3 tour featured Mehra from the OHC, 
Maude Barlow from the Council of Canadians and Hurley from CUPE-OCHU 
(OHC 2002e; OHC 2002£). Local tours aimed to create media opportunities, local 
political pressure and spread awareness about P3s in the lead-up to the election. 
For CUPE, financially supporting the tour made more sense than other tactics 
such as paid media advertisements: 
In a huge media market like Ontario ... we spend a million dollars buying 
television ads ... and it's gone in two weeks .... So how do you try to get 
media all across the province? ... in terms of what we would have had to 
do to get a comfortable amount of paid media advertising, the OHC 
activity was perfect and it allowed us to put a focus on the issues 
(interview, Hurley: CUPE, 2006). 
These events also provided an educational opportunity for CUPE members. 
While CUPE members were outnumbered by community participants at these 
events, CUPE had the largest group of union participants. CUPE's public 
hospital workers had a broad union interest in the P3 campaign. As Hurley 
noted, 'members believe they work in a very socially useful service ... and they 
fight zealously to keep their work delivered as a public service ... they feel that 
they are positioned to defend health care. If they won't defend it, who will?' 
(interview, Hurley: CUPE, 2006). Additionally, Hurley argued that CUPE's 
decentralised local structure, combined with a centralised, dedicated health care 
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unit, contributed to the depth of CUPE's engagement in the local tours. He 
contrasted the structure of CUPE with other unions: 
I think our success is partly a function of our union structure 00; if you 
look at the other unions in the health sector like, for example SEIU, they 
have one local for the province ... They centralise resources ... in CUPE 
there is a local structure. The locals retain half the money. So they are 
better organised workplaces. But then on top of it, we had an illegal strike 
in 1981 and because of the problems with how CUPE handled that strike 
we created OCHU - so, we're also one of the few organisations that 
actually has a real health sector structure. We don't have a big budget-
about a million dollars- and we spend a lot of it on campaigning ... and I 
think that is fairly unique (interview, Hurley: CUPE-OCHU, 2006). 
Local participation in the tour also relied on pressure from CUPE's leadership. 
Hurley's participation in the tour helped engage CUPE's local structure, allowing 
the tour to be prioritised by the locals. As someone outside the union explained: 
The people who get the request for everything are the local president 00. 
often those requests go to the bottom of their pile 00 00 Always the priority 
is the grievances and the direct issues, bargaining 00. having Michael 
there meant that they actually had an organised approach to getting 
people out to the meetings. They organised people to phone through their 
list. It [the tour] rose above the noise for the local president (interview 35: 
coalition participant, 2006). 
Local union engagement was also shaped by the presence of union bridge 
builders and place consciousness. As one CUPE official argued, 'highly 
committed activists' who 'believe in a universal system ... and are prepared to 
fight for it' would call around members and invite them to the event (interview 
28: CUPE, 2006). CUPE officials' experience showed that when the tour was held 
in a town with large numbers of union members or had a hospital, the 
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supportive place consciousness increased member participation (interview, 
Hurley: CUPE-OCHU, 2006). 
However, while the tour was province-wide, it was not deep. While Mehra ran 
'action plans: with local activists during tour events (interview, Mehra: OHC 
• 2006), participation was hard to sustain outside the directly affected P3 areas. In 
Kingston, for instance, it was 'impossible to get public attention because none of 
our hospitals were going P3' (interview 14: coalition participant, 2005). 
Additionally the centralised coordination of the tour restricted local ownerships: 
'local groups found it hard to keep people invested because ... they did not have 
a lot of ownership' (interview 20: OHC, 2005). Correspondingly, several 
Toronto-based events after the tour had weak participation. These included a 
small picket in November 2002 and a rally in May 2003. They were media stunts 
rather than sites for collective action, with visual effects such as a two-tier bus to 
symbolise two-tier health care and bands (interview 24: coalition participant, 
2005). However, there was not mass participation, as one participant described 
it: 'it was an un-rallying rally .... with congo players, a samba band but nobody 
was dancing' (interview 24: coalition participant, 2005). 
The tour highlights a fundamental contradiction between leadership and 
participation in the OHC's multi-scaled organising. While Mehra and Hurley 
acted as leaders to generate interest in the issue of P3s, there was still a gap in 
local participation. The lack of local coalition ownership and capacity meant that 
the local coalition work, while effective at generating publicity, did not sustain 
anti-P3 campaign work after the tour. This parallels a weakness in the Vinson 
Inquiry, where locally-scaled action was successful when the resources of the 
Alliance and NSWTF were mobilised in the local area, but not sustained beyond. 
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It highlights a common limitation for multi-scaled coalitions when they do not 
have broker organisations leading the campaign locally. 
In mid-2003, with the upcoming provincial elections on 2 October, the P3 
campaign broadened to make health care an election issue. A local campaign 
• developed in the weak Conservative electoral districts ('ridings'), particularly in 
the Conservative ridings in Brampton. Elections in Canada include three main 
parties, the Conservatives, the Liberal Party and the NDP. In this election, the 
OHC's challenge was to remove the pro-P3 Conservatives. The electoral 
campaigns were locally run, where the local coalitions planned activities such as 
door-knocking, community outreach and media events. The key message 
focused on P3s, with signs featuring the word P3 with a non-smoking sign over it 
(OHC 2003j). Strategic decisions were made locally, and in Brampton the 
coalition decided to run a candidate for the NDP. This helped the BHC get its P3 
message out, but at the same time the BHC became engulfed in electoral 
competitiveness. Local Liberal Party activists joined the BHC and began using 
the BHC's anti-P3 signs, with the Liberal Candidate also 'falsely claiming she had 
the support of the BHC' (interview 29: BHC, 2006). 
At a provincial scale, the elections were an opportunity for the OHC to again 
engage the unions. Most of the OHC's unions were located in the public sector 
with significant election budgets irrespective of their ideological identity 
(interview 3: OPSEU, 2005; interview 33: SEIU, 2006). As one official noted, the 
commitment was strong because of 'concern in the labour movement about a 
third term Tory government' (interview 5: union, 2005). 
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In contrast to claims in existing scholarship about political parties and coalitions, 
amongst the unions, whether or not a union had a pre-existing relationship with 
the NDP did not affect its commitment to the OHC's election campaign. Most of 
the OHC' s unions were members and active supporters of the NDP. Where there 
was a bridge builder who could translate how the OHC could support the NDP, 
NDP unions were actively engaged. Political bridge builders interpl"eted the 
political utility of coalitions for unions: 
Coalitions are actually useful to supporting a political party like the NDP 
because they help the NDP focus on particular issues and provide them 
with the good research and good ideas . . . if you are going to make 
changes, progressive changes ... you need the pressures coming from a 
political party and you need pressures coming from bipartisan coalitions 
(interview 21: union, 2005). 
The election campaign covered the province through tours, with CUPE 
providing significant union resources that gave it influence over the campaign. 
The tours included a video about the problems of P3s in the United Kingdom, 
then a 'Trojan Horse' tour, where a fourteen-foot wooden horse was used to 
expose how P3s were a Trojan horse that threatened to destroy public health care 
from within (CUPE 2003). Most unions provided a financial donation (OHC 
20031). However, CUPE's financial commitment was significantly above the 
other unions, resulting in a high level of 'integration' between CUPE and the 
OHC's election strategies (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006). 
CUPE's integration with the P3 election campaign produced class movement 
collaborative power for the union, supporting the politicisation of union 
members and helping CUPE to set an agenda. CUPE members were connected 
to the campaign through their self-interest, but their engagement extended to 
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their belief in the 'value' of the work they do in supporting 'universal free access 
to quality health care'. For Hurley, it was the interconnection of interest with 
values that strengthened member co~mitrnent: 
They are quite prepared to say that the work that we do is valuable and it 
should be valued and shouldn't be privatised because that's actually less 
• 
efficient. But I do not think that they like doing that as much, they have to 
do that, whereas the other one they feel better about because there is a 
social ... a social benefit from that advocacy (interview, Hurley: CUPE, 
2006). 
The OHC also provided CUPE with relational collaborative power. At a 
provincial scale, according to Hurley, 'they (the OHC) have more credibility than 
we do, with the public, as health employees we are seen as a bit of a vested 
interest' (interview, Hurley: CUPE, 2006). Having the OHC as public 
spokespeople for P3s provided CUPE's campaign with legitimacy. 
Yet, this 'in sync' OHC-CUPE campaign led to a backlash from other OHC 
unions (interview 23: union, 2006). As one CUPE officer recognised, 'there was 
some organisational jealously as other unions or groups within the health 
coalition felt that CUPE was getting too much attention, or that CUPE campaign 
ideas were being implemented not as they liked ... that is so sensitive' (interview 
23: union, 2006). Harris from the OFL argued that this practice can create a 
competitive culture: 
Because you get every group wanting to be seen as working on an issue 
and be out in the forefront ... but one of the strengths was we are a group 
of organisations that have come to a consensus about what the issues are 
.. . and when you start highlighting individual organisations you are 
saying something different (interview, Harris: OFL, 2006). 
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Harris argued that the close relationship between the OHC and CUPE had the 
potential to undermine the spirit of consensus. It limited the OHC, because 'the 
strength of the coalition was that we are all in this together, it was not that one 
was bigger or smaller or richer or poorer than the other, the strength was in the 
collective voice' (interview, Harris: OFL, 2006). The experience highlighted the 
• 
contradiction between organisational autonomy and coalition unity inherent in 
consensus-based processes: how to balance campaign capacity and provide 
recognition on the one hand, while preventing a fragmentation of coalition unity 
on the other. 
A strategic election issue for the OHC was 'how harsh or how pointed we should 
be in our criticism of the Liberals in the lead up to the election' (interview 5: 
union, 2005). The OHC was non-partisan; it did not endorse candidates or tell 
people how to vote. Instead it focused on issues. However it had to negotiate 
across the different political allegiances of its affiliates (interview, Mehra: OHC, 
2006; OHC 1995a; OHC 2003i; OHC 20031). CUPE was suspicious of the Liberals, 
as they had an unclear position on P3s (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005; Ryan: 
CUPE, 2006). In the OHC, CUPE aired its concern, creating a majority 'not a 
consensus, but a feeling at the end that we had to hit them' (interview 5: union, 
2005). Yet, many of the unions were more interested in 'kicking out the 
conservatives' than criticising the Liberals (interview, Harris: OFL, 2006). 
Similarly several seniors' organisations disagreed with criticising the Liberals 
(interview 4: seniors' organisation, 2005). However, outside the OHC, CUPE 
began targeting the Liberal Party. Ryan condemned the Liberals at a CUPE 
Convention in May, provoking the Opposition Leader, Dalton McGuinty, to 
make his first statement opposing P3s (Petersen 2003). 
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The OHC's campaign against the Liberals created conflict within the OHC. At a 
joint OHC and CUPE September press conference, Mehra commented that the 
Liberal's Financial Plan had 'no financing plan for infrastructure ... they were not 
going to stop the P3s because if they were they would have to have money there' 
(interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006). This statement was immediately criticised . 
• Harris, from the OFL 'was upset that this Liberal critique had appeared on the 
newswire' (interview 4: seniors' organisation, 2005), and some seniors' groups 
were also frustrated, one noted, 'we were so busy saying how bad the Liberals 
were' (interview 32: seniors organisation, 2006). Mehra 'had to call an emergency 
meeting to respond', where the issue was resolved through face to face 
discussions, with support from most of the unions (interview 4: seniors' 
organisation, 2005). 
The debate revealed a contradiction between the OHC's diverse inter-
organisational relationships and its common concern. The OHC's strength was 
that it straddled different interests and ideologies, but here the diversity of 
political opinions produced disagreement. Several members did not want to 
upset the possibility of defeating the Conservatives, and so did not want to 
offend the Liberals: 'you cannot be too rude to these people, otherwise you lose 
and they are not going to listen to you' (interview 4: seniors' organisation, 2005). 
Others, particularly from CUPE, wanted to use the opportunity of the election to 
put as much pressure as possible on the Liberals to oppose P3s: 'you have got to 
be outspoken, if you are too polite, continually too polite then they don't listen to 
you anyway' (interview 6: coalition participant, 2005). 
The election was a landslide against the Conservatives, but it was a short-lived 
victory (Quinn 2003). On 21 November the new Premier, McGuinty, announced 
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. that the P3 hospitals in Brampton and Ottawa would go ahead (OHC 2003o). 
While the Liberals used ambiguous language, the substance of the proposal was 
that the non-clinical and construction work for these hospitals would be 
performed by private contractors (Lawton and Funston 2003; Office of Premier of 
Ontario 2003; OHC 2003r). According to the OHC, there was nothing 'materially 
• different' in the deal (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). A former Conservative 
Minister agreed: 'despite the doublespeak ... it looks pretty identical to the deal 
that [Conservative Minister] Ernie Eves announced here two months ago' 
(Lawton and Funston 2003). 
The ambiguity of the Liberals' political position led most interviewees to argue 
that 2004 was the OHC's 'most difficult year'. The OHC's Administrative 
Committee debated if they should 'try to influence the government' or campaign 
and 'attack the government' (interview 14: coalition participant, 2005). The post-
election strategy was a challenge for the unions: 
They were tired after fighting for so many years with the Harris 
government and didn't want to fight any more. They wanted a different 
relationship with government. They wanted access to government. And 
they didn't have a vision that they needed to provide constant pressure, 
no matter what government was in (interview, coalition 34: coalition 
participant, 2006). 
CUPE was an exception. Hurley was convinced that P3s were on the rise, and 
that CUPE members would be directly affected (interview, Hurley: CUPE, 2006; 
Mehra: OHC, 2006). Yet mobilising to fight the Liberals was harder than fighting 
the Conservatives because of the ambiguity of the Liberals' message: 
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The Tories ... have a fairly straightforward class struggle approach, we are 
going to kick the workers in the head ... If you don't like it, too bad; then 
don't vote for us. Whereas, these guys [Liberals] they tried to wrap 
themselves in the banner of public ownership. They'll deny, deny, deny 
that they are privatising hospitals . . . but they are actually doing the 
privatisation and the cutbacks quite effectively (interview, Allan: CUPE, 
2005). 
• 
The 2004 Privatisation campaign started off as a media campaign, and escalated 
to focus on the May budget. The OHC initially struggled to get agreement to 
take public action. The OHC used tactics that only required small numbers of 
participants, such as small media events in Toronto, including a sit-in at the 
Health Ministry that won a government commitment to policy disclosure and 
consultation (Boyle 2004; The Record 2004; OHC 2004a; OHC 2004b; OHC 2004c). 
At a 3000-person P3 rally in April, there was a lot of conflict in the Coalition that 
showed the worst side of union dominance. Before OHC events there was . 
commonly a process of 'speakers' hell'; a jostling amongst the unions for a 
prominent place on the speakers list (interview 11: coalition participant, 2006). 
" The OHC traditionally dealt with this by pulling speakers' names out of a hat 
(interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006). This time, the unions lobbied the co-chairs to try 
to get the OHC to prioritise union speakers over community speakers, and when 
some of them did not get their way they criticised the OHC in their rally 
speeches (interview 22: coalition participant, 2006). As one community 
representative reflected, 'there was a lot of ego in some of the union leaders 
involved', and another noted that it was an example of 'the salaried union people 
running their own agenda' (interview 32: seniors' organisation; interview 18, 
2006). 
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Meanwhile, the government escalated its P3 agenda. Between February and May 
2004, the.government consulted on a new infrastructure policy with a discussion 
paper called Building a Better Tomorrow that supported P3s and established a 
Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal (Caplan 2004a; Caplan 2004b) . 
• The OHC responded at a provincial scale through a Toronto media event and 
another round of cross-provincial tours. On 27 May, all the major 'social 
movement' organisations in Ontario held a press conference in Toronto to 
condemn P3s (OHC 2004e). There was also a 'relentless creating of events' with 
tours across the province over the spring and summer (interview, Mehra: OHC, 
2006). In May, there was a budget tour by economists and a P3 expert from the 
United Kingdom (OHC 2004d; OHC 2004£; OHC 2004i). From July to October, 
CUPE sponsored an unprecedented tour of the Trojan horse, visiting forty-three 
locations with events staged by local coalitions with media conferences and the 
distribution of leaflets about privatisation (Berthiaume 2004; Bradley 2004; 
Brown 2004; Danese 2004; De Almeida 2004; Demers 2004; Dixon 2004; 
Kingston Whig-Standard 2004; OHC 2004g). 
However, the breadth of these tours left OHC resources spread very thin. The 
campaign was primarily resourced by the OHC and CUPE, with only a couple of 
committed, but small, local coalitions engaged. It was difficult to build interest 
, in the campaign. Firstly, because it felt unwinnable - as one participant 
described it, 'the privatisation agenda seemed to be going ahead like a 
steamroller' (interview 23: coalition participant, 2006). Secondly, there was a lack 
of ownership over these events. As one local representative put it, the OHC 'is 
fairly good at manufacturing events that keep people involved, but you can only 
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do it so many times if it is not, real, if it is not focused on action that really results 
in something' (interview 36: BHC, 2006). 
The OHC did experiment with some local capacity-building work in the Greater 
Toronto Area (GTA). A Toronto-based campaign targeted the Health Minister's 
• 
riding with anti-P3lawn signs (OHC 2004h). By employing an OHC staff person, 
the GTA group attempted to organise public meetings at the locations of three 
proposed P3 hospitals, but ended up coordinating activities as a central group 
because 'it was uphill work to get people to come out to the meetings' (interview 
17: coalition participant, 2005). For the OHC, awareness-raising was more of a 
challenge in Toronto than in the local town. As one seniors' representative 
argued, 'it's not easy to be visible in a big city' because the large population 
required a volunteer base and capacity that was hard to build through the single 
Toronto local health coalition (interview 32: seniors organisation, 2006). 
For the unions too, mobilising a union base in Tgronto was a constant struggle. 
Union participation in the GT A was limited to local union leaders, not members. 
CUPE union officials I interviewed struggled to explain why: 'I am not sure I 
have the explanation for that' _(interview 28: CUPE, 2006). Issues included the 
. 
time constraints on workers, including the distance between work and horne 
(interview, Hurley: CUPE, 2006). Also, some of the city locals did not have a 
strong mobilising capacity, for instance not having the horne phone numbers of 
members (interview 34: CUPE, 2006). 
As the Government's P3s plans escalated, the OHC's campaign faced a growing 
pessimism. The Government released Building a Better Tomorrow in July 2004, 
and building work on Brarnpton Hospital began on 22 October (Divell 2004; 
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Smitherman 2004a). In Brampton, a small group from the BHC protested the 
start of construction, but began to doubt their ability to stop the privatisation: 
'we stood out there and all these important people were inside the fence ... we 
got cold and tired . . . we were left feeling nobody came, kind of dejected' 
(interview 9: BHC, 2005). The BHC activists noted that it was hard to sustain 
• participation in the face of campaign losses: 'it became increasingly difficult 
because the hospital was going ahead ... people get burned out' (interview 9: 
BHC, 2005). 
During the P3 campaign the OHC undertook repeated· multi-scaled activity to 
sustain its political influence and its local coalition capacity. Successfully, they 
helped drive out the Conservatives and create broad awareness about P3s. 
However, the campaign remained reactive 'against' public-private-partnerships. 
The wide range of centrally-directed coalition activity made it difficult to sustain 
local coalition capacity and engagement. 
3.3 A new strategy, January 2004 to January 2006 
In this final phase, the OHC developed a new P3 strategy that focused on the 
local scale, using a tactic of community-run plebiscites to demonstrate opposition · 
to individual P3 hospitals. The OHC also broadened its issue base, including a 
campaign on long-term care which was of key concern to seniors' groups. These 
campaigns demonstrated two distinct coalition strengths: the capacity to 
overcome different interests to create consensus, and the strength of a sustained 
localised strategy to create greater ownership, improve message development 
and increase union involvement. 
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In 2004, following requests from seniors and with the stalling of the P3 
campaign, the OHC attempted to build a policy around institutional and 
community care. This addressed an ongoing concern of seniors, as 
. ... ' 
representative noted, 'home care had never been high on their (the OHC's) 
agenda, but for seniors it has been top' (interview 32: seniors' organisation, 2006) . 
• The campaign was complicated because of the contradictions between union and 
seniors' interests. Seniors preferred community care because it ensured 
independent living; yet most of the OHC unions preferred institutional care, 
because a centralised workplace such as a hospital made for better working 
conditions (interview 12: coalition participant, 2005). As one unionist put it, 
'they're thinking about care and we're thinking about the workers' (interview 13: 
union, 2005). 
Consequently, the safest space for joint union-seniors' work was in establishing 
standards for long-term care institutions. Seniors were pragmatic about this, 
acknowledging that 'the health care unions were very important participants in 
the coalition so their emphasis became more of an emphasis on the coalition' 
(interview 30: seniors' organisation, 2006). In March 2004, the OHC established a 
separate committee with unions and seniors to coordinate the long-term care 
campaign, staging fifteen hearings around the province with over 370 people 
attending (OHC 2004i). 
Building policy consensus for long-term care required a conscious balancing of 
interests. For instance, in the OHC's archives an early version of the homecare 
policy had a scribbled note: 'lack of employment stuff' (OHC 2004j). Negotiating 
consensus based on different interests was a conscious strategy. Seniors and 
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unions had a mutual self-interest in high staff radios, as they directly affect the 
quality of care received. As on~ senior representative argued: 
We sided absolutely with the unions on the question of standards of care, 
for instance three point five hours per day of nursing care for every 
[nursing] home ... if you don't have that level of nursing care, then you 
get neglected (interview 30: seniors' organisation, 2006). • 
The decision to segment the OHC agenda and to campaign on long-term care 
separate to P3s might have usefully reconnected the OHC to seniors, but it broke 
dowri some of the collective momentum as well. In 2004, the OHC focused on 
multiple issues, ranging from hospitals, mental health, access to services and P3s 
(OHC 2004i). The Jack of one clear focus demobilised the OHC's base: 
attendance at the 2004 Assembly was down, with 90 registrations compared to 
180 the year before. Moreover, the common concern had been diluted, shifting to 
the 'institutions of health care' rather than health care itself. As one 
representative commented, 'the key message? I don't know it,· I am not 
convinced that anything has really been working enough to excite people' 
(interview 21: union, 2005). 
The OHC's second strategy sought to reconnect the OHC to its base and do 
something different to confront P3s. The OHC was well aware that despite 
centralised tours and election campaign, P3s were spreading. Mehra wanted the 
campaign to go local, so at a July 2004 strategy meeting she suggested a plebiscite 
strategy. She was inspired by an Australian campaign in the LaTrobe valley, 
which had held a referendum to stop a public-private-partnership (interview, 
Mehra: OHC, 2005). The idea was 'to concentrate resources' and 'like the Days of 
Action against the Harris Government that moved around the province', target 
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towns with the aim of stopping P3 hospitals 'one by one' (interview, Mehra: 
OHC, 2006; Munro 1997). 
There was broad support for this strategy, with local coalitions in particular 
arguing that it seemed like a way of taking 'a pre-emptive strike' and getting a 
• 
discussion about P3s out across a local population (interview 8: Niagara Health 
Coalition (NHC), 2006 ). As in the Medicare campaign, CUPE's support carried 
weight. President Ryan argued that the plebiscites 'were an offshoot' of the 
community-building strategy launched with the Medicare canvas' (interview, 
Ryan CUPE 2006). With this support, Mehra proposed a pilot plebiscite with the 
NHC in Niagara for mid-2005. 
Union commitment to the Niagara plebiscite was an offshoot of intense union 
competition between SEIU and CUPE. These two unions had just contested a 
recognition election at Niagara Health Systems.24 For CUPE, the jurisdictional 
competition led to 'a motivation on the part of the local union', who had control 
of local resources, to choose to engage in the plebiscite in order to be 'prominent' 
and prove itself as the better health union (interview 28: CUPE, 2006). As one 
official commented, the competition directly escalated engagement: 'it kept them 
involved because no one wanted to be the one to walk away' (interview 25: 
union, 2006). 
For the SEIU, their recognition victory increased their engagement in the NHC. 
The SEIU 'made a point of involving members employed in the region, especially 
at Niagara Health Systems' (interview 33: SEIU, 2006), arguing that the 
24 Canada's union jurisdictional laws are regulated by the unions not the industrial relations system, and 
SEIU and CUPE each had jurisdiction over non-clinical staff. 
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combination of a recognition battle and a health campaign drew the union in. 
One official commented that 'when you win a representation vote and you are 
the only union representing those workers ... we had a responsibility to be 
involved' (interview 33: SEIU, 2006). 
• 
The NHC's plebiscite helped shift the unions in the local area. The place-based, 
multi-scaled capacity of the OHC provided an opportunity to shift the SEIU's 
engagement at precisely the time when the union was seeking to establish its 
credibility as the recognised health care union (interview 33: SEIU, 2006). 
Union engagement in the plebiscite was a function of self-interest. For SEIU and 
CUPE, their interest was to enhance their legitimacy as strong health care unions. 
But for OPSEU, who had not faced a recent recognition battle and whose clinical 
members would be less directly affected by a P3 hospital, there was less union 
involvement. This was partly because they were engaged in 'core union 
activities', _with bargaining at one hospital and another hospital 'snowed under 
with grievances' (interview 3: OPSEU, 2005). This 'day to day' union work made 
it difficult for organisers: 'I had trouble calling on people' (interview 3: OPSEU, 
2005). Without a direct interest, the plebiscite did not register as a priority for 
OPSEU above these core union tasks. 
The NHC was able to manage the complexities of union competition because of 
the leadership of a local union bridge builder. The NHC's aim was to 'stay 
neutral and make sure that both parties were not just using the campaign to 
promote their local' (interview 8: NHC, 2005). The key local NHC organiser, Sue 
Hotte, could bridge this tension as she was an executive officer in the local labour 
council. She worked with 'leadership in those locals and representatives on the 
259 
ground who wanted it to work' (interview 34: CUPE, 2005). Her experience 
allowed the NHC 'to make sure that (the conflict) didn't show up' (interview 8: 
NHC 2005). As a CUPE official commented, the local coalition acted 'to keep the 
warring factions apart' (interview 25: CUPE, 2006). 
• 
The NHC's local campaign planning created a successful public social frame that 
focused on building the hospital right. The NHC 'spend a lot of time carefully 
framing' the campaign's public message, because as in Brampton, the NHC knew 
that 'we desperately needed a new hospital' (interview 8: NHC, 2005). The 
public social frame was developed through local discussion: 
We didn't want it to come out looking like we didn't want a hospital if it 
couldn't be 100% publicly funded and administered ... we didn't want to 
focus on Government and Dalton McGuinty, we just wanted to focus on 
building it right; we wanted to engage in the discussion and take the 
politics out of it and say what we want is a 100% publicly funded hospital 
(interview 8: NHC, 2005- my emphasis). 
The effectiveness of the 'build it right' frame was made clear four weeks before 
the plebiscite, when the government changed the name of P3s in Ontario. In 
ReNew Ontario released in May 2005, the government expanded the number of 
P3s and renamed them 'alternative finance and procurement mechanisms' 
(Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal2005).25 However, because the NHC's 
local message had a positive frame that did not rely on the government's use of 
language, its public message was resilient. 
25 It followed a similar process of name changing that occurred in Britain- where the initial term 'private 
finance initiative' was later changed to 'public-private-partnerships' after ridicule by the British Medical 
Assodation Journal . 
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Across the multi-scaled structure there was, however, a contradiction in planning 
goals. The OHC mentored the NHC through the plebiscite, helping to expand 
the 'organising skills' of the group while building a reproducible plebiscite 
model that could be taken to other towns to influence provincial policy (OHC 
2005h). Yet as the NHC developed its own capacity, it found these centrally 
• 
determined planning goals 'inappropriately short' for building local capacity: 
'you need more time to be able to develop good community ties, we didn't really 
have the time to get to all the organisations ... go to their membership meetings' 
(interview 27: coalition participant, 2005). There was a conflict between the local 
coalitions' need for campaign sustainability and the OHC's need to duplicate the 
campaign at a provincial scale. 
The NHC campaign aimed to maximise volunteer participation. The NHC 
coordinated subgroups that helped tum interested participants into active 
volunteers and organisers. By the day of the plebiscite, the campaign had 
recruited over 400 volunteers (interview 8: NHC, 2005). The OHC supported this 
by hiring local staff and organising volunteers from other cities to assist 
(interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005). 
The NHC also focused on organising inside unions. Hotte' slinks with the labour 
council built union participation, with educational leaflets and referendum 
voting occurring at all the schools through the teachers union, large auto plants 
through the CAW and at hospitals through SEIU and CUPE (OHC 2005i). 
CUPE's involvement was organised locally and relationship-driven. For 
instance, one local union president became an active participant, motivated by 
her previous volunteer work with the OHC in the Save Medicare campaign. The 
issue also connected to the CUPE locals beyond health care, with the anti-
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privatisation message connecting to their interests as public sector workers 
(interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). 
CUPE's Coalition engagement underwent a qualitative shift in the plebiscite 
campaign. CUPE locals had always been engaged in OHC activities by the 
• 
central CUPE office, but in the P3 campaign central support led to local unions 
becoming active campaign coordinators, engaging their members as well as other 
locals without centralised direction. The combination of dedicated resources 
from CUPE' s central offices, expertise and experience in the privatisation 
campaign, combined with the opportunity of a local plebiscite, contributed to a 
shift in local union participation. As Allan from CUPE noted: 'its gone from 
where CUPE's involvement went through me ... now OCHU and the hospital 
locals also put in significant time and resources into the Coalition campaign 
(interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). Union member involvement enhanced the 
political awareness and class movement capacity of CUPE. Hurley argued that 
member political awareness .was expanded through local engagement with other 
progressives: 
Where the health coalition exists in real terms on the ground in 
communities, they [our members] are likely to encounter progressive 
people, they might be retired teachers . . . they are going to have an 
analysis about trade, they are going to have an analysis about public 
services ... they get to work with socially progressive people in fighting 
on what is really a wage issue but also about something that is happening 
to their district, so I think it politicises them (interview, Hurley: CUPE, 
2006). 
The Niagara plebiscite was successful. Over 12 400 people cast ballots and 98% 
voted to 'build it right', and keep the hospital public. It generated widespread 
• 
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awareness and support for public hospitals in the local media (Benner 2005; 
Draper 2005; Herod 2005). 
Plebiscites became the central strategy of the OHC with eight additional 
plebiscites held during 2005 and 2006. A comparison of three plebiscites- North 
• 
Bay, Woodstock and Hamilton - demonstrated how place and organisational 
capacity contributed their success. The plebiscites in the small cities of North 
Bay and Woodstock achieved the highest percentage of voters on a per capita 
basis, much larger than the 500 000-person union city of Hamilton (interview 35: 
coalition participant, 2006). Between North Bay and Woodstock, Woodstock had 
a larger tum-out and a more stable coalition base mainly credited to 'two 
experienced CAW activists, who had political experience' and used those skills in 
the media and in building the campaign (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006). 
Hamilton was more difficult; the size of the city complicated the logistics of the 
referendum and there was limited campaign experience in the local coalition 
(interview 35: coalition participant, 2006). A government and hostile media 
campaign which got progressively worse over time were features of all the 
plebiscites (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006). 
Plebiscites became the OHC's response to an expanded P3 agenda. The 
decentralisation of Coalition activity strengthened its activist base and provided 
a local strategy to attack the hospitals 'one by one'. It required a large 
commitment of resources, and rewarded coalition and organisational capacity by 
building local union engagement and the depth of campaign capacity in the local 
coalitions. 
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4.0 Reflections and Conclusion 
The changing fortunes of the 2001-2006 OHC campaigns can be explored using 
""<-=-
- the three coalition frameworks developed in this thesis. The differences between 
the three campaign phrases revealed a shifting pattern of coalition elements, 
which produced different levels of union commitment and collaborative power. 
These changes varied coalition success, in terms of achieving outcomes, political 
climate change, sustaining relationships and building the capacity of the 
participating organisations. 
The OHC developed slowly, through the collective work of individual union and 
community organisation representatives and a central coordinator. Internal 
restructuring, including the development of a mandate, the formalisation of an 
Administrative Committee and the creation of local coalitions created a 
foundation for the 2001-2006 coalition work. The OHC was set up with a strong 
foundation of familiar organisational relationships driven by individual 
organisational representatives and a multi-scaled capacity that produced the 
OHC's key strengths. 
In the first phase, the Save Medicare campaign, the OHC's activities were multi-
scaled and relied on close inter-organisational relationships and the OHC's 
centralised resource base. Resources included the skills and experience of the 
coordinator, the capacity to centrally finance a campaign and hire staff and a 
Coalition office separate from organisational partners. It also harnessed the 
.personal relationships across the Administrative Committee. However, the 
common concern was the campaign's chief limitation: it had a limited public 
social frame. 
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Thus, in this first stage, the OHC successfully achieved a policy outcome and 
sustained relationships, but had less of an impact on the political climate and the 
capacity of the participating organisations. The Romanow Report supported the 
OHC's main aim, which was to protect universal health insurance. However, the 
• 
narrow 'Save Medicare' demand did not help the OHC shut down the threat of 
P3s. Save Medicare defended the status quo rather than proactively proposing 
an alternative to the crisis in the health care system. There were also strengths 
and weaknesses in terms of relationships. The OHC's strong personal 
relationships and independent structure made the Coalition relationships 
sustainable and the local coalitions developed their organisational capacity 
through the campaign, by developing and implementing a local Medicare 
campaign and canvas. However, the distant union interest bred weak 
commitment. While engaged union staff enhanced their campaigning capacity, it 
did not flow through to the unions. 
Indeed, the organisational distance in the Medicare campaign shaped the 
collaborative power it provided to unions. It provided a relational collaborative 
power, creating a trusting foundation for future relationships. It also built place-
based power at a central scale by challenging unions to undertake a canvassing 
campaigning. Yet the issue of Medicare had limited class movement 
collaborative power. The distance between the coalition and union interest 
limited member commitment, restricting the campaign's ability to expand 
political awareness. 
In the second phase, the P3 campaign significantly changed the common concern 
across the OHC, engaging CUPE on its core organisational interest. The message 
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of the campaign was negative: 'opposition to P3s'. However, it usefully enabled 
the OHC to partner with CUPE and engaged sufficient union resources to allow 
the OHC to act at a provincial scale through P3 tours. The P3 campaign 
continued to rely on the OHC's multi-scaled capacity and strong inter-
organisational relationships, but with key differences to the Medicare campaign . 
• 
The OHC's engagement in the P3 campaign was initially more centralised and 
prioritised education events rather than local mobilisations. Locally there were 
some tensions between local health care volunteers and unions. In places such as 
Brampton, local coalitions were critical for contesting conservative place 
consciousness. Usefully, the OHC's structure allowed for genuine leadership 
and education on a complex issue. Yet, it also often left local coalitions 
disengaged from the strategy. 
In terms of Coalition success, the P3 campaign supported a change in political 
climate and enhanced the capacity of CUPE, while not achieving a change in 
outcomes and increasing tension between the Coalition's relationships. 
However, the tendency to 'manufacture' local events rather than support local 
campaign plans did limit the degree to which local coalitions enhanced the 
Coalition's capacity. The negative P3 message mitigated the effect of the 
campaign on the political climate, as it did not create an alternative policy 
framework to respond to P3s. Political bridge builders helped create broad 
union engagement in the OHC's electoral campaign. However, the proximity of 
the CUPE/OHC relationship challenged the centralised inter-organisational 
relationships at the OHC. The OHC practised consensus where all the 
participants were seen as equal, for instance by drawing names out of a hat for 
rallies. Yet underneath this formal commitment was unequal financial support 
and informal union dominance. Moreover, CUPE' s increased organisational 
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commitment to the P3 campaign upset the OHC's balanced coalition unity and 
organisational autonomy, and created tension in the OHC's inter-organisational 
relationships. 
The P3 campaign provided CUPE with several forms of collaborative power, as it 
• directly engaged its organisational interests. The OHC acted as a change agent-
shifting the capacity and power to the union. CUPE's engagement in the P3 
campaign and the OHC carne from the leadership. This leadership engagement 
enabled CUPE to plan new types of campaigns with the OHC, such as tours, that 
could provide a class movement educative opportunity for CUPE union 
members. Relational collaborative power was also produced as CUPE relied on 
the organisational resources of the OHC to undertake the cross-provincial tours, 
and in tum the OHC helped CUPE spread a credible public agenda about the 
problems of P3s. The tours were useful for CUPE, because union leadership 
engagement helped spread participation amongst union locals and members. 
The third phase, the OHC's new strategies, demonstrated the OHC's capacity to 
renew. Firstly, it highlighted the strengths of the inter-organisational 
relationships and the OHC's ability to forge consensus around a long-term care 
campaign. Secondly, the Plebiscite campaign dramatically shifted the OHC' s 
multi-scaled campaign method, focusing on the scale of individual local 
coalitions rather than the cross-provincial scale. By dedicating centralised 
resources into local coalitions, the plebiscites enhanced volunteer and union 
commitment and campaign skills. The localised strategy led to innovations in 
the OHC's campaign strategy, with the development of a new positive public 
social frame for the campaign. Moreover, the localisation of Coalition resources 
allowed the NHC to operate as a change agent for unions. This final stage of the 
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campaign demonstrated the importance of local-scaled activity for coalitions to 
develop the campaign capacity of participating organisations. The tactic of a 
plebiscite was also very effective at generating media attention and public 
awareness around the OHC's issues, shifting the political climate. 
Overall, the OHC represented a form of relationship-driven coalition u1lionism. 
Across the phases, the campaign consistently relied on centralised inter-
organisational relationships, an independent capacity through the coordinator 
and multi-scaled local coalitions. Yet consistently the OHC was weakened by its 
common concern, with it often running a negative social frame. The multi-scaled 
capacity of the broker organisations enhanced the reach of the coalition, 
engaging volunteers as well as staff, and increasing their campaign skills in the 
process. 
The relationshi£cdnven coalition unionism was riddled by the contradictions 
between common concern and inter-organisational relationships. When the 
OHC enhanced common interest engagement in the P3 campaign, it had a 
contradictory effect. While increasing CUPE' s engagement, it also caused 
tension in the wider inter-organisational relationships. The OHC's tendency 
towards reactively framed campaigns was in part a consequence of the diversity 
of the organisations present in the OHC, as it was easier to form consensus on the 
basis of what the organisations commonly disagreed with rather than on a 
proactive policy agenda. 
The themes of relationship-driven coalition unionism are not exclusive to the 
OHC; this coalition model also describes other coalitions in the secondary 
literature. For instance, the Walk against the War Coalition in NSW, that 
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operated between October 2002 and May 2003, had a very similar combination of 
coalition strengths and limitations (Tattersall 2007a; Tattersall forthcoming a). It 
too had a strong web of diverse organisations operating in formal coalition, with 
up to sixty participating organisations and several full-time coordinators. It 
developed a multi-scaled structure, with up to twenty-five local peace groups 
• 
operating in Sydney and around NSW between January and April 2003. 
Similarly, its common concern, as with the OHC, was framed as a negative 
demand: 'stop the war, and bring the troops home'. It had far greater limitations 
than the OHC, in that the issue of peace was distant from the concerns of union 
members, particularly at a rank and file level. Also, a wide array of participating 
organisations made it difficult to build consensus between the organisational 
partners, leading to the use of a narrow range of tactics. This coalition was not 
sustained long-term, only lasting six months, however it was successful as a 
collective mobilising agent, organising the largest demonstration in Australia's 
history, on 16 Feliruary 2003. 
The study of the dynamics of the OHC revealed three key findings about 
relationship-driven coalition unionism and its relationship to union collaborative 
power. Firstly, when coalition unionism operates with strong inter-
organisational relationships and multi-scaled capacity, it has the capacity to 
sustain a powerful campaign agenda. Secondly, when this campaign agenda 
overlaps with the mutual organisational self-interest of a union, the campaign 
agenda can be a powerful vehicle for union relational collaborative power. 
Thirdly, when the centralised resources and capacity of a coalition prioritise 
locally-scaled organising, they have the capacity to change unions, through the 
class movement education of union members and by increasing the campaign 
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skills and capacity of union members. Locally-scaled coalitions can transform 
the multi-scaled capacity of a union, enhancing its place-based power. 
The final case study chapter considers a coalition from the United States which 
shares with the OHC a strong set of inter-organisational relationships while not 
• 
operating with its multi-scaled capacity. Instead, it cultivated a strong common 
concern over living wages that enabled it and its key union to advance a series of 
collective bargaining and policy victories in a hostile union climate. 
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Chapter Seven 
Mobilising Coalition Unionism: 
SEIU Local880 and Chicago's Grassroots Collaborative 
~: 
2002 to 2006 
• 
On 30 July 2005, packed into an overflowing inner-city downtown Chicago 
church were a thousand mainly low-income African American ·and Latino 
. Chicago residents. Outside sat twenty yellow school buses that had ferried in the 
crowd. Inside was a sea of colourful T-shirts. The room was divided into blocks 
defined by the t-shirts - a strip of yellow on one side signifying the Chicago 
Coalition for the Homeless (CCH), a purple SEIU strip down the other side, a red 
group of ACORN leaders at the front. The noise was deafening. Voices across 
the hall sang to the rhythm of hand-clapping- 'we're fired up, won't take it no 
more; we're fired up, won't take it no more.' Some people were standing, others 
were waving their arms. It was electric. 
As one speaker described it: 'this is a gathering of the grassroots.' The 
Grassroots Collaborative, a coalition of ten union and community organisations 
in Chicago, had turned out a thousand people to 'take back' Chicago. The event 
was not focused on a single issue but on a multiplicity of concerns; speeches 
ranged from non-militarised education to a living wage. 
This event was one of many. The Collaborative and its member organisa'tions 
already had a reputation as agitators in Chicago and across Illinois by repeatedly 
mobilising their base of member supporters in pursuit of centrally crafted 
strategies for living wages. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The Grassroots Collaborative, as with the previous case studies, was a long-term 
coalition, and this case study analyses its work with SEIU Local 880 and their 
campaigns for living wages. Since the successful Living Wage camfaign in 
Baltimore in 1994, a living wage movement had developed in the United States 
(Walsh 2000). Its message had its roots in the progressive era at the tum of the 
last century, where economic depression and burgeoning catholic and socialist 
unions raised demands for living wages amongst then Irish immigrant workers. 
The term derived from Pope Leo VIII's 1891 encyclical that called for a 'just 
wage' (Figart 2004, p.2; Gertner 2006). 
This case study had strong contextual differences from the Canadian and 
Australian studies. As in Australia, this case study featured a strategic union 
campaign, but here the focus was on organising new members rather than policy 
changes. in the United States, with its very low union density, unions had to 
'organise or die' (Kelleher 2005). The union itself is a further point of difference. 
While most of SEIU Local 880's members are in the public sector, these workers 
work in the home, in contrast to the formally employed teachers and hospital 
workers examined in the previous studies. The Collaborative was initiated by 
community organisations; starkly different community organisations compared 
to those studied in Canada and Australia, having a strong membership and 
mobilising capacity (Delgado 1986; Osterman 2006). 
This case study exhibited a model of coalition unionism that this study calls 
mobilising coalition unionism. The coalition had a strong set of inter-
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organisational relations that negotiated common concern and mutual self-
interest, but was also categorised by a singularly-scaled, rather than multi-scaled, 
capacity. The limited scale derived both from the union, where there was a 
relatively small and centralised steward structure; and from the coalition, where 
leaders tended to be engaged as public advocates rather than strategic cross-
• 
organisational actors. At a local scale, there were no coalition broker 
organisations and there was limited space for member participation in coalition 
strategising. Instead, member engagement was limited to mobilisation. The 
name mobilising coalition unionism is appropriate because mobilisation requires 
a mobilising agent, which was continuously present in the Collaborative's strong 
centralised inter-organisational relationships. 
This chapter examines a series of living wage campaigns in Chicago between 
2002 and 2006. It begins in 2002 with the Collaborative's return to the Living 
Wage campaign, coinciding with SEIU Local 880's campaign to achieve 
recognition and living wages for homecare and childcare workers. The study 
ends with the Big Box Living Wage campaign in September 2006.26 While all the 
participants insisted that 'the campaign never ends', it ends here because the 
· mixture of strategies, limitations, strengths and triumphs allowed a detailed 
examination of the coalition's mobilisation form, which is key to this study. 
26 'Big box stores' is a US term to describe large retail stores such as Target, Costco or Wal·Mart. 
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2.0 Context for Case Study 
2.1 Unions 
The two SEIU unions affiliated to the Grassroots Collaborative are 
predominantly public sector SEIU locals with leadership support and union 
identities that commit them to working in coalition (interview 7: SEIU 'i"S, 2005; 
interview 13: SEIU 880, 2005). The Collaborative also worked closely with the 
UFCW and the Chicago Federation of Labor (CFL). 
In 2006, SEIU International represented 1.8 million workers in the United States 
and Canada across four industries: hospital systems, long-term care, the public 
sector and business services (SEIU 2006b). It had an International Office in 
Washington DC, and over 300 locals operating through twenty-five State 
Councils. Over the previous ten years it had led growth strategies to organise 
non-union workers (SEIU 2006b). It centralised its resources, through dues to 
fund industry research, organiser training, new member organising and political 
races where collective bargaining rights could be secured (SEIU 2006d).27 
SEIU Local 880, the Grassroots Collaborative's first union partner, was an 
unusual union, 'distinguished by its history of growing out of ACORN' 
(interview, Kelleher: SEIU, 2005). By 2006 it was the SEIU's fifth largest local 
with dose to 70 000 members, yet it was also one of the youngest locals, forming 
as one of five United Labour Unions (ULU) founded by ACORN, affiliating with 
the SEIU in 1985 (Kelleher 2005; Tait 2005). These independent ULU's adapted 
the community organising techniques of ACORN, such as door-knocking and 
27 Local contributions to SEIU International vary depending on the income level of the unionised workers, 
but SEJU Local880, for instance, sends approximately 40% of its dues income to SEJU International, and 
AFL-CIO state and local bodies (interview 40: SEIU 880, 2006). 
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leadership development, to organise low-wage workers in the service industries 
who had been neglected by traditional AFL-CIO unions (Kelleher 2005; Tait 
2005). Consequently, SEIU 880 organised an atypical constituency of private and 
public hornecare workers from 1983 and then horne childcare workers from 1996. 
The union's community organising origins created a broad political vision and 
• 
union identity. As the field director outlined, 'our vision is nothing less than 
redistributing power in the city, in the country, in the world ... unions need to 
have a larger vision of social and political change' (interview, Glassman: SEIU, 
2005). SEIU 880 was physically located in the same premises as its sister 
organisation, ACORN. This integration was enhanced by the close personal 
relationship between the two principle organisers of SEIU 880 and ACORN, as 
Keith Kelleher and Madeline Talbott have been married for the last twenty years. 
The union is structured with separate 'legislative' and 'executive' functions. The 
legislature included a rank and. file membership executive board, a stewards' 
board, and monthly regional membership meetings open to all union members. 
The executive is led by Kelleher as head organiser, a field director and full-time 
organising staff. The union explicitly organises on the 'basis of geography' while 
targeting workers by industry, with regional organisers, lead and field organisers 
operating across 'the whole membership ... to build power overall' (interview 13: 
SEIU, 2005). 
SEIU Local 73 joined the Collaborative in August 2004. In 2006 it represented 
25 000 public sector workers across Illinois and north-west Indiana (interview 7: 
SEIU 73, 2005). The union was a general union until 1996, when an SEIU 
restructure turned it into a public service local (interview 25: SEIU, 2005). Under 
the leadership of Christine Boardman, a former SEIU 73 organiser, the union 
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sought to expand its community strength by appointing a community-labour 
organiser in 2003 (interview 7: SEIU 73, 2005). This organiser aimed to move 
away from 'one-way' community work where unions take support from the 
community but do not give back, to 'two-way organising' that created 
'sustainable relationships beyond organising drives' (interview 7: SEIU 73, 2005) . 
• The goal was to build 'long-term systemic' relationships, rather than just ad hoc 
relationships. The union also saw its own workers as 'not just union members 
but people who live in the community', seeking to build sustainable relationships 
to support that broad base of experience (interview 7: SEIU 73, 2005) 
In 2006, the UFCW represented 1.3 million workers in the United States and 
Canada, working in the retail, food and packing industries (UFCW 2006a). 
Chicago's UFCW Local 881 represented 37 000 members and was the largest 
UFCW local in the United States (UFCW 881 2006). Until recently, the UFCW 
was best categorised as a more traditional business union, with only limited 
experience· in coalition work (interview 20: union, 2005). Yet changes like the 
union's national public campaign around Wal-Mart, and its enhanced investment 
in new organising initiatives since joining the Change to Win Federation in 2005, 
have expanded its operating model (UFCW 2006b ). 
In 2006, the CFL was the central labour council for Chicago and Cook County, 
with 320 affiliated labour unions representing around 400 000 workers.28 
Historically, a key plank of the CFL's power was a 'great relationship with the 
City Council ... an open door ... over the last 100 years' (interview 46: union, 
2006). Chicago was a city run by the Democratic Party. The Daleys, first father 
,. Of note, in 2006 the Change to Win Federation unions remained affiliated to the CFL. 
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and then son, have had almost unbroken control of City Council politics through 
a centrally controlled 'political machine' (Royko 1970). However, from the mid-
1990s, the machine changed, changing the political influence of the CFL. As one 
official noted, 'city workers didn't have a contract for two and half years ... the 
Council began forging relationships with business that tipped the scales when 
you look at business over labour' (interview 46: union, 2006). The President of 
the CFL identified a 'political vacuum', particularly after the Daley Machine was 
publicly accused of corruption in 2004, and hired a political director with the aim 
of 'getting more involved politically' (interview 46: union, 2006). These political 
relationships also facilitated community outreach, as the political director 
became a bridge between community organisations and the CFL (interview 46: 
union, 2006). 
2.2 Com111;unity organisation partners 
The Grassroots Collaborative was initiated by community organisations, which is 
fitting as its location in Chicago is the home of United States Alinsky-styled 
community organising. That said, Chicago is not an anomaly, as many of these 
Chicago organisations are part of national community organisation networks 
that operate around the United States.29 The Collaborative's community 
organisations have many similar capacities: they have leaders who prioritise 
organising, not service provision, and they employ dedicated organisers who 
develop leaders and assist members to take direct action to achieve policy 
outcomes. In 2006 there were ten community organisation affiliates. This section 
reviews four prominent members. 
29 Association of Community Organisations for Reform Now (ACORN), the Industrial Areas Foundation 
(IAF), the PICO (People Improving Communities through Organising) national network and Gamaliel are 
national 'community organising' organisations which have affiliates across the country, including Chicago. 
277 
Since it was established in 1970, ACORN has become a national, multi-issue 
community organisation that builds neighbourhood chapters, coordinated by 
.. tf. .. 
state offices, organising 'low and moderate-income people fo work together to 
provide for each other in decisions that impact their lives' (interview, Talbott: 
• 
ACORN, 2006). In 2006, ACORN Illinois was centrally funded by membership 
dues, fundraising, foundations and allies.30 Its funding pays for twelve 
permanent full-time organisers, who door-knock and support campaigns with 
the local chapters (interview 36, community organisation, 2006). Illinois ACORN 
had eight neighbourhood chapters, all in the Chicago metropolitan areas, and a 
central executive with representation from each of the chapters. While it always 
had a permanent coalition with SEIU 880, since the Living Wage Campaign of 
1995, ACORN has become increasingly engaged in coalition work (interview 49: 
community organisation, 2006). 
The CCH was formed in 1980 to agitate for a political response to homelessness 
in Chicago (interview 19: community organisation, 2005). In the 1990s, a new 
director, John Donahue, broadened the organisation's focus to the 'causes of 
homelessness ... lack of affordable housing, lack of living wage jobs and lack of 
access to services and insurance, the services people need to survive' (interview 
19: community organisation, 2005). This organisational range created 
opportunities for coalitions on living wages, because as the executive director 
noted, 'people are homeless because they don't have enough money and if there 
are strategies that work to increase the amount of money people get, we are 
30 Households pay $10 per month in membership fees, which makes up approximately 10% of the ACORN 
budget (interview, Talbott: ACORN, 2006). However, there is currently discussion about bringing in 
provisional free membership. 
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interested' (interview 19: community organisation, 2005). The CCH operated 
with policy and legal staff, and an expanding organising department that 
worked to develop member leaders (interview 19: community organisation, 
2005). The CCH is funded by me~bership fees and foundations. It does not seek 
government funding so it can 'be critical of government' (interview 19: 
• 
community organisation, 2005). 
During the period of the ;Case study, the Illinois Hunger Coalition's (IHC) 
purpose was to 'eliminate hunger by addressing its underlying causes, which are 
poverty, socio-economic injustice, racism and discrimination' (interview 6: 
community organisation, 2005). It focused on issues of access to government 
food services, like food stamps (IHC 2006). Since 1998, under Dianne Doughty's 
leadership, the IHC had developed an organising department and engaged in 
coalition work (interview 6: community organisation, 2005). Its organising work 
focused primarily on Latino immigrant communities based in suburban Chicago 
(interview 6: community organisation, 2005). IHC is primarily funded through 
foundation grants, with limited funding from institutional and individual 
members. 
Metro Seniors in Action was formed, according to its executive director, to 
'organise seniors and empower them to fight for their rights' (interview 8: 
community organisation, 2005). In 2006 it had a fifteen-person board with 
representation from across the city, and monthly delegate meetings attended by 
about fifty to seventy seniors. Campaigns were identified by members, with the 
board overseeing the activity (interview 8: community organisation, 2005). The 
organisation's funding comes mainly from fundraising and foundations. Metro 
Seniors regularly works in coalition; members want 'to be in the same room with 
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young people ... to work with a younger generation' (interview 8: community 
organisation, 2005). Coalition work was also enhanced by personal relationships, 
as the executive director, Amanda Solon, was a former SEIU 880 organiser 
(interview 8: community organisation, 2005). .. 
• 
During the period of study, the Brighton Park Neighbourhood Council (BPNC) 
operated as a local organisation in south-west Chicago, in an area where 
residents are 80% Latino. It was formed in 1997, with the support of the National 
Training and Information Centre, a nationally-based community organisation 
(BPNC 2006). Like ACORN, it was built through door-knocking and 'bringing 
residents together to meetings and developing strategies around issues' 
(interview, Poeter: BPNC, 2005). Yet unlike ACORN with its office in the centre 
of the city, the offices of BPNC are based in Brighton Park with a shop front and 
meeting space (participant observation, BPNC Office). As a local organisation, 
BPNC was still committed to multi-scaled campaigning. This was why they 
joined the Collaborative: 'we wanted to tie local organising campaigns to policy 
campaigns so we became involved in coalitions' (interview 9: community 
organisation, 2005). 
2.3 Emergence of the Grassroots Collaborative 
The Grassroots Collaborative was a product of the original Living Wage 
Ordinance campaign in Chicago between 1995 and 1998 (interview 6: community 
organisation, 2005). The campaign was organised by the Chicago Jobs and 
Living Wage Coalition, with twelve organisations on its steering committee and 
sixty endorsing groups (Kelleher 2005). Its goal was to pass an ordinance at the 
City Council that would require companies receiving taxpayer funds - for 
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example, as city contractors- to pay their workers a living wage of $7.60 an hour, 
the amount that would keep a family of four out of poverty. It was an intense 
campaign, involving rnobilisations and door-knocking of wards, with victory 
corning through the Coalition's use of a state law that required aldermanic salary 
rises to occur within the six months before Council Elections. The Coalition used 
• 
this as a political opportunity by connecting a living wage to the City Council's 
desire for a pay increase, which created unanimous City Council support for a 
living wage the same night it voted to give itself a pay rise (Kelleher 2005). 
According to 'legend,' the Grassroots Collaborative began after the executive 
directors of the CCH, ACORN and the Interfaith Leadership Project (Cicero) 
were at a function at the Woods Foundation when John Ouancho) Donahue from 
CCH turned to the others and said, 'why is it that we are only meeting now?' 
(interview 21: community organisation, 2005). Through ACORN, SEIU 880 was 
invited to join the first of the Collaborative's monthly breakfast meetings at 
Manny's cafe, which ran 'on a relational basis' that 'tried to get a deeper sense of 
people's program and agenda' (interview 21: community organisation, 2005; 
interview 1: community organisation, 2005). 
Months of open discussions created six concrete lessons about coalition practice 
that would underpin the Collaborative. These lessons were: firstly, that coalition 
participation required organisational accountability and capacity; secondly, that 
unions and community organisations were distinct and equally important; 
thirdly, that a coordinator could relieve some of the organisational burdens of 
coalition work, fourthly, that timing was key for coalition success; fifthly, that 
relationships were more important than issues for long-term coalitions, sixthly, 
that Collaborative decision making become concentrated amongst full-time staff. 
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It was the history of previous struggle combined with time for dedicated 
reflection that allowed the relationships of the past to shape the future form of 
the Collaborative. 
" 
Firstly, the Collaborative participants had learnt that coalitions need to connect 
• 
organisational involvement in decision making to a form of collective 
accountability. The Living Wage Campaign had an open collective decision-
making structure 'where everyone in the world was invited to the meeting'; it 
was 'the biggest error' (interview 1: community organisation, 2005). 
Organisations that 'could move numbers were very tired of being in rooms with 
people who couldn't, where they were carrying the load and everybody else was 
having opinions' (interview, Talbott: ACORN, 2005). Thus the Collaborative 
developed a 'principle about tum-out ... a transparent process about what it 
takes to be a real decision maker ... you would have to move numbers of people 
and you would have to put some money on the table' (interview, Talbott: 
ACORN, 2005). While anyone could participate in coalition events, decision 
making was limited to organisations that made tum-out pledges. 
Secondly, the Collaborative learnt that unions and community organisations 
were equally important, and that unions in particular were distinct. The 
Collaborative had proportionally more community organisations, but it 
recognised that unions are 'big players ... because they have a large number of 
members' (interview 1: community organisation, 2005). By restricting decision 
making to tum-out, the Collaborative created a space for unions that recognised 
their capacity. However, there was also an acknowledgment that even small 
unions are bigger than large community organisations, and that it is important to 
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balance the diversity of participation (interview 35: community organisation, 
2006). 
Thirdly, the Collaborative believed a coordinator could assist coalition 
sustainability by taking responsibility for coalition reproduction above the 
• 
participants. It could help them balance coalition unity and organisational 
autonomy. In the Living Wage campaign, coalition unity came at the expense of 
participant autonomy, as one community organiser recalled: 
Some organisations were being drained because such a long campaign 
required so much effort ... we just did not have a continual way to build 
our organisations as we were waging the campaign (interview, Talbott: 
ACORN, 2005). 
Fourthly, the Living Wage campaign provided concrete lessons about 'strategy 
and timing' (interview 19: community organisation, 2005). The original Living 
Wage Ordinance was won because it was attached to a political opportunity. As 
one community organiser described it: 'timing is really critical and being aware 
of timing is really crucial, kind of anticipating' what will happen (interview 19: 
community organisation, 2005). 
Fifthly, the Collaborative learnt that relationships were more important than 
issues for long-term coalitions. Up until then, there was 'a lack of trust', and 
with the new Collaborative: 'we felt that if we could build some trust personally 
with each other and then get to know each other's organisations that we would 
stand a better chance of making a success' in future coalitions (interview 19: 
community organisation, 2005). The aim was to 'build relationally' between the 
staff (interview 1: community organisation; interview 19: community 
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organisation, 2005). Thus the Collaborative would not be defined by a single 
issue, but build issue campaigns out of negotiation and discussion at breakfast 
meetings and day long retreats. Aside from Living Wage campaigns, the 
Collaborative coordinated a large Kidcare demonstration in May 2000, an 
immigrant amnesty rally in September 2000 and an immigrant driver's licence 
• 
campaign in 2001. 
Sixthly, Collaborative planning involved full-time staff, not the rank and file, of 
the participating organisations. Organisers openly acknowledged the limitations 
of only having staff participation, one recognising 'it violates all the rules of 
-community organising that says you can't hold power for people and that they 
need to make decisions' (interview 18: community organisation, 2005). However, 
despite the contradiction, this form of organising became practically necessary, 
helping the Collaborative to 'build trust ... sustain relationships', 'create quick 
decisions' and have effective decision-making structures for long-term 
relationships outside of crisis (interview 18: community organisation, 2005). The 
organisers themselves noted the need to confront the difficulties of staff-led 
organising, and 'felt its way' in experimenting with engaging the rank and file, 
ensuring for instance, that they were speakers at Collaborative events (interview 
18: community organisation, 2005). 
Thus the Collaborative would be defined by a narrow set of inter-organisational 
relationships, based on strong levels of trust between the staff of organisations 
with strong tum-out capacity, and operating as a multi-issue coalition that 
renegotiated issue priorities over time. However, while the coalition structure 
facilitated tight relationships between staff, organisational members would play 
a more distant role. They would be consulted and mobilised in Collaborative 
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campaigns through the participant organisations, but not through ongoing 
localised coalition bodies (broker organisations) across the rank and file of the 
organisations. 
3.0 The Living Wage Campaigns: 2002-2006 
• 
The Living Wage campaigns had a dual strategy, using two arms of social power: 
an organising strategy to win collective bargaining rights and a coalition strategy 
focused on social policy. These campaigns built on the Collaborative's 
foundations of relational bonds and inter-organisational trust to create a new 
type of coalition capacity, well suited to the hostile US climate. 
The case study is divided into two sections. It firstly focuses on organising for a 
living wage and SEIU 880's strategies for organising state-subsidised homecare 
and childcare workers. Secondly, it analyses the Living Wage campaign for 
workers in 'big box' retail stores which developed out of a difficult campaign 
against Wal-Mart in Chicago. 
3.1 Organising for living wages 
The living wage campaigns for homecare and childcare workers were developed 
and run by SEIU 880. While formally separate from the Collaborative, SEIU 880's 
campaign directly connected to the Collaborative's living wage agenda -
borrowing and adapting the original living wage message to support its 
organising goals. Similarly, the organising campaign and its ad hoc coalitions 
exhibited the mobilising coalition unionism model, with a centrally directed 
organising strategy that activated union members on a broad range of issues but 
did not create local structures that handed over control for decentralised decision 
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making. The organising campaigns are presented in three sections, firstly 
exploring the origins of the SEIU's organising model, secondly the Living Wage 
campaign for homecare workers and finally the Living Wage campaign for 
chilflcare workers. 
• 
3.1.1 The Origins of SEIU Local 880' s Organising Strategy 
Since the mid-1980s, SEIU 880 had developed an integrated organising and 
political strategy to represent and bargain for homecare workers. While a 
combined political and organising strategy was commonplace in countries with 
histories of labour parties (such as the United Kingdom or Australia), it was 
unusual for the United States, where bargaining focused on the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) and not on the political arena. This new political 
organising strategy created an enduring capacity for SEIU 880 to engage in ad 
hoc alliance work with community allies that were connected to its 
organisational self-interest and the interests of its partners. At the same time, the 
strategy was state-scaled and relied heavily on full-time staff organisers. 
SEIU 880 began organising low-wage service workers in the 'homecare industry' 
(Kelleher 2005). Homecare grew in the late 1970s as health care de-
institutionalised through a combination of reductions in publicly funded nursing 
homes and hospitals, and federal policies such as Medicaid Waivers, which 
allowed people to claim for care in their home (Feldman, Sapienza and Kane 
1990; Kelleher 2005; BLS 2006; Shirk 2006). This prompted states to establish 'in-
home' care programs. In Illinois, the largest number of workers operated as 
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public homecare providers funded by the Illinois Department of Rehabilitation 
(Kelleher 2005; Shirk 2006).31 
The challenges of organising public homecare workers, combined with the SEIU 
880's unusual history, saw the union develop a distinct organising model focused 
• 
simultaneously on new member organising and political action. Political action 
was necessary because the employer was the state. Yet public homecare workers 
were not classified as employees according to NLRB, thus state intervention was 
required to enable collective bargaining.32 The union's status changed during 
different Illinois State Administrations. Limited recognition was won in 1994 but 
withdrawn in 1997 (Kelleher 2005, p. 47). To organise the industry, SEIU 880 
developed an inside/outside organising strategy - working 'inside' to build the 
union by using organisers to build density while working 'outside' against the 
state and with the community to increase wages and win recognition rights. 
This inside/outside strategy created space for ad hoc alliance work with 
community partners and other unions. Alliances provided a source of influence. 
As one organiser described it: 'it helps you with the politicians who see you 
working together with the consumers, it gets them a little nervous' (interview 40: 
SEIU 880, 2006). The union developed a variety of 'consumer' relationships, 
including with ADAPT (American Disabled for Attendant and Programs Today), 
31 There were two types of homecare workers. Firstly, a state-based public model, where seniors with a 
disability hired homecare workers and the state financed the cost of care and worker wages. Secondly, a 
private sector model, where the city council or state subcontracted homecare services to private companies 
who made a bid on the work then hired, trained and assigned workers who provided the services- usually 
on an hourly basis. 
32 The State Labor Relations Board made a determination in 1985 that because the work of homecare workers 
was directed by the client/consumer on many of the day to day supervisory tasks, that the state was merely 
a 'co-employee' of the worker, and thus the worker was not afforded the protections and collective 
bargaining rights of the State Labor Act. 
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Metro Seniors in Action and the Jane Adams Senior Caucus (interview 40, SEIU 
880, 2006). These consumer organisations similarly described their union 
relationships as 'a natural alignment . . . so many seniors are in touch with 
hornecare workers' (interview 43: community organisation, 2006). The 
relationships went beyond instrumental need; they were about sustaining trust 
• 
over time. As one union official described it: the campaigns 'sometimes had to 
do with hornecare consumer issues but other activity had nothing to do with 
hornecare at all' (interview 40: SEIU 880, 2006). The union was willing to engage 
in broad relationships related to the union's vision. 'The union has always 
believed in multi-issue ... it's not just about wages and conditions' (interview 40: 
SEIU 880, 2006). 
Engaging in ad hoc alliances and taking political action required growing the 
-capacity of an internal membership to anchor coalition work. The union 
undertook regular lobbying trips to Springfield (Illinois's capital) with dual 
goals: to win political victories while 'empowering' member leaders (interview 
40: SEIU 880, 2006). Similarly, the alliances hinged off an organising model that 
relied on trained staff organisers to grow the number of union members rapidly, 
in a growing industry with high worker turnover (Kelleher 2005).33 Organisers 
predominantly carne from outside the union, particularly amongst progressive 
college students (interview 5: community organisation, 2005; interview 10: SEIU, 
2005). Using employee lists obtained from the state, non-union workers were 
identified by zipcode, and organisers had targets of recruiting between thirty and 
fifty new members per month through cold-call door-knocking, using a standard 
organising script (interview 2: union, 2005; interview 10: union, 2005). 
"Even by 1990, there were 7000 publicly funded Department of Rehabilitation Service workers. 
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Organisers were then responsible for leadership development through zipcode-
based neighbourhood meetings, where members were encouraged to do phone-
banking and door-knocking (interview 15: SEIU 880, 2005). Additionally, the 
union organised regular 'workers organising workers' (WOW) training sessions 
for members on door-knocking and lobbying (interview 33: SEIU 880, 2006) . 
• 
The mutually reinforcing, centrally-scaled political-community organising 
strategy created wage outcomes and growth during the 1990s (SEIU 880 1994; 
Kelleher 2005).34 Political successes reinforced state-scale organising when the 
union won the right to representation, dues check-off (which allowed the union 
to collect union fees through workers' pay cheques), and a system of 'fair share' 
where the union could charge non-union members a fee that was the 'fair share' 
of the costs of representation incurred by the union. A limitation of this strategy 
was demonstrated in 1998 when the union lost its fair share agreement. 
Membership fell by 4000 members in two months (Kelleher 2005). 
Internal union solidarity was also shaped by union member's relatively similar 
identity and the isolated work they performed in people's homes. Most of the 
union members were women, most identifying as Christian, and over 55% were 
African American. The union created collective experiences that built off this 
identity. Union meetings began with a prayer, and were punctuated by chanting 
and singing (participant observation, member meeting Sept 2005). Member 
leaders confirmed the importance of faith to their union commitment; one stated 
'SEIU are here to deliver us, honestly', and 'the people in this union are blessed' 
34 From 1990 to 1994, after organiser targets were introduced, the union grew by 5000 net new public 
homecare members, which escalated further between 1994 to 1997 with limited union recognition by the 
state. 
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(interview 32: SEIU 880, 2006). The collective experience of the union was highly 
valued by people who work alone, as another rank and file leader expressed: 
'you don't have anyone to talk to who has the same problems as you and I didn't 
know that there were so many women that were going through this ... I needed 
to know that I was not alone' (interview 33: SEIU 880, 2006). 
• 
3.1.2 Living Wages for Homecare Workers 
To win collective bargaining rights and a living wage for homecare workers, the 
SEIU 880 engaged in a two-pronged coalition campaign. Firstly, an electoral 
political campaign in coalition with the other SEIU locals, and, secondly, a 
community lobbying strategy in coalition with its community partners in the 
Grassroots Collaborative. 
SEIU Local 880's participation in a comprehensive political campaign to win 
collective bargaining rights developed in response to a. weak Republican 
administration in Illinois and an SEIU restructure. At the request of SEIU 
International, the Illinois SEIU State Council was completing a major restructure 
(interview 25: SEIU, 2006). It had supported its locals to shift to five industry 
unions, and now moved to increase the political capacity of the union 'to create 
some economies of scale' about 'how to do politics' (interview 25: SEIU, 2006). 
The State Council hired a team of 'political campaign professionals' to enhance 
the political capacity of the union in running its electoral strategy (interview 24: 
SEIU, 2005). These professionals became political bridge builders, developing a 
union political campaign while using personal relationships to support SEIU' s 
political influence. 
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The State Council's restructure, led by its new President Torn Balanoff, gave the 
SEIU Council the political capacity to do what SEIU 880 had 'pioneered' 
(interview 34: SEIU, 2006). A key element of the political strategy was the 
involvement of members, taking it away from what one SEIU 880 person 
described as: 
• 
The insiders' game . . . the business unionist practice of 'I am now a 
respected union leader, I can wear a nice suit and we can talk rationally 
with the politicians as opposed to member mass action' (interview 40: 
SEIU 880, 2006). 
The centralisation of financial resources created a union coalition capable of 
influencing the 2002 election. The State Council had always existed, but its focus 
dramatically shifted. It increased the per capitation fee from 25 cents per 
member per month to $2. It changed its meeting style, to be 'more wide open, 
more discussion, more debate on the issues ... of course, if there were big issues 
someone preps you beforehand, but it was no more "all in favour, yes'" 
(interview 51: union, 2006). 
Over December 2001 and January 2002, the State Council began coordinating its 
State Election campaign by asking locals to prioritise their election issues, with 
all candidates in the Democratic primary asked to complete questionnaires. The 
only candidate to support the SEIU's questionnaire in full was Rod Blagojevich. 
The most far-reaching demands carne from SEIU 880, and included executive 
orders for hornecare and childcare workers that would recognise the union as a 
collective bargaining agent. This was broadly supported, firstly by the State 
Council and then by the internal decision-making bodies of the locals (SEIU 880 
2002a). It was in keeping with the Council's goals - as one SEIU 880 official 
noted: 'growing the union was considered the biggest priority'- but it did result 
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in differing levels of SEIU local commitment to the campaign (interview 10, SEIU 
880, 2005). As an official from one local described 'a State Council is a function of 
the pieces ... if a local can't build consensus or support, it plays out in how much 
they contribute to the campaign' (interview 34: SEIU, 2006). 
• In early 2002, the SEIU's primary campaign was directed by the new political 
professionals and operated at a centralised state-scale. The Council's campaign 
was closely 'integrated' with the Blagojevich campaign (interview 24: SEIU, 
2005). The goal was to maximise internal union support for Blagojevich by 
turning out union members to vote in the primary. The strategy required the 
union to build member commitment for Blagojevich' s candidacy, then develop 
an organisational capacity to tum out members. 
Building support for Blagojevich required the union to negotiate the competing 
interests of union,-class and racial identity. According to one official, some locals 
faced 'resistance to Blagojevich primarily based on race' (interview 34: SEIU, 
2006). This was difficult, according to another official, when 'there was an 
African American running, and a lot of our members are African American' 
(interview 25: SEIU, 2005). However, the union put to its members that when the 
'African American candidate had been the Attorney General, he had resisted 
unionisation while in office' (interview 25: SEIU, 2005). The SEIU argued that a 
candidate's union commitment was more important than a candidate's racial 
identity. It was effective. As one rank and file African American leader put it: 
'Blagojevich was a man for working families and homecare which is more than 
just a person who is black' (interview 38: SEIU 880, 2006). 
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The March primary campaign required the mobilisation of SEIU members to vote 
for Blagojevich in the primary. The strategy had two arms, a centralised 
communications centre (call centre) which contacted members, and a door-
knocking strategy. The centralisation of the strategy required all voters to be 
quantified; it involved contacting union members and 'converting' them into 
• 
supporters (interview 24: SEIU, 2005). 
SEIU 880 was very involved at a staff and membership level, using the election to 
increase its number of member leaders. It appointed an organiser to coordinate 
the SEIU State Council's door-knocking canvas on the South Side, where SEIU 
has about 10-15000 members, and SEIU 880 had around 2000 members (interview 
14: SEIU 880, 2005). Additionally, member leaders volunteered, with SEIU 880 
providing 'probably 150 members that were regularly going out door-knocking 
and doing phone calls during the week and every weekend during the 
campaign' (interview 11: SEIU 880, 2005). 
The primary campaign was a success, both for Blagojevich, who won narrowly, 
and for SEIU. SEIU believed its contribution was decisive: 'he was elected by 20 
000 votes and we delivered 25 000 ... we delivered more votes for Blagojevich 
than any political organisation' (interview 24: SEIU, 2005). State-scaled 
integration between the Blagojevich campaign and the SEIU State Council 
continued through the November general election which focused on the 
population at large, with the political bridge builders directing the tactics that 
maximised the recognition and responsibility of the SEIU within the Blagojevich 
campaign. 
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The November election shifted the political target to the broad public instead of 
union members. In tum, it reduced the SEIU's capacity for member 
development by introducing the 'slash and bum' techniques that are familiar to 
political campaigning (interview 36: SEIU, 2005). For instance, the union 
provided members for weekly media events 'when we got a call for say fifty 
bodies', staged solely for the media, not for member development (interview 24: 
SEIU, 2005). Additionally, SEIU ran the entire Blagojevich campaign in a 
congressional district. However, just because the campaign work was local, it 
did not necessarily enhance member control over the activity. Volunteers played 
a key role in contacting voters, but what they did and when they did it was 
centrally controlled (interview 24, SEIU, 2005). The shifting of the target to the 
general public also required less effort and political engagement by member 
volunteers. As one organiser said: 'you are giving somebody a two-minute rap 
on the candidate and then you are rolling on' (interview 34: SEIU, 2006). 
"' 
The activities of phone-banking and door-knocking were used together with 
differing effect. As one organiser compared them, 'house calling is the most 
effective tool we have for building leadership, but it can be a futile event because 
people are often not home ... if you work the phones you talk to a lot more 
people', for political effectiveness 'the two work well together' (interview 34: 
SEIU, 2006). However, for member development the greatest power was in the 
face to face contact. As one steward described it 'you are looking into their face 
and you can see the despair in their eyes, you can see the need' (interview 33: 
SEIU 880, 2006). Door-knocking also helped remedy a lack of confidence, as 
another noted, 'doing the visiting ... I wasn't shy any more, it's like a graduation 
and now I want to create leaders from others ... that's how I felt' (interview 32: 
SEIU 880, 2006). 
294 
During 2001 and 2002, alongside the political campaign that elected Blagojevich, 
SEIU Local 880 continued to engage in alliances with the Collaborative and 
consumer partners to escalate political influence, media awareness and internal 
union growth to win living wages for homecare workers. Yet, as the 
relationships became increasingly tied to the SEIU's core concerns for organising 
rights, the coalition activity became increasingly union-led. ~ 
SEIU 880's alliance work focused on political lobbying work around homecare 
rights and regulating the homecare industry. SEIU 880 initiated a homecare Bill 
of Rights, where allies endorsed SEIU 880 demands and supported lobby days 
(SEIU 880 2001a; SEIU 880 2001b). The union's message focused on living wages 
because, as one organiser put it: living wages 'had become very entrenched in the 
minds of the members and the idea of a living wage, the righteousness of the 
idea was so broad' (interview 10: union, 2005). SEIU 880 also joined the industry-
wide Community Care Alliance in 2002, along with Metro Seniors, the Jane 
Adams Seniors Caucus, Progress Centre for Independent Living, Access Living 
and ADAPT (interview 43: community organisation, 2006). This alliance lobbied 
for better conditions for the consumers, and indirectly improved conditions of 
workers. As one community organiser noted, the alliance supported 'more jobs 
for homecare workers' (interview 43: community organisation, 2006). 
SEIU 880 also worked on two broader issue-based coalitions. Firstly, in 2002 in 
coalition with the ACORN-led Coalition for Jobs and Living Wages, it 
campaigned for an annual cost of living adjustment for the 1998 Living Wage 
Ordinance. SEIU 880 supported rallies throughout the year, and in August along 
with the SEIU State Council it led successful negotiations with the City Council 
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(SEIU 880 2002b). Secondly, it worked with the Collaborative on a campaign 
around the State Budget that culminated in a 5000-person rally in Springfield. 
The Budget campaign was a Collaborative initiative, designed as a multi-issue 
event focused on the common theme of a 'people's budget' (interview 6: 
community organisation, 2005). The diversity of the issues at the rally, according 
• 
to one organiser, provided 'a good way to educate about other people's issues', 
while committing organisations to the event via their organisational self-interest 
(interview 21: community organisation, 2006). 
Asthe election approached, SEIU 880's coalition work became more focused on 
its own needs. Within the Collaborative this was treated 'pragmatically', as the 
requests were based on years of trust and strong personal relationships. As one 
organisation member commented: 
The SEIUhad the most strength, so the rest of the Collaborative members, 
we had' to support that, and when the SEIU needed something from us-
and I remember getting calls saying can you guys come to a 
demonstration or some meeting ... we would bring a couple of people 
along ... we would try to participate at critical points .. but they were 
really the heavy lifters (interview 8: community organisation, 2005). 
Organisational interest in the homecare Living Wage campaign directly shaped 
the decision-making process. This was an SEIU 880-led Living Wage campaign 
where the SEIU 880 was decision maker. This did not exclude other ad hoc 
alliance work, such as the 'people's budget rally' but when the union was 
campaigning on its issues, it led the decision making. 
The combined political and community campaigns elected Governor Blagojevich, 
translating SEIU's electoral campaign into political power. According to the 
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State Council, the key to translating electoral activity into political power was the 
integration of the SEIU with the Blagojevich campaign team, because this 
allowed them to 'directly impact the race ... the Blagojevich people know what 
we did for them on a daily basis' (interview 24: SEIU, 2005). This proximity came 
from a shared scale of operation and the presence of union political bridge 
• builders, where the SEIU' s professional staff and the Governor's team worked 
across the same space, using similar methods and 'spoke the same language' 
(interview 24: SEIU, 2005). Consequently SEIU's political power grew. As one 
official commented, SEIU became the 'single strongest political operation in 
Illinois' (interview 25: SEIU, 2005). 
More liveable wages for hornecare workers followed. SEIU 880 won collective 
bargaining rights in February 2003 (interview 5: community organisation, 2005). 
It formed a bargaining committee of homecare leaders and successfully won its 
first contract. 
Overal!, while the union's centralised political campaign created political and 
organising outcomes, there were limitations in member development and 
decision making given the short-term electoral priorities. The strengths and 
limitations of the staff-directed, centrally-run political strategy intensified as 
SEIU 880 shifted to its collective bargaining campaign for childcare workers. 
3.1.2 Living Wage for Home Childcare Workers 
Building on its past success, SEIU 880 ran a Living Wage campaign for horne 
childcare workers. SEIU 880 had been organising home child care workers since 
1996, and the 2002 electoral victory created an opportunity for childcare 
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collective bargaining rights. Despite the remarkable achievement of winning 
recognition rights for 49 000 childcare workers in 2005, there were limitations in 
this campaign. Victory delivered only weak rank and file structures amongst the 
home childcare members. While paid staff were crucial for organising the large 
numbers of union members, a dependence on staff limited member development 
• 
during the campaign. 
SEIU 880's childcare organising began well before the 2005 recognition election. 
In 1996 the union deployed its first home childcare organiser. Home childcare 
was a growing industry that expanded as the Clinton Administration's federal 
welfare reform program pushed welfare recipients into work, and the State of 
Illinois began subsidising home childcare for working parents (LUC 1998; 
Anderson and Ramsburg 2003; Kelleher 2005).35 Work was based in the home, 
with pay as low as $9.48 per day (interview 11: SEIU 880, 2005). There were two 
classifications. for home child care providers: the more stable and regulated 
'licensed' providers, and the more temporary 'license-exempt' providers (IDHS 
2004). Unlicensed providers made up approximately 43 000 of the 49 000 
workers and were highly mobile and insecure, with between 50-70% of the 
workers moving out of the industry every year (Kelleher 2005). The work was 
also demanding, with many providers working twelve-hour days during the 
week and during the weekend (interview 33: SEIU 880, 2006). 
35 Home child care evolved out of federal welfare reform in 1996 which pushed welfare recipients into work, 
thus creating a widespread demand for inexpensive child care. The State of Illinois allocated childcare 
funding as part of its welfare budget in 1997 in a policy called Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF). 
This policy replaced a program of welfare which was just payment-based, without 'mutual responsibility', 
called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). 
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The organising strategy included coalition building, initially focusing on 
provider associations and relationships with parents. Some providers were 
already organised into provider associations, such as Latina Childcare Providers 
in Action. However, within these organisations there was a suspicion of unions. 
As one member put it, 'I was worried about the mafia' (interview 50: SEIU 880, 
• 
2006). However, once one to one organising produced union supporters, SEIU 
used the provider organisations as a base for recruitment (interview 32: SEIU 
880, 2006). The workers also had close relationships with the parents, who were 
regularly mobilised to support the union at lobby events (interview 33: SEIU 880, 
2006). 
In 2004, the alliance campaign moved public with the aim of winning food 
subsidies for unlicensed childcare. SEIU 880 formed a coalition with the IHC, an 
organisation it had met through the Grassroots Collaborative (interview 11: SEIU 
880, 2005). The"alliance worked because, from the SEIU's perspective, the IHC 
brought 'their connections to the government, the relationships and the policy', 
and the union brought 'the pressure ... the visible population that was going to 
be affected ... that we could move' (interview 11: SEIU 880, 2005). 
However, the primary element of the organising strategy was, as SEIU 880 
organisers described, an unprecedented, escalating, staff-led new member 
contact plan (interviews 10, 11, 14, 15: SEIU 880, 2005). Between 1996 and 2003 
organising moved slowly, and the union focused on building a core group of 
home childcare activists who took on door-knocking and phone-calling other 
providers about the union and lobbying in Springfield (Lasslo 2005). However, 
after the 2003 election, with the possibility of an executive order and collective 
bargaining rights for child care workers, the union's focus turned to getting new 
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members to sign union authorisation cards rather than to member development. 
Before February 2005, when the Governor signed an executive order and a 
recognition election was called, SEIU 880 needed an 'interest showing' at the 
State Labor Election board, requiring the union to demonstrate that a proportion 
of the membership wanted to join the union. To do this, SEIU needed union 
• 
authorisation cards from 10% of the 50 000 person workforce (Kelleher 2005). 
The authorisation cards strategy was run by staff, involving seven senior staff 
managing over fifty new organisers and twenty college student interns; joined by 
dozens of rank and file volunteers (interview 11: SEIU 880, 2005). 
Compounding SEIU 880' s organising challenge, in February 2005, American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), another large 
public sector union, decided to also seek union recognition. AFSCME 
acknowledged in a hearing before the AFL-CIO that their organising work 
amongst child care providers 'did not commence in earnest' until after the 
executive order had been made (Williams 2005). AFSCME 'spent a lot of 
resources' to get on the recognition ballot, (interview 16: AFSMCE, 2005). 
AFSCME represented childcare workers in other states, and argued that they had 
a right to representation (Williams 2005). But, for SEIU 880, the AFSCME 
recognition contest was a union raid (interview 2: SEIU 880, 2005). 
Union competition had some traction in home childcare, given the challenges 
involved in organising these workers. Unlicensed childcare workers moved 
quickly in and out of work and the long work hours were often undertaken 
alone. Consequently, home childcare workers were difficult to organise into a 
sustained union relationship. While many new members between 1996 and 2003 
were developed into a core group of union activists and participated in union 
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campaigns and member meetings, new member development was a secondary 
priority after 2003. The organising strategy focused on a single contact with 
potential members at their homes, and a lack of permanent local rank and file 
union structures meant that new members had to attend centrally coordinated 
monthly meetings in order to participate. The focus on new authorisation cards 
• limited member development during the Recognition campaign. Thus, in July 
2005, three months after the Recognition campaign had ended, there were less 
than twenty stewards amongst the childcare activists, and no more than fifty 
·>' 
childcare workers who regularly attended union monthly meetings (interview 
55: SEIU 880, 2005). This combination of factors limited union engagement 
amongst new union members, making space for AFSCME to challenge for 
jurisdiction. 
The 2005 Recognition campaign was one of the most intense staff-driven union 
election campaigns in United States union history. SEIU Local880, with support 
from the SEIU International, overwhelmed the AFSCME challenge. SEIU 
International organised for fifty SEIU locals from around the United States to 
pledge a total of 600 organisers for the election, combined with another 100 
organisers from the Change to Win Federation partners in Illinois and ACORN 
(Kelleher 2005). As one childcare worker described it: 'it was like a platoon', as 
from mid-March to 6 April, these organisers went door to door from Sam to 9pm; 
on some days, the union knocked on over 20 000 doors and visited 4000 
providers (Kelleher 2005; interview 10: SEIU 880, 2005). AFSCME was forced to 
withdraw before the election was completed because of a ruling by the AFL-CIO 
(Franklin 2005; Knowles 2005b). This withdrawal, in combination with the SEIU's 
intense door-knocking campaign, saw it win recognition. SEIU's victory was 
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significant with 87% voting in favour of SEIU. Yet given the intensity of member 
contacting, a surprising small number of people voted: 16 000 out of 50 000. 
In one of the larger union recognition victories in the United States, SEIU 880 
won union representation for 49 000 workers. However, the campaign did not 
deliver a strong base of stewards. Indeed, in interviews held in July 2005, 
organisers noted that they had only 'about thirty stewards' amongst 50 000 
providers (interview 14: SEIU 880, 2005). Home childcare worker participation in 
the monthly meetings was significantly smaller than amongst the homecare 
worker population (participant observation September 2005; interview 55: SEIU 
880, 2005). The rapid increase in the number of SEIU 880's union members 
delivered a weakened capacity to mobilise its member base: the union has 
struggled to keep up its high levels of tum-out (which amount to between 7 and 
10% of union members per year) (interview 56: SEIU 880, 2006).36 Despite these 
difficulties, between May and December 2005, a bargaining committee of around 
fifty childcare providers was formed, which consulted members, then led 
negotiations with the state. Home childcare workers received their first contract, 
a step closer to a living wage, in December 2005 (interview 33: SEIU 880, 2006). 
3.2 Policy routes to living wages 
Alongside SEIU 880, the Grassroots Collaborative undertook campaigns for 
living wages between 2002 and 2006. As organisations representing the low-
wage, working poor and homeless, the Collaborative campaigned for legislative 
36 Over the last five years, internal SEIU 880 statistics on member turn-out reveal that in 2002 the union 
mobilised approximately 10% of the union membership, falling to 7% in 2006. The statistic for 2006 only 
includes full members, and not fair share members. This makes the proportion of tum-out significantly 
lower if all new union representees are included. 
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changes that would affect the entire population. SEIU 880 was an active 
participant in these campaigns, a practical application of its testament to its 
identity and ideological belief in 'redistributing power ... by not just doing our 
campaigns, but campaigning for everybody' (interview 13: SEIU 880, 2005). 
The focus of this section is on two campaigns initiated after Wal-Mart's pr~osed 
entry into Chicago. Firstly, the Collaborative supported a UFCW campaign of 
'site fights' to block zoning changes that would allow Wal-Mart to build in 
Chic:ago. Secondly, after this did not stop Wal-Mart, it launched a Living Wage 
Ordinance for all big box workers, that proposed a minimum standard for large 
retailers in the City of Chicago (New York Times Editorial2006). 
These campaigns were rooted in the established strategy of living wage activism 
created by the 1995-8 Living Wage campaign, and sustained through ACORN-
led campaigns i~ 2002 and 2003 around living wages and a state minimum wage. 
The cost ofliving indexation campaign in 2002 was 'played smarter' than the first 
campaign, harnessing the importance of timing and staging it in an election year 
(interview 18: community organisation, 2005). The minimum wage campaign 
was won through a combination of supportive relationships with organised 
labour and direct action by ACORN in the Illinois House. 
This section discusses the No Wal-Mart campaign and the 'big box' Living Wage 
campaign. They are discussed together because they are linked, as many of the 
weaknesses identified by organisers in the Wal-Mart site fights led to strengths in 
the Living Wage campaign. 
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3.2.1 No Wal-Mart in Chicago, Tune 2003 to May 2004 
As almost all coalition participants openly acknowledged, and later strove to 
correct, there were weaknesses in the campaign against Wal-Mart. It was 
organised using a weak set of inter-organisational relationships that hamstrung 
planning and message development. The centralised organisatioPI. of the 
campaign limited its locally-scaled capacity. The lack of locally-based opposition 
to Wal-Mart allowed Wal-Mart to divide the community on issues of race, and 
successfully gain approval for one Wal-Mart store in Chicago. 
When Wal-Mart announced that it was planning a mega-store in the City of 
Chicago, it created a widespread crisis and potential opportunity for the key 
retail union - the UFCW (Alexander 2003; Yue 2003; New York Times Editorial 
2006). The crisis was inspired by the magnitude of the threat that Wal-Mart 
posed to the union. Unlike under Keynesianism, where the largest employer was 
the unionised General Motors, in 2004 Wal-Mart was the largest employer in the 
US and a 'template business' setting standards for non-union employment 
(Lichtenstein 2006a, p. 4). Wal-Mart's strident opposition to unions threatened 
the very viability of the UFCW: in 2003 and 2005 it shut down stores in Texas and 
Quebec when unions won recognition (Greenhouse 2003; Austen 2005; Rathke 
2006). Yet as one UFCW organiser described, the crisis, while severe also 
created an opportunity: 'we are now faced with the biggest threat ever ... we 
either do this or we start putting our resumes together and help our members to 
change careers' (interview 66: UFCW, 2006). 
From the start, the UFCW's campaign against Wal-Mart reacted to Wal-Mart's 
proactive agenda. Since 2000, Wal-Mart's growth strategy was to enter 'blue' 
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(liberal Democrat) areas, and build stores within city limits rather than just in the 
suburbs (Olivo 2004; Yersk 2004).37 In 2003, Wal-Mart pre-emptively pinpointed 
the location of its main site and its necessary political allies (Yue 2003; Coates 
2005). Wal-Mart had a 'place-specific strategy': selecting a site on the West Side 
of Chicago in an economically depressed area, with high unemployment 
• 
amongst a largely poor African American community to which it could 'bring 
economic development' (Olivo 2004). Alderman Mitts, the local representative, 
was approached by Wal-Mart in early 2003 about a Wal-Mart in the area, and 
from the outset she was a champion of the development (Coates 2005). 
' 
Nationally, the UFCW had been engaged in ad hoc campaigns against Wal-Mart 
since 2002, when it held its first anti-Wal-Mart rally (AFL-CIO 2002). The UFCW 
was aware that Wal-Mart's entry into Chicago would directly affect it; in 
California, Wal-Mart's presence eventually triggered the 2003 aborted retail 
strike where Wal-Mart's low standards drove down health care standards and 
wages across the unionised parts of the industry (Lichtenstein 2006a; interview 
20: union, 2005). When Wal-Mart announced its Chicago plans in July 2003, the 
UFCW Local 881 immediately responded in opposition. However, as a more 
traditional business union, relatively inexperienced with broad coalition 
campaigns, the UFCW was unprepared. As one official said: 'honestly, we 
thought we would put up a fight and see where it takes us' (interview 20: union, 
2005). 
37 The 'suburbs' has a different meaning in the US than in Australia, because the suburbs are defined as the 
areas outside the 'city limits', that is outside the City of Chicago Council area. In 2006, the 'City' of Chicago 
had a population of approximately 2.7 million (2.8 million including Cook County). But, when combined 
with the 'suburbs' the population of the Chicago metropolitan area was 5.3 million. Over the last 30 years, 
businesses have sought to develop in the suburbs to 'escape' city taxes, contributing to the problem of 
hollowed out cities (LeRoy 1997). 
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The UFCW developed a reactive strategy. The goal was to fight Wal-Mart 
through the City Council, calling on aldermen to vote against a zoning proposal 
that would allow Wal-Mart to build its store. Similarly, the public message was 
of opposition: 'we just wanted to stop them and hold on to our market share in 
Chicago', which evolved into messages on placards that said 'No Wal-Mart in 
• Chicago', used at all the rallies and events during the Wal-Mart site fight 
campaign (Franklin 2004; Mihalopoulos 2004; interview 20: union, 2005; Rathke 
2006). 
The combination of Wal-Mart as an iconic 'bad employer' and the initial 
magnitude of UFCW's fight did allow the UFCW to cultivate some allies. The 
union recognised it 'could not do it on our own ... even if we could have 10 000 
members down at the City Council it would not make a difference' (interview 20: 
union, 2005). The union called on everyone it could find - sending out 
broadcast emails~inviting organisations to open 'coalition' meetings. These hard 
to manage meetings did produce a long list of organisational supporters for the 
campaign, but failed to translate into a commitment of hard numbers of 
protestors at rallies. This prompted the union to target a few partner 
organisations for more concrete support. One such organisation was ACORN, 
who had a relationship with the UFCW from the 1995-1998 Living Wage 
campaign (interview 49: community organisation, 2006). Building off this ad hoc 
connection, UFCW 881's President asked ACORN to support their fight against 
Wal-Mart. 
Most ACORN members were initially opposed to campaigning against Wal-
Mart, and the leadership had to build a constituency against the company by 
educating members about Wal-Mart's anti-social practices. The low-wage 
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membership of ACORN 'went to Wal-Mart, people loved Wal-Mart because they 
had low prices' (interview 49: community organisation, 2006; interview 36: 
community organisation, 2006). ACORN staff and leaders began a member 
education campaign focused on Wal-Mart's anti-social behaviour. Leaders 
educated each other about Wal-Mart's social wrongs such as 'its discriwination 
against women' and 'the persecution of immigrants when immigrant workers 
were locked in a store' (interview 49: community organisation, 2006). 
In early 2004, arising out of ACORN's reports to the Collaborative about Wal-
Mart, a Collaborative retreat decided to join the UFCW' s campaign (interview 8: 
community organisation, 2005). Strategically, Collaborative members believed 
Wal-Mart provided 'a real opportunity to solidify our relationships with some 
unions because they were already engaged' (interview 8: community 
organisation, 2005): 
UFCW's alliance with the Collaborative broadened the UFCW's capacity and 
legitimacy. For the UFCW, the Collaborative provided 'a broad base of support, 
unions are not the most progressive organisations and the Collaborative brought 
a lot of credibility amongst a wider segment of the population' (interview 20: 
union, 2005). 
However, member commitment to the campaign needed to be built, requiring 
internal education campaigns. Aside from ACORN, the strongest education 
campaigns were amongst the unions, where the anti-union threat of Wal-Mart 
provided an organisational connection (interview 40: SEIU 880, 2006). These 
education campaigns attempted to build a constituency of opposition to Wal-
Mart through workplace meetings and education sessions. UFCW engaged its 
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members by getting them to write to local aldermen. Workplace organisers, who 
normally focused on contract negotiations, briefly became political campaigners. 
As one organiser noted: 
We sent our stewards and our union representatives out to the stores with 
a pad of notebook paper and asked members to write letters ... ~ying I 
work and live in X ward and I think Wal-Mart will hurt my job. And that 
was one of the most effective things that we did (interview 20: union, 
2005). 
SEIU 880 undertook a program of awareness-raising through education at 
member meetings. Several SEIU 880 members had formerly worked in retail 
and, as one staff person noted: 'made good spokespeople on the issue' (interview 
40: SEIU 880, 2006). At Saturday meetings, education 'focused on what's bad 
with Wal-Mart', before 'door-knocking around Wal-Mart in the wards' 
(interview 40: SEIU 880, 2006). However, a gap remained that paralleled the 
homecare and, childcare campaign, and contrasts with the Canadian and 
Australian coalitions. While members were engaged through education and 
volunteer work, no decentralised, rank and file decision-making structures were 
established for members to take control in planning the localised parts of the 
campaign. 
Among the organisations, campaign planning was weak. By the time the 
Collaborative entered the campaign, the building blocks of the strategy had been 
assembled by the UFCW. By February 2004, the terrain changed slightly, with a 
Council hearing uncovering that there were now two Wal-Marts proposed for 
Chicago, one on the South Side in addition to the West Side proposal. However, 
as one Collaborative member recalled: the Collaborative 'pretty much bought 
into the UFCW idea of fighting against the location of two Wal-Marts' (interview 
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28: community organisation, 2005). There was a lack of central coordination; as 
one union observer observed: 'there was no one leading, there was no 
coordinated effort whatsoever' (interview 54: union, 2006). Without centralised 
planning, the campaign was left moving from event to event, aiming to attract 
media attention (interview 28: community organisation, 2005). 
• 
The lack of planning led to two key weaknesses - a weak message and little 
multi-scaled capacity. Organisers reflected on the limitation of the 'No-Wal-
Mart' message as a 'negative, reactive message' that did not explain why Wal-
Mart was harmful, which was a problem because Wal-Mart's bargains made 
them popular (interview 36: community organisation, 2006). The message was 
particularly weak in the socio-economically depressed areas where the Wal-
Marts were proposed. As one organiser argued, 'the message we were using was 
that Wal-Mart brings bad jobs, but people weren't interested in fighting Wal-
Mart because they were from communities without any jobs' (interview 4: 
community organisation, 2005). 
As several community organisers emphasised, compounding this message 
weakness was that the primary messengers were white union officials (interview 
29, community organisation, 2005). Inadvertently this supported Wal-Mart's key 
message, which, as one community organiser commented, sought to 'portray 
opposition to their stores as coming from racist trade unions who were trying to 
protect their jobs at the expense of jobs for the low-income black community' 
(interview 4: community organisation, 2005). The idea of racist trade unions had 
traction within Chicago's African American community who had felt excluded 
from construction jobs by some of the building trades unions (Coates 2005). The 
No Wal-Mart message and messengers reinforced a public image that the 
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campaign was 'white labour versus the black community' (interview 27: union, 
2005). 
In May 2004, the City Council's decision on the two Wal-Mart stores was split, 
with the West Side Wal-Mart approved and the South Side blocked 
(Mihalopoulos 2004). Aside from the internal campaign weakness!!s, the 
interviews consistently explained the contrasting outcomes as a result of 
campaign differences at two political scales. Firstly because of different.levels of 
political support at the scale of the Council; and secondly, because of differences 
in the Collaborative's local organisational capacity (interview 4: community 
organisation; interview 14: union; interview 22: alderman; interview 23: 
alderman, 2005). 
At the Council level, the zoning proposal for the West Side Wal-Mart had 
stronger aldermanic support than on the South Side. As one alderman 
confirmed, Council practice is usually for aldermen to 'unanimously approve 
zoning proposals by their colleagues' (interview 23: alderman, 2005). While the 
Wal-Mart campaign sought to upset this precedent, aldermen had the ability to 
organise support across the Council based on aldermanic prerogative. As 
observers noted, Alderman Mitts on the West Side was better organised: 'she did 
her homework, she talked to her fellow members on the Council', attracting 
support on the basis that her area needed local economic development (interview 
20, union, 2005; interview 23: alderman, 2005; Napolitano 2004; Sluris 2004). In 
contrast, as one alderman put it, Brookins on the South Side 'didn't lobby -his 
colleagues ahead of time,' and he was not upfront about the nature of the Wal-
Mart development (interview 23: alderman, 2005). Publicly, aldermen said they 
voted against the South Side proposal 'to teach him a harsh lesson ... for lacking 
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respect for more senior Council members' (Mihalopoulos 2004) Consequently 
several aldermen on the South Side voted for the West Side but not the South 
Side (interview 23: alderman, 2005). 
Added to this, at a local scale the Collaborative had a significantly different 
organisational capacity between the West Side and South Side. Colmborative 
affiliates such as ACORN, SEIU 880 and the BPNC had their membership base on 
the South Side, not the West Side. This capacity gap made opposition easier to 
mobilise on the South Side. As one organiser reflected: there was 'a lot more 
neighbourhood opposition to the South Side store' (interview 4: community 
organisation, 2005). Similarly, door-knocking and a public hearing organised by 
Jobs with Justice were all on the South Side (interview 36: community 
organisation, 2006; interview 12: community organisation, 2005). Outreach to 
local organisations was also only undertaken on the South Side, with BPNC 
targeting srnaUbusinesses (interview 9: community organisation, 2005). 
In general, a key weakness in the No Wal-Mart campaign was insufficient 
locally-scaled campaigning in the wards. Door-knocking, as a tactic, targeted 
individuals, not local organisations, and did .. not build an organisational 
constituency of local groups that opposed Wal-Mart. Moreover, the goals of the 
door-knocking were about awareness-raising, not building sustainable broker 
organisations. As one organiser explained: 'we didn't organise them, it was 
mainly doing it for information to get the people aware of that it was corning 
(interview 14: SEIU 880, 2005). Consequently, as one community organiser 
reflected: 'not many local neighbourhood organisations were involved' 
(interview 4: community organisation, 2005). The BPNC did attempt to build a 
local constituency amongst the small business community, which, as it turned 
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out, was very influential. According to one Councillor, the business organising 
was decisive: 'a Jot of aldermen on the South Side said they were being lobbied 
by their business owners in their neighbourhoods who felt that the Wal-Mart 
would pose a threat to their livelihood' (interview 23: alderman, 2005). 
The Collaborative's organising can be contrasted to the local~-scaled 
'strategically grounded work of Wal-Mart' on the West Side (interview 27: union, 
2005). As one union organiser observed, through the support of Alderman Mitts, 
Wal-Mart 'built a huge coalition of powerful West Side ministers'; Wal-Mart 
'went to individual churches and known leaders on the West Side and offered 
them money ... they said "Reverend we are here to identify some needs in the 
church" and wave a cheque at them' (interview 29: community organisation, 
2005). The media also described Wal-Mart's work as a 'grassroots campaign', 
where Wal-Mart representatives attended and hosted many community 
meetings about its local hiring policy and commitment to jobs and economic 
development (Olivo 2004). 
Despite the weaknesses of the No Wal-Mart campaign, the political opportunity 
of a weak alderman on the South Side, combined with the Collaborative's 
stronger organisational presence on the West Side, tipped the balance in the vote, 
preventing the South Side Wal-Mart gaining approval (interview 23: alderman, 
2005; Washburn 2004). However, even with this partial victory, evaluation of the 
'No Wal-Mart' result was welcome, but reserved. While the UFCW and others 
were pleased at the result, it was widely felt that the campaign had been reactive 
and that the Collaborative needed a new strategy where it 'didn't just fight Wal-
Mart' (interview 28: community organisation, 2005). This desire for a 'next step' 
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led to the idea of proposing a Living Wage Ordinance for all big box stores, 
including Wal-Mart in Chicago (interview 4: community organisation, 2005). 
3.2.2 Living Wage for Big-Box Workers, May 2004 to September 2006 
The Big Box Living Wage campaign, while a product of the No Wal-Mart 
• campaign, was not against Wal-Mart per se. It aimed to pass an ordinance that 
required all big box stores in the city limits to pay their workers a living wage. 
The idea of the Living Wage Ordinance sought to generalise the highest standard 
of big box employment in Chicago. The idea came from Talbott from ACORN, 
and sought to set Costco' s employment standards as city-wide big box standards, 
including a $10 starting wage and health benefits. The Collaborative members 
and UFCW quickly endorsed the idea because it provided the Wal-Mart 
campaign with a next step where they could set the agenda, rather than being 
attacked for opposing Wal-Mart (interview 49: community organisation, 2006). 
Moreover, it overcame many of the misgivings amongst the Collaborative about 
the No Wal-Mart campaign, providing a new direction that built off past 
experience in living wage campaigning. 
A Living Wage Ordinance addressed two key weaknesses in the anti-Wal-Mart 
campaign; its message and its scale. The Living Wage Ordinance shifted from a 
message about 'good jobs and bad jobs', to creating pressure for 'all jobs to be 
living wage jobs' (interview 4: community organisation, 2005). This was 
simultaneously more effective at building member and public commitment. As 
an organising tool, the living wage language was familiar to Collaborative 
members, particularly ACORN and SEIU 880: 'our history on living wages, our 
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members knew what a living wage job was ... there was deep support for a 
living wage' (interview 18: community organisation, 2005). The public message 
about living wages also was 'a positive, popular' public social frame, 'about jobs 
with benefits' creating rights and 'safeguards' (interview 36: community 
organisation, 2005; interview 23: alderman, 2005). It helped the Collaborative put 
retailers on the defensive (New York Times Editorial 2006), and its pPSitive 
enfranchising moral claim made aldermanic opposition difficult (interview 4: 
community organisation, 2005). 
In terms of scale, a city-wide ordinance broadened the campaign from a reactive 
fight against individual locally-scaled stores to setting standards about all big 
box stores in Chicago. It provided a way to effectively fight Wal-Mart's 
incremental strategy of bringing in stores one by one. As one Collaborative 
organiser described: 
It's city-wide, if Wal-Mart wants to bring ten stores into the city, it's going 
to be a tough to fight to win ten times basically on turf that Wal-Mart and 
their friendly aldermen pitch .. .it would be starting out against us ... so 
the great thing about the Living Wage Ordinance is ... it's city-wide so it's 
strategically better for us (interview 4: community organisation, 2005). 
The Living Wage Ordinance changed the scale of the key decision makers, from 
individual aldermen to the council as a whole. As most of the Collaborative's 
organisations are city-wide, that broader scale provided a more ready space to 
build influence. Additionally, the scale shift reinforced the public social frame, 
from being against a company to being for standards in employment (interview 
12: community organisation, 2005). 
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The scale shift changed the timetable for the campaign. While there was 'a sense 
of energy' corning out of the site fight, those with previous living wage 
experience were more cautious. Madeline Talbott emphasised lessons about 
timing, 'we discussed having to wait until election year ... we had done it wrong 
before' (interview, Talbott: ACORN, 2006). 
• 
A long lead time created opportunities for slowly building strong organisational 
relationships beyond the Collaborative that could leverage political power in the 
wards. To do this, the Collaborative undertook four structural reforms: firstly, 
hiring a new coordinator; secondly, developing new ad hoc relationships with 
community organisations and unions; thirdly, mapping supportive, neutral and 
hostile aldermen across the City Council and fourthly, creating a new issue-
based coalition called the Living Wage Coalition. 
In late 2004, the Collaborative hired a new coordinator, which created space for 
strategic reflection, capacity building and a new campaign strategy. The new 
coordinator, solely dedicated to coalition work, identified the scale and message 
weaknesses of the previous campaign. Internally, the Collaborative developed 
its base by running a series of speaker trainings with (rank and file) leaders from 
its affiliate organisations 'around our new message' who could present a more 
diverse public face for the Living Wage campaign' (interview 4: community 
organisation, 2005). 
Then, in early 2005 the Collaborative actively worked to build its supportbase 
amongst local neighbourhood organisations and unions. This was the work of 
the new coordinator, Ken Synder: 
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When I started I did a lot of work going out to the local neighbourhood 
organisations ... I identified consistencies in their neighbourhoods and 
talked to them about the Living Wage Ordinance and found out their level 
of interest (interview 4: community organisation, 2005). 
This mapping exercise was then tested using the tool of a low intensity multi-
scaled postcard campaign. For a six-month period, supportive org~isations 
were asked to get their members to get postcards signed. Postcards included 
address details, and could be used to map signatories by ward (participant 
observation, 2005). It simultaneously engaged members while developing 
pressure for lobbying aldermen. As one community organiser described it: 
It was a critical step in transitioning the campaign from the planning 
stages .... it went from where a pastor was interested to a place where the 
whole congregation could show their support (interview 35: community 
organisation, 2006). 
Between August 2005 and February 2006 the Collaborative collected 10 000 cards, 
which helped galvanise the support of allies, particularly amongst organised 
labour: 'because they understood that if they moved on this there would be 
broad community support' (interview 35: community organisation, 2006). 
The postcard campaign directly fed into a strategic targeting of the Council. The 
Living Wage campaign moved away from the 'media' focus of the anti-Wal-Mart 
campaign to 'plotting out the fifty aldermen and who is on board, and a strategy 
for how to influence those who are not' (interview 4: community organisation, 
2005). It was a downward shift of scale, where political leverage would be built 
through a 'constituency of supporters' in local wards. As one community 
organiser observed: 'so we can go to an alderman and say "look you've got 356 
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postcards from your community that say they want you to support the Living 
Wage Ordinance'" (interview 4: community organisation, 2005). 
Finally, the growth in ad hoc organisational support required the Collaborative 
to broaden its coalition, forming the Living Wage Coalition in mid-2005 
(participant observation 2005; interview 35: community organisation, 2005). The 
new temporary coalition was led by the Collaborative, which was vital, as one 
union representative commented: 
Having a good facilitator is critically important because if you don't have 
a centralised person or organisation who can really take charge of the 
housekeeping, contacting, its never going to happen ... Ken kept us on 
track and produced output for all of us (interview 46: union, 2006). 
However, while there were more organisations, the Coalition participants were 
all full-time staff, not rank and file leaders, maintaining the Collaborative's 
centrally-scaled, staff-led decision-making practices. 
The new coalition structure allowed the Collaborative to formalise its wider net 
of relationships, while underpinning the more temporary Living Wage Coalition 
with lessons from the Collaborative. New unions, such as the UFCW, SEIU Local 
1 and the CFL joined, along with new community partners. Collaborative 
practices around tum-out became Coalition practices, but some of the 
Collaborative's golden rules were revised. Collaborative representatives 
recognised that a new form of power was essential; organised labour's political 
relationships and in-kind support offered the Coalition a different form of 
power: 
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How many people you can put into a room is important ... but there was 
some valuable stuff being added that didn't have anything to do with that 
... SElU letting us use their phone-bank, the CFL' s lifelong relationships 
with some of these alderman ... it isn't about putting people in a room ... 
but they were probably responsible for a dozen aldermen that they were 
keeping on board . . . it is power in the form of relationships rather than 
numbers or money (interview 35: community organisation, 2006). • 
This relationship power was effective because of the 'context of a campaign ... it 
can't be done in isolation', but as an element of Coalition success it was critical 
(interview 35: community organisation, 2006). 
In March, a new Living Wage Ordinance was introduced into the City Council 
with thirty-three co-sponsors. The campaign then moved public, promoting 
select constituencies at monthly council meetings, with the aim of demonstrating 
a diversity of support (interview 30: union, 2006; interview 35: community 
organisation, 2006). In March, it was the community organisations who turned 
out and helped move the Coalition away from the 'organised labour versus Wal-
Mart' debate that surfaced during the no Wal-Mart campaign. In April, it was 
the unions, whose public and private support remained critical for maintaining 
the backing of the labour aldermen. In April, the Collaborative organised for the 
immigration movement to speak to the Latino aldermen (the March 10 Coalition 
had organised two rallies with over 300 000 people during this period) (interview 
37, UFCW, 2006). Then in June it was religious leaders. 
The religious leaders were a key constituency, as previously Wal-Mart had 
support from key African American Ministers. This time, the Collaborative 
organised early, assisted by two religious bridge builders, Reverend Robin Hood 
from ACORN and a representative from Protestants for the Common Good who 
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built an interfaith alliance organising over forty-five clergy to sign a public 
letter(Chicago Sun Times 24 July 2006). The living wage frame assisted church-
based organising. As one community organiser described it: 'the living wage, 
Catholic social teaching calls it a just wage ... we knew it would have immediate 
appeal' (interview 35: community organisation, 2006). Having ;eligious 
organisers inside the coalition 'was critical' to 'know who to call' and to establish 
'credibility' (interview 44: community organisation, 2006). 
Organisational engagement in the campaign was uneven, and related to 
organisational identity. As one community organiser put it: 'I don't think people 
looked at this campaign from the point of view of self-interest' (interview 35: 
community organisation, 2006). ACORN contributed most to turn-out, because 
'ACORN had built its name around living wages .. . and have a mobilised 
constituency that understands it and is willing to fight around it' (interview 35: 
community organisation, 2006). ACORN also brought in SEIU 880, which 'had a 
history of fighting for living wages for their own members ... they understood it, 
it's a value that they share' (interview 49: community organisation, 2006). 
However, for SEIU 880 to successfully turn out members, they needed to connect 
the living wage concept to the direct concerns of their membership. In March, 
SEIU 880 field staff 'tried a general rap [phone call script] about living wages for 
the city and nobody came, they didn't care enough' (interview 47, SEIU 880, 
2006). Rank and file leaders were not involved in Calition decision making, and 
because these leaders were 'so busy', staff believed that mobilisation messages 
needed to be 'more connected' (interview 33, interview 47: SEIU 880, 2006). The 
rap changed. It began with questions about current workplace campaigns, then 
linked their identity as low-wage workers to the Living Wage Ordinance, 
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arguing: 'if we can set a standard that big box workers should earn $10 a hour, 
then it will make it easier to push wages up in our industry' (interview 47: SEIU 
880, 2006). For the staff, the results were immediate: 'we went from a handful to 
thirty, forty, fifty members turning up' (interview 47: · SEIU 880, 2006). 
Mobilisation increased because members' fates were tied to the success of the 
• Ordinance. 
Across the Coalition, organisational commitment increased after a series of 
aggressive City Council hearings in May. Early on, organisers lamented that the 
Ordinance was not 'taken seriously' by the aldermen, making it hard to organise: 
'it doesn't really feel like a campaign if there is no opposition' (interview 35: 
community organisation, 2006). This changed at a May Council hearing, when 
retailers attacked the Coalition: 
People left· feeling pretty screwed, there was a lot of anger ... but it was a 
change, people bought in, it took an event like that to· get them to say, 
okay this is now when we have to decide whether we are going to 
dedicate the staff, money and resources necessary to win a campaign 
(interview 35: community organisation, 2006). 
After the hearing, several community organisers described the campaign as 
taking on 'a movement feel' (interview 35: community organisation, interview 
49: community organisation, 2006). Meetings became more regular and 
resources immediately increased when several unions committed to fund an 
ACORN-led, Chicago-wide field operation throughout the wards. 
Aldermanic targeting involved a dual-scaled strategy, at the scale of the ward 
and also of the city through the media and labour's aldermanic relationships. 
Timing also varied, with some organisations building public awareness slowly in 
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individual wards, while the field operation and phone-banking rapidly moved 
across twenty-five aldermanic wards. 
To target wards, organisations selected one to three aldermen on the 
simultaneous basis of their own organisational priorities and the living wage 
• 
targets. Then: 'we divided up the list and figured out who had relationships 
with which alderman and let them go after their aldermen' (interview 35: 
community organisation, 2006). For example, Metro Seniors targeted three 
aldermen they had a relationship with, put paid organisers in the field, organised 
constituency meetings and lobbied (interview 43: community organisation, 2006). 
Beyond individual organisations, in one South Side ward a local coalition was 
established. Moises Zavala from the UFCW used his South Side organising 
experience to set up the only local broker organisation in the campaign; a 'team' 
of six member-based organisations in one ward. From May until July, this group 
coordinated 'door-knocking, a lot of phone-banking, talking to members in 
church and a press conference', focused on local issues (interview 37, UFCW, 
2006). Part of the local coalition's power was that the locally-scaled organisations 
'were not going to go away' (interview 37, UFCW, 2006). Despite the alderman 
in the ward being 'very close to Daley', the local coalition organised sufficient 
pressure to keep the alderman's support for all the City Council votes on the 
living wage (interview 37, UFCW, 2006). 
Above the ward strategy, the CFL, UFCW and SEIU State Council operated as 
'the closest thing we had to lobbyists', meeting with the aldermen. The Coalition 
had the personal relationships of the CFL President Dennis Gannon, and the 
'expertise' of the UFCW, who had 'credibility' as the retail union (interview 35: 
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community organisation, 2006). They also had SEIU, who were recognised as a 
powerful electoral force after the 2002 Governor's race. 
Across the wards, the field campaign and phone-banking worked at the same 
pace as the lobbyists. The field campaign was Talbott's idea. She had learnt that 
• 
moving constituents in the ward was the key weapon in shifting aldermen: 
I went up to [a wavering alderman] before the hearing and I said ... we 
are going to have a meeting in your ward ... and he looked terrified. He 
took a position in the hearing . . . just the threat of going into his ward 
moved him over to our side (interview, Talbott: ACORN, 2006). 
The field plan was run by ACORN, who hired a team of organisers who would 
go into twenty-five wards, a mobile unit deployable across swinging wards. It 
door-knocked voters, then passed mobile phones to supporters to call their 
alderman and register their opposition. The breadth was significant; ACORN 
/ .. ,,,_ 
knocked on over 26 000 doors and directly contacted 9837 people in the eight 
weeks before the vote (interview 49: community organisation, 2006). In parallel, 
the Collaborative organised volunteers to use the SEIU State Council phone-bank 
to call constituents in targeted wards to organise voters to contact their aldermen. 
The speed of the field operation and phone-banking was able to keep pace with 
the lobbyists. As Talbott observed: 
We had the union guys on the phones calling the aldermen and as soon as 
they heard someone was weak, they would call us and say ... go to [this 
ward], or we have to send"more into [that ward], and we would. change 
the walk sheets and move that day (interview, Talbott: ACORN, 2006). 
The ward operations and labour lobbying went from June until 26 July, with 'the 
field operation enhancing the pressure exerted by the union relationships. As one 
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organiser commented, it was the combination of 'dinner conversations' and 
'moving numbers in the field' that eventually moved the Ordinance out of 
committee and into the Council meeting for a vote (interview 49: community 
organisation, 2006; interview 46: union,. 2006). 
The media had been dominated by the retailers, but just before the•vote the 
Collaborative developed a media intervention team (Rose 2006). Wal-Mart and 
the retailers could afford mass advertising, targeting black radio arguing that the 
Ordinance would take jobs out of Chicago (Washburn 2006; Spielman 2006a; 
Spielman 2006b ). According to one organiser, 'it was impossible to fight', so the 
Coalition 'just tried to hold our own, trying to make sure that, when they had 
events that our side was covered' (interview 35: community organisation, 2006). 
The media team of rank and file leaders saw the Coalition become visible in the 
media, as the issue grew into a Chicago, then national, media story (Eckholm 
2006). 
Yet. as the stakes rose, tensions between relationship-based organising and more 
aggressive militant organising surfaced between the CFL and the SEIU. Two 
weeks before the Council vote and separate from the Coalition, SEIU State 
Council advertised three aldermanic trainings for candidates interested in 
standing in the 2007 elections. It sent shock waves through the council; from an 
SEIU perspective 'it set fire on the aldermen ... it shook them up' (interview 53: 
union, 2006). However, it upset the CFL, who had stretched the political capital 
of its aldermanic relationships (interview 52, union, 2006). The SEIU' s tactics 
'were a different way of doing politics' that 'looked like a threat', which, from the 
CFL' s perspective put at risk the relationships the CFL had built for the Coalition 
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(interview 52: union, 2005). The tension reflected the potential conflict between 
aggressive militant organising and relationship-based power. 
Just before the vote, Mayor Daley came out against the Ordinance, but this had a 
limited effect. The Daley Machine had been in trouble over the past year some of 
• its participants exposed as corrupt (Mihalopoulos 2006a). According to one 
organiser, where disobedience to the Mayor used to result in losing your seat, the 
ward-based campaign 'made it hard to vote against the living wage, it would be 
political suicide' (interview 35: community organisation, 2006). 
With local and centralised pressure and the opportunities of a weak Daley 
Machine and an upcoming election, on 26 July the Living Wage Ordinance was 
supported by thirty-five Councillors (Eckholm 2006). The 'night before and the 
day of the vote exhibited a pinnacle of social movement activity, with a prayer 
vigil sleep-ov'?r in the downtown First United Methodist Church, a dawn prayer 
service and continuous rallies all day (interview 36: community organisation, 
interview 43: community organisation, 2006). 
But the campaign was not over. After the vote, the Mayor could exercise a veto, 
which would require at least one third of the aldermen to vote in support. 
Immediately retailers swung into a counter-mobilisation, demanding a veto, and 
in August and September the retailers led a mass media campaign, threatening a 
retail withdrawal from Chicago (Chicago Sun Times 1 August 2006; Mihalopoulos 
and Washburn 2006; Spielman 2006c; Spielman 2006d). This placed considerable 
pressure on aldermen who had Development Applications for retail stores 
underway (Davey and Barbaro 2006), even though it did not significantly sway 
popular opinion which remained supportive of the Ordinance (Fomek 2006). 
324 
Mayor Daley also argued that the big box campaign was against the interests of 
African Americans, reclaiming the 'race-card' first used in the 'No-Wal-Mart 
campaign (Ciokajilo 2006; Hussain 2006). 
In response the Coalition 'kept doing what it was already doing', but as 
organisers noted, there were signs of strain - it was becoming 'c»fficult to 
sustain' the campaign (interview 49: community organisation, 2006). The 
reliance on a multi-ward field operation, rather than permanent locally-scaled 
coalition broker organisations, made it difficult to keep up the pressure over a 
long period of time. Supervisors of the field campaign saw limitations, 
particularly that the organisations were being drained of resources (interview 49: 
community organisation, 2006). 
On 11 September 2006 Daley announced he would veto the Ordinance, and on 13 
September there was a Council vote that protected his veto, with three 
councillors shifting their votes (Davey and Barbaro 2006). It was a loss, but it 
occurred in the context of a victorious campaign, as one community organiser 
said, 'we won the vote', and it was the first time that Daley had been forced to a 
veto in seventeen years (interview 36: community organisation, 2006). 
Subsequently, the Coalition successfully pushed for a minimum wage raise in 
November 2006 (Sander 2006; Spielman 2006e). Politics changed in Chicago in 
February 2007, when the elections were used by the unions and the Collaborative 
to successfully challenge a series of hostile councillors (Mihalopoulos and 
Pearson 2007). The Ordinance vote may have been vetoed, but the political 
climate was altered by the political momentum built by the Living Wage 
campaign. 
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Internally the campaign was an unprecedented success. As one community 
organiser put it: 'this is it in Chicago in terms of community-labour coalitions -
this is the one, this is the one that's got the broadest labour participation and the 
broadest community participation, and highest profile issue' (interview 35: 
community organisation, 2006). 
• 
4.0 Conclusion 
The five years of living wage campaigns between SEIU 880 and the Collaborative 
generated some remarkable political successes at the same time as developing a 
singularly-scaled, value-based coalition structure with long-term sustainability. 
These organising and policy living wage campaigns operated simultaneously, 
underscoring the importance of balancing internal union priorities for growth 
with alliance work in the hostile political context of the United States. 
SEIU 880's organising campaigns around homecare and childcare workers 
exhibited similar themes. In terms of coalition success, the combination of a 
hostile context and strong inter-organisational structure pressured the union to 
combine politics and coalition practice to achieve significant new organising 
victories, while less successfully sustaining widespread member development. 
The driving force behind the union's strategy, and most of its alliance work, was 
union staff. While this led to remarkable organising victories, it also led to a 
moderate decline in member participation across the union. Between 2000 and 
2006, during the period of rapid union growth, monthly member meetings 
remained consistent at around seventy-five to 100 participants, and member tum 
out declined from 10% to 7%, even while remaining an impressive figure overall 
(interview 56: SEIU 880, 2006, participant observation 2005). Unlike the 
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Australian or Canadian case studies, this alliance-based strategy was not 
supported by expanding rank and file steward structures, or locally run sub-city 
steward networks that created space for member decision making and 
development during Coalition campaigns. 
' 
• 
In terms of coalition success, the case study revealed a contradiction between 
outcomes and capacity building. While SEIU SSO's centralised political 
organising effectively delivered significant increases in union membership and 
political power, as one SEIU interview noted in commenting on the Governor's 
electoral campaign, this process potentially 'slashes and burns' active rank and 
file volunteers (interview 24: SEIU, 2005). Moreover, the strategy limits member 
ownership and participation about how the campaign is run because 
coordination is singularly-scaled. This mitigated the opportunity of turning rank 
and file leaders into coalition strategists. For instance, in the Governor's election 
and childcare. campaigns, rank and file leaders tended to describe their 
development personally rather than collectively, producing 'confidence' rather 
than the capacity to organise autonomously with other leaders. 
The Collaborative's living wage policy campaigns evolved out of close inter-
organisational relationships. These relationships were distinctly structured 
beyond specific issues, harnessing informal relationships and an employed 
coordinator to create an interdependent sustainable structure. The Collaborative 
joined the UFCW's site fight campaign as part of its strategy to expand its 
relationships with unions. As participants openly acknowledged, the campaign 
had weaknesses. It had significant limitations in its coalition planning and 
messages. It was also weakened by a lack of decentralised capacity in the wards, 
which made political influence difficult to build. 
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However, many of these weaknesses were overcome in the Living Wage 
Ordinance campaign, where the strong inter-organisational relationships of the 
Collaborative became central to the newly formed Living Wage Coalition. The 
living wage message supported public and member commitment, particularly 
when explicitly linked to the interests of low-wage workers. • While 
organisational commitment was based on values more than interest, the hostility 
of opposition and the connection of the issue to low-wage workers were 
sufficient to expand organisational commitment in the lead-up to the vote. 
Yet while the Collaborative and the Living Wage Coalition effectively acted at 
local and city-scales, organisationally, the coalitions were single, not multi-
scaled. Member participation in the coalitions was based on mobilisation rather 
than decision making. Rank and file participation was separate from the 
strategising that happened amongst staff. Key organisers acknowledged the 
'irony' of the Collaborative's structure was that it was run by staff, not rank and 
file leaders (interview 18, community organisation, 2005). This gap between rank 
and file mobilisation and decision-making structures often created a 'disconnect' 
between rank and file media spokespeople and the strategy. According to one 
organiser this could have been overcome: 'if the members had been more full 
participants they could have been more ready to handle the media' (interview 49, 
union, 2006). The decentralised strategies of the coalitions tended to be based on 
mobilisation, where ·door-knocking or phone-banking pushed people to take 
action rather than join locally-scaled organisations. Those activities also often 
relied on staff and individual organisations, which made sustainability difficult 
and could have led to organisational competition. Moreover, the relative success 
of the South Side coalition 'team' demonstrated that local coalitions might have 
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produced a more sustainable multi-scaled coalition structure. This broker 
organisation was able to sustain local pressure against an alderman that other 
Living Wage Coalition partners thought would falter and support Daley. 
Without coalition-wide broker organisations, an organising strategy that sought 
to recruit new members would have been difficult - as one community organiser 
• 
noted, 'some people were mad that ACORN were raising money off this'; group 
competitiveness would have made a local recruitment strategy that benefited 
only one organisation untenable (interview 49: community organisation, 2006). 
While the Chicago coalition achieved success, like all the coalitions studied the 
types of success it achieved was uneven. It was primarily driven by external 
outcomes, such as collective bargaining victories, policy changes or political 
climate change over internal member development and decision making. The 
structure of the coalition also delivered sustainable relationships. In a sense, the 
structure and strategy of the coalition were well suited to, and dialectically 
informed by, the hostile political climate. The coalition delivered its 
participating organisations much-needed political outcomes while securing a 
permanent structure for powerful inter-organisational relationships. By 
harnessing aggressive political and electoral activity, the coalitions 
institutionalised gains like collective bargaining rights or living wage policies in 
the context of reshaping the political climate. However, those successes did have 
the weakness of providing limited member development. This, in part, limited 
the degree to which long-term membership capacity developed in these 
organisations over time. Additionally, the absence of local coalition organisation 
left the Collaborative open to being labelled as outsiders on the hostile West Side 
during the Wal-Mart campaign, and made it difficult to sustain multi-scaled 
political influence across the wards. 
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Overall, while the coalition elements varied across the campaigns, the consistent 
features of strong centralised inter-organisational relationships and a strong 
living wage common concern can be described as an example of mobilising 
coalition unionism. The Collaborative was a hub for interdependent inter-
• 
organisational relationships, where a coordinator, strong informal relationships 
and regular meetings balanced coalition coordination with the autonomous 
needs of organisational participants. This open space for strategic negotiation 
led to innovations in common concern, in particular with the adaptation of the 
Living Wage Ordinance. Yet, without a multi-scaled structure, the inter-
organisational relationships remained staff-led, with member volunteers 
mobilised in support of these centrally-scaled strategies. Local coalition broker 
organisations were not formed as in Australia and Canada. 
In terms of union collaborative power, the Collaborative, more than the other 
case studies, provided the most powerful example of relational collaborative 
power. Its strong relationships balanced coalition unity and organisational 
autonomy by requiring all coalition participants to have the capacity to tum out 
members. The Collaborative also disconnected coalition participation from 
specific shared issues or interests, basing participation on values, thus facilitating 
longer-term relationships. Additionally the public social frame of living wages 
enhanced the unions' political agendas, regulating standards for public and 
private sector workers by emphasising the unions' 'sword of justice' (Flanders 
1970; Gertner 2006). Internally, the living wage message crossed class, religious 
and racial boundaries, supporting a broadening of member class consciousness. 
However, the case study revealed the difficulties of building place-based power 
in small workplaces without establishing locally-based decision making and 
330 
horizontal communication structures (for instance permanent, rather than 
temporary neighbourhood-based broker organisations). The value of locally-
based steward structures is acknowledged and debated inside SEIU Local 880, 
with the union having experimented before with local union offices on the South 
Side of Chicago and regional delegate networks in its 2006 homecare organising 
drives in Indiana (interview 13: SEIU 880, 2006). • 
Finally, this case study demonstrated that public and private sector unions can 
be drawn to coalition strategies. While SEIU 880, like the NSWTF and CUPE, 
also had a progressive union identity and public sector status that supported 
alliance work, the UFCW, with its very limited coalition experience, was drawn 
into coalition work through a crisis, and the opportunity of building on a 
previous ad hoc relationship with ACORN. The study highlighted that while 
coalition practice may be most widespread in the public sector, it is not 
exclusively a strategy for public sector unions. 
The mobilising coalition unionism in this study has similarities to coalitions 
described in secondary literature, exhibiting similar features to the activities of 
union-to-union coalitions that exist in central labour councils (Ness and Eimer 
2001; Ellem and Shields 2004; Reynolds and Ness 2004). The purpose of inter-
organisational relationships in a peak council is based on a broad strategic 
commitment to unionism, not a specific issue, and its internal decision-making 
processes allow it to renegotiate priorities while sustaining relationships. Peak 
councils, like the Collaborative, tends to have strong centres yet a more limited 
capacity to develop the rank and file, as their only contact with the rank and file 
is through individual union affiliates rather than through localised cross-union 
coalition structures. While some successful labour councils in the United States 
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have, through trust, built databases of union members, this is rare, and when it 
occurs it tend to be for the centralised mobilisation of union members. The 
singular, staff-based. form of peak councils, like the Collaborative, is 
characterised by a lack of multi-scalar structural and strategic capacity. 
-· 
• The Collaborative and SEIU 880's coalition strategies responded to the harsh 
political climate of the United States with a singularly-scaled set of strong inter-
organisational relationships orientated towards achieving political outcomes and 
political climate change. The successes of their coalition work were not only the 
remarkable collective bargaining victories and the push for regulating private 
sector work conditions through a Living Wage Ordinance, but also the 
development of a coalition structure that could be sustained beyond specific 
issues. Yet, without also building locally-scaled broker organisations or union 
steward structures that provided a space for decentralised member decision 
making, these successes had a more limited impact on the development of union 
and community organisation members' capacity to campaign. 
The next chapter considers the three case studies together, and tries to draw out 
the key dynamics of coalition unionism, union collaborative power and likely 
coalition unionism. 
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Chapter Eight 
Comparing Coalition Unionism 
Through three internationally comparative case studies this thesis has tested 
three frameworks that explore how coalitions contribute to union renewal. This 
• 
chapter brings together the empirical findings under the conceptual themes 
developed in Chapters Two and Three. The aim is to test the usefulness of the 
frameworks, and to explore how the case studies expand, confirm or challenge 
these findings. 
The chapter is structured into two broad sections, firstly dealing with the theory 
on successful coalitions discussed in Chapter Two, and then dealing with the 
union-centred theory developed in Chapter Three. 
1.0 Successful Coalitions 
Chapter Two identified three elements of coalitions. It argued that inter-
organisational relationships, common concern and scale had internal measures 
that shaped coalition variation and success. Using those elements, the chapter 
identified three models of coalitions, suggesting that different combinations of 
these elements described three ideal types of coalition unionism- agenda-driven 
coalition unionism, relationship-driven coalition unionism and mobilising 
coalition unionism. The three case studies tested these frameworks. 
The first major argument of this thesis was that coalitions as a union strategy 
vary over time - a dynamic product of shifting elements and measures. The 
study argued that three elements are present in all coalitions and their respective 
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measures help explain when coalitions are successful. Coalition success was 
defined as winning outcomes, changing the political climate, sustaining 
relationships and building the capacity of participating organisations. 
1.1 Inter-organisational relationships 
• 
Chapter Two suggested that a coalition's inter-organisational relationships are 
defined by four measures: 
• Organisational capacity and commitment 
• Structure of the coalition 
• Forms of decision making 
• Organisational culture and bridge builders. 
Organisational Capacity and Commitment 
The capacity of the participating unions and community organisations shaped 
the available resources of the coalitions, affecting how they could win outcomes 
and change the political climate. 
Features of organisational capacity included the size of an organisation's 
membership, its ability to mobilise that membership, organisational leadership 
and relationships with government or employers. For instance, changes in 
leadership affected the P&C's engagement with the PEC. The leadership skills of 
ACORN were a driving force behind the living wage strategy and its field 
campaign. For the CFL, it was capacity in the form of powerful aldermanic 
relationships that increased the political leverage of the Living Wage Coalition at 
the City Council. 
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In the different countries, the capacity of community organisations varied 
significantly. In the US, community organisations drove the coalition's strategy 
and they were capable of significant turn out commitments, whereas in 
Australia, unions were primarily responsible for turn-out and the community 
organisations' role was as media spokespeople and activating their relationships 
..... 
with government and the Department of Education. In Canada, despite the 
seniors who undertook regular turn out, the participating community 
organisations had a limited turn-out capacity. 
Differences in organisational capacity across the countries shaped the relative 
dominance of unions or community groups in the coalitions. However, the 
coalitions simultaneously adapted their internal organising strategies to build 
mobilising power from alternative forces, where a mobilising capacity did not 
previously exist. The broker organisations in Australia and Canada, which relied 
on union activists or community activists respectively, responded to a lack of. 
centralised community organising power. 
Community organisation commitment was affected by interest links to the 
respective coalitions, but also shaped by the identity and values of the 
participating organisations. Service users were common across the coalitions. 
Parents were a key public education ally, and seniors were important health care 
and homecare allies. However, organisations with broader identity connections 
also joined the coalitions. The Council of Canadians joined the OHC because of 
their value-based opposition to privatisation. Similarly, ACORN's connection to 
the Collaborative's Living Wage campaign was based on its identity as a low-
income organisation. Thus while interest was a key motivator for community 
335 
organisation commitment, an organisation's values and identity were also 
important motivators for participation. 
Union commitment contributed to coalition capacity in each of the case studies. 
Unions drove the Australian coalition, and financially supported the Canadian 
• coalition. Union participation qualitatively shaped and created the resource base 
for their powerful coalition practice. In the US, union participation was not 
necessary in order for the coalition to operate, but it was important because of 
the political influence it provided. It was the participation of SEIU 880 that 
helped attract close relationships with other unions, such as SEIU 73, the CFL 
and the SEIU State Council. It was the unions' political relationships and 
electoral capacity that were necessary to win the living wage vote. Union 
participation was a conscious strategy amongst the Collaborative; unions were 
recognised as having proportionally larger financial resources than community 
organisations, and some, such as SEIU 880, had the capacity to mobilise a large 
membership base. 
Additionally, across the case studies, the number of unions in the coalition 
shaped but did not determine the success of the coalition. As Nissen pointed 
out, union commitment was critically important for coalition power, as in each 
case the unions were the key financial supporters (Nissen 2000). Yet the number 
of unions engaged in the coalition did not directly shape coalition success. The 
Australian coalition was arguably more successful at achieving outcomes with 
only one union, compared to the Canadian coalition with seven unions. Rather, 
it was the willingness to share financial resources and commit to the coalition as 
a strategic priority that shaped coalition success. Thus, in the P3 campaign in 
Canada and in the Vinson Inquiry in Australia, union commitment directly 
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correlated with political outcomes and internal capacity-building because of a 
mutual self-interest between the coalition and the union. 
1.1.1 Structure ofthe Coalition 
Coalition structure includes analysing how a coalition is formed, its membership, 
external relationships and the presence of a separate coalition of~ce. A 
coalition's structure may help it to win outcomes, particularly when a coalition's 
external relationships can help it harness the resources of powerful allies. Staff 
and offices may help a coalition successfully sustain relationships between 
unions and community organisations. As Chapter Two identified, narrow 
membership and a separate coalition office can enhance the capacity of a 
coalition to build coalition unity and balance autonomous organisational interest. 
When a coalition builds external relationships with other organisations, it can 
overcome the limitations of organisational narrowness by ensuring that the 
coalition also identifies and targets powerful allies. 
Chapter Two questioned the importance of whether a coalition is formed by a 
union or community organisation. This was a key variable across the case 
studies, with the union-initiated Sydney coalition, the community-initiated 
Chicago coalition and the union-initiated but strongly independent Toronto 
coalition. In both Sydney and Toronto, union dominance in union-initiated 
coalitions occurred, as would be predicted from by literature. However, in 
Chicago there was a strong mutuality amongst the union and community 
partners despite it being community-initiated. Categorising coalitions only by 
reference to how they were formed is too simplistic a portrayal of the complex 
dynamics of organisational participation in the coalitions, as it suggests that the 
coalitions are strictly informed by certain parties when in fact the practices of 
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these coalitions over time reveal significant variation. As suggested in Chapter 
Two, mutuality of interest and the role of self-interest more accurately explain 
CUPE's 'dominance' of the P3 campaign than the suggestion that because the 
. . 
OFL formed the coalition it must ipso facto have inherently more influence. 
Indeed, organisational dominance was mitigated by whether the coalition was 
• 
able to balance the competing need for coalition unity with the simultaneous 
pressures for organisational autonomy. 
Coalition unity and organisational autonomy were balanced by the coalitions 
restricting organisational membership. In Sydney and Toronto, coalition 
membership was limited to organisations with a direct interest in either public 
education or health care. In Chicago, the Collaborative invitation to participants 
to join was not based on interest but their tum-out capacity and their willingness 
to contribute to collective financial resources. Selecting organisational partners 
helped the coalition collectively negotiate campaign priorities and commitments, 
assisting it to negotiate a unity of purpose across diverse organisations. 
For the Toronto and Chicago coalitions, building external relationships beyond 
the coalition supported coalition success. The OHC's influence over the 
Romanow Royal Commission was enhanced after the CAW organised the auto 
companies to support the Medicare campaign. Similarly, local broker 
organisations regularly reached out to locally-based consumer organisations and 
unions, enhancing the level of popular and organisational support. The broadest 
external relationships were built by the Grassroots Collaborative, which 
established a temporary living wage coalition to solidify its relationships with 
unions and targeted community organisations, bringing in powerful labour 
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unions and religious organisations. In contrast, the Sydney coalition did not 
focus on relationships with unions or community organisations beyond the PEC. 
The Sydney and Chicago coalitions both achieved outcomes while operating 
with different types of external relationships. The structural differences were 
• 
driven partly by their different political contexts. In Sydney, a favourable 
political context created by relatively strong relationships with the DET and the 
ALP Government, combined with the opportunity of an election, created space 
for coalition policy influence that did not require the PEC to reach out to external 
allies in order to achieve policy outcomes. In contrast, the Chicago coalition 
needed to build external relationships in order to build majority support for the 
living wage. But beyond outcomes, the Chicago coalition's cultivation of 
external relationships also enabled its organisational partners to build a broader 
network of sustainable relationships among community organisations and 
unions for the long term, supporting their organisational capacity as well as their 
external success. 
Across the studies, the coalitions that hired staff and established coalition offices 
were more able to balance the competing demands of coalition unity and 
organisational autonomy, and thus more successfully sustained organisational 
relationships. Separate coalition structures helped the Toronto and Chicago 
coalitions by creating a disinterested facilitator to manage the coalition 
relationships. Coalition staff reproduced the coalitions, calling meetings and 
managing business, allowing participating organisations to simultaneously focus 
on their own needs and coalition activities. Between these two coalitions, the 
balance of unity and autonomy was different. In Chicago there was greater 
reliance on organisations because the coalition did not have a separate mobilising 
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power of its own. Coalition unity was therefore strongly dependent on 
organisational autonomy at all times. In Toronto, there was a greater reliance on 
organisational autonomy, because the coalition had independent resources with 
its broker organisations. While campaigns were developed in consultation, the 
OHC had sufficient resources to run a campaign without all the organisations 
• 
committing to it. The effect of structural dependence or independence affected 
the degree of organisational commitment, with the Toronto campaign often 
struggling harder to maintain organisational interest than the Chicago coalition, 
which was dependent on it. 
An independent coalition structure was absent in the Public Education Coalition, 
and this contributed to a high degree of informal control by the NSWTF. This 
changed over time, as the Vinson Inquiry briefly operated with a separate 
research unit. However, the lack of a separate structure meant that the NSWTF's 
disproportionate control of resources allowed it to direct most of the campaign. 
Without a separate body that could help moderate conflict and manage different 
inferests, the relationships were more unstable and transient, falling away during 
the salaries campaign. 
1.1.2 Types of Decision Making 
Each of the coalitions operated with a consensus-based form of decision making 
managed through formal meetings. Yet, their decision-making processes 
differed to the degree they shared planning, built formal and informal 
relationships and balanced organisational interests and coalition consensus in the 
decision-making processes. 
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Regular meetings combining informal and informal relationships helped build 
organisational trust. The Chicago coalition relied on an intense horizontal 
relationships among the coalition members, where organisations allocated 
significant time to regular breakfast meetings and retreats. Similarly, the practice 
of regular monthly coalition meetings sustained organisational participation in 
• 
the OHC and built strong personal relationships between individual participants. 
This was different to the public education coalition, where the meetings were 
often ad hoc and tended to be initiated by the NSWTF. 
Consensus decision making was shaped by informal union power in both 
Sydney and Toronto, where union resources impacted upon campaign decisions. 
The availability of CUPE and NSWTF resources shaped coalition strategy. In 
contrast, in Chicago the presence of unions actively committed to 'two-way' 
coalitions helped share control over decision making between the organisations. 
The Chicago- coalition created minimum standards that defined what 
organisations brought to the coalition table. The coalition's practice was to 
acknowledge and account for different levels of commitment rather than to rely 
on informal dominance by resource-rich organisations. That said, in Chicago, 
'certain voices carried more weight' whether because of experience, skills or 
commitment to the particular campaign. However, the Chicago experience was 
significantly different from Toronto's, where the enhanced commitment of CUPE 
caused some organisational backlash. The more focused 'consensus-based' form 
of decision making in the OHC made it difficult to accommodate enhanced 
organisational commitment by one organisation, leading to tension between the 
parties. 
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The lesson is that for consensus decision making to succeed, the challenge is not 
to pretend that everyone is equal, but to balance the competing needs of unity 
and organisational commitment in the decision-making process. For instance, in 
the Living Wage campaign it was the discrete organisational skills of ACORN in 
the field, labour' doing politics' and the Collaborative collectively mobilising and 
• 
'doing media' that enabled the coalition to be successful. It was an 
interdependence born of specialisation and mutual respect for difference. 
1.1.3 Organisational Culture 
Common organisational culture and the presence of bridge builders helped 
sustain organisational relationships and led to innovative coalition strategies, 
particularly in Toronto and Chicago. In Chicago, almost all the organisational 
staff representatives in the Collaborative were former SEIU 880 or ACORN 
organisers. Coalition planning and strategising was enhanced by a common 
language of organising that carne from their common organisational experiences. 
Common experience made it easy to share and debate strategies - for instance, it 
was a community organiser sympathetic to the plight of unions who adapted the 
strategy of a Living Wage Ordinance to regulate the conditions of retail workers. 
In Toronto, unionists with community organising experience built bridges that 
encouraged the unions to use new campaign tactics, firstly the Medicare canvas 
and later the plebiscite. Mehra, a community organiser with experience in 
working with unions, expanded the OHC's broker. organisations and built 
connections between those organisations and union locals. Even in Sydney, local 
connections between teachers and principals in south-west Sydney created the 
relationships that led to the union's Public Education Coalition strategy. 
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Individual relationships and past campaign experience created a space for 
building organisational trust. In Sydney, a strong history of relationships 
supported coalition building. The Three Federations. bred strong parent-teacher 
relations, and principals were members of the NSWTF. In Toronto, the long 
history of the OHC allowed organisational participants to build trust over time. 
In Chicago, the experience of the 1995-1998 Living Wage campaign created a 
common experience for building the Grassroots Collaborative. 
Moreover, a commitment to balancing cultural differences was important for 
coalitions that had a diverse membership. Diverse coalitions had the potential to 
share different kinds of power. Chicago's Living Wage Coalition was the most 
diverse coalition. It bridged across labour, religious and community 
organisations. This alignment of different organisations was necessary for 
political power, combining the political relationships of the CFL, the work of 
religious bridge. builders, the field capacity of ACORN and coordinated 
mobilisations of the Coalition. This diverse group of organisations successfully 
enabled the Coalition to pass the Ordinance. It also shifted the political climate 
in the city by demonstrating that the Coalition had the capacity to impact voters 
in the wards and make living wages in Chicago a national issue. 
Beyond their common histories, it was the combination of organisations with 
different interests that also allowed the coalitions to be a site for learning and 
organisational change. Repeatedly, in Chicago, participation in the Collaborative 
gave organisations the opportunity to campaign outside their direct interests; for 
example, Metro Seniors and SEIU 73's participation in the Living Wage 
campaign. These opportunities became sites for organisational learning, as 
organisations expanded the range of issues they campaigned on and engaged in 
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member education. Similarly, there was significant organisational learning in 
Toronto. Learning occurred firstly around issues; for instance when seniors and 
unions debated home and long-term care policies. Secondly, learning occurred 
around campaign tactics as the Coalition challenged unions to move to support 
canvassing and plebiscites. A feedback loop of organisational learning occurred 
• 
when CUPE taught the Coalition about the power of provincial tours as a source 
of media attention and mobilisation. Yet in Australia, organisational difference 
did not sufficiently translate into organisational learning. Instead, when conflict 
arose, the inter-organisational relationships did not have sufficient levels of trust 
to sustain learning, nor did they 'agree to disagree', but rather they pulled apart. 
This occurred because the issue of salaries was perceived to only be in the 
interests of the NSWTF, and the NSWTF did not seek to engage the P&C in the 
salaries campaign, preferring to run it as an industrial campaign. 
1.1.4 Conclusion 
A coalition's inter-organisational relationships create a basis for rich dialectical 
exchange. When these relationships harness the interdependence of both 
coalition unity and organisational autonomy they can support coalition outcomes 
and assist organisations to sustain their relationships. The success of the inter-
organisational relationships varied between the coalitions. Chicago's 
relationships were the most sustainable. This was partly produced by Chicago's 
context, with its strong community organisations, and partly a product of active 
reflection on previous coalition experience. 
Across the coalitions, key measures of inter-organisational relationships 
delivered coalition success. Measures of success included a narrow 
organisational membership, the presence of coalition staff, a familiarity with 
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organisational culture, and decision-making processes that respected 
organisational diversity while sharing participation across all the parties. 
Conversely, when inter-organisational relationships were weak, as in Sydney, 
there was a tendency towards union dominance of the coalition. The 
relationships became more difficult to sustain as there was not an independent 
arbiter able to broker organisational difference. Consequently, in •Sydney, 
compared to Chicago and Toronto, the degree of shared planning across the 
coalition changed significantly, varying between a highly collective· independent 
inquiry and a highly autonomous salaries campaign. In contrast, the coalition 
staff in Chicago and Toronto balanced coalition unity, where organisations 
pursued sectional concerns separate from the coalition 
1.2 Common concern 
Chapter Two established that common concern can define coalitions and operate 
as a multi-levelled variable that affects coalition success. Coalitions are most 
commonly defined by the issues they campaign on, like the public education or 
health coalitions. However, as the Grassroots Collaborative demonstrated, 
coalitions can also be defined by common values. 
Chapter Two established that common concern operates in three discrete ways 
within a coalition. Firstly, it measures organisational commitment; secondly, it 
shapes member commitment; thirdly, it shapes the general public's commitment 
to the coalition. The success of a coalition can be measured according to whether 
a coalition's common concern successfully engages these three different 
measures. 
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1.2.1 Organisational Commitment 
The first measure of common concern addresses the participant organisations 
and their organisational interest in a coalition's common concern. Organisations 
are more likely to commit resources to a coalition if a coalition's strategy and 
purpose directly overlaps with the organisation's own strategic interests. The 
• 
concept of mutual self-interest is a measure of organisational interest in a 
coalition: the greater the overlapping interest between organisations within a 
coalition, the more powerful the coalition's common concern and likely success. 
Additionally, organisational commitment is likely to be enhanced if a coalition's 
purpose also connects to an organisation's values. Overlapping concern between 
interests and values strengthens organisational commitment. 
The link between organisational interest and issues was strongly identified in the 
case studies. The presence or absence of organisational interest affected the 
sustainability of the coalitions and the depth of organisational engagement. The 
Public Education Coalition had the strongest form of organisational interest 
when it campaigned on the six United Demands during the 2003 State Election. 
All the organisations had a direct interest in the outcome of the campaign 
because the issues, like class sizes, were constructed as sufficiently open to 
facilitate mutual engagement. Indeed, the class sizes issue integrated interest 
and value concerns, particularly for the NSWTF, as it simultaneously offered 
union members measurable improvements to workplace conditions as well as 
improving the professional standards of the education system. In contrast, 
organisational interest was highly variable within the OHC. Save Medicare was 
an abstract, broadly-framed demand. Consequently the Medicare campaign was 
not prioritised ahead of immediate needs such as contract bargaining. The 
importance of organisational interest was also evident in the NSWTF's salaries 
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campaign. When issues are not shared by the participant organisations, 
coalitions can fall away. 
Organisational interest relies on the support for organisational leadership. When 
the leadership of the P&C changed during the PEC, so did its organisational 
• 
engagement in the coalition.~Conversely, Hurley's direct engagement in the P3 
campaign intensified CUPE's commitment. Additionally, organisational 
commitment in the Living Wage campaign was enhanced by the close 
relationships between staff that had already been built by the Grassroots 
Collaborative. 
Indeed, organisational commitment to the Grassroots Collaborative was 
sustained through relational ties and a common set of values more than by the 
presence of organisational interest. Aside from the UFCW, most of the 
participants had a distant organisational interest in the campaign. For ACORN 
and SEIU 880, there j,\'as a strong value commitment, arising out of their history 
of living wage campaigning. For other Collaborative participants, what was 
absent in self-interest-based commitment was slowly built through strong 
relational ties between the leaders of the organisations. Commitment to the 
campaign slowly built within organisations like Metro Seniors, SEIU 73 and SEIU 
Local 1 out of a conjunction of the possibility of victory and political opportunity 
that underpinned the Living Wage campaign after May 2006. This broad base of 
organisational participation enhanced the resources of the Living Wage 
Coalition, enhancing its ability to win the Ordinance. 
Reflecting on the case studies, we can reconceptualise the often deadlocked 
theoretical debates between 'interest' and 'identity/values' reviewed in Chapter 
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Two. In contrast to there being an inherent conflict between unions and 
community organisations, the case studies suggest that values and interests are 
fluid and responsible for generating organisational engagement by both unions 
and community organisations. The experience of Canada and Australia confirms 
the importance of organisational mutual interest as an element of union 
• 
engagement in coalitions, while the Living Wage campaign demonstrates that a 
reductive, instrumentalist understanding of interest alone cannot sufficiently 
explain the engagement of SEIU 880 or even more traditional unions such as 
SEIU 73, the CFL and SEIU 1. Organisational identity and values led to ACORN 
and SEIU 880' s engagement in the Living Wage campaign. 
The overlap between values and interests reinforced a change in the political 
climate in Sydney and Chicago. The independent inquiry into public education 
and the class sizes campaign, which connected to parent and teacher interests 
and value for. quality education, led to the broadest set of public education 
reforms in a generation. Similarly, it was the interconnection of the UFCW's 
direct interests in the Living Wage Ordinance, the union's desires to change how 
it did politics in Chicago and the Collaborative's value-based commitment to 
living wages that led to a national debate over living wages in Chicago. 
The simultaneous importance of interest and values reinforces the point that 
organisational commitment is negotiated in the process of sustaining 
relationships. Organisational interest is a compromise between coalition unity 
and organisational autonomy. There was no evidence that sustained coalitions 
represented a fusion of organisational interests as Clawson suggests (Clawson 
2003). Rather, organisations were motivated to participate in the coalitions 
depending on their discrete organisational interests. It was parents' concerns for 
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quality education for their children and teachers' concerns for improved 
classroom conditions that generated their mutual engagement in the class-sizes 
campaign. Similarly, it was the BHC's concern for hospital services in the local 
town and CUPE's concern that public-private-partnerships could harm the 
conditions of union members that led to their participation in the P3 campaign . 
• 
The negotiation of organisational commitment also led to conflict, which 
sometimes threatened the sustainability of the relationships. Conflict occurred 
over issues and strategies. Where the inter-organisational relationships were 
strong, and supported by coalition staff, conflict over issues led the coalition to 
'agree to disagree', shifting the coalition to different issues (Rose 2000). Thus, in 
the OHC, when unions and s~niors could not agree on a policy for homecare, 
they shifted to develop a policy over long-term care. Sometimes issues of conflict 
were ignored, for instance when the CFL and SEIU disagreed over strategies for 
influencing the· aldermen in the Living Wage Campaign. The depth of 
relationships already built enabled the Coalition to continue despite the conflict; 
however it did cause some resentment between the parties. Similarly, the PEC 
did not include salaries in its United Demands because it could not build 
consensus with the parent groups, a decision that later caused problems for the 
PEC. Where inter-organisational relationships were weak, conflict over issues 
caused the coalition to fall away, as in the salaries campaign in the PEC (Craft 
1990). 
1.2.2 Member Commitment 
The second measure of common concern relates the commitment of 
organisational members to coalition practice. For a coalition to have an effective 
common concern, the issues at the heart of the coalition also need to support 
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coalition movement building (Snow, Rocheford, Worden et a!. 1986; Tarrow 
1994). Social movement theory suggests that member commitment is enhanced 
when an issue is proximate to member experience (Gamson 1992), and develops 
when members believe collective action will achieve meaningful change on that 
issue (Fantasia 1988) and when interests are connected to a broader set of values 
• 
(Carroll 1992). The focus is on how common concern is capable of building a 
movement to influence coalition outcomes and the political climate, while the 
process of member engagement may also increase member political 
consciousness. 
Member commitment across the case studies suggests that interest and identity 
interact to produce strong member commitment. In the NSWTF for instance, 
engagement in the PEC grew out of self-interest. Widespread participation in the 
Vinson Inquiry stemmed in part from the problem in the 1999 salaries campaign. 
The NSWTF salaries rallies in 2003 and 2004 were attended by over 15 000 
teachers.. The Vinson Inquiry, however, did not only tap into the interests of 
union members. The Inquiry asked members their views on the education 
system and invited them to make constructive suggestions for improving the 
system; the Inquiry made teacher and parent experience its central concern, and 
appealed to teachers' professional identity as well as their interests. By 
privileging teacher and parent experience, the Inquiry created a medium for 
engaging a new layer of members, and as the NSWTF President described it 
'engaging the middle teacher who normally doesn't get involved in the union' 
(interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). 
The Chicago campaign operated in reverse. An identity-based commitment to 
living wages first drew the SEIU 880 and ACORN into the big box campaign. 
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However, in order to successfully build member commitment and turn out, the 
SEIU had to connect the union's identity around living wages to members' 
interests as low-wage workers in order to produce a successful mobilisation 
strategy. 
What is revealed is that member commitment is not a static concept that can be 
read off a particular issue. Rather, education and low level campaign 
engagement can create a constituency of people who can be engaged when 
campaign opportunities arise. While tapping into interest concerns is an 
important mechanism for generating member commitment, as the PEC shows, it 
is not the only mechanism for creating issue support amongst a membership. 
Indeed, it is possible to build a constituency of support for issues through 
member education programs. In Chicago, member education about Wal-Mart's 
employment practices was necessary to create a constituency of ACORN 
members that wanted to participate in the UFCW's No Wal-Mart campaign. 
Similarly, in Canada, one local coalition representative observed that the CAW 
frequently provided coalition participants. As the CAW noted, these rank and 
file participants probably had participated in their ideologically-driven paid 
education program, which has sustained high degrees of coalition interest 
amongst the CAW rank and file (interview 27: CAW, 2006). 
Additionally, campaign exposure helped to slowly generate member 
engagement. In Chicago, many of the organisations, including Metro Seniors, 
were drawn into the Living Wage campaign by slowly building a constituency of 
support amongst organisation members through low-intensity activities like the 
postcard campaign. These low-intensity programs created a proximity to the 
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campaign, building awareness, which was then able to be activated when the 
campaign increased in intensity. 
1.2.3 Public Commitment 
Finally, a coalition's common concern seeks to engage the public at large. A 
• 
coalition's public social frame supports coalition outcomes and its ability to 
shape the political climate. The concept of public commitment derives from the 
social movement literature on social frames, and was applied to coalitions in the 
case studies. 
Public commitment was strongest when the coalition presented a positive, 
consistent message. Positive messages were most successful when articulating a 
proactive agenda which laid claim to an underlying moral framework and 
captured a broad agenda-setting capacity while still fighting on a specific issue. 
The Medicare and the living wage social frames were each based on national, 
religious and historical values that helped the coalitions stake moral claims. The 
strength of the public education message lay in its use of consistent, positive 
language. Additionally, the PEC was able to link this underlying agenda for 
public education to surface demands such as class sizes or salaries (Lakoff 1996). 
This enabled the PEC to build a public education agenda through achieving 
specific victories, assisting the Coalition to build both outcomes and a political 
climate favourable to public education (Pastor 2001). 
Similarly, the Living Wage campaign's repeated use of the language of living 
wages, from 1995, helped build a political climate supportive of living wages. 
Using Snow and Benford's terminology, the living wage frame was an elaborated 
frame, able to be used by different constituencies, by SEIU 880 and the 
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Collaborative, each expressing their grievances in terms of its problem-solving 
schema (Snow and Benford 1992, p. 140). 
~.,. 
The OHC's privatisation frame demonstrated the weakness of a negative public 
social frame. The P3 campaign was defined in reaction to a government agenda, 
• 
reliant on the language of that agenda. While it was able to make a clear 
ideological claim against privatisation it did not articulate or argue for a positive 
vision (Lakoff 2005). The anti-privatisation frame was what Snow and Benford 
describe as a restricted closed frame, as it did not allow the coalition to present a 
broad solution to the problem of privatisation (Snow and Benford 1992) Thus, 
the OHC was able to be portrayed as against the building of a new hospital in 
Brampton. 
Yet public social frames are fluid, and there were several examples of coalitions 
shifting from ·negative public messages to positive ones. The NHC's 'build the 
hospital right' message emerged from the weaknesses of the Brampton hospital 
campaign. The positive 'living wage frame' came from reflections about the 
limitations of the No Wal-mart campaign. The public education campaign 
developed out of rank and file reflections on the limitation of public messages 
about salaries. These positive proactive frames developed through a process of 
active reflection by coalition participants. 
Additionally, as suggested by social movement theorists, public commitment is 
also shaped by the messenger as well as the message (McAdam 1996). While the 
OHC's P3 message was negative, it was still useful for CUPE as it enabled the 
union to have its demands articulated by the OHC a 'more legitimate' non-union 
constituency. Conversely, the No Wal-Mart campaign was limited when its key 
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spokespeople were white trade unionists. The Vinson Inquiry was lauded by the 
NSWTF because it allowed a neutral academic to speak for the union and the 
coalition. Having spokespeople separate from the union was a source of 
strength. This independent messenger generated public commitment for the 
union's issues, building media attention and a supportive political climate in the 
lead-up to the 2003 State Election. • 
1.2.4 Conclusion 
The case studies affirm that there are three separate, discrete measures for a 
coalition's common concern: organisational commitment, member commitment 
and public commitment. These three elements derive from the three audiences 
of coalitions - organisations, members and the public. To effectively articulate 
these three forms of common concern, coalitions need to be strategic. While 
establishing a direct union interest may build organisational and member 
commitment to a coalition's campaign, public interest will be less successfully 
engaged if the campaign appears to be based on the 'vested interests' of unions. 
Identifying three separate categories of common concern clarifies one of the key 
ambiguities in coalition literature. Often coalition theorists argue for coalitions 
that are framed as broad social justice frames. Yet unless these coalitions also tap 
into an organisation's and members' values and interests, they will not 
effectively gain the commitment of a union's organisational resources or engage 
union members. 
This three-part framework links these three different measures of common 
concern to success. A broad public social frame is likely to help a coalition to 
achieve outcomes and a supportive political climate. Expressing the objectives of 
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the coalition as proximate to the interests, values and experiences of organisation 
members is likely to enhance a coalition's ability to build a mass movement in 
support of outcomes and politicise union members. Finally, expressing and 
negotiating the objectives of a coalition as simultaneously engaging the 
organisational interests and values of unions or community organisations is 
• likely to increase the level of resources an organisation provides to a coalition, 
and to sustain a coalition's relationships. 
1.3 Scale 
The international comparative approach in this thesis allowed for an exploration 
of how context and scale shaped coalition success. Factors included harnessing 
and creating political opportunities, building multi-scaled coalition capacity and 
in particular building local broker organisations. 
1.3.1 Political Opportunities 
A coalition's political opportunities are shaped by national differences such as 
political openness and union-party relations, as well as by strategic decisions 
made by the coalition, such as whether it harnessed electoral, policy or legislative 
opportunities in its relationship with government. Using social movement 
theory, Chapter Two speculated that 'creating' opportunities represented a 
height of coalition success. Certainly the Vinson Inquiry and the Living Wage 
campaigns affirm that creating political opportunities helps coalitions achieve 
policy outcomes. 
The coalitions used electoral opportunities across the case studies. For both the 
Sydney class sizes campaign and the Chicago Living Wage campaign, elections 
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enhanced pressure on elected officials to achieve outcomes. In Chicago's 
homecare campaign, the SEIU's participation in the election and its relationship 
with the gubernatorial candidate was critical for securing collective bargaining 
rights. Yet elections were not always an ingredient for policy outcomes; the 
OHC's intervention into the 2003 Provincial Election did not successfully end 
• 
P3s, nor did the PEC' s Federal Election campaigns lead to policy outcomes. In 
both those cases the coalitions had insufficient capacity; the P3 campaign had 
uneven locally-scaled participation at the scale of electoral distriCts, and in 
Sydney, the state-scaled PEA did not have necessary support across other states 
to impact the nationally-scaled election. 
Policy victories occurred, or failed, in each case based on whether the coalition 
was capable of dividing the major political parties or political representatives, to 
enable the coalition to insert an alternative policy agenda. In Australia, it was the 
support of the Liberal Opposition in the lead-up to the State Election that 
enhanced pressure on the ALP Government to support the education demands. 
Similarly, in Chicago the coalition initially passed the Living Wage Ordinance 
despite hostility from the Mayor, because its campaigning capacity and targeted 
political relationships threatened the electoral prospects of individual aldermen. 
However, in Toronto the activities of the coalition around P3s did not 
successfully divide the Liberal Party, a necessary step towards building an 
alternative policy (Tarrow 1994). 
Beyond the presence or absence of political opportunities, the relative effect of 
national political context across these three countries did not appear to 
significantly affect outcomes. Each of the coalitions was able to achieve policy 
victories - stopping the privatisation of Medicare (if not hospitals), winning 
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smaller class sizes, and achieving collective bargaining rights and a Jiving wage 
(albeit briefly). These victories came despite differences between the countries, 
such as contrasting histories as welfare states, the culture of political 
representation or the type of party relationships. Even where there were 
contextual advantages, as in Australia with the ALP, the coalitions all undertook 
• 
mass mobilisations over a period of months prior to victory. 
Rather than political context shaping success, it instead created a dialectical 
context that shaped the organising strategies of the coalitions in different ways. 
In NSW where there are centralised party caucuses, the PEC focused on lobbying 
key ministers and government leaders. In Chicago, where there were not central 
caucuses, political lobbying focused on individual aldermen. To influence 
elections, all the coalitions focused on 'swing' electoral districts. In Australia, 
with compulsory voting and in the OHC's non-partisan P3 electoral campaign, 
the coalitions focused on publicising issues. In contrast, the SEIU focused on 
actively running an election campaign and not only influencing the issues but 
turning our supportive voters in the polls. 
Across the studies, the relationships among unions, coalitions and political 
parties varied. What was important for coalition success was that the coalition 
built influential relationships with governing political parties, rather than 
whether the unions had historically strong relationships with those parties. In 
Australia, the union's relationship with the coalition partners was a substitute for 
weak relationships with the ALP. The NSWTF used the strategy of building 
coalition relationships with the P&C and principal organisations as a mechanism 
for building a stronger political relationship with government. Yet, in Chicago, 
almost the opposite was true. The SEIU' s coalition strategies ran parallel to a 
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union campaign to rebuild electoral and political influence. Union political 
influence was critical for coalition victories, whether it was the SEIU at a state 
scale or the CFL at a City Council scale. In Toronto, union-party relationships 
did not significantly affect policy outcomes, because of the minority party status 
of the NDP. While the NDP created a supportive public voice, it did not have 
• 
sufficient electoral influence to impact the P3 policies of the Liberal Government. 
To build political relationships, the unions and coalitions did have common 
strategies. In Toronto and Chicago in particular, there were political bridge 
builders who helped increase political influence. In Chicago, the new political 
professionals in the State Council enhanced the SEIU' s legitimacy as a political 
actor. Similarly, the CFL' s President Gannon's personal bridge building 
relationships with aldermen was a critical point of coalition power. In Toronto, 
while the NDP was less politically powerful in terms of achieving outcomes, 
coalition members affiliated with unions and the NDP helped build collaborative 
relationships and mitigated conflict between the OHC and the NDP. 
It has been argued that coalitions can be a threat to social democratic parties, 
particularly if they threaten to usurp the 'political role' of the industrial-political 
split that historically defined union relationships with labour parties. The case 
studies suggest political bridge builders may help manage this conflict by 
translating how coalitions may be useful for social democratic party agendas, 
helping to forge constructive rather than competitive relations. 
1.3.2 Multi-scaled Coalitions 
All the coalitions studied sought to act at multiple scales in order to mirror the 
political scale of their targets. For instance, the OHC produced a multi-scaled 
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campaign to save Medicare. It built a local capacity in order to have a presence 
in local media markets and create political awareness. It also jumped to the 
national scale, by building relationships with other provincial health coalitions in 
order to influence the nationally-scaled Romanow Commission. 
However, a coalition's capacity to successful jump scales required -building 
external relationships at different scales and in different places. Thus, in 
Australia, the PEC and the NSWTF did not successfully influence the Federal 
Election as they did not have sufficient political partners in other states. 
The Chicago coalition demonstrated how coalition success can depend on being 
strategic about the choice of scale, and privileging action at a scale where the 
coalition has most power. Thus, the coalition made a strategic decision not to 
contest Wal-Mart directly or at the scale of individual stores. To increase their 
leverage, the coalition sought to regulate the behaviour of Wal-Mart and other 
big box retailers where they had the most leverage, at the City Council. The 
Collaborative's experience not only helped it to win, but by taking action so close 
to an election, it enabled the collaborative to shift the political climate of the 
Council and later elect more supportive aldermen. Similarly, the SEIU's decision 
to shape gubernatorial politics in Illinois elected a governor who supported 
collective bargaining rights for the union and an increase in the state minimum 
wage. 
Additionally, the Collaborative demonstrated that a state-scaled organisation can 
mobilise political ·influence at other scales by undertaking a ward-scaled field 
and phone-banking operation to influence voters. This campaign influenced 
alderman in the lead-up to the vote by threatening their voting constituency. 
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However, it was difficult to sustain as it involved staff being brought into local 
wards rather than local residents being organised to take action where they lived. 
Indeed, the most powerful way for a coalition take action at a local scale is to 
build local broker organisations. 
1.3.3 Local Broker Organisations • 
A major variable across the Chicago, Sydney and Toronto coalitions was the 
presence of multi-scaled coalition structures, or what this study -called local 
broker organisations. Most markedly in Toronto and to a lesser degree in 
Sydney, the coalitions operated at two scales simultaneously. In Toronto, this 
occurred through local health coalitions in regional cities around Ontario, and in 
Sydney there were public education lobbies. These local structures were critical 
for allowing the coalitions to develop local spaces for member participation and 
decision making, and to sustain multi-scaled political influence. 
In terms of participation, local coalitions created an open space for rank and file 
unionists and community volunteers to come together and develop a parallel 
campaign strategy at a local level. These local organisations were linked to the 
issues and concerns of the central group through, for instance, the 
Administrative Committee and assemblies of the OHC. Dedicated coalition 
resources were important for sustaining these local groups; the OHC's staff 
contributed to the sustainability of the Ontario coalitions whereas the public 
education lobbies declined after the Vinson Inquiry. These groups had the 
ability to plan their own strategy, suitable for their local environment. The 
broker organisations increased the number of people involved in coalition 
activities, and shifted organisation members from passive participants to local 
coalition 'strategists'. They spread ownership over the coalition to organisation 
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members, and particularly in the OHC, they built long-term volunteer 
commitment from a small core group of activists around the province. 
Locally-scaled broker organisations increased the capacity of participating 
organisations by enhancing the skills of organisation members in two ways . 
• 
Firstly, they provided opportunities for union and community organisation 
members to be exposed to coalition campaigns, offering the potential to expand 
member political consciousness. Secondly, the local broker organisations 
provided a space for rank and file members to expand their organising and 
strategising skills. Members developed as they were brought into relationships 
with different organisations, and were responsible for developing plans for social 
action. In the OHC, member development was most pronounced when local 
coalition activity required a sustained campaign plan, such as in the Medicare 
and Plebiscite campaigns. In contrast, where strategies were centrally 
developed, local participation was more difficult to sustain. 
Local broker organisations also enhanced a coalition's local political influence. 
Multi-scaled coalitions are necessary when taking action against politicians, as 
politicians are simultaneously elected by a local electoral district while making 
decisions that affect a city, state or national political agenda. Local broker 
organisations not only allow a coalition to take action at multiple scales, as with 
the Chicago field campaign, but they enable a coalition to simultaneously 
undertake locally and centrally-directed activity, intensifying political influence. 
In Sydney and Toronto, local broker organisations coordinated local forums, 
organised local residents to lobby candidates and generated media attention, 
building electoral support. 
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Similarly in Sydney and Toronto, locally-scaled coalitions allowed the central 
coalition to tap into supportive political consciousness in the surrounding area. 
The local coalitions adapted to place-specific conditions to maximise their own 
capacity. Broker organisations were particularly successful at mobilising support 
for public education in south-western Sydney, evidenced by a succession of large 
forums, because this area has pronounced socio-economic disadvantagE!. Broker 
organisations in union towns, such as Kingston, were able to build support from 
local union activists through bridge builders. Place consciousness ·also detracted 
from a coalition's power, with the conservative town of Brampton hostile to 
coalition activists. Yet local coalitions at least provided a mechanism for 
challenging this hostile context. In contrast, without locally-scaled broker 
organisations, hostile place consciousness was a major weakness in Chicago, 
where on the West Side the anti Wal-Mart coalition was accused of being 
outsiders, interlopers, without an understanding of local concerns. 
The Chicago coalition's key weakness was its lack of local broker organisations. 
This limited the impact that coalition participation had on the capacity of 
organisational members. The coalition did not tum active organisational leaders 
into campaign strategists for the sub-city area, relying on staff from city-scaled 
organisations to plan local campaign work. The Chicago coalition was 
centralised, including only staff representatives, which meant that organisational 
members were linked to the coalition only through their organisations. The 
Collaborative actively organised for members to be volunteers and spokespeople, 
but it did not provide members with a space to make campaign decisions. This 
was also the case in the SEIU's election strategy, which even when it was 
localised. It did not expose union members to decision making. 
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As a consequence, the Living Wage Coalition's political influence was singularly-
scaled making it difficult to sustain over time and mitigating its impact on the 
aldermen. The coalition did act at multiple scales, but this action was 
undertaken by centrally directed staff, not through building local ward 
organisations, with the result that ACORN organisers noted that the campaign 
• 
drained its resources. Moreover, building local broker organisations would have 
provided the Coalition with greater political influence. For instance, the local 
coalition established by the UFCW organiser sustained the support of its target 
alderman in part because it engaged with the alderman about economic 
development issues in that area. The local organisation could harness place-
based concerns for jobs as a source of political influence. Yet without a 
permanent local ward presence, after the initial vote, the Mayor was able to 
convince three aldermen to support his veto of the Ordinance. 
The Living Wage Coalition tried to compensate for a lack of broker organisations 
by encouraging participating organisations to act locally, however, while 
important, this was not sufficient. For instance, the BPNC was a neighbourhood 
organisation that took local action and Metro Seniors and ACORN stopped 
events in particular wards in the lead-up to the living wage vote. However, a 
single organisation could not substitute for the breadth of a coalition. They were 
only able to organise a single constituency, for instance Metro Seniors organised 
seniors. These local organisations did not reach out to local union stewards in 
that same area. 
1.3.4 Conclusion 
Political opportunities, multi-scaled coalition action and local broker 
organisations shaped coalition success in all the case studies. While national 
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context influenced the degree of available political opportunities, coalitions 
regularly adapted to that context and built new political relationships or 
undertook more sustained movement action to increase their influence against 
the state. Multi-scaled coalition action was a vital ingredient for political 
influence. Political influence repeatedly required the coalitions to mobilise allies 
• 
at local, city, state and national scales to exercise influence against decision 
makers and achieve outcomes. 
Locally-scaled broker organisations also enabled the coalitions to develop the 
capacity of participating organisations by developing the consciousness and 
organising skills of rank and file members. Moreover, the sustainability of local 
broker organisations also meant that they could sustain multi-scaled electoral 
and political influence and social awareness more effectively than a singularly 
scaled coalition. 
2.0 Coalition Models 
Chapter Two argued that not only do the coalition unionism elements explain 
variation within a coalition, but they also help to describe different coalition 
models. The chapter argued that particular alignments of the coalition elements 
created different types of coalition unionism. Three models were identified: 
• Agenda-driven coalition unionism had strong common concern and scale 
and a weak set of inter-organisational relationships. In the case study, the 
PEC was union-initiated and union-driven, where a union crisis caused it 
to reach out with a broad social agenda to new allies, and to deploy 
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significant union resources to achieve campaign goals and more deeply 
activate its union base. 
• Relationship-driven coalition unionism had a strong set of inter-
organisational relationships and scale, with a weak common concern. In 
• 
the case study, it was initiated and funded by unions and engaged 
community groups to respond to a broad social crisis. The coalition 
developed a quasi-independent structure that gave it the capacity to act 
with independence, and over time deepened the scale of union 
participation. 
• Mobilising coalition unionism had a strong set of inter-organisational 
relationships and common concern with weak scale. In the case study, it 
was initiated by community organisations. It built relationships of mutual 
trust across unions and community organisations that supported strategic 
planning and reflection, at a single scale. The coalition worked 
collectively on campaigns that combined the interests of some groups and 
the values of all. Its open structure enabled the union to independently 
pursue new member organising while still engaging in coalition activities. 
The conclusions to the case studies emphasised that these coalition unionism 
models also described coalitions commonly analysed in the literature. Agenda-
driven coalition unionism described the Justice for Janitors campaigns in the US. 
Relationship-driven coalition unionism outlined many of the features of the Walk 
against the War Coalition in Sydney (Tattersall 2007a; Tattersall forthcoming a). 
Finally, mobilising coalition unionism parallels union-to-union coalitions in 
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central labour councils, where relationships and reliance on union affiliates is 
strong, but singularly-scaled. 
These models do not necessarily represent a perfect match. The OHC had 
difficulties harnessing and creating political opportunities from the state, and 
• 
despite a lack of broker organisations, the Grassroots Collaborative still acted 
with multi-scaled capacity and was able to respond to political opportunities. 
Rather, as general trends, the coalition models seek to generalise coalition 
strengths and weaknesses in order to develop an analytical model that not only is 
capable of identifying different types of coalition practice, but also identifying 
the strengths and weaknesses of that practice and considering how it might be 
possible to enhance coalition success. 
In identifying the models, the case studies revealed that a recurring feature of 
long-term coalition unionism is that the coalition elements work in partial 
contradiction. In the case studies, each of the examples of coalition unionism had 
a strong presence of two elements that created difficulties and tensions for the 
realisation of the third element. 
Agenda-driven coalition unionism built a strong issue-based agenda-driven by 
the NSWTF, and pulled together coalition relationships with parents and school 
principal organisations that had an interest in that agenda. But the 
organisational dominance of the union, which drove tum-out at rallies and the 
multi-scaled campaign activity, was also its weakness as it made the inter-
organisational relationships relatively unstable and vulnerable to collapse. 
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In the public education case study, the participants attempted to overcome this 
weakness by establishing a separate coalition office during the Vinson Inquiry to 
mitigate the imbalance between the inter-organisational relationships. This was 
partly successful in that it allowed for a more effective negotiation between the 
parties. However, the NSWTF's disproportionate human and financial resources 
• 
saw imbalance return once the Inquiry disbanded. Without a dedicated decision 
by the union to build the independent capacity of its community organisation 
partners, this imbalance would continue to categorise the coalition's inter-
organisational relationships. 
The relationship-driven coalition unionism of the OHC built a loose set of 
organisational relationships through a coalition that possessed independent 
capacity brought together by a common health care threat. This issue was in the 
interests of all the organisations but not the number one issue for any of them. 
The coalition built organisational commitment through the participation of 
organisational representatives and volunteers who acted at a local scale. The 
coalition's strength was that it brought different organisations together in 
common cause, activating unions on issues they may have not necessarily acted 
on if they were alone. However because the coalition's issues were not the 
number one interest of any group, it was difficult to build organisational 
commitment. Yet while this was a weakness, it also created a sense of 
equilibrium that sustained the coalition, as it produced a relative equality across 
the partners and their diversity. 
In the OHC case study, the relationship-driven coalition unionism did have an 
opportunity to overcome its indirect common concern when it shifted to the P3 
campaign, an issue that CUPE prioritised more strongly than Medicare. While it 
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drew CUPE more directly into the coalition and was able to engage more union 
members and union locals in the OHC, it also emphasised the tension between 
balancing the breadth of relationships and deep organisational buy-in - as it 
caused tensions with other coalition parties. Without the union being willing to 
forgo credit for its commitment and without the coalition being able build a 
• 
stronger constituency of participants among organisational members, unequal 
engagement led to coalition tension. 
Mobilising coalition unionism brought together relationships across a group of 
organisations with a high degree of relational connection and trust that allowed 
it to negotiate strong issue-based campaigns. The intensity of the relationships 
was driven by personal relationships and past campaign experience. While this 
space was vital for building and enacting strategy, and drawing organisations 
into campaigns on the basis of value commitments and not just interest, the 
coalition excluded organisation members from the process. Furthermore the 
need to achieve victories acted against incentives to build more local 
decentralised structures that engaged members in decision making and 
strategising. 
In the Living Wage case study, the coalition did undertake multi-scaled activity. 
However, most of it was singularly-scaled, and did not establish local sustainable 
coalition structures. Similarly, in the union organising campaigns, while union 
members were engaged in contract decisions, local member-based structures 
were not maintained as part of the organising campaign. Separate to the Living 
Wage Coalition, a broker organisation was established, highlighting that local 
organisations can operate in tandem with a centrally-driven coalition. 
Coordination across scales was possible, but a challenge when the central group 
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is a tight, exclusive, group and the coalition has to make strategic decisions based 
on outcomes as well as capacity building. 
While it is conceptually possible that the most 'powerful' form of coalition 
unionism would have strong common concern, strong inter-org~isational 
relationships and strong multi-scaled capacity, the empirical evidence 
demonstrates that coalition perfection is elusive. As the case studies reveal, there 
are practical contradictions between the elements when they come together. 
Yet, the dream of a more perfect coalition is not impossible. In each of the case 
studies, the coalitions attempted to mitigate their weaknesses. However, 
overcoming these weaknesses would have required active intervention and 
reorganisation to build capacity in parallel to campaigning. For instance, to 
overcome the organisational dominance of agenda-driven coalition unionism, the 
stronger partner may need to play a role in building the capacity of the weaker 
partners. To overcome the common concern weaknesses of the relationship-
driven coalition unionism the coalition may need to help in cultivating member 
organisational engagement through education work. To overcome the scale 
weaknesses of mobilising coalition unionism, the coalition may need to actively 
establish locally-scaled organisations through training, mentorship and 
education work. It is not impossible to build a coalition that functions 
powerfully on all elements, but it takes resources and a commitment to 
prioritising capacity-building in parallel to winning outcomes. 
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3.0 Coalitions in Different Countries 
Finally, the international comparative dimensions of the three case studies raise 
questions about what is similar and different between coalitions across national 
borders. At one level, this study attempted to build an explanation for coalitions 
that translates practice across borders. The model incorporates many of the 
• 
national, political and organisational variables that influence coalition practice in 
different countries. The 'scale' element recognises that political context and 
opportunities shape coalition capacity, thus the more favourable context of a 
labour party or a welfare state is acknowledged. Similarly, the 'inter-
organisational relationships element' recognises the role of organisational 
capacity and thus differences among the United States, Canadian and Australian 
community organisations. 
Moreover, while there are contextual differences between coalitions in different 
countries, the coalitions exhibited many common themes. The elements, even 
when working in tension, did vary the coalitions in similar ways. Positive social 
frames improved the capacity for the coalition to engage supporters and shift the 
political climate. The opportunities of elections provided spaces for the 
coalitions to win policy outcomes - particularly in the Living Wage and Public 
Education campaigns, where the policy recommendations were positively 
framed. 
Consequently, while these three models of coalition unionism were built out of 
case studies from different national contexts, there was not a direct correlation 
between those strategies and national context. Certainly, not all Australian 
coalitions are agenda-driven; we can see agenda-driven coalition unionism in the 
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US Justice for Janitors coalitions. Rather, coalition unionism models categorise 
the possibilities and limitations of coalition unionism more broadly. 
That said, coalitions are clearly not immune from national context. National 
context shaped strategic decisions and opportunities in all the case studies. In 
• 
the United States, the need to combine coalition work with union organising 
made the mobilising coalition unionism model a useful strategic choice. In 
Australia, the opportunities of an ALP government and a strong public school 
system made the NSWTF's decision to engage in policy-directed agenda-driven 
coalition unionism a useful strategy. The history and popularity of Medicare in 
Canada meant that building a constituency of individuals committed to 
Medicare campaigning was possible. Context and history clearly shape coalition 
choices. 
Similarly, organisational capacity shaped coalition practice. The fact that union 
density is relatively strong in Australia (20%) and Canada (30%) made unions 
important partners for social change and coalition resources (Jackson 2006; ABS 
2007). Unions are much larger and richer than any other community 
organisations in those countries. But, even in the United States where unions 
have much smaller density (12%), unions continue to be the richest organisations 
with the largest membership base (BLS 2007). Comparatively, the United States 
history of community organising, where member-led community organisations 
have consistently struggled for services for low-income people without a strong 
welfare state, has provided a strong resource for contemporary coalitions. 
Mobilising coalition unionism was able to develop because of a strong network 
of powerful community organisations in the United States context. 
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Coalition victories and improvements to the political climate were achieved in all 
the case studies. The PEC had the most successful policy achievements, winning 
reforms on class sizes and professional development. This however, was not 
simply a function of the existence of a labour party and welfare state, but equally 
related to the strategic decision to define 'public education' as consisting of 
• 
smaller winnable reforms. The Chicago Living Wage Coalition, even in the harsh 
economic climate of the US, took on the largest retailers in the world and won, 
briefly. Yet even when this policy victory was vetoed, what remained was a 
political climate victory, as the February 2007 elections resulted in a more 
coalition-friendly council. The OHC effectively achieved a climate change 
through its Medicare campaign, yet its ambitious policy goal of blocking all 
public-private-partnerships was difficult to win. That said, its work eventually 
led to backdowns by the Ontario Government around the practice of P3s in 2007. 
In each case, coalition work led to outcome and political climate gains. 
There were, however, significant differences in the capacity building across the 
coalitions. The ability to build ongoing capacity was often a product of the 
national context. The harsher political climate in the US neces~itated strategic 
decisions where the coalition decided to prioritise achieving outcomes and 
sustaining strong relationships. In Australia, the decision to focus exclusively on 
education policy narrowed the type of coalition partners, and the relatively open 
political climate also allowed the coalition to rely on the member tum-out of the 
NSWTF to win. The size and population spread of Ontario compelled the OHC 
to build a multi-scaled structure that could develop volunteers and connect to 
local unions. The coalitions were strategic agents, capable of identifying 
strengths and weaknesses and innovating in response to structural obstacles or 
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opportunities to change their fortunes. Circumstance was a mother of 
innovation. 
The ability to generalise the coalition elements underscores how many of these 
local innovations are tools that can be adapted to different political contexts. The 
• 
idea of multi-scaled coalition structures was initiated in both Australia and 
Canada, and even in the US the coalition actively worked at two scales to build 
political influence. The idea of independent coalition staff, finances and an office 
was initiated in both Canada and the US, and the Australian coalition would 
have benefited from a mediator that could have helped balance the inter-
organisational relationships. 
Beyond the conditions of national difference, these three case studies taken from 
three global cities, establish the benefits of coalitions as strategic agents in global 
cities. In each case, whether through re-regulating public education, the 
improving the conditions of health care or retail work, coalitions between unions 
and community organisations were viable strategies for re-regulating global 
cities to respond to inequality and the concerns of residents. 
Importantly, the studies demonstrate that global cities themselves are multi-
scaled - affected not only by the global scale of capital but by variations between 
neighbourhoods and communities inside and around the cities. The capacity to 
re-regulate health care in Toronto required action at a national and provincial 
scale in order to shift the policy framework for city-based public health care. 
Coalitions could change the city by acting at a city scale when there was a set of 
city-based decision makers to influence, such as in Chicago. But even there, 
multi-scaled action- action across the city and within the wards- was necessary 
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to build political pressure to achieve change. Furthermore, the coalition's ability 
to act in certain areas of the city was influenced by whether city-scaled 
organisations had members in that area, the socio-economic status of that area 
and past experiences of those people. 
• 
The study highlighted that while global cities may have similar attributes 
conditioned by the operation of capital, the cities themselves are not 
homogenous or porous. Building a successful political movement inside a global 
city requires building coalitions across the city while also engaging 
organisational members and building local organisation inside the city. 
The research undertaken in this thesis found that coalitions are one commonly 
useful strategy for social change that can successfully shape power relations, 
political outcomes and the political climate in global cities. 
4.0 How and When Coalitions Support Union Collaborative Power 
Beyond the operation of successful coalitions, this thesis has also investigated 
how coalitions can support union renewal. This question has been explored 
through two interrelated questions: firstly, when are coalitions powerful for 
unions and secondly when are unions likely to engage in long-term coalitions? 
4.1 When are coalitions powerful for unions? 
This question has already, in part, been addressed by the discussion in section 
1.0, because built into the investigation of successful coalitions was that coalitions 
need to enhance the capacity of participating organisations. However, to focus 
specifically on when coalitions are powerful for unions, this section explicitly 
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identifies structural features of coalitions and unions that contribute to making 
coalitions powerful for unions. The section revisits the framework developed in 
Chapter Three, and investigates three forms of collaborative power that 
coalitions may provide to unions: relational power, class movement power and 
place-based power. 
• 
4.1.1 Relational Power 
Pluralist and radical industrial relations theorists' insights about the potential of 
union relationships usefully help explain when coalitions can be powerful for 
unions. Hyman's argument about the permanent dialectic of coalition unity and 
organisational autonomy, as well as pluralists' insights into the practices of 
distributive bargaining and behavioural practices, can be combined into a theory 
of relational collaborative power. 
The claim that horizontal relationships with community organisations enhance a 
union's ability to challenge employers and the state was evident in the case 
studies (Hyman 1975; Dabscheck 1993; Levesque and Murray 2002). Coalition 
relationships repeatedly coincided with policy and collective bargaining victories 
for unions. This was evident in the P&Cs ad hoc solidarity that supported the 
NSWTF's salaries negotiation; the Independent Inquiry that supported the 
NSWTF class sizes campaign; the Collaborative's door-knocking campaign that 
helped the UFCW block the South Side Wal-Mart; and the OHC's provincial 
tours that enhanced CUPE' s opposition to P3s. In each case, the union's agenda 
was 'legitimated' by coalition and community organisations providing support, 
through member mobilisation (such as in Chicago), media and lobbying (in 
Sydney) or building local education events and public awareness (in Toronto). 
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However, relational power is more complex than an instrumental exchange of 
resources. The dialectic of coalition unity and organisational autonomy 
demonstrates the transient and dynamic nature of powerful coalition 
relationships for unions. Using the coalition elements as a guide, relational 
• 
power is a question, firstly, of common interest and, secondly, inter-
organisational relations. 
Firstly, to provide relational power for unions, a coalition's agenda must 
simultaneously overlap with the strategic goals of the participating union. The 
extent of interest overlap between the coalition and the union shapes the degree 
of union relational power provided by the coalition. This changes over time. 
The OHC was less powerful for CUPE when campaigning on Medicare, 
compared to P3s, as the interest overlap between the organisations was stronger 
on P3s. Similarly, the NSWTF class sizes campaign or SEIU's homecare alliance 
with seniors were powerful for the unions because of the integration of union 
and community organisation interest. Indeed, pluralists use the term distributive 
bargaining to describe the process when shared concerns can be jointly pursued 
across a coalition. 'Consumer' /union relationships are a good example of the 
way increasing the quality of services can support improvements in working 
conditions. 
Secondly, union relational power is also shaped by a coalition's inter-
organisational relationships. The PEC was most effective at achieving policy 
changes when decision making was shared, during the State Election campaign, 
rather than when the NSWTF dominated the coalition, such as during the 2001 
Federal Election campaign. Strong inter-organisational structures can create 
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more power for unions as community organisations are more likely to share 
power when they play a role in decision making. Thus, by enfranchising equal 
numbers of union and community organisations, the OHC attempted to share 
organisational ownership and participation. These findings are supported by 
pluralists' insights about conducting negotiations, where decisions are made 
most easily when organisational leaders are present (as in Sydney and.Chicago) 
and the relationships are familiar (as was the case in all the case studies). 
The coalition that most effectively delivered union relational power was the 
mobilising coalition unionism of the Grassroots Collaborative. After all, 
mobilising coalition unionism is defined by strong inter-organisational 
relationships and common concern. In terms of inter-organisational 
relationships, the Collaborative's standards for decision making allowed the 
significant capacity that a union brings to the table to be respected by other 
organisational participants, as all organisations had a capacity that could be 
reciprocated. This created a condition within the coalition where organisations 
were, in the words of one participant, 'willing to share power' with each other 
(interview 49: community organisation, 2006). In terms of common concern, the 
Collaborative's decision to build a coalition based not on an alignment of 
interests but on strong relationships and shared values, overcame the so-called 
'interest' trap of coalitions, where the natural life span of a coalition often only 
lasts as long as a specific issue is in contention. The Collaborative sustained 
relationships building on shared values and a common belief in an organising 
strategy. 
Overall, these findings dispel reductionist analysis of when union collaboration 
is powerful. While union domination over coalition relationships can enhance 
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the resources available to unions, the most powerful forms of collaboration 
developed when the relationships were mutual and positive-sum. Positive-sum 
relationships move beyond zero-sum instrumentalism if inter-organisational 
relationships help share organisational ownership, and where common concern 
is negotiated to be in the mutual interests of the union and community 
• 
organisations. When this occurred, collaboration increased the power of all the 
participating organisations, increasing the likelihood of community 
organisations committing to joint activities and sharing resources, while 
achieving outcomes that mutually benefit the union. 
4.1.2 Class Movement Power 
Radical theorists suggest that the alignment of community organisations and 
unions can help broaden the scope of issues on which unions and union 
members are prepared to take action. Furthermore, by broadening a union 
agenda, coalitions can help build an agenda-setting power in unions. 
The degree to which coalitions deliver class movement power to unions is 
primarily a function of the type of common concern in the coalition. 
Additionally, the depth of member engagement and awareness-raising that 
arises from coalition participation relates to whether union commitment to the 
coalition is spread across the union's membership. Class movement power is 
also shaped by the scale of union and coalition activity. 
Class movement power firstly requires a coalition to be built on an issue with 
class content - an issue that goes beyond sectional concerns to the concerns of a 
wide group of people and organisations. The case studies demonstrated that to 
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engage in coalitions, unions repeatedly took action and dedicated resources to 
campaigns on issues beyond wages and conditions, such as reducing class sizes, 
opposing privatisation or fighting for living wages. 
Class movement power had a second dimension, as coalitions may provide 
• 
unions with opportunities for expanding the issue awareness and consciousness 
of union members. Class consciousness and member engagement relate to the 
second element of class movement power- scale. To effectively expiihd the class 
consciousness of union members, a coalition must not only be in the mutual 
interests or values of the union but, as Hyman explains, it must connect to the 
'localised sympathies' of union members, where the common concern of the 
coalition connects to the values and experiences of union members (Hyman 1975, 
p. 178). When a coalition's concerns connect to localised sympathies, 
engagement is likely to produce an expansion in consciousness as union 
members have a direct interest in a set of issues that are broader than the union. 
Thus the PEC, and in particular the Vinson Inquiry, readily connected to the 
experiences of union members. They successfully engaged a new layer of union 
members, the 'middle teacher', that was not usually involved in their union. 
Similarly the class sizes campaign activated union members, not on wages and 
conditions, but on broader professional concerns for class sizes. This action 
simultaneously enfranchised teachers, parents and those who value public 
education. 
A similar pattern developed in the other case studies. In Ontario, the 
privatisation campaign connected CUPE members' concerns for workplace 
conditions with local residents who sought to maintain local hospital services. 
CUPE and the OHC's campaigns around privatisation engaged union members 
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by linking the way a reduction in workplace conditions would reduce the quality 
of health care. 
A connection to localised sympathies was a vital ingredient in the SEIU 880's 
member engagement during the Big Box Living Wage campaign. When the 
• 
union first tried to organise tum-out, it talked about the importance of living 
wages in the abstract and only a few members participated. However, once the 
union told members that a living wage of $10 for retail workers could help 
homecare workers increase their wage to $10, participation increased. Class 
consciousness and member engagement increased when the concerns of the 
coalition were directly translated to the experience of union members. 
Class movement power may also be enhanced if political action is combined with 
education or the pre-existing identities of the workforce; ACORN and SEIU 880's 
. engagement in the anti-Wal-Mart campaign was supported by education 
programs run at membership meetings. 
Class movement power, by combining a broad social vision and deep member 
engagement, can help a union set an agenda. Coalitions helped unions set an 
agenda when they combined common concern and scale, and this was most 
evident in the agenda-driven coalition unionism of the PEC. It combined a 
positive public social frame around public education with specific winnable 
demands such as reduced class sizes and increased funding for professional 
development. Mass member engagement reinforced this broad public social 
frame, allowing the union to act 'with its sword of justice' and not just member 
interest, helping it not only win its outcome but set a platform for public 
education more broadly (Flanders 1970). 
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However, despite the success of the PEC's class movement power, the NSWTF 
still struggled to combine the industrial power of the workplace with the political 
power of social movements. The difficulties of counter-hegemonic activity are 
underscored by the tendency for a union to separate how it acts in coalition and 
how it acts in fighting for wages and conditions. The NSWTF's strategies 
differed significantly between the Vinson Inquiry and the salaries campaign. 
This separation of industrial and political tactics prevented the coalition from 
uniting political and economic power, breaking down the agenda it built in the 
State Election campaign when it came to the salaries campaign (Gramsci 1971; 
Holloway and Picciotto 1977; Meiksins Wood 1995). 
Overall, these findings suggest that coalitions can build a union's class 
movement power if they effectively entwine common concern and scale. This is 
possible if the coalition opens the range of issues that unions campaign on and 
broaden the political engagement and awareness of union members. This can 
also expand the ability of unions to set an agenda for their own policy issues. 
4.1.3 Place-based Power 
One of the goals of this thesis was to connect labour geographers' place-based 
analysis of industrial relations to the question of how coalitions can be powerful 
for unions. Certainly, geographers' contention that the changing spatial context 
of work may enhance the possibilities for coalitions is affirmed, as in each case 
study unions connected to coalitions in response to crisis. These crises were born 
of changes to the state and shifting employment conditions that affected union 
members' wages and conditions, including cutting government spending in 
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Australia, privatisation in Canada and cost cutting to welfare and public health 
infrastructure in the US. 
Moreover, labour geographers' analysis of the multi-scaled nature of union 
participation helps us to understand how coalitions can increase union capacity 
• 
in the context of achieving outcomes. The type of success achieved by a coalition 
is a strategic decision between the competing demands for outcomes and 
capacity. Outcomes and capacity building can work in contradiction. The ability 
of a coalition to change the capacity of a union is most likely when coalition work 
is focused on enhancing the skills of the participants in the process of taking 
action, while powerful political outcomes often require centralised decision 
making focused on mobilisation, not skill transfer. 
Consequently place-based power is the most elusive form of collaborative power. 
It specifically refers to the ability of a coalition to enhance the capacity of unions 
through the transfer of skills between organisations through coalition 
relationships at multiple scales. Yet in the long term, it is the most valuable form 
of union power produced by coalitions, as it enhances the external resources and 
internal capacity that a union can rely on in the future. 
Place-based power is most likely to develop through the combination of strong 
inter-organisational relationships and scale. Strong inter-organisational 
relationships enable a union to learn strategies from others. As Voss and 
Sherman argued, unions can change; certainly coalitions were an agent for union 
change in the case studies (Voss and Sherman 2000). For instance, given the 
<;!Vailable opportunity of an external ailiance, the OHC's union affiliates 
embraced a radical Medicare canvassing strategy and then a plebiscite strategy, 
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turning away from traditional forms of political action such as rallies. In 
Chicago, the UFCW learnt how to work in coalition and how to undertake a 
mass-based political campaign through its relationship with the Collaborative. 
However, strategic lessons are not permanently 'learned', they are negotiated, 
and may give way if more familiar repertoires of contention take over. Thus, 
• 
once the NSWTF moved into a salaries negotiation, its coalition work during the 
State Election campaign fell away and was replaced by a traditional industrial 
relations campaign. 
Yet, building organising capacity at one scale is necessary but not sufficient for 
building the capacity to challenge decision makers at multiple scales. Thus, a 
union's place-based power also derives from a coalition's scale. Most 
importantly, a coalition's scale enhances place-based power to the degree that it 
builds local broker organisations that connect to rank and file union members. 
-The goal is that when union members participate in coalitions, they enhance their 
organising skills. Beyond class consciousness, place-based power refers to the 
capacity of unions and union members to act as strategic agents. As the NSWTF 
identified, awareness of social concerns does not necessarily generate the skills or 
capacity to take action. In order for union members to shift from being passive 
participants to developing organising skills, the coalition needed to offer spaces 
for union member engagement, in particular localised broker organisations 
and/or decentralised union structures. The generation of these skills increases 
the capacity of the union in the long run, because union members can take the 
skills they learn in coalitions and deploy them in union organising campaigns. 
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Across the case studies, a coalition's ability to enhance the capacity of union 
members, stewards and locals varied. The factors that affected how coalitions 
enabled members included the degree to which: 
• The union had decentralised union structures 
• The union's decentralised structures connected with local coalition 
• 
• 
• structures 
The central union allocated resources to.coalition work 
There were union representatives and activists who had a personal 
commitment to coalition work. 
In Sydney and Toronto, the NSWTF and CUPE's local and regional union 
structures made it possible for the union to engage in local coalition 
relationships, unlike the SEIU 880 in Chicago. Because of the NSWTF's teacher 
associations and CUPE' s locals, CUPE local leaders could attend local coalition 
planning meetings and the NSWTF could initiate public education lobbies with 
parents and principals and locally organise the hearings for the Vinson Inquiry. 
However, while SEIU 880's stewards actively participated in coalition campaigns 
- such as door-knocking wards - they did so as a centrally organised group, 
corning in buses after monthly union meetings. The problem was that these 
stewards were not necessarily from that local area nor did they have the added 
responsibility for organising the door-knock themselves, or creating a plan for 
building political pressure locally. The mobilisation of stewards did not lead to 
an autonomous organising capacity amongst the SEIU stewards. 
Union member organising capacity was also more likely to develop when a 
union's decentralised structures connected with established local coalition 
structures. Thus comparing the Australian and Canadian coalitions, the 
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relationship-driven OHC provided an external magnet that opened opporhrnities 
for local union engagement. The OHC's independent resource base enabled it to 
influence CUPE. This was different in Australia, where the local coalitions were 
initiated by the union. In Canada, the presence of local coalitions opened the 
door for local union coalition engagement across the province. 
• 
As Voss and Shearman found, union leadership commitment also encouraged 
the development of local union organising capacity, through the provision of 
financial resources, mentoring and training (Voss and Sherman 2000). CUPE's 
supp~rt of the OHC and their attendance at local coalition events encouraged 
local unions to participate in the P3 provincial tours. In Chicago, education work 
around Wal-Mart helped to build a union constituency around living wages for 
retail workers in SEIU 880. Leadership commitment to the Vinson Inquiry set a 
standard that meant organisers and teachers associations prioritised participation 
in Vinson Inquiry events. 
However, in order for local coalitions to connect to local unions, unions not only 
required localised structures but local representatives or activists with a personal 
commitment to lead coalition work. In Durham and Kingston, it was union 
bridge builders who connected OPSEU and CUPE to the local coalition. In 
Niagara, a CUPE official who had previously been engaged in the Medicare 
campaign was again a bridge builder for the Plebiscite campaign three years 
later. 
As was speculated in Chapter Three, place-based power may be more useful for 
certain kinds of unions. Geographers suggested that unions operating in 
industries with a capital fix may benefit more from coalitions, as coalitions 
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represent a strategy for building support for work that cannot be moved. 
Certainly for the public sector care services studied here, such as education, 
health care, homecare and childcare, harnessing local support was useful. For 
health care, it enabled hospital workers to be supported by the community, 
particularly in the Plebiscite campaign. Additionally, the public sector nature of 
• this work meant that local support enhanced the union's political leverage, thus 
the public education lobbies helped the NSWTF build support for education 
reforms from Members of Parliament, and SEIU 880's homecare coalition made 
'politicians a little nervous'. 
Place-based power may also be useful for harnessing supportive place 
consciousness or mitigating negative place consciousness. Again, this is 
particularly useful for locally-scaled industries, because the place of work is 
relatively fixed. For the NSWTF, the socio-economically disadvantaged area of 
south-western Sydney was home to a radical group of principals and a large 
number of union activists. Conversely, the BHC was able to take action to 
mitigate conservative place consciousness alongside CUPE in opposing P3s. 
Place consciousness, however, can weaken union support; for instance Wal-Mart 
played on historical divisions between the African American community and 
unions in the west side of Chicago to weaken the anti-Wal-Mart campaign. 
The potential of place-based power is that it directly contributes to the renewal of 
union capacity. When a coalition can deliver place-based power, it is able to 
increase the organising capacity of union members and union leaders. It can 
increase the campaign capacity of unions, providing an opportunity for learning 
new strategies and enhancing the campaigning skills of members. Additionally, 
it provides a set of relationships, at multiple scales, that provide a foundation for 
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future coalition work. Place-based power represents a residual relational power, 
from which future coalitions may be able to be built. For the UFCW, the 
experience of the Living Wage campaign in 1995-1998 provided an entry point 
that enabled the union to contact ACORN when Wal-Mart entered Chicago in 
2003. 
• 
Certain types of unions benefit the most from this type of power, including 
unions with internal multi-scaled structures, like the NSWTF or CUPE, unions in 
industries with capital fixes, or unions that want to influence the political 
process. Yet this form of power is the most difficult to build, as it requires a 
dedicated effort to build capacity. In certain circumstances, coalitions may 
choose to prioritise outcomes ahead of the slower process of transferring skills, in 
which case the potential of place-based power for unions is weakened. 
4.1.4 Summary of Union Collaborative Power 
As Chapter Three established, industrial relations theory neglects methods by 
which coalitions and community organisations can enhance union power. 
However, by reframing three areas of industrial relations theory, this thesis 
produced a framework that identified three types of collaborative power that 
coalitions can provide unions. The case studies affirm that coalitions can support 
unions. They can assist unions to build social legitimacy, a relational form of 
power. They can help broaden the class consciousness of union members and 
the ability of unions to set an agenda, a class movement form of power. They can 
also build the organising capacity and external support for unions, a place-based 
form of power. 
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The resources that community organisations can provide unions must be 
understood in broad terms. Collaboration, as pluralists note, need not be a zero-
sum game. Coalitions can simultaneously build the power of community 
organisations and unions, if the participation and interests of the organisations 
are balanced between the competing demands for coalition unity and 
organisational autonomy. • 
Furthermore, coalitions can be powerful for unions because they can change 
-
unions. They can open the range of issues that unions campaign on, helping 
unions to set an agenda, build class consciousness and enhance union's 
campaigning capacity, at a leadership and membership scale. 
My analysis of how coalitions can enhance the power of unions moves beyond a 
tendency in industrial relations literature to frame community organisation 
relationships as only instrumentally useful. Community organisations are 
regularly perceived as an additional resource to be used for short-term campaign 
outcomes, and then are dispensed with. However, th~ possibilities of positive-
sum relationships, and the potential for coalitions to build the capacity of unions, 
reveals that coalitions can be a long-term strategically useful tool for union 
renewal. 
4.2 When are unions likely to practise long-tenn coalitions? 
As the previous section suggested, it may be that certain unions are more likely 
to practise long-term coalitions, given their external opportunities and internal 
choices. Chapter Three introduced six possible factors that may make coalition 
practice more likely. These can be reviewed in light of the case studies. 
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4.2.1 Opportunities for Coalition Unionism 
Across the case studies, there were similar opportunity structures that .Jed to 
unions embracing coalition strategies. The larger number of external 
opportunities, and thus the broader the 'opportunity structure' for coalition 
practice, the more likely unions were to engage in cqalitions. • 
In all the studies, political and economic context was important. This included 
an external 'crisis' as an opportunity for promoting initial coalition engagement. 
The NSWTF salaries crisis, CUPE's P3 crisis and the UFCW's Wal-Mart crisis all 
preceded long-term coalition participation. The only exception was SEIU 880. 
Yet coalition practice had always been integrated into SEIU 880's organising 
strategy to compensate for its small size and limited ability to use industrial 
tactics such as the strike. Its lack of influence in the employment relationship 
meant that it had always relied on political and coalition relationships. Secondly, 
all unions in the case studies were in spatially tied service work, from the public 
sector unions such as NSWTF and CUPE, the mixed public and private sector 
SEIU 880, and the private sectorUFCW. Additionally, as interviews with the 
unions revealed, the unions' public sector location created the need for political 
influence, for which coalitions were seen as a useful strategy. 
All the key unions had a broad union identity and pre-existing community 
organisation relationships. NSWTF, CUPE and SEIU 880 each identified 
themselves as socially progressive unions. They each had previously 
campaigned on issues beyond wages and conditions and had participated .in 
coalitions. Yet, while identity was important for those unions, it did not appear 
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to be a prerequisite for coalition practice. After all, the UFCW, a union with 
limited coalition experience, engaged in a long-term coalition once it was 
threatened by Wal-Mart. While a broad union identity was common across the 
case studies, it was not a necessary ingredient. 
Organisationally, union homogeneity and size were important. For the 11-JSWTF, 
the relative homogeneity of members as teachers was important for building 
shared common interest to the public education campaign. Similarly the size of 
the union meant that it had significant financial resources it could deploy. CUPE 
was also a large union, but it lacked homogeneity, representing a diverse mix of 
public sector workers. It mitigated this through a dedicated hospital bargaining 
unit (OCHU) that provided the union with leadership, a communications 
structure and resources especially for health care campaigning. SEIU 880 did not 
have a homogenous membership with workers in homecare and childcare. The 
union compensated by always focusing on common workplace and non-
workplace identities to build a common union identity across the workforce. 
These included framing all work campaigns as living wage campaigns, 
emphasising homecare and childcare workers' common experience as low-~age 
workers, and incorporating practices associated with the workers' religious faith 
into union practice. 
Available community relationships were a part of all the union's opportunity 
structure. The unions had ready community allies with public sector service 
users, ensuring that coalitions were possible for each of the unions. NSWTF 
relationships with parents, CUPE's relationship with the OHC and seniors, and 
SEIU 880's relationships with homecare consumers and ACORN, all preceded 
the case studies. 
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In contrast, union-to-union relationships were less important. Weak 
relationships between the NSWTF and other NSW unions or the national office 
did not affect coalition formation. While CUPE's commitment to the P3 
campaign was influenced by national union research, the state leadership was 
the driving force to union engagement. However, jurisdictional competiti{!eness 
with SEIU did lead to a depth of coalition engagement around the plebiscite. 
Even for SEIU 880, while the State Council supported coalition engagement, it 
was SEIU 880' s political organising strategy that influenced the State Council, not 
the Council shaping 880' s practice. SEIU' s union relationships enhanced SEIU 
880' s capacity to achieve coalition outcomes rather than influencing its coalition 
practice. 
The unions in the case studies had significantly different internal union 
structures, and these differences did not affect the unions' decisions to engage in 
coalitions. Thus decentralised union structures in the NSWTF and CUPE and 
their absence in SEIU 880 did not affect whether they engaged in coalitions, it 
rather shaped the depth-of coalition unionism practiced. 
4.2.2 Choices for Coalition Unionism 
Within the studies, how the union chose to engage with the coalition revealed the 
importance of common interest but demonstrated how coalition support from 
different union actors led to different levels of union support for coalition 
strategy. 
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Across all the coalitions, the issues campaigned on had a strong connection to 
union members. The coalitions often connected to workplace experiences, such 
as teachers with public education and hospital workers with health care. For 
SEIU 880, campaigns for living wages grew out of the workers' identity and 
common experience as low-wage workers. 
• 
However, across the coalitions, the decision to engage came from different union 
actors. Coalition engagement was pushed for by the leadership in SEIU 880, and 
conversely by delegates and organisers in the NSWTF. These different coalition 
proponents influenced the kinds of coalition unionism evident in the studies. 
The multi-scaled union participation in the NSWTF case study was generated in 
part by the fact that union delegates and organisers led the push for the long-
term coalition strategy. This was in contrast to the coalition engagement by 
CUPE and SEIU 880 which was primarily supported by the union leadership. In 
the NSWTF, coalition unionism first developed as a movement inside the union 
that led to a change in union strategy at the annual conference, and then was 
consolidated in 2002 when new union leaders were elected. The pressure from 
union members that was ratified by union leaders resulted in alignment of 
'power for' and 'power over' decision making, producing a deep member 
commitment to, and engagement in, coalition unionism. 
In contrast, SEIU 880 became engaged with the Grassroots Collaborative through 
ACORN. The union's commitment to long-term coalition practice came from 
union leaders and staff. Union members were engaged as participants at 
coalition events. The leadership's decision to engage in the coalition exercised 
'power over' the membership, while the coalition outcomes produced by the 
coalition created 'power for' the membership. 
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CUPE was also connected to the OHC by its leadership, but the coalition 
relationships changed and intensified over time, as the coalition's concern for 
privatisation aligned with the union's own strategic interests. Member 
engagement developed as the OHC shifted to a local scale - engaging in 
plebiscites in local towns. This local scale enabled CUPE' s union locals to 
intensify their commitment beyond individual events, playing a role in planning 
the local plebiscite campaign. Thus, while coalition engagement was initially a 
decision made by the leadership exercising 'power over' the membership, 
locally-scaled union engagement enabled members to commit to the coalition to 
create 'power for' themselves. 
Across the unions, the sources of pressure for coalition unionism were different. 
In the NSWTF, pressure came from inside the union. For CUPE and SEIU 880, 
the pressure came from the relationship between the union and the coalition. For 
SEIU 880, it was its relationship with ACORN that introduced it to the 
Collaborative. For CUPE, while the union leadership led the union to work with 
the OHC, it was when the coalition shifted its strategy to a local scale that 
CUPE's engagement deepened. This variation suggests that the pressure to 
engage in coalition unionism can derive from inside a union as well as from the 
dialectic relationships between unions and coalitions. Moreover, it suggests that 
the way in which unions shift to engage in coalitions can shape the degree to 
which members commit to and engage in coalition campaigns. 
The variation across the case studies also suggests that while leadership support 
is a necessary ingredient for shifting to coalition unionism, it does not necessarily 
create deep member engagement in coalition campaigns. For deep member 
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engagement to occur, it was necessary for leadership support to connect to 
pressure from the membership, or pressure from an independently resourced, 
multi-scaled coalition. It was the combination of leadership support and 
member activity that led to deep union engagement, where 'power over' the 
union could align with 'power for' members demands. 
• 
4.2.3 When is Coalition Unionism Likely to Develop? 
The similar and different union circumstances in the case studies suggest some 
common themes and potential limitations about when coalition unionism is 
likely to develop. A wide opportunity structure was consistently important for 
coalition unionism practice. External crisis in the ability for unions to protect 
wages and conditions preceded the NSWTF, CUPE and UFCW coalitions, and 
coalitions were intimately connected to SEIU 880's strategy for collective 
bargaining rights. Similarly, a relatively homogenous union identity, where the 
unions were familiar with coalition practice and where community organisations 
existed as available coalition partners, helped coalition practice develop. 
The main differences were in the contrasting processes that provoked coalitions 
within the unions. The various patterns of leadership, community organisation 
and internal demands for union engagement in coalitions were all positively 
correlated to coalition practice - they did not determine whether coalition 
unionism developed. However, these differences in coalition formation 
significantly influenced the degree of member engagement in the union's 
coalition practice. Local member pressure or direct locally-scaled exposure to 
coalitions was an essential feature of deep member coalition engagement. 
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5.0 Conclusion 
The case studies support the utility of the descriptive typologies and the 
measures of success set out in Chapters Two and Three. 
The coalition elements usefully categorised variation across the case studies. 
Despite differences in national context, the concepts of inter-organisational 
• 
relationships, common concern and scale identified shifts in coalition capacity 
that varied coalition success. Moreover, combinations of these elements also 
provided three models of coalition unionism that categorised common themes in 
each of the case studies, highlighting that coalition unionism practice varies. 
The case studies also demonstrated that coalitions can provide power for unions. 
This power was not simply an instrumental consequence of community 
organisations handing over resources to unions, but was a product of managing 
the combined interests of unions and community organisations over time. The 
forms of power included: relational power, where coalitions legitimise union 
demands; class movement power, where coalitions increased the class 
consciousness of union members and the ability for unions to set a political 
agenda and place-based power, where coalitions increased the campaigning 
capacity of unions at a leadership and membership scale. 
The case studies also suggested that coalitions are likely to develop given 
particular opportunity structures and pressures. These included a wide union 
identity, union homogeneity and an external crisis that affected how a union 
could deliver wages and conditions for members. The studies also revealed 
several different routes for when unions are likely to engage in coalitions. 
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Coalitions can arise from internal pressure, leadership support and the dialectic 
agitation from external community organisations and coalitions. 
Finally, this review of the case study findings also revealed the complexity of 
coalition success. While each of the coalitions was able to achieve political 
outcomes, political climate change, sustainable relationships and increase the 
• 
capacity of the participating organisations, the degree to which these goals were 
achieved was uneven. 
Certain models of coalition unionism were more likely to deliver different types 
of success for unions. Agenda-driven coalition unionism produced class 
movement power which was most successful at political climate change and 
increasing the capacity of participating organisations. Mobilising coalition 
unionism produced relational power, which supported sustainable relationships 
and political outcomes. Relationship-driven coalition unionism was most likely 
to produce place-based power through supporting sustainable relationships and 
increasing the capacity of the participating organisations. 
The types of power and success achieved were often based in strategic decisions 
for the coalition participants, where building organisational capacity had to be 
weighed against the need for more short-term political victories. Coalition 
success is thus complex and uneven. It is not that one model of coalition 
unionism is necessarily 'more successful' than another, but rather that the 
different models of coalition unionism are better suited to producing particular 
forms of coalition success. These findings challenge much of the best practice 
literature on coalitions, which often suggests that coalition strategy is a simple 
linear progression from weak coalitions to strong coalitions. Instead, this 
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research argues that while it is theoretically possible to produce an ideal form of 
coalition, coalition success and practice is riddled with contradictions and 
tensions between the coalition unionism elements and the capacity of coalitions 
to deliver successful outcomes and improvements in capacity. 
• Therefore, through three case studies of long-term coalitions, this thesis has 
demonstrated that coalition unionism is a viable strategy for union renewal. It 
has found that given the particular type of coalition practices produced, a 
coalition's ability to produce outcomes, achieve change in the political climate, 
build sustainable relationships and increase the capacity of unions varies. 
Chapter Nine, the conclusion to the thesis, revisits the three frameworks built in 
this thesis, and summarises the findings from the case studies. It also identifies 
several implications that this research poses for scholarship on community 
unionism, global cities and industrial relations, and for union practice. 
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Chapter Nine 
Successful Coalition Unionism 
This thesis has developed a series of frameworks for understanding if, how and 
when coalitions can be powerful for union renewal. The study brought together 
• multi-disciplinary literature, not only from union renewal scholarship and 
industrial relations, but labour geography and social movement theory. The 
approach was based upon a new, threefold definition of community as 
organisation, common interest/identity and place, in order to evaluate coalition 
practice from three perspectives. Firstly, it developed coalition elements and 
models that help explain when coalitions are likely to be successful. Secondly, it 
explored when coalitions can be powerful for unions. Thirdly, it considered 
when unions are likely to engage in long-term coalition unionism. These 
frameworks were then explored through three case studies of long-term 
coalitions, in order to explore how and when coalitions helped win outcomes 
and shift the political climate, created sustainable relationships between 
organisations and increased the capacity of participating organisations. 
1.0 Overview and Summary 
As I argued in Chapter One, this investigation is timely and important given the 
identified crisis that unions faces across the industrialised world. While the raw 
levels of union density vary (Frege and Kelly 2004b), similar conditions such as 
falling union density, the growth of a non-union service industry, the global 
consolidation of capital, decentralised industrial regulation and workplaces and 
shifting relationships between unions and social democratic parties, undermine 
398 
the foundations of unionism and challenge 'a certain kind of unionism' based on 
nationally-scaled collective bargaining and service provision (Hyman 2001). 
This challenge to unionism calls for new strategies and a renewal of old ones. As 
Chapter One noted, included in the arguments about union renewal is a call for 
• 
community unionism broadly, and coalitions more specifically. However, what 
these terms mean and when these practices are powerful for unions is unclear. 
The central aim of this thesis is to provide a conceptual foundation and analytical 
frameworks for understanding when, how and why coalitions are a powerful 
strategy for union renewal. 
In light of a lack of explanatory frameworks for coalition practice in the union 
renewal literature, and the widespread practice of coalitions and their potential 
contribution to rebuilding union influence, this thesis makes theoretical and 
empirical contributions to understanding coalitions as a particular example of 
union renewal. Theoretically, its contribution was to review and reframe the 
literature on community unionism and coalition unionism, and to use industrial 
relations scholarship to understand when coalitions are a powerful form of union 
collaboration. Empirically, it moved beyond the common practice of national 
comparison to undertake an internationally comparative study of coalitions 
across three global cities in liberal market economies. 
Chapter Two set up the first theoretical contribution, establishing an original 
definition of community as a foundation upon which the ambiguous term 
community unionism could be defined, so that the more specific strategy of 
coalition unionism could be explored. An investigation of coalition unionism 
required an analysis of coalition success and how coalitions can support unions. 
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Coalition practice was explored in Chapter Two, and the relationship between 
unions and coalitions was considered in Chapter Three. 
To explore coalition practice, the definition of community was used to identify 
common themes about coalition practice in the literature. The study identified 
three key analytical elements that shaped coalition success. These elemerrts were 
common concern, inter-organisational relationships and scale. Using those terms 
to reframe the literature on coalitions, Chapter Two identified measures that 
might determine how the elements contribute to coalition success. Chapter Two 
argued that common concern has three separate measures - organisational 
commitment, member commitment and public commitment. Inter-
organisational relationships were broken down into four measures -
organisational capacity and commitment, the structure of the coalition, types of 
decision making and organisational culture. Scale had three measures - the 
availability of political opportunities, the multi-scaled capacity of a coalition and 
whether it had local broker organisations. 
Chapter Two also suggested that these different elements of coalition unionism 
may not only identify coalition success and define change in coalition practice 
over time, but may also be useful for defining different models of coalition 
unionism. In a similar manner to Hyman's categorisation of union identities 
(Hyman 2001), the chapter argued that these three elements can be used to 
produce three models, or ideal types, of coalition unionism. Firstly, was agenda-
driven coalition unionism with strong common concern and scale, but weaker 
inter-organisational relations. Secondly, was relationship-driven coalition 
unionism with strong inter-organisational relations and scale, but weak common 
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concern. Thirdly, was mobilising coalition unionism, with strong inter-
organisational relations and common concern, but weak scale. 
Chapter Three set up the second theoretical contribution. It focused on how 
coalitions may directly contribute to union renewal by reframing industrial 
relations literature on collaboration to explore, firstly, when coalitions ar~likely 
to be powerful for unions, and secondly, when unions are likely to engage in 
coalitions. Industrial relations theory is insufficiently engaged with the .question 
of when collaboration with community organisations is powerful for unions. 
Pluralist theorists often neglect analysis of community organisations because 
they fall outside the employment relationship, and radical theorists, while 
identifying the concept of the united front, often overlook the particular 
circumstances that cause an alignment of unions and community organisations 
to be powerful. This chapter examined pluralist and radical theories, and 
introduced labour geography to analyse the potential of collaboration. 
Additionally, it adapted the definition of community in order to reframe labour 
geographers' contributions on collaboration into a three-part framework of 
relational, class movement and place-based union collaborative power that 
suggests when coalitions might be powerful for unions. 
Secondly, Chapter Three also identified a series of measures for when unions are 
likely to work in long-term coalitions. It combined two approaches. Social 
movement theory's conceptualisation of opportunities and choices, as adapted 
by Turner (2007), was combined with the definition of community to identify 
three community-based opportunities and choices that intersect to make 
individual unions more likely to engage in coalition unionism. It identified 
opportunities such as 'place-based' political and economic context, 
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'organisational' features such as organisational relationship and structure, and 
'identity' features such as union identity and union education. It also noted 
choice-based features such as the different types of organisational actors, the 
connection to member interest and the activation of internal union structures. 
The model suggested, firstly, that union collaboration is more likely to develop 
• 
as the opportunity structure for coalitions broadens. Secondly, the framework 
identified that choice-based factors not only demonstrate when coalition 
unionism may happen, but also influence the degree to which union· members 
are engaged in coalition practice. 
Chapter Four set up the methodology for the thesis. The international 
comparative approach departed from much of the work on coalitions and union 
renewal, which often compared across 'different' contexts. Instead, it used two 
independent variables to assist in case selection, to try to control for contextual 
differences in international comparison. Using the varieties of capitalism 
literature, I chose three similar liberal market economies and, using the global 
c1r' 
cities literature, I chose three similar global cities. While acknowledging that 
even these similar contexts have small differences, such as community 
organising capacity, union-political party relations and political culture, the 
broadly similar contexts allowed the international comparison to focus more on 
similarities than differences. The case studies sought to compare coalition 
practice and coalition success in terms of the coalition's common concern, inter-
organisational relationships and scale. 
The choice of three global cities was also an original methodological contribution 
to the study of coalitions. Global cities, as Sassen and others argue, are key 
actors in the global economy: they have a concentration of multi-national firms, 
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they are sites of growing service provision and they are hubs of migration, travel 
and cultural events (Sassen 1994; Sassen 2001). However, global cities are also 
increasingly unequal (Fainstein 2001 ). By selecting case studies in three global 
cities, this research was also able to investigate whether coalitions may be a 
viable strategy for challenging the distribution of wealth and decision-making 
processes in global cities. The study investigated whether coalitions Cin be a 
vehicle for redressing the needs of workers and residents in global cities. 
Chapter Five explored the Sydney-based PEC, which was identified as an 
example of agenda-driven coalition unionism. This was a union-initiated 
coalition, born out of an internal crisis from a salaries campaign and a member-
led shift in strategy that worked with parents and principals. The nature of the 
coalition varied over time, due to its relatively weak inter-organisational 
relationships, shifting from a close partnership with parents in the Vinson 
Inquiry, a broader coalition with principals during the State Election, to 
practically no coalition during the salaries campaign and a return to a simple 
coalition for the 2004 federal election. The weakness of the relationships came 
from the dependence of the coalition on the union's resources, and apart from 
the Vinson Inquiry, the coalition lacked an independent structure to support and 
sustain its inter-organisational relationships. The weakness of the coalition's 
inter-organisational relationships typified the weakness of agenda-driven 
coalition unionism. Yet, despite the weakness of the relationships, the campaign 
was powerful in establishing mutual interest across these education partners. 
Similarly, the establishment of broker public education lobbies and the 
decentralised structure of the union, through teacher associations and regional 
organisers, created a strong multi-scaled capacity for the PEC' s greatest success, 
the Vinson Inquiry. 
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For the union, the PEC provided class movement collaborative power for the 
NSWTF by creating a multi-scaled proactive agenda for public education that 
was in the mutual interests of the union. The connection to parents and 
principals allowed the union to achieve political influence that it could not 
gamer on its own. The coalition agenda also engaged union members ia a new 
way, 'attracting the middle teacher' to participate in an inquiry, which engaged 
members with whom the union had previously struggled to connect with. 
Additionally, the multi-scaled structure of the union enabled it to deepen the 
coalition, as the rank and file activists who initiated the coalition unionism 
spread the public education campaign through forums, lobbying and activities at 
the local scale. 
Chapter Six explored the Toronto-based OHC, an example of relationship-driven 
coalition unionism. While initiated by the OFL, the OHC built a strong 
independent ·coalition capacity early on through its large number of 
organisational partners, coalition office and staff, and its local broker 
organisations. While the coalition brought together many different parties with a 
stake in health care, it struggled to manage that diversity. Consequently, the 
OHC had a weak common concern, struggling to develop mutual interest 
campaigns. The Medicare campaign had a distant self-interest engagement from 
..... 
the unions, and the P3 campaign had uneven buy-in, with CUPE providing a 
much greater proportion of resources than the other union or community 
organisations. Additionally, the public social frame of 'opposition to 
privatisation' struggled to articulate positive proactive demands for health care. 
Its reactive message struggled to create political opportunities, particularly in 
challenging the Liberal Party's support of P3s. However, the coalition had a 
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strong set of inter-organisational relations created through a large formal 
Administrative Committee and a highly respected coordinator. The OHC's 
greatest strength was its multi-scaled capacity, with its thirty-five local broker 
organisations operating as a space for volunteer engagement, local union 
relationships, strategic planning and responsiveness to place consciousness. 
These local coalitions helped the OHC act at provincial scale and -spread 
awareness on P3s, an issue of mutual concern to CUPE and the coalition. 
Moreover, the local coalitions enabled the OHC to build a locally-scaled 
plebiscite campaign to take on P3 hospitals one at a time. 
For CUPE, the OHC acted as a change agent, developing place-based power by 
deepening member politicisation and engagement on a social issue which also 
increased union members' campaigning capacity and political awareness. The 
multi-scaled capacity of the OHC, when aligned with CUPE's mutual interests 
and strong leadership engagement, decentralised coalition involvement from a 
leadership scale to the scale of local unions and rank and file members. This was 
unevenly developed across the union, being driven by bridge builders, local 
union competition or crisis. However, it powerfully demonstrated how a union 
can be changed by a coalition. Additionally, the OHC provided CUPE with a 
multi-scaled vehicle to campaign on an issue of vested interest with a 'sword of 
justice'. The OHC's voice on the issue of P3s, even with a reactive social frame, 
created a relational power that allowed the OHC to garner public commitment 
for CUPE, made possible because of mutual interests. 
Chapter Seven explored the Chicago-based Grassroots Collaborative, an example 
of mobilising coalition unionism. This was a community-initiated coalition with 
a very strong set of inter-organisational relationships based on common values 
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and organising capacity. Common concern for living wages was often unevenly 
shared across the coalition, however it remained strong as the inter-
organisational relationships connected member tum-out to decision making. The 
chapter firstly investigated a union organising campaign for a living wage. SEIU 
880's campaign involved winning representation rights and wage increases for 
• low-wage homecare and home childcare workers using a combination of 
alliances, political action and home visits. Secondly, living wages were also 
pursued by the Grassroots Collaborative and SEIU 880 for retail workers, after an 
unsuccessful campaign to stop Wal-Mart entering Chicago. Strong inter-
organisational relationships were a common strength in these campaigns. 
Union-to-union relationships with the State Council enhanced union political 
power, which helped achieve collective bargaining outcomes, and deep 
relationships inside the Collaborative were supplemented by new union and 
community relationships in the temporary Living Wage Coalition. Additionally, 
the open inter-organisational space allowed for the negotiation of a powerful 
common concern, particularly evident in the shift from the No Wal-Mart 
campaign to the Big Box Living Wage campaign. Yet the Chicago coalition was 
weakened by its singularly-scaled coalition capacity. The Collaborative and 
SEIU 880's campaigns were staff-led. SEIU 880 members were engaged through 
state-scaled member meetings. While Collaborative members were engaged as 
public speakers, the Living Wage Coalition also did not establish locally-scaled 
structures while undertaking the living wage campaign. The Collaborative did 
campaign at multiple scales, running a local field operation; however, the local 
' activity was hard to sustain because it was resourced by centrally employed staff, 
not locally-based volunteers. 
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For SEIU 880, the most powerful element of the Collaborative's mobilising 
coalition unionism was its relational power. The inter-organisational 
relationships provided a capacity to constantly renegotiate the contradictions of 
coalition unity and organisational autonomy, particularly over interest. 
Relationships were sustained beyond crises or issue-based campaigns, and there 
was a strong understanding between the parties of each other's issue's and 
concerns. Collaborative relationships fed into SEIU 880's organising campaigns; 
for example, through the Springfield rally in 2002 and the IHC's support for 
childcare workers in 2004. Similarly, Collaborative engagement provided a space 
for member politicisation around Wal-Mart in the Big Box Living Wage 
campaign. 
Chapter Eight reorganised the findings of the three case studies under the 
theoretical frameworks established in Chapters Two and Three and examined the 
viability of my coalition unionism frameworks as a theory for understanding 
coalition unionism. In reconsidering the elements of coalitions, it demonstrated 
how these elements helped explain the patterns of success across the case studies. 
Additionally, while the models of coalition unionism did not perfectly correlate 
with existing union practice, they were useful for highlighting differences across 
the coalitions in the case studies and the secondary literature. 
Chapter Eight also explored the different ways in which coalitions can be 
powerful for unions. This contributed to filling a gap in the existing literature, 
which often assumed rather than established how coalitions can be powerful for 
unions. While all the unions, to an extent, made gains through their engagement 
with coalitions, there was a strong alignment between the coalition models and 
the types of power they provided unions. As noted above, agenda-driven 
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coalition unionism most successfully provided class movement power. The 
strong mutual interest relationships and depth of union engagement in the PEC 
created a multi-scaled political consciousness and helped set the union's agenda 
for public education. Relationship-driven coalition unionism most successfully 
provided place-based power. The OHC activated CUPE's multi-scaled structures 
• 
to expose the union's leadership, locals and members to campaign tactics such as 
tours, and campaign planning in the plebiscites. Mobilising coalition unionism 
most successfully delivered relational power, where SEIU 880 was able,. to 
simultaneously organise new members while engaging in collective coalition 
campaigns for living wages. 
As Chapter Eight concluded, the power that coalitions can provide for unions 
related to strategic and contextual pressures. Across the case studies, there was 
no evidence to say that one type of coalition unionism was more powerful than 
the other, but rather that the coalitions harnessed strategic opportunities that 
enabled them to leverage political power and enhance their capacity. Yet these 
strategic decisions for coalition success often worked in contradiction. In 
Chicago, successful outcomes and sustainable relationships were pursued ahead 
of the development of rank and file participation. In Sydney, successful 
outcomes and union member development were pursued ahead of sustainable 
relationships. In Toronto, sustainable relationships and rank and file 
participation developed while achieving more limited political outcomes in the 
P3 campaign. Coalitions choose to maximise certain types of success given the 
available opportunity structure. 
This thesis provides a conceptual map for understanding how and when 
coalition unionism is powerful for unions. This framework has clear value for 
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industrial relations by suggesting three types of collaborative power that unions 
can draw from coalitions. It contributes to union renewal theory by clarifying 
the meaning of community unionism and providing a framework for 
understanding how and when coalition unionism is effective. It is useful for 
union practitioners, as it provides an understanding of the elements of effective 
• 
coalition practice at a time when coalitions have become a mainstream strategy 
for unions. 
2.0 Implications for Theory 
Furthermore, this thesis has implications beyond coalitions. The implications are 
firstly methodological, including the potential for future quantitative research 
and an approach to international comparison for union renewal. Secondly, the 
findings have implications for the relationship between coalitions and identity. 
Thirdly, the findings have implications for the global cities literature. Fourthly, 
the findings have implications for community unionism strategies, and in 
particular the importance of scale for renewing unions. Finally, the thesis has 
implications for how industrial relations theory recognises the role of community 
organisations and how it assesses the purpose of unions. 
1.1 Methodology 
This thesis's qualitative research into coalition practice presents several criteria 
that might be useful for future quantitative research on coalitions. The coalition 
elements are capable of being reduced to quantitative dependent variables, 
which could investigate the extent to which the measures of common concern, 
inter-organisational relationships and scale shape the independent variable, 
coalition success. Similarly, the opportunities and choices factors identified in 
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Chapter Three could be investigated as dependent variables, to explore when 
any of these measures significantly correlate with, or predict coalition practice. A 
challenge for this kind of quantitative research is building a sufficient sample 
size to undertake these tests. However, research of this kind would be a useful 
and important supplement to the qualitative approach in this thesis as it would 
allow for an investigation of how the elements and frameworks identified in this 
study account for and explain likely and successful coalition practice across the 
union movement. 
My finding that coalitions are strongly capable of dialectically adapting their 
strategies to differences in national political context has implications for how we 
compare international strategies for union renewal. As noted in Chapter Four, 
there is a tendency in industrial relations to argue either that the external 
political context shapes differences in union renewal strategy, or that unions are 
strategic agents that can overcome various structural obstacles and achieve 
similar outcomes in different national contexts. While the findings give weight 
to the idea that unions and coalitions are strategic agents, the framework 
developed tried to accommodate a dialectical understanding of structure and 
agency to interpret how unions and coalitions respond to, and shape, their 
external environment. After all, across the studies there were small but 
important differences that derived from national context, including differences in 
community organisation capacity, the relative role of unions and community 
organisations in the coalition, union-party relationships and political culture. Yet 
these contextual differences were not static obstacles that produced differences in 
coalition outcomes. Instead, coalitions responded with different strategies. The 
OHC established broker organisations to respond to a lack of mobilising capacity 
from community organisations; the Collaborative prioritised mobilisation to 
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achieving outcomes more than capacity building because of a more fragmented 
political structure (with non-compulsory voting, and non-binding party 
cultures); and the PEC relied on the NSWTF to undertake member mobilisation 
because of the union's strong multi-scaled structures and mobilising capacity. 
Coalitions, as strategic actors, dialectically responded to their context and were 
successful in different national environments. Yet their kinds of success v~ried. 
These findings signal an alternative method for understanding and evaluating 
union renewal strategies. Rather than seeing context or union agency as 
primarily shaping union renewal outcomes, it may be possible to build a 
framework for analysing union renewal that accommodates the different types of 
practice and outcomes evident across countries. This would allow for an 
international comparison of union renewal practice that recognises both 
strengths and weaknesses in different national contexts, and could also assess 
how difference is a product of the pressures of national context, history, 
opportunity and union agency. A comparison of union renewal strategies could 
assess a range of practices, such as resource commitment to new organising, 
industry planning, the prevalence of coalition practice and the development and 
engagement of rank and file steward structures, against a diversity of outcomes, 
such as collective bargaining coverage, legislative protection, social policy 
outcomes and union density. Privileging the dialectical interaction between 
independent and dependent variables could allow for a more internationally 
sensitive method of international comparison of union renewal strategies. 
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1.2 Coalitions and identity 
The three unions featured in this study of coalitions were each underpinned by 
several common identities. The key unions all had a history of progressive issue-
based campaigning. They also had a majority of female members. The NSWTF 
had a professional union identity that supported its public education campaign, 
and SEIU 880 integrated religion to enhance member commitment to the uruon's 
campaigns. Additionally, CUPE and the NSWTF had a homogenous 
membership and/or homogenous union structures that facilitated the formation 
of common interest in the coalitions they practised. The case studies revealed a 
strong correlation between common identity and long-term coalition practice. 
The overlap between identity and coalition practice is worthy of further research, 
and has broader implications for union renewal strategies. Firstly, it would be 
useful to further examine, using quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
whether common identity in a union correlates with coalition practice. Secondly, 
it suggests, consistent with the work of Yates, Milkman, Needleman, Fine and 
Savage amongst others, that coalitions and other collaborative strategies are a 
necessary element in strategies for organising workers with non-traditional 
identities (Needleman 1998b; Milkman 2000; Fine 2005a; Yates 2006, pp. 111-2). 
Affirming their findings that coalitions with community organisations can 
provide a supplementary form of leverage for strategies towards organising 
marginalised workers, these findings suggest that the utility of coalitions also 
flows from the common identity base of the workers being organised. Thirdly, it 
exposes a challenge for coalition and common identity organising, which is the 
need to balance the utility of organising sectional identities with broadening 
solidarity. As Nissen's work on migrant organising, amongst others, 
highlighted, organising workers on the basis of single common identities creates 
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challenges for unions when diverse workers are united in a union, or union 
movement (Nissen 2002; Sayee, Greene and Ackers 2006). The findings from 
Hyman's dialectic of organisational autonomy and coalition unity may be useful, 
in that they suggest that just as in coalitions, integrating diverse identities 
requires the organisation and respect of difference while enabling bridge 
• 
building across diversity to forge broader solidarities. 
1.3 Global cities 
The finding that coalitions were a successful strategy for political change and 
union renewal in three global cities also has implications for the global cities 
literature. Coalitions were consistently a viable strategy for the re-regulation of 
social policy in the interests of union members and residents. The global cities 
literature identifies that global cities are facing democratic deficits, where local 
residents have reduced influence over political outcomes, and face an increasing 
gap between rich and poor. The thesis suggests that coalitions are a viable 
strategy for challenging these problems of accountability and inequality. 
However, these findings also challenge some of the assumptions in the global 
cities literature. Firstly, while success was evident in the three studies, coalition 
practice across the global cities was affected by 'small differences' in national 
political context. Global cities may share similar economic circumstances, but in 
this research, economic similarities did not overcome political historical 
differences, which impacted on coalition practice. Secondly, the coalitions' 
strategies were not restricted to the global city as a privileged domain of social 
action. Rather, the strategies sought to build policy change at the scale of the 
state, nation and city. This contradicts the claim made by some global cities 
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theorists, that the significance of political scales beyond the city have declined (cf 
Fagan 2000; Sassen 2004, p. 32; May, Wills, Datta et a!. 2006). Coalition outcomes 
relied on multi-scaled coalition activity beyond the city; for instance, the OHC 
relied on local broker organisations outside the city to supplement the challenges 
of mobilising union and community organisation members in Toronto. 
Similarly, to re-regulate global cities required political activity at scales beyond 
the city, as in Sydney where the Public Education Coalition achieved its greatest 
policy outcomes through the NSW Government. Moreover, the 'city' is multi-
scaled, which is not emphasised in the global cities literature. Levels of 
inequality and place consciousness varied within the cities and shaped coalition 
practice. This required multi-scaled coalition capacity at a sub-city level, such as 
through the establishment of broker organisations. 
This thesis challenges the illusion that globalisation takes us beyond the bounds 
of geography. The case studies demonstrate that political, coalition and union 
scales, inside and beyond the global city, are critical for political outcomes and 
building capacity. This suggests that it is vital for the global cities literature to 
recognise the many scales of power that operate inside and beyond these cities, 
as these scales all offer possibilities for challenging the inequality and lack of 
accountability evident in global cities. 
1.4 Community unionism, scale and union renewal 
The thesis also offers scholars a more concrete understanding of community 
unionism. In contrast to the mixed meanings of community unionism across the 
literature, I suggest that community unionism is a descriptive term defining 
three distinct union organising strategies. While the study focused on one 
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particular example of community unionism, it is possible that these findings 
about coalition unionism may have implications for understanding other 
community unionism strategies. 
In particular, the finding about the importance of scale has direct implications for 
union place-based organising strategies. The thesis suggested that coalitron scale 
was important in two ways for achieving outcomes and building organisational 
capacity. Firstly, coalitions were successful if they were multi-scaled and able to 
challenge decision makers at multiple scales. Secondly, coalitions were 
successful if they had local broker organisations that could be a site for rank and 
file union engagement and development. 
The implications of these findings stressed the dual importance of multi-scaled 
union capacity as essential for contesting the decisions of employers and 
government and building union capacity. As noted in Chapter Three, there is 
some ambiguity in the labour geography literature about which scale of action is 
most important for rebuilding unionism, with theorists debating the merits of the 
global, the local and multi-scaled strategies. Additionally, the literature on 
worker centres recognises that political influence beyond the local is a challenge 
for locally-scaled organisations, a potential limitation of workers' centres (Fine 
2003, p. 630; Osterman 2006). 
These findings suggest a different way to understand the challenges of scale for 
union renewal. Local union capacity is important. As the worker centre 
scholarship and many labour geographers note, the local is where workers live, 
reproduce their productive capacity and can participate in decision making 
(Wills 2001 ). Renewing local union structures is critical for increasing the 
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capacity of union members as union strategic agents for rebuilding the place-
based power unions. Indeed, a consistent obstacle for coalitions in the case 
studies was a lack of local union capacity. Renewing the local base of unions has 
the potential to improve coalition practice and union capacity. Yet local action, 
while necessary, is not sufficient for challenging the decision makers unions 
confront. Employers are increasingly global, and unions, like coalitions, ~eed to 
be capable of acting at multiple scales. It was the combination of local and multi-
scaled capacity that was essential for coalition success, and it is potentially this 
same combination of union scale that is critical for increasing the success and 
capacity of unions. 
These findings about the importance of scale for unions are timely given the 
increased attention in union literature to the role of scale and local organising. 
For instance, interest in scale has increased recently with growing literature on, 
and experimentation with, global union strategies (Herod 2001; Harrod and 
O'Brien 2002; Bronfenbrenner 2007; Tattersall 2007b ). Similarly, interest in local 
organising strategies is evident in the growing research on non-union workplace 
organising, such as worker centres or 'community unions' (Cranford and Ladd 
2003; Fine 2005a; Fine 2005b ), and in local union strategies as a way to respond to 
globalisation (Herod 2001; Levesque and Murray 2002; Ellem 2005; Rainnie and 
Ellem forthcoming). By identifying the link between coalition unionism and the 
broader strategies of community unionism, these findings about the importance 
of scale may have direct implications for these related union strategies. 
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1.5 Implications for industrial relations theory 
Finally, the thesis has implications for industrial relations theory, by introducing 
a framework for understanding the role of community organisations in industrial 
relations and the purpose of unions. While the research work focused on the 
relationship between community organisations and unions, the case studies 
highlighted that this horizontal relationship was capable of supporting cQilective 
bargaining outcomes and a broader set of policy outcomes. 
This has three implications. Firstly, the thesis proposed a framework for 
understanding under what circumstances community organisations can support 
unions. Three forms of union collaborative power were suggested - relational 
power, class movement power and place-based power. These may contribute to 
reworking industrial relations theories of union collaboration with community 
organisations specifically, and the importance of collaboration more broadly. 
Secondly, the analysis of collaborative power may have implications for 
understanding other types of union collaboration. While the frameworks were 
based on coalitions between unions and community organisations, these 
frameworks may provide an insight into how and when union-to-union 
collaboration is likely, such as global union collaboration or in central labour 
councils. Indeed, I have adapted my analysis of coalitions to exploring the 
SEIU's global partnerships unit and its alliance with the Transport and General 
Workers Union. (Tattersall 2007b). This implication is useful, as union 
collaborative strategies are currently under review, exemplified in the trend 
towards stronger international union activity to confront multi-national 
corporations or the changes to central labour councils, evidenced by the split of 
the AFL-CIO and the formation of the Change to Win Federation. 
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Thirdly, these findings challenge traditional understandings of the role of unions. 
In the case studies, union members and union leaders were able to use collective 
strategies to shape not only their employment relationships, but to shape policy 
and the political environment. The effectiveness of this practice opens up the 
question of what is the legitimate purpose for unions. In particular, it suggests 
that it may be useful for unions, in a time of crisis in density, to campaign on a 
broader scope of demands. These findings suggest that by campaigning on a 
broader range of mutually interested issues, both inside and beyond the 
employment relationship, unions can achieve victories that affect the conditions 
of their members and increase their campaigning capacity. These gains are not 
only important in and of themselves, but can also feed back into the union's 
ability to contest the employment relationship. 
In conclusion, this thesis has developed and explored three frameworks for 
understanding successful coalition unionism. It found that coalitions can 
support union renewal by enhancing a union's ability to win outcomes, shift the 
political climate, sustain union relationships with community organisations and 
increase the capacity of unions. It argued that coalition unionism is a diverse 
strategy, where long-term coalitions differ depending on the strength or 
weakness of their coalition elements. It argued that coalitions tend to operate 
with consistent themes, as the coalition elements often exist in contradiction 
where there is a strong presence of two elements and a weak presence of the 
third. These different coalition models offer different possibilities for unions, 
presenting contrasting forms of power and potential for union renewal. Unions 
are more likely to practise coalitions when presented with certain circumstances, 
including a crisis in bargaining capacity, a broad union identity, available 
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community partners and internal pressures. In these ways, coalitions can 
provide power for unions. By developing three frameworks of coalition 
unionism this thesis has developed an overall framework that explains how and 
when coalitions can be a powerful strategy for union renewal. 
• 
.... 
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Interview 29 (2005). Community organisater, July-September, Chicago (*). 
Interview 30 (2006). Union organiser, 14 September, Chicago. 
Interview 31 (2006). Union organiser, 14 September, Chicago(**). 
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Interview 35 (2006). Community organiser, 15 September, Chicago. 
Interview 36 (2006). Community organisation rank and file member, 15 
September, Chicago. 
Interview 39 (2006). Community organiser, September, Chicago (*). 
Interview 41 (2006). Community organiser, 18 September, Chicago (**) . 
Interview 43 (2006). Community organiser, 19 September, Chicago. 
Interview 44 (2006). Community organiser, 19 September, Chicago. 
Interview 46 (2006). Union organiser, 20 September, Chicago. 
• 
Interview 48 (2006). Union organiser, 20 September, Chicago (by phone)(**). 
Interview 49 (2006). Union organiser, September, Chicago (*). 
Interview 51 (2006). Union organiser, September, Chicago (*). 
Interview 52 (2006). Union organiser, September, Chicago (*). 
Interview 53 (2006). Union organiser, September, Chicago (*). 
Interview 54 (2006). Union organiser, September, Chicago (*). 
* means theinterview name is an alias. 
** means that the interview was undertaken but no direct quotations are 
included in the text of the PhD. 
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